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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis sets out to examine how local environmental movements mobilize to engage a new 
intertwined national and global context in which capitalist globalization has intensified major 
problems, in particular social and economic inequalities and ecological degradation. In their 
struggles, local movements mobilize beyond their local and/or national borders, inserting 
themselves into transnational networks. A representative of such struggles, as I argue in the 
thesis, is the Bergama movement. 
The Bergama Movement, a local environmental movement struggling against a transnational 
gold-mining company in Western Turkey, is analyzed based on an extensive field research 
reflecting the geographical scope of and the diversity of actors involved in the movement. The 
research aims to understand the interrelated dimensions of a social movement such as initial 
mobilization, mobilizing structures, framing, identity construction, and political opportunities; 
embedding it in a new political and social context in which structures and practices at varying 
levels of politics become enmeshed. Thus, the thesis shows that making clear-cut distinctions 
between the local, the national and the global, is inadequate in understanding local 
movements which challenge actors of capitalist globalization. The contribution of this thesis 
lies in using the case of the Bergama movement to unpack the interrelated dynamics involved 
in enmeshed scales of doing politics. 
In that regard, I show that national and transnational actors align themselves, as in the case of 
the state in Turkey and transnational mining corporations, in a pro-mine network, while the 
Bergama activists have formed an extensive movement network by forging links with global 
civil society actors, external political parties, supranational and international organizations 
and the media who challenge capitalist globalization. Witnessing that their national political 
context is being restructured under capitalist globalization, they extensively utilize 
transnational political opportunities and define themselves as part of a general anti-capitalist 
globalization struggle.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a plethora of mobilizations 
against capitalist globalization which have continued into the new century, spreading into new 
geographies and grievances. Groups as different as transnational activists in Seattle, Genoa, 
Prague, Washington D.C., indigenous populations in Chiapas, Indian peasants in the Narmada 
Valley, rubber tappers in Brazil, and Ogoni people in Nigeria contend capitalist globalization 
which has created major crises such as increasing inequalities, weakening democratic 
participation and degrading environment. Similarly, the Bergama peasants in Turkey have 
joined the heterogeneous coalition of local social movements, transnational networks, 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational social movement 
organizations (TSMOs), and traditional organizations such as labour unions and farmer 
associations all of which is referred to as the Global Justice Movement (GJM) as a ‘movement 
of movements’, not withstanding its diverse structure (Smith and Johnston, 2002; Sklair, 
2002; della Porta et al., 2006; della Porta, 2007; Rootes and Saunders, 2007; Smith, 2008).   
Among these demonstrations, the Seattle protest against the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1999 is a significant turning point in terms of the emergence of a ‘new’ type of 
social movement –the transnational social movement. The crucial aspect of the Seattle protest 
is that it was the first time these diverse contentions were channelled and expressed in a single 
protest. Thus, the protest in Seattle was the organized action of an increasingly coordinated 
and powerful movement against neoliberal globalization rather than an isolated, spontaneous 
event (Khagram et. al, 2002; Smith, 2002). With the Seattle protest, new forms of repertoire, 
mobilization, and targets emerged. It is also significant in the sense that it raised and solidified 
the demands from below for involvement in the restructuring of world politics (Smith, 2002).  
Subsequently, the movement networks intensified and extended at the transnational 
level, while at the same time reaching out to and establishing links with local movements. 
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Among these local movements, environmental conflicts have become prevalent as the 
ecological crisis deepened, in part due to the impact of capitalist globalization. In most 
environmental movements, the central actors are local people who are discontented with the 
degradation of their environment which they frame in terms of discontent with globalization. 
The main environmental issues that are contested in such movements are deforestation, dam 
projects, local rights to resources, pollution, toxic contamination of land and water, and 
mining. There are many examples of local environmental social movements all around the 
world such as the social movement against deforestation in Sarawak, Malaysia (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998), resistance of Amungme and Kamoro people against copper and gold mines in 
Indonesia (Abrash, 2000), the anti-dam movement in Southern Brazil (Rothman and Oliver, 
2002), the anti-mine movement in Thessaloniki, Greece 
(http://antigoldgreece.tripod.com/en/id6.htm), and anti-mine movements in Latin America 
(www.minewatch.org). The Bergama movement is also a local environmental movement 
against gold mining with cyanide leach method which has contested the mining TNCs on the 
grounds that they have attacked their livelihood and their right to a healthy life. It is 
reminiscent of environmental justice movements which perceive existing social organizations 
as the cause and the empowerment of the locals as the remedy for environmental injustice 
(Rootes, 2004). Yet it is more than a local environmental justice movement since it has 
become integrated into the transnational political sphere.  
All of these local social movements plug themselves into a campaign, social 
movement and/or advocacy network at the global level. The degree of their involvement and 
the way they link themselves vary depending on the different political opportunities they face 
and the nature of the specific movement. Nevertheless, they are important actors in the global 
politics which is being restructured. As they take part in this restructuration, the political 
environment in which they are embedded changes, offering new political opportunity sets. 
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Hence, the analysis of these local social movements is crucial for understanding the 
restructuration of world politics.   
Theoretical Framework: 
The analysis of political contexts has been the contemporary dominant trend within 
the social movement literature. As its name implies, political opportunity structures (POS) 
analysis has been examining social movements by focusing on political structures in which 
social movements emerge and are sustained. These POS are national ones. On the other hand, 
general world politics as we know it has entered a period of restructuration as a result of the 
diffusion of the globalization process. The nation-state based model of doing politics has been 
changing in certain aspects as new actors emerge demanding inclusion into world politics 
such as INGOs, TSMOs, local movements and other transnational organizations (Held et al., 
1999; Beck, 1999; Sklair, 2002; Sassen, 2003, Smith, 2004). The conflicts as well as their 
solutions are becoming more transnational. These new actors’ political targets revolve around 
similar sets of issues such as the environment, human rights, women’s rights and labour 
which go beyond borders. Moreover, the relations between different levels of politics -local, 
national, and transnational - have deepened, blurring distinctions among them. As Della Porta 
and Kriesi (2009: 4) claim, “…globalization implies an intensification in the cross-national 
spread of political conflicts, the transnational political relations, the role of international 
relations and supranational political institutions, and the relevance of international issues in 
national politics”. These developments have affected social movements as well. The 
implications of this change are twofold. First, there are newly emerging transnational social 
movements and thickening transnational advocacy networks. Second, the way in which both 
local and transnational social movements are formed has changed. Hence, it is absolutely 
crucial to integrate global opportunities in interaction with national and local opportunities 
10 
 
into our understanding to analyze not only transnational movements but also local social 
movements.    
Until recently, social movements have been studied from a nation-state perspective by 
the dominant approaches in the field- these being the Resource Mobilization Approach (RM), 
New Social Movements Theories (NSM), and Political Opportunity Structures (POS)/Political 
Process Theory (PPT). Among these approaches, it is the POS/PPT theory which has become 
prevalent in analyzing social movements which explains their emergence, continuation, and 
success based on political opportunities and/or constraints (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 
1996; Diani and della Porta, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). The POS comprises of the political 
institutions and the political relations surrounding a social movement which either become 
opportunities or constraints by opening or closing avenues of contention for social 
movements. In its revised version, POS/PPT incorporates mobilizing structures and framing 
processes in addition to political structures. Repertoires of contention, 
organization/mobilizing structures, identity and political opportunities are interdependent 
according to the synthesis model. As such, it provides us with a more comprehensive model 
for social movement analysis compared to earlier approaches mentioned above. Yet, the 
analysis is to a large degree based on national contexts as it has been the national 
opportunities and constraints which have been the focus of study. Also, the synthesis model 
has remained state-centric since state is taken as the main political actor within a national 
political context. In its state centric form, the synthesis/POS approach does not allow to make 
the links with macro social, economic, and political changes taking place under capitalist 
globalization outlined above which have an impact on national contexts. In other words, the 
state-centric and national context based version of POS/PPT is unable to incorporate 
globalization-related factors such as the rise of non-state actors and the prevalence of 
transnational practices. In that regard, the synthesis model fails to take into account the impact 
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of the enmeshed interactions between the local, national and transnational political spheres on 
the mobilizing structures, framing processes and political opportunities.  
More recently, studies which incorporate global opportunities have emerged (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998; Smith and Johnston, 2002; Sklair, 2002; della Porta et al., 2006; Smith, 
2008). Other theorists put emphasis on international organizations as emerging political 
opportunities and study their relation with domestic opportunities, arguing that they are nested 
in each other (Meyer, 2003). In general, these theories focus on analyzing and formulating 
TSMOs and global networks in which local social movements are linked to one another. The 
general tendency in these studies is to describe global political context as a multi-level polity 
assuming that there is a hierarchy among these levels. However, theorists of capitalist 
globalization such as Sklair (2002), Sassen (2007), and Smith (2008) show that capitalist 
globalization is not a process taking place outside national boundaries which constrains 
political, economic and social structures and relations at the national level. Rather, some of 
the national and local actors carry out transnational practices enabling capitalist globalization. 
In that regard, capitalist globalization brings about a ‘multi-scalar’ political context in which 
different scales of politics are divided between proponents and challengers of capitalist 
globalization. However, there is still less focus on the impact of capitalist globalization which 
transcends and transforms national political contexts and evaluation of local movements with 
respect to the ‘multi-scalar’ nature of politics. In other words, the question of how global 
political opportunities enmeshed between local, national, and transnational operate for local 
social movements needs to be further explored. In order to address this gap, these global 
political opportunities and the way they affect and transform national and local political 
opportunities should be researched by examining the interweaving relations between global, 
national and local opportunities, which is precisely what this dissertation aims to do.   
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That said, two points should be clarified. First, these changes favourable to local and 
transnational social movements are not operating evenly across the globe. Second, 
emphasizing the need to understand how global opportunity structures are impacting and as a 
result transforming the local, national and global political contexts is not to argue that nation-
states have lost all their significance. Instead, the power and ability of nation-states have been 
re-configured and reshaped under globalization. In relation to this, transnational 
opportunities/constraints do not exist and facilitate/hinder social movements on their own. 
The global opportunity set interacts with national opportunities since nation-states are still 
crucial actors. Opportunities like the composition of elites, the kinds of alliances they form, 
and states’ openness are affected by these actors’ position toward globalization and global 
forces. Just as crucial is the fact that framing processes are as indispensable to social 
movement formation as political opportunities since changes in the political context can 
become opportunities as long as they are framed as such by movement participants.  
In this study, I utilize the political opportunity concept in its extended version which 
incorporates local, national, and transnational political opportunities. This will allow me to 
build the linkages between local, national and transnational political opportunities that are 
enmeshed together, creating a highly dynamic set of transnational practices with multiple and 
varying interactions. Hence, the main hypothesis is: as a result of global transformations, a) 
domestic political opportunities change; b) a new set of political opportunities, global political 
opportunities, emerge; and c) they interact with national and local opportunities creating an 
enmeshed political opportunities as a whole; and d) one of the likely responses to the changes 
in politics, economy, and culture is that locally based movements occur through continuous 
interpretations and framing of these political opportunities. 
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The case of Bergama:  
The anti-gold mine mobilization centered at Bergama provides a good case to analyze 
the relationship between local movements and enmeshed local, national, and transnational 
opportunities. Bergama and its surrounding villages lie in Western Turkey, a fertile plain 
close to the ancient city of Pergamon, its geographical location making it an important region 
for both agriculture and tourism.
1
 The start of the conflict dates back to 1988 when Eurogold, 
a gold mining transnational company (TNC), made an agreement with the Turkish 
government in order to search for gold and silver in Turkey, which also included the rights to 
build and run a mine. Eurogold was aiming to extract approximately 24 tonnes of gold and 24 
tonnes of silver in about 8 years (www.mta.gov.tr). The state in Turkey has made all decisions 
concerning the operation of the Ovacık goldmine and has granted all permissions without 
consulting with the local people. The controversy about mining in the region appeared 
because of the method the company would use, i.e. cyanide leach method.
2
 Gold mining has 
been a controversial issue all around the world which entails major risks for the environment 
and human health. These risks mainly arise from the cyanide-leach method, a.k.a. heap-leach 
method, used predominantly in the gold-mining industry to decompose gold from soil. It is 
estimated that in order to produce one ounce of gold 79 tonnes of waste is produced 
(Earthworks and Oxfam America, 2004).
 3
 The major method used for eliminating waste in 
the mining industry is to dump waste in tailing ponds and leave them in open air to dissolve 
back into nature which is a prolonged process taking hundreds of years. Mining activities in 
Bergama started with the operations of Eurogold, in Ovacık, 10 kilometres away from the 
                                                 
1
Please see Appendix B for the maps of Bergama and its villages. 
2
 Sodium cyanide is acutely toxic to any living organism. Incredibly small amounts of cyanide can kill fish. Also 
a teaspoon of 2% cyanide could kill humans. Leftover cyanide harms birds and wildlife even at very small 
concentrations taken by drinking from the waste ponds. It is also harmful to human health when exposed to at 
certain levels (http://www.minewatch.uk.ca). Cyanide is a powerful solvent that breaks down heavy metals such 
as mercury, cadmium, chromium, and lead. In its use, cyanide might break down and form complexes with other 
chemicals or metals and remain as toxic. Mixes of cyanide with other metals and chemicals can be just as toxic 
as cyanide itself (http://www.minewatch.uk.ca). 
3
 Another striking indicator for the extent of the waste produced is the percentage of gold in ores. Only 0.00001 
percent ore is processed into gold and the remaining turns into waste. 
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town of Bergama when it initiated the project of constructing a gold mine in Ovacık, 
Bergama. Apart from the direct presence of TNCs in Ovacık, other TNCs and international 
banks were also involved in the construction and running of the Ovacık gold mine either as 
financial supporters, indirect partners, or providers of substances and materials for mining 
operations such as Germany based Degusta, Ohio based INCO, Dresdnerbank, and Metall 
Mining Corporation (Arsel 2005; Taşkın, 1998). 
Given the transnational character of the Ovacık gold mine, contention over the gold 
mining activities in Bergama was mainly directed towards the TNCs. The conflict in Bergama 
emerged gradually as the peasants became aware of the risks of cyanide leach method with 
the involvement of environmentalists and local political activists, especially the mayor of 
Bergama who played an indispensible role in initiating and later maintaining the mobilization. 
The Bergama movement activists claimed that cyanide leach method would have hazardous 
impacts on their environment, health, and livelihood. The aim of this growing movement was 
declared as preventing Eurogold from carrying out its mining activities in the region. They 
defined their struggle against the TNCs in two master frames of environmentalism and human 
rights.  
They carried out their contention in four major areas: science, judiciary, grassroots, 
and institutional politics. The movement network also operated across local, national, and 
transnational political spheres. Thus, the mobilization spanned all four areas at all levels of 
politics which have in fact become enmeshed in capitalist globalization so as to interact with 
and shape each other in a multidirectional manner, as I illustrate with the case of Bergama. In 
the area of science, they have collected and used data provided by scientists and CSOs both in 
national and transnational spheres which they have used to boost their credibility and 
legitimacy as well as invalidate the claims of the TNCs. In the area of legal action, struggle 
continued throughout the movement with Bergama activists gaining favourable court 
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decisions repeatedly which were not implemented as a result of the lack of will of national 
governments to drive out the TNCs. Grassroots activism revolved around non-violent civil 
disobedience acts staged in innovative repertoires which proved crucial for warding off state 
repression, attracting the attention of the media and gaining the support of the public. Finally, 
the quest for allies at the national and transnational levels to use as political opportunities 
proved more fruitful at the transnational level while national politics remained relatively 
closed to the demands of the peasants. The participants of the movement were the peasants, 
members of the local elite, representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs), scientists 
and politicians at the national level, representatives of INGOs, external political parties and 
members of the European Parliament, scientists and journalists from abroad. Other groups 
such as unions, CSOs and individual environmentalists at the national level have been for the 
most part sporadic supporters, albeit with some exceptions. Concomitantly, the Bergama 
movement activists successfully carried their contention to the transnational sphere, involving 
renowned scientists working on the hazardous impact of the cyanide leach method, green 
members of the European Parliament, German Greens, representatives of INGOs, and 
journalists whose support for the movement increased its visibility, bringing it to the agenda 
of the transnational public and supranational political institutions which, in turn, intensified 
the pressure on the TNCs. Despite all these efforts which lasted for 9 years, the Bergama 
movement demobilized in 2003 without achieving its stated-goal of closing the Ovacık gold 
mine. 
 However, the Bergama movement cannot be dismissed as a complete failure. The 
Bergama movement exemplifies a local movement which successfully developed and 
sustained its mobilization, in addition to achieving unintended, indirect, and partial outcomes, 
despite its failure to realize its stated-goal. This success in mobilization occurred at a time of 
neo-liberalization which has been transforming the political and economic structures in 
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Turkey since the 1980s. More specifically, The Bergama movement was able to emerge when 
the domination of the pro-capitalist globalizers left little room for the locals who were 
suffering from the developments related to capitalist globalization in Turkey.  Additionally, 
the local population in Bergama did not have any prior experience in activism including land-
based conflicts. The land structure in the Bergama villages is based on small land-holdings 
owned by self-sufficient peasantry. On average, a household unit possesses 15 to 20 thousand 
square meters of land.
4
 The agricultural production is rich in terms of variety of products 
including exportable items.
5
 The prevalence of a market-oriented small peasantry and the 
application of populist-protective policies revolving around clientelistic relations particularly 
with the right-wing parties hindered the formation of peasant movements in the history of 
Turkey. Furthermore, even though Turkey has been going through a neo-liberalization process 
from the 1980s on, significant levels of structural adjustments in the rural sector arrived as 
late as in the aftermath of the 1999 economic crisis. Unchanged land structure and the 
continuation of protective measures until the late 1990s were the main reasons why peasant 
mobilizations found elsewehere were not widely found in Turkey.
6
 Therefore, the Bergama 
peasants lacked any movement networks or experiences which would have a spill-over effect 
for their movement. In combination with the unpromising national political context which is 
dominated by the pro-capitalist globalization actors, the absence of pre-existing movement 
networks of peasants made the conditions for mobilization unfavourable. Yet, the Bergama 
movement was capable of seizing opportunities simultaneously at the local, national, and 
                                                 
4
There is a variation in the amount of land owned by peasants. The number of landless peasants is relatively 
small. The landless peasants earn their livelihood either by working on the land of others or by carrying out non-
agricultural activities in the villages. Nevertheless, the differences in the amount of land owned are not 
significant enough to create land disputes.  
5
Please see Appendix C for the agricultural products of the region.  
6
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze peasant movements against capitalist globalization. Briefly, 
peasants mobilized against the adverse impacts of capitalist globalization in Central America, India, and Europe. 
Peasants organized locally against subsidy cuts, global trade policies, fiscal measures, genetically modified 
organisms, and environmental and health aspects of agriculture. These peasant and farmer organizations forged 
links at the regional and global levels among themselves. La Via Campesina is the most well-known 
transnational peasant network (Edelman, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Boras et al., 2008). Recently, Çiftçi-Sen, a 
confederation of farmers’ unions representing around 20 thousand farmers from Turkey, joined in the network.     
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transnational levels which led to the development and sustenance of a successful mobilization. 
Within the enmeshed scales of politics, the Bergama activists were able to overcome their 
disadvantages with respect to national level opportunities with the facilitative impact of 
transnational and local opportunities. This succeful mobiliziation process was a true 
inspiration for local communities both at the national and transnational levels. In Turkey, the 
Bergama movement was followed by a wide range of local movements mobilizing over 
various issues such as mining, large dam constructions, hydroelectric, thermal, and nuclear 
power plant projects. These subsequent movements adopted many of the strategies and tactics 
innovated and introduced by the Bergama movement. In that sense, the Bergama movement 
ignited a series of rural based environmental movements combining environmental and 
human rights concerns. This spill-over effect reached out to the Halkidiki movement in 
Northern Greece. Once a scattered uprising using violence as the only means against the gold 
mining companies in their region, the Halkidiki movement activists started utilizing litigation 
processes and moving their contention to the transnational level with the influence of the 
Bergama activists. Therefore, the Bergama movement acted as as a progenitor movement for 
other local mobilizations surrounding its area both inside and outside Turkey. In sum, it is a 
successful case in terms of developing and maintaining mobilization which deserves an in-
depth analysis.  
Research Questions: 
My first analytic concern is to integrate macroeconomic, social and political changes 
that capitalist globalization brings into the political process theory in the social movements 
literature to achieve a better understanding of contentious politics. My second theoretical aim 
is to analyze a grassroots political response to the transforming local, national and 
transnational political spheres which have become enmeshed.  
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In that regard, the focus of my research is to analyze the emergence and sustenance of 
the Bergama mobilization under capitalist globalization which uses and furthers intertwined 
local, national, and transnational opportunities. Therefore my central research questions are: 
a. How does a disadvantaged and deprived local population suffering from capitalist 
globalization mobilize and sustain that mobilization within a changing political context? What 
is the relevance of mobilizing structures, framing, and enmeshed political opportunities?  
b. Why and how do strategies change throughout the mobilization in relation to the dynamic 
interplay of enmeshed political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes? 
More specifically, the objectives of the study are: 
1. to explore the ways in which the locals of Bergama interpret changing domestic political 
opportunities in relation to capitalist  globalization and the emerging global political 
opportunity/constraint sets, and the interaction between the two;  
2. to investigate the ways in which they try to manipulate these different levels of political 
opportunities and show that, in fact, rather than separate distinct levels, what exists is a nexus 
of local-national-global opportunity sets which are enmeshed together. Given this interwoven 
structure with multiple interactions, how do they transform their contention into collective 
action?  
3. to analyze the ways they try to expand these opportunities through the social movement 
process. Thus, the main theoretical question of the study is:  How do local people encounter, 
and interpret transnational practices that weave through so-called local, national, and global 
political opportunities, blurring their distinctions? In what ways are they likely to respond and 
become pro-active forces in the process?  
 
Methodology: 
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In this section, I will explain what kinds of research methods I have chosen and why I 
find them appropriate for the study. I will also give a detailed account of the fieldwork 
including how the interviews were conducted, who was interviewed, the geographical scope 
of the fieldwork and the challenges encountered during the fieldwork. 
As research strategy, a single case study is conducted. Since the research aim 
necessitates both exploratory and explanatory questions such as “How were the political 
opportunities interpreted and framed?”, “How did the contention turn into collective action?”, 
“Why did it occur?” and “As a continuing process, how can it be placed within the general 
political sphere?”, the case study is an appropriate research strategy for the purposes of this 
research (Yin, 1994). The main problem that has been posed for the case study approach is the 
question of generalization. However, the distinction between theoretical generalization and 
statistical generalization is drawn. Case studies involve theoretical generalization which aims 
“to expand and generalize theories” rather than statistical generalizations which aim “to 
enumerate frequencies” (Snow et al., 2002: 164). As such, the research is designed to achieve 
theoretical refinement, modifying certain aspects of the political opportunity theory by 
introducing a novel approach with new case material. 
In the study, I have used qualitative research methods for data collection. The 
fieldwork consists of both in-depth interviews and participant observation as well as 
documentation analysis. The aim of qualitative interviewing is to understand and map out the 
values, relations, beliefs and attitudes in a social context from the social actor’s point of view 
(Gaskell, 2001). Thus, by using qualitative interviews, a thick description of participants’ 
interpretation and framing of the political opportunity structures as well as their motivations, 
expectations, and identity formation was obtained which will be interpreted and 
conceptualized in the data analysis process. Furthermore, qualitative interviews have provided 
detailed narratives of both the historical process of the Bergama movement, facts such as 
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responses to opportunity changes, and the means used for mobilization, strategies, and tactics. 
It is also important for the study to grasp the discourses of participants about citizenship, their 
positioning themselves in the political sphere, their understanding of the concepts of state and 
globalization to analyze the linkages of the Bergama movement to political opportunity 
structures. In short, I aim to understand the way in which movement participants  construct 
the political sphere and how they situate themselves in that sphere with respect to different 
dimensions of local, national and global issues. Finally, data on the internal dynamics of the 
movement such as relations between the movement elite and the local people are obtained 
through interviews.  
a. The fieldwork: 
The data collection process consists of 3 dimensions. First, a desktop research was 
completed by reviewing all relevant literature as well as analyzing the documentation relevant 
to the Bergama movement. The latter includes reports of scientists, chambers (professional 
organizations), and civil society organizations, e-mails and internal correspondence between 
activists provided by the interviewees, the brochures of the TNCs and the Bergama 
municipality, court decisions and statements given in court. The desktop research was 
finalized with an analysis of local, national, and international newspapers as well as relevant 
websites.  
Second, 72 in-depth interviews were conducted mainly between 2003 and 2005. The 
interviews are semi-structured. They are composed of open-ended questions in order to 
minimize any influences of my own prejudices. Moreover, interviewees feel more free and 
relaxed with open-ended questions, and this leads them to impart more. For each interviewee, 
the order of questions is changed depending on each respondent’s answers during the 
interview. The interviewees can be grouped into 3 categories: peasants who are the ‘carriers’ 
of the movement; urban segments of the Bergama movement network such as scientists, 
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representatives of civil society organizations, lawyers, local and national political party 
representatives, academics, and journalists in Turkey; and last but not least, people who are in 
the transnational networks connected to the movement such as European MPs, representatives 
of Greenpeace, FIAN, Minewatch, SOS-Pergamon, Halkidiki movement in Greece, scientists, 
journalists and activists who maintain local-transnational links.
7
 In addition to the period 
between 2003 and 2005 when the bulk of the fieldwork was conducted, I did follow-up 
research, making several trips back to the villages in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011.  
I have conducted most of the peasant interviews in Çamköy and Ovacık. There are 
several reasons for this. First, I established my initial contacts through the “elite” of the 
movement. They still had relatively strong relations within the Çamköy village even though 
the movement had entered a decline stage at the time of my fieldwork. Second, Çamköy is 
one of the three villages closest to the mine. In the case of Çamköy, some of the houses are 
adjacent to the wall of the mine. Thus, Çamköy is one of the villages which has been 
experiencing the direct effects of the operation of the mine. Third, Çamköy has been one of 
the most radical villages where the turnout in the protests was quite high. In addition to the 
interviews conducted in Çamköy and Ovacık, I have interviewed peasants from Tepeköy and 
Narlıca as well. Narlıca, like Çamköy, was one of the most active villages. Other interviews 
were conducted with the local elite of the movement, local politicians, representatives of 
national political parties and experts in various small towns along the Aegean coast of Turkey 
such as town of Bergama itself, Burhaniye, Altınoluk, Ören, and Çeşme. Interviews with the 
lawyers and the Elele platform which formed the scientific legal network of the Bergama 
movement were conducted mainly in İzmir while in İstanbul and Ankara, I talked to 
representatives of Greenpeace, scientists, journalists, activists, and academics. Exploring the 
                                                 
7
 The interviews are cited throughout the text in two categories: E/E refers to the elite/expert interviews while 
P/A refers to peasant/activist interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish and hence, 
translations appear in the thesis. Some interviews, on the other hand, were conducted in English such as those 
with European MPs, representatives of FIAN, Minewatch, Halkidiki movement in Greece, and scientists and 
journalists from Germany (E/E 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 32, 33). 
22 
 
transnational ties of the movement required travelling to Munich, Aachen, Brussels, and 
London. The geographical scope of the fieldwork reached even Malta, Greece, and Australia, 
albeit via the internet. In short, the fieldwork covered a wide ground both locally and 
transnationally, true to the spirit of the thesis.  
21 of the in-depth interviews were conducted as group interviews. As a lot of 
interviews took place at the coffeehouses of the villages, peasants other than the particular 
individual I was interviewing would pass by or stop at the coffee house, inevitably joining in 
the conversation. On average, 3-4 villagers were involved in each group interview. Same 
respondents can be found in several interviews as well as first time respondents. These group 
interviews were extremely fruitful in the sense that not only the unscheduled talks with 
whoever happened to arrive in the coffee houses revealed rich, new information but also, it 
allowed me to observe firsthand the dynamics of the relations among peasants.   
Third, the fieldwork also involved participant observation. The research plan had not 
included participant observation; however, the nature of village life was very conducive to 
such research. Talking to the villagers meant hanging out with them at the coffeehouses, 
going to their fields, travelling with them to nearby places to meet other participants of the 
movement, eating at their houses; in short, participating in their life. Once rapport was 
established, the peasants included me in their everyday life throughout our repeated 
encounters and interviews. The chance to do participant observation enriched my data in 
significant ways, allowing me to grasp the relations among peasants, as well as between 
peasants and the local elite. For instance, listening to the discussion of lawyers and local 
elite’s on what strategy to adopt or observing the kinds of responses given by the peasants to 
their portrayal in the media gave just this kind of insight.  
 
b. Establishing rapport: 
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In the research, snow-ball sampling technique is used. I have established my first 
contact with one of the lawyers who supported the movement and represented the villagers in 
the legal process. Then, I contacted the two leaders of the movement. Through their 
connections, I established contacts in the villages and got to know other elites. Using 
connections through the journalists who follow the movement closely and getting in touch 
with the leading elite group who are still enthusiastic about the movement made gaining 
access relatively easy. However, the peasants were more reluctant to be interviewed even 
though the movement leader had established the connection with them for me. As I met with 
people, they seemed to be more confident about my position as a researcher. Gradually, 
peasants in Çamköy started introducing me to people from other villages such as Ovacık and 
Narlıca. On the other hand, it took a considerable amount of time to gain their confidence. 
Establishing rapport involved some challenges.  
First, there were difficulties with respect to the timing of the study. By the time I 
started my research, the Bergama movement was in its decline stage. Thus, I was facing an 
exhausted crowd who were despondent and unmotivated. Their expectations were minimized 
and they did not hold any hopes for the outcome as well as the future of the movement. 
Hence, it was not easy to get people talk about their movement. Second, they were sceptical in 
the beginning about my presence as a sociologist. In some of the interviews, the respondents 
mentioned that the mining company sent anthropologists, sociologists, and researchers in 
order to analyze the social structure in the villages. According to these accounts, these 
researchers came to the villages and interviewed the villagers without stating that they worked 
for the company. The interviewees claimed, in this way, the company established its strategy 
for gaining supporters among the villagers by determining whom to approach and how. 
According to the accounts, this strategy was effective especially in one village, Narlıca, which 
was the most radical in the protests. The villagers claim that the head of the village and some 
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of the religious leaders were either hired or given money; and because the villagers are loyal 
to their leaders according to Alevi
8
  tradition, most of Narlıca villagers followed them (P/A 2, 
6; E/E 4). 
One of the peasants told me that they had also thought that I was the secret police 
because I arrived in the village with different cars at different times. It was also a sensitive 
time for the peasants because they were questioned about their connections with foreign 
NGOs with the accusation of espionage by State Security Court (DGM) in March 2002.
9
  
However the court acquitted them. Thus, it was a sensitive topic especially for the peasants 
since there was a possibility that they could be charged with espionage when I did the first 
part of my interviews. As pointed above, gaining their trust and overcoming their 
unwillingness to share information proved to be a gradual process that had to be carefully 
handled. Once I was able to overcome their distrust and hesitation, rich data could be obtained 
both through interviews and participant observation, as explained above. However, the 
challenges associated with establishing rapport resulted in a limitation of the study.  
One limitation of the study is that one group relevant to analyzing the Bergama movement 
had to be excluded from the data collection process, namely the miners. As talking to 
employees or directors of the TNC(s) would jeopardize my trusted position as a researcher, I 
made talking to participants of the movement my priority. The fact that the atmosphere was 
highly charged did not help. The other group which had to be excluded from the data 
collection was the women. The traditional way of life in the villages with patriarchal practices 
made it difficult for a male researcher to talk to women. Women seldom appeared in public 
spaces. They were working either in the fields during summer or at home during winter. It is 
on the streets that they are publicly visible. They usually socialize with each other at home. 
They mingle with the village crowd very seldom at the wedding and circumcision ceremonies. 
                                                 
8
 Alevi is a sect in Islam, and Narlica is a Alevi village where almost everyone belongs to the Alevi sect.   
9 As reported in the newspaper Radikal, 13/04/2002. 
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In the case of men, they regularly meet with each other the coffeehouses of the villages. These 
coffeehouses are the public spaces where most of the socializing took place through exchange 
of information, news and opinion among men. Women were mostly confined to the houses. 
They paid visits to each other and held some female based home meetings. Thus, even though 
women had an important role in the Bergama struggle, taking their place in the frontlines of 
the demonstrations and appearing in the media as much as the men, insisting on interviewing 
them would adversely affect the trust relations I had established. This limitation could partly 
be overcome by using the book by Reinart (2003), a participant of the movement and a female 
academic who published her interviews with the peasants, including women, verbatim.  
Organization of the Chapters: 
In Chapter 2, I review the social movements literature with a focus on political 
opportunity structures analysis and framing processes. It is argued that globalization is a 
necessary element for analyzing local movements since it creates a new set of political 
opportunities- transnational political opportunities. Social movements and civil society 
organizations are situated in the capitalist globalization by analyzing the relevant literature. In 
Chapter 3, I focus on the domestic political structure of Turkey and social movement history 
in Turkey. I discuss the historical context of state-society relations, the formation of 
citizenship, the transformations taking place in the Turkish political space as a result of the 
globalization, domestic political structures and their interaction with global opportunities.  
In Chapters 4 to 7, I analyze the data on Bergama. In Chapter 4, an analysis of the 
organizational structure of the Bergama movement is presented, discussing mobilizing 
structures, collective identity formation and framing processes. Chapter 5 delves into framing 
processes of the Bergama movement, identifying master frames of environmentalism and 
human rights as well as analyzing the framing of capitalist globalization. In chapter 6, I 
examine political opportunities and the ways they were perceived and used at the local and 
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national levels. Chapter 7 turns to transnational links of the Bergama movement and discusses 
cross –border relations with external political parties and politicians; activities at 
supranational and transnational political and legal spaces, alliances with INGOs and social 
movements, and the responses of the Turkish state to transnational relations of the Bergama 
movement.
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Chapter 2:  
Social movements and civil society in a globalizing context 
 
 The concept of globalization has been a major focus of debate in the social science 
literature. Various theories of globalization compete with each other to explain the historical 
roots, nature, content, scope, and impacts of the concept.
1
 One of the main controversies 
among these theories revolves around the question of whether or not globalization exists as a 
novel and distinct process which transforms the world system based on the nation-state. The 
sceptic camp, mainly consisting of realists and orthodox Marxists, basically rejects the 
proposition that globalization really exists. The sceptics claim that globalization is a ‘myth’ 
and nation-states continue to be the primary actors in all sorts of activities and relations (Hirst 
and Thompson, 1996). By questioning the uniqueness of the globalization process and 
pointing to similar processes in the 19
th
 century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996), they describe 
globalization either as a new (neoliberal) ideological cover for imperialism (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2000) or enhanced internationalisation and/or regionalisation which means 
intensified links between national economies (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).
 2
  
 On the other hand, a wide range of theories commonly evaluate the contemporary 
developments in the world as signifying the existence of a globalization process which 
transforms the previous model of politics based on nation-states. Yet, even accounts which 
accept the novelty and transformative power of globalization vary among themselves in their 
explanations of globalization with regard to its causes, content and effects. Accordingly, 
globalization has been defined in numerous ways as: “time-distance variation” (Giddens, 
                                                 
1
 Globalization theories are classified in various ways with respect to the conceptualization of the process (Held 
et al. 1999), focus of studies (Sklair, 1999, 2002) and ‘domain questions’ of each theory (Robinson, 2007). 
2
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage in this debate. Very briefly they fail to account for the 
various qualitative and quantitative changes in the economy regarding extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact 
of economic practices at the global level which occurred especially in relation to the impact of technological 
advancements (Held et al., 1999; Sklair, 2002; Scholte, 2005).    
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1991), “time-space compression” (Harvey, 1989), the “widening, deepening and speeding up 
of global interconnectedness” (Held and McGrew, 2000, 2007), a “long-term upward trend” 
within the world system (Chase-Dunn, 1999), “glocalization” (Robertson, 1992), a “world in 
motion” (Appadurai, 1990), “world society” (Meyer et. al, 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997), 
“network society” (Castells, 1997), a world with heightened “transplanetary” and 
“supraterritorial” relations (Scholte, 2005), and “global capitalism” (Sklair, 2002; Robinson, 
2004). Even though each account underlines either the economic, political or cultural level as 
the determining factor  in their explanations, they all agree on three basic dimensions of 
globalization: ‘the transformation of dominant patterns of socio-economic organization’, ‘the 
transformation of the territorial principal’ and ‘the transformation of power’ (Held and 
McGrew, 2000: 7). This overlap implies the double meaning of the concept of globalization, 
referring both to a more generic process and to the contemporary form of that process. 
According to its generic meaning, globalization is the general shrinking and compression of 
spatio-temporal dimensions of social life which have been conditioned and constrained by the 
nation-state system until recently. With the reduction of the nation-states’ limitations on time 
and space, economic, political, and social spheres are being reshaped. The underlying cause is 
the spread of transnationalization of practices, relations, and social organizations throughout 
the world which transforms the primary role of states in social, economic and political 
terrains. Consequently, the distinction between internal and external imposed by national 
borders is being transcended. In other words, generic globalization refers to the creation of a 
new space transcending national boundaries with increased time-space compression and 
tightly bound networks of interactions between a variety of actors including social 
movements, interest groups, transnational corporations (TNCs), states, and individuals backed 
up by increased global flows of capital, goods, information, ideas, people, environmentally 
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and biologically relevant substances (Giddens, 1991; Scholte 2005; Held and McGrew, 2007; 
Sklair, 2008).
3
  
 On the other hand, globalization does not necessarily come into being in one form. 
Depending on the driving forces behind, globalization might take different shapes, 
notwithstanding the basic characteristics of generic globalization mentioned above.
4
 However, 
generic globalization and capitalist globalization are often being conflated. In that regard, the 
concept of globalization has been mostly equated with neoliberal capitalist globalization 
which dominates the contemporary global system as if it is the only viable form that can 
achieve a global order. (Evans, 2005; Sklair, 2008: 95). The fuzzy use of the concept which 
does not differentiate generic and capitalist globalization leads to the conclusion that 
problems and defects of the capitalist globalization are inherent and inevitable within the 
globalization process. However, a wide range of social movements both at the transnational 
and local levels are struggling against the detrimental impacts of capitalist globalization by 
advocating a more just global social order and proposing alternative globalization models 
without using nationalist rhetoric. Therefore it is crucial to elaborate the contemporary form 
of globalization in detail in order to situate the Bergama movement, which is an example of 
such struggles, in the context of globalization and the conflicts, opportunities and constraints 
it renders.  
 The contemporary global system is dominated by “the capitalist globalization”, as 
explained by the ‘global capitalism’ model (Sklair, 1995, 2001, 2002; Robinson, 2004). Since 
the 1960s onward, developments in communication, travel, and information technologies have 
facilitated the re-organization of capitalism. Consequently, the logic of capitalism has 
                                                 
3
 In addition to this development, described as the “moment of transnational social spaces” by Sklair, three other 
dimensions also contribute to the realization of generic globalization: the ‘electronic moment’, “the postcolonial 
moment”, and “qualitatively new forms of cosmopolitanism” (Sklair, 2008: 96). 
4
 Sklair (2002, 2008) argues that other forms of globalization such as a ‘socialist globalization’ based on a 
‘human rights regime’ are possible. Held et al. (1999) also claim that different types of globalization have 
occurred throughout the world history with varying levels of extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact (Held, et. 
al, 1999: 444-452; Held, 2004).   
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changed, and activities of capitalist forces regarding production, management, and 
distribution have moved beyond national markets to global markets by turning the whole 
globe into the capitalist forces’ site of operations (Sklair, 2002). In addition to the dispersal of 
production related activities throughout the globe and the increase of transnational capital 
flows, financial capital has also globalized as a result of the removal of capital controls and 
state control over the value of currencies (Evans, 1997: 67). These developments in the 
economy led by the transnational practices (TNPs) of non-state actors constitute a striking 
difference in comparison to earlier periods because of unmatched qualitative and quantitative 
transformations (Held et al., 1999; Woods, 2000; Sklair, 2002; Scholte, 2005; Sassen, 2010).  
Yet, TNPs do not merely take place in the economy, but also in politics and culture 
which makes contemporary globalization a process operating in all spheres of social life 
(Sklair, 2002; Woods, 2000; Held et.al, 1999; Scholte, 2005). The acclaimed primacy of the 
nation-state in the economy, politics, and social life has been supplanted by transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the economy, by the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in politics, 
and by the culture-ideology of consumerism in culture, each working as the dominating force 
within their terrain (Sklair, 1999: 157).
5
 However, the reconfiguration of power and 
restructuration of economy, politics and culture under globalization do not render nation-
states redundant and powerless. On the contrary, as stated by numerous scholars, states 
continue to exist, but they are different in their use of power and authority (Evans, 1997; Held 
et. al, 1999; Woods, 2000; Mann, 2001; Scholte, 2005; Held and McGrew, 2007). It is evident 
that with the globalization process, non-state actors connecting to each other across national 
borders have shaken the primacy of nation-states. The limitations on states are brought about 
by the entrance of transnational and local actors into the political arena which turn states into 
one of the actors among others in economy, politics and culture. These non-state actors 
                                                 
5
 In a similar vein, Robinson (2004, 2007) also points out a similar shift towards a global economy with the 
emergence of the TCC. However, Robinson claims that a ‘transnational state’ in the making which is a network 
of supranational political and economic institutions as well as national state apparatuses (Robinson, 2007: 131).  
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comprise of transnational civil society  actors such as INGOs and transnational social 
movements (TSMs) in global politics,  economic and political supranational organizations and 
international organizations whose significance and impact have increased Additionally, local 
actors at the sub- national level freed from control and cooptation of nation-states and national 
cultures, have started expressing their own cultural and political claims, mainly with respect 
to identity issues. Combined, these developments have led to the questioning of the salience 
of nation-states.
6
  
However, these processes within globalization have not done away with the state. 
States continue to be a crucial entity with respect to transnational processes, even if not the 
most important one. This is because concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘place’ are not totally 
irrelevant under globalization. Rather, they are being re-invented and re-configured as Held 
and McGrew (2000) and Sassen (2007) have argued. In other words, a “new sovereignty 
regime” has come into shape in which the relationship between sovereignty, state power and 
territoriality is being redefined (Held and McGrew, 2007). States occupy a crucial role in the 
expansion of globalization with their entitlement to rule and capacity to select forms of 
political, economic and social development. (Held and McGrew, 2000: 9). As Sassen (2003, 
2007) argues, states are indispensible components of the globalization process since many 
aspects of globalization are embedded in the national. In that regard, not all the practices and 
entities within the borders of a nation state are necessarily ‘national’ in the historically 
constructed meaning of the term. Rather, in addition to the processes taking place at the 
supranational level such as the global capital market, many transnational practices and 
dynamics related to globalization occur within sub-national localities such as global cities, 
                                                 
6
 ‘Methodological nationalism’ in social sciences which takes nation-states as the unit of analysis has been 
criticized based on similar grounds that social, economic and political practices are no longer encased within 
nation-states ( Sklair, 2002; Sassen, 2003; Beck, 2005). 
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leading to ‘localization of the global’.7 These transboundary relations between sub-national 
localities cut-across national states by shifting the global system from the older ‘hierarchies of 
scale’ model to a ‘multi-scalar’ one, transcending the centrality of the national level.8 
However, direct connections between local and global enabled by the new information and 
communication technologies do not lead to the removal of nation-states or their territories. 
Rather, states enter into negotiations with the non-state actors in order to preserve their 
authority and sovereignty, and consequently, they attain a crucial role within the capitalist 
globalization, facilitating TNPs within their territories. At the same time, certain components 
of states become active providers of new ‘regulation’ which are necessary for the global 
market and global flows such as implementation of monetary, fiscal and trade policies and 
related legal arrangements. In terms of politics, states follow a similar path by adapting 
themselves to the capitalist globalization’s version of the human rights regime. Since national 
interests and goals are not explicit within these transformed regulatory activities of states, 
they signify a ‘de-nationalization’ process alongside the process of ‘re-territorialization’ 
(Sassen, 2003, 2007). 
Yet, given its importance for globalization, nation-states do not have an inevitable role 
in enhancing globalization. The denationalization process is a partial one since only some 
highly specialized components of nation-states are pursuing such strategies in varying degrees 
which differs from one state to another (Sassen, 2003, 2007). Other parts of states both in 
bureaucracy and executive branches that are nationally oriented continue to stand still. Then, 
contemporary state under globalization is best conceived as a site in which globalizing and 
anti-globalization forces with nationalist tendencies and priorities compete with each other 
                                                 
7
 As one of the most important nodes of global networks, global cities are sites where many TNPs of 
management, finance and services take place which happen to exist within certain national territories. All these 
global cities are linked to each other, constituting the basis of the global networks (Sassen, 2007). 
8
 According to the ‘hierarchies of scale’ model, scales of international, regional, national and local are ordered in 
a ‘nested’ structure so that the connections between each are  conceived hierarchically. National scale, on the 
other hand, appears to have a key role of mediating and articulating among other scales (Sassen, 2003:6).   
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(Sklair, 2002). Therefore, universalized characteristics and attitudes cannot be identified for 
nation-states; rather, the practices and positions of different nation-states are largely 
determined by the interests and attitudes of the power holders, whether they are pro- or anti- 
globalization. 
 The competition taking place within and over states constitute one dimension of the 
larger conflictual context of capitalist globalization. As a result of TNPs of the transnational 
capitalist class (TCC) whose main driving force is to seek profit, the world faces major crises 
including rising inequality at the global level and exacerbated levels of environmental 
degradation (Sklair, 2002; Held and Kaya, 2006).
9
 These problems interact with other long 
lasting conflicts produced by the nation-state system in relation to gender, ethnicity, human 
rights and democratic participation, and globalization produces a globalizing world full of 
contradictions and injustices for the majority of the world population. Accordingly, the 
contemporary global political sphere is shaped by the struggles between two ideal-typical 
competing transnational networks: the neoliberal network and the democratic globalization 
network (Smith, 2008).  
 The neoliberal network refers to states, organizations, groups and individuals which 
employ the neoliberal outlook and dominate capitalist globalization. The main force within 
the neoliberal network is the TCC, i.e. the “globalizing” ruling class. The TCC is composed of 
four interrelated and complementary, yet loosely connected, fractions: corporate fraction, state 
fraction, technical fraction, and the consumerist fraction.
10
 The corporate fraction consists of 
                                                 
9
 These long-enduring problems have been elevated during the capitalist globalization period to unprecedented 
levels. First, inequalities between different classes which are inherent in capitalism have grown under 
globalization by creating a “class polarization” throughout the world. Intrastate inequalities both in the global 
North and South have grown since the 1970s (Sklair, 2002; Wade, 2001; Pogge, 2007; Evans, 2008).  Second, 
the ‘ecological crisis’ is caused not only by capitalism but also by industrialism since environment has been 
extensively exploited by the state-socialist systems. However, the degree of environmental exploitation exceeded 
any given period within modernity as a result of the domination of cultural-ideology of consumerism under 
capitalist globalization (Sklair, 2002).       
10
 Other studies also point at the emergence of a ‘global’ class, i.e. TCC (Robinson and Harris, 2000; Robinson, 
2004; Sassen, 2007). Yet, in contrast to the more inclusive conceptualization of TCC by Sklair, these studies 
describe the TCC in narrower terms.  
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the transnational business elite who are either the owners and/or controllers of major 
corporations ranging from executive and non-executive directors to major owners and their 
affiliates (Sklair, 2001). The politicians and bureaucrats with neo-liberal orientations and 
goals whose fundamental aim is to advance capitalist globalization constitute the state 
fraction. The technical fraction is composed of the section of the skilled workforce such as 
engineers, lawyers, economists and so on working for TNCs, i.e. globalizing professionals. 
Lastly, the consumerist fraction is comprised of those consumerist elite actors such as the 
media and merchants who aim to spread and sustain the consumerist ideology throughout 
societies (Sklair, 2001: 17). In contrast to its locally- or nationally-oriented counterparts, the 
TCC has some distinct features making it a transnational entity such as orientation toward 
global markets, involvement in transnational practices, use of cultural-ideology of 
consumerism to maintain its control and hegemony, sharing of similar tastes and consumption 
patterns based on luxurious goods throughout the globe, sharing of similar educational 
backgrounds, and construction of  their identities as ‘world citizens’ (Sklair, 2001). 
Discourses and activities of the TCC rest upon the neoliberal worldview as summarised in the 
economic reform model of “Washington Consensus” which envisions a global system 
organized on market principles.
11
 Their basic argument is that the global economy which is 
described as inevitable and irresistible will generate economic growth which exceeds that of 
the previous system of the nation-state, and subsequently, the liberalized global market would 
remedy all the economic, social and political deprivations of human beings.   
                                                 
11
 The “Washington Consensus” is a an economic model that advocates implementing measures of “free trade, 
capital market liberalization, flexible exchange rates, market-determined interest rates’ and ‘the transfer of assets 
from the public to the private sector, the tight focus of public expenditure on well-directed social targets, 
balanced budgets, tax reform, secure property rights and the protection of intellectual property rights” (Held and 
McGrew, 2007: 187-188). However, as a result of criticisms revolving around its failure to achieve development, 
economic growth and reduction of poverty at the targeted levels from the early 1990s on, a “post-Washington 
consensus” model has gained ascendancy among the proponents of the neo-liberal economy which asserts an 
institutionalist approach by proposing that the state in its transformed form is a necessity for the global market 
(Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2002). 
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However, the domination of the TCC and diffusion of their model do not occur 
automatically since hegemony requires conscious work of its bearers. Respectively, the TCC 
pursue strategic activities throughout the globe in order to maintain the capitalist global order 
based on market-centred values and to ensure its legitimacy as the ruling class. First, by 
discrediting the welfare state as inefficient and corrupt, they try to replace the ‘welfare state’ 
whose central tasks are regulation and redistribution with the ‘garrison state’ which facilitates 
the running of global market (Smith, 2008: 69-73). Second, the TCC intentionally acts to curb 
the power of the United Nations (UN) which is seen as an obstacle to the neoliberal global 
agenda by reducing the UN’s legitimacy as a global political institution.12 Third, as the role 
and effectiveness of the UN are minimized, multilateral economic institutions such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and IMF are being emphasized as the 
global economic institutions with extended power over the global economy. Fourth, the 
cultural-ideology of consumerism has been promoted extensively since consumerism ideology 
has been the essential pillar of capitalist globalization.
13
  
On the other hand, the majority of the world population does not benefit from the 
fruits of capitalist globalization and suffers from its negative impacts and outcomes. Despite 
high variation in their conditions, values, ideas, evaluations, and identity, ‘losers’ of 
globalization can be categorized as ‘the global class of disadvantaged’ (Sassen, 2007) as a 
loose class category based on shared ‘objective conditions’ and ‘subjective dynamics’ at the 
minimum level since sources of their diverse grievances are capitalist globalization and their 
                                                 
12
  As “peace, equality and human rights” are prioritized over “the promotion of global capitalism” in the UN 
charter, the UN has become a locus of demanding a “new international economic order” in the 1970s. (Smith, 
2008: 74). In order to remove such a threat and turn it into a more pro-business organization, the TCC a) has 
attacked the UN and its agencies by mobilizing the elite opposition in the US; b) has put pressure on the UN to 
change its agenda and staff with the help of the US influence; and c) has started using the UN for private 
economic gains (Smith, 2008: 74). 
 
13
 According to Sklair’s (1997) typology, the first three strategies are carried out especially by the activities of 
two fractions of the TCC, the globalizing bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction). On the other hand, the 
promotion of the consumerist ideology is achieved through the practices of the TNC executives and the 
consumerist elite (Sklair, 2002).  
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positions within this process. Many groups belonging to the ‘global class of the 
disadvantaged’ have mobilized both at the transnational and local levels against capitalist 
globalization by forming the ‘network of democratizing globalizers’ (Smith, 2008).  
The democratic globalizers’ network is organized in a similar way to its rival network: 
the organizational fraction consists of social movements and NGOs; the political fraction is 
constituted by politicians in national and sub-national governments as well as in international 
organizations that advocate humanized globalization against the market-driven globalization; 
the technical fraction is composed of think tanks, academics, and professionals such as 
engineers, lawyers, public servants; and the cultural fraction is a collection of civil society 
groups and individuals conveying the ideas and principles to bystanders throughout the globe 
(Smith, 2008: 24). Despite the similarities with respect to shapes of the networks, the 
democratic globalizers’ network has major disadvantages since its members have less 
economic power at their disposal, and their levels of political efficacy and access to decision 
making processes are much lower in comparison to their adversaries (Sklair, 1995).
14
 
Moreover, the democratic globalizers’ network is not as unified as its adversary. Even though 
human rights and democratization of the global order constitute the basic principles that actors 
of the democratic globalizers’ networks share, they vary among themselves in terms of their 
strategies and proposed solutions with respect to the implementation of these principles. In 
that regard, the democratic globalizers’ network mainly consists of: reformists who aim to 
‘civilize’ the contemporary form of globalization by reforming the institutions including 
INGOs, international institutions, social movements and networks; radical critics and 
alternative globalizationists who opt-out of  the current globalization order and create their 
own alternative social orders consisting of grass-roots movements, groups and networks; and 
resisters/rejectionists entailing groups both from the left and right that oppose  economic 
                                                 
14
 According to Sklair (1995), transnational labour movement failed to achieve success matching their adversary, 
transnational capital, due to lack of resources. 
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globalization, or additionally global rule of law and global political ordering (Anheier et al., 
2001; Pianta, 2001; Pianta and Silva, 2003; Held and McGrew, 2007).  
Kaldor et al. (2003) have revised their categorization of positions within GCS by 
adding the category of ‘regressive globalizers’. This position entails groups and individuals 
whose attitudes towards globalization are shaped by the criteria of benefiting the ones that 
they represent. In that regard, they are either for or against global policies of economy, 
technology, law, or flow of people depending on the impact of these policies on interests of 
their country or their group such as stakeholders, electoral groups, lobby groups and ethnic or 
religious groups (ibid.: 6-7). In fact, this is an in-between category whose members might also 
belong to the network of neoliberal globalizers since they pursue activities facilitating the 
operation of capitalist globalization through their practices. Regressive globalizers are also 
found among politicians and state bureaucrats who approximate the state fraction of the TCC.  
In sum, the activities of the democratic globalizers can be best described as a dynamic 
process of finding ways to articulate their diversified demands and strategies under the master 
frame of humanized and democratic global order alongside their opposition to capitalist 
globalization. In doing that, many of the local components of the democratic globalizers 
utilize transnational networks that are part of global civil society. In that sense, it is important 
to understand global civil society, and its opportunities and problems which will be discussed 
in the next section.   
Global Civil Society: The contested terrain of the democratic globalizers’ network 
  In the literature, civil society was overwhelmingly treated as a state-centric entity by 
various approaches regardless of differences in their views over actors, functions, and 
promises of civil society (Keane, 1988; Anheier et al., 2001; Kaldor, 2003a, 2003b).  In that 
regard, civil society has been analyzed as part of national contexts, mainly modelled after 
European experiences, according to which the state is depicted as the main political actor. 
 38 
 
From the state-centric point of view, the interactions between the state, domestic market and 
civil society are the determinant factors shaping civil society.  
With the advance of capitalist globalization, the students of civil society started 
employing a ‘global’ approach in their analysis by questioning the formerly pre-dominant 
state-centric view. Accordingly, a burgeoning literature on global civil society (GCS) has 
emerged (Falk, 1997; Smith, 1998; Guidry et al., 2000; Scholte, 2000, 2004; Keane, 2001, 
2003; Chandhoke, 2002, 2005; Anheier et al., 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002; Anheier 
and Katz, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Batliwala, 2002; Pianta and Silva, 2003; 
Batliwala and Brown, 2006a; Tarrow, 2007). These accounts generally converge on the idea 
that civil society has been released from its national boundaries with the impact of 
globalization in terms of its actors’ interests, concerns, activities and interactions. As 
constraints on time and space have been removed because of technological advancements in 
communication, information, and travel, infrastructural facilities have been set for the 
emergence of a ‘transnational public sphere’ beyond the borders of nation-states. Using these 
technological facilities, people from different states and regions as well as members of 
different transnational organizations have been engaging in extensive and intensified cross-
border interactions and relations. Subsequently, “transnational networks” are established 
which enable global flows of resources, information, knowledge, influence and legitimacy 
among various non-state actors across the globe. Global problems exacerbated by capitalist 
globalization whose destructive effects are felt at both domestic and global levels are 
addressed by non-state actors through these transnational networks. Transnational networks 
have enabled transnational discourses, identities and practices to be disseminated by crossing 
over national boundaries. In sum, the “transnational public sphere” and “transnational 
networks” constitute the infrastructure of the emerging global civil society (GCS) (Guidry, 
Kennedy, and Zald , 2000: 6-8; Katz and Anheier, 2006: 240). Accordingly, in its basic form, 
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the GCS refers to the transnational sphere in which non-state actors forge transboundary links, 
establish networks, negotiate and exchange information and experiences, and stage their 
activities (Pianta and Silva, 2003; Kaldor, 2003a). Yet, GCS is not only restricted to the 
transnational level since it is an “interconnected and multilayered social space” where 
transnational, national and local issues and interests are brought forth by connecting countless 
organizations and ‘ways of life’ existing at each different level (Keane, 2001:23-4).  
GCS can be conceptualized as a huge “network of networks” in which all sorts of 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational social movement 
organizations (TSMOs) as well as their national and local counterparts operate (Anheier and 
Katz, 2005). In other words, GCS is made up of a multiplicity of sub-networks; mainly 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs), social movements, and INGO networks. Within the 
overarching network of GCS, a wide range of groups and individuals exist with diverse 
interests, concerns and ideological orientations. Additionally, GCS actors are also diversified 
due to their purposes, strategic and tactical choices, and organizational structures (Anheier et 
al., 2001; Keane, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a).  
Among civil society actors, INGOs come to the fore in that they occupy a dominant 
position as important nodes within the GCS network displaying centrality and brokerage roles 
(Kaldor, 2003: 79).
15
 In fact, one of the main signs for deepening of GCS is considered to be 
the growth in the number of NGOs/TSMOs (Smith, 1998; Anheier et al., 2001; Clark, 2003; 
Kaldor, 2003a). In Kaldor’s (2003a) terms, NGOs are inherently ‘value-driven’ social units of 
service provisioning or advocacy that are based on voluntary relations. In comparison to 
social movements, NGOs are the ‘tamed’ versions of NSMs in the sense that NGOs operate in 
the similar issue areas of NSMs, but they are more ‘institutional’ and mostly ‘professional’ 
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 Centrality of a node within a network is measured by number of connections that particular node has with 
others. Brokerage, on the other hand, refers to the intermediary role of one node which establishes links among 
related but unconnected nodes.    
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(ibid, 86).  Importance and effectiveness of NGOs and, especially, INGOs have escalated as a 
result of global opportunities such as the UN conferences, world summits, support of the 
global business, and the technological revolution facilitating the reduction of transaction 
costs. INGOs have been growing at unprecedented rates in terms of their numbers, 
membership basis, and location within global decision-making centres since the 1990s 
(Anheier et al., 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002: 194; Kaldor 2003a: 89).  In addition, the 
links among INGOs and interconnections between INGOs and intergovernmental 
organization s (IGOs) have intensified during the 1990s, producing a “thicker” GCS structure 
(Anheier et al., 2001: 4). Parallel to the ‘intensification’ trend,  GCS has also become more 
extended since issue areas of INGOs has enlarged - entailing development, poverty, 
humanitarian aid and relief, service provision, human rights, peace, environment, and gender. 
While working on these diverse issues by transcending national boundaries, INGOs face 
difficulties of operating in diversified political, economic, and cultural contexts. In response 
to the increasingly diversifying opportunities and constraints, NGOs are organized in various 
ways by combining different organizational characteristics of: formal or informal; hierarchical 
or participatory; centralized or decentralized (in the form of networks, federations or 
confederations); and membership based or board/trustee based governance (Kaldor, 2003a: 
91; Clark, 2003: 112). Each organizational form contains its own strengths and weaknesses 
regarding efficiency, efficacy, participation, and legitimacy (Anheier and Themundo, 2002).  
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) appear as an important form within GCS, 
especially for domestic movements. TANs are issue-specific networks formed with the 
purposes of exchanging information and services and of sustaining communication on a 
voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal basis between by all types of GCS actors (Keck and 
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Sikkink, 1998: 8).
16
 Even though TANs cover a wide range of issues, they are more 
concentrated on three specific areas which are human rights, environment, and women’s 
rights. Mainly, TANs emerge: when channels between state and society are not open for 
resolving conflicts; when activists reckon their campaigns will be facilitated by networking; 
and when international contacts such as conferences provide grounds for 
forming/strengthening networks (ibid.: 12). In that regard, TANs exist as crucial channels for 
domestic social movements by facilitating local-global links through which they can bypass 
and pressure their non-responsive governments in their struggles – also known as the 
“boomerang effect” (ibid).  
Although groups, organizations, and individuals challenging capitalist globalization 
constitute a major component of GCS, it would be misleading to assume that GCS comprises 
of the democratic globalizers’ network only.  For many students of civil society, (global) civil 
society does not include business and profit making groups and their activities (Scholte, 2000; 
Anheier et al., 2001; Pianta, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a). Yet, as Keane (2001; 2003) indicates it is 
difficult to draw a clear-cut line between capitalist globalization and GCS.
 
This is mainly due 
to the fact that capitalist globalization is the main driving force that has shaped the GCS. In 
other words, it is the capitalist globalization which has generated the conditions and 
infrastructures for GCS to develop. The TNPs of the global capital in its search for profit 
throughout the globe have created ‘global spaces’ such as electronic finance and 
communication networks crosscutting national borders. In order to maintain and enhance 
global flows, global capital has invested in and improved the communication and information 
technologies which enabled various groups to forge links among themselves across their 
national boundaries. Also, neo-liberal regulations which are being standardized throughout 
the world in order to facilitate capitalist globalization have provided the legal infrastructure 
                                                 
16
 The essential activity within TANs is information circulation and exchange. However, information 
disseminated by TANs is of a specific type of knowledge because it is not only the facts that are conveyed but 
also experiences and testimonies of people. In that regard, connections with grassroots are maintained.   
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for globalization. Simultaneous changes in the welfare state as part of the neoliberal agenda 
have been accompanied by the assertion of NGOs as the novel social service providers and 
contractors of development projects. Enhanced levels of influence of the international and 
supranational agencies have also opened the way for people to make their claims outside their 
national-states and territories (Keane, 2001, 2003; Scholte, 2000; Chandhoke, 2002). Given 
the symbiotic relationship between GCS and capitalist globalization, members of the TCC 
also take part in GCS through ‘elite social movement organizations’ (ESMOs) which are the 
NGOs and business associations established by the TCC. Their main objectives are to 
generate the social and political conditions necessary for the operation of the market-driven 
global order in which they can pursue their capitalist activities and maintain their dominant 
position and hegemony by advocating freedom and democracy in its liberal sense (Sklair, 
1997, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a). As such, GCS exists as a complex and multifaceted terrain 
encompassing all sorts of conflictual relations and struggles alongside solidarity based 
relations in contrast to the normative conceptualizations of GCS as a terrain that is free of 
destructive and unequal impacts of the market (Keane, 2001).
 
This is mainly due to the 
heterogeneity of GCS with respect to its actors whose interests might diverge and even clash.    
Still, GCS has developed partly as a response to the crisis of representative democracy 
caused by a set of deficiencies of ideology, integrity, representation, reach, and sovereignty 
(Clark, 2003). Under these circumstances, GCS offers alternative ways of expressing 
demands through INGOS, social movements and other networks and channels of access to the 
decision-making centres. In accordance with the general promises of GCS, INGOs claim to 
materialize the democratization of the global power structure by acting as “system checks and 
balances”, voicing the demands of the ‘poor’ and ‘deprived’, and enhancing participation of 
the excluded sections of the world population in global decision-making processes. GCS 
actors have gained considerable achievements in terms of improving the working of the 
 43 
 
global structure to a certain extent. First, GCS actors have contributed to the global 
agenda-setting. Through campaigns and other activities like lobbying, GCS actors help get 
issues of environmental degradation and inequalities onto the agenda of power holders by 
linking these problems to global policies. On the other hand, GCS actors also aim to raise 
public awareness about global problems and enable ordinary people to relate their local 
deprivation to the capitalist globalization. Second, GCS undertakes the role of promoting 
certain norms such as human rights which subsequently contributed to the formation of 
‘human rights’ as a global norm. Third, activities of GCS pushed globalizing forces to be 
more accountable to the ‘people’ in their activities. In addition to pressuring TNCs and 
IGOs to be more transparent about their policies and operations, GCS actors undertake the 
role of monitoring the activities of IGOs, states and TNCs. They publicize those states 
which do not implement ratified international agreements and TNCs whose operations do 
not comply with human rights criteria or environmental standards. Furthermore, GCS 
actors unearth shortcomings, fallacies, and problems created by global policies. Also, from 
the perspective of the deprived and excluded masses, GCS provides channels of conveying 
their grievances and sounding their voices (Scholte, 2004). 
However, GCS has various shortcomings mostly specific to INGOs. INGOs 
undermine the democratic principles that they advocate in their own organizational 
structures and practices which make them suffer from a set of internal democratic deficits. 
Major problems INGOs experience  include low levels of participation and biased 
representation with respect to region, class, gender, and ethnicity; top-down managerial 
authoritarianism; prioritization of civil and political rights over social and economic rights; 
lack of accountability; and transparency shortcomings in financial statements or decisions 
over their issue agendas (Scholte, 2000; Chandhoke, 2002; Keane, 2001, 2003; Kaldor, 
2003a).  
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Representativeness of INGOs is questionable due to their weak links with the 
grassroots groups who directly bear the costs of global problems. This problem is exacerbated 
by the North-South divide which refers to the unequal spread of INGOs and their 
organizational availability across the world due to the concentration of INGOs in Europe 
and North America. Furthermore, cities in these regions which host the headquarters of 
INGOs serve as ‘the NGO capitals of the world’ (Kaldor et al., 2003; Anheier and Katz, 
2002). INGOs emphasize certain issues at the expense of others without representing all the 
‘people’. Representativeness of INGOs is adversely affected also by the fact that resources 
necessary for engaging in GCS are unevenly distributed across the globe. Consequently, 
GCS is far from being a terrain in which disadvantaged people from all parts of the globe 
express their grievances to a full extent (Scholte, 2000). For instance, the new 
communication technologies have provided numerous benefits to the GCS such as 
increased access to information across distant geographies and the formation of ‘virtual 
communities’ with shared interests across the territories. Yet, these benefits are unevenly 
distributed because of the ‘digital divide’ which is evident between the North and South 
and across different classes (Chandhoke, 2002; Naughton, 2001).  
Additionally, the scarcity of resources available to INGOs leads them to act as if 
they are market-actors in the sense that they enter competition with each other over 
resources. The major outcome of this competitive environment is that INGOs consider 
bureaucratization as a necessity which results in separation from grassroots since efficiency 
is the main criteria for the constituents that provide financial resources. In order to increase 
their resources, INGOs tend to focus on issues and concerns that resonate with their 
donors’ interests rather than beneficiaries’ (Anheier and Themudo, 2002: 205; Kaldor, 
2003b: 21).  
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Under the “new public management” which is mainly supported by the reformers 
and supporters of the capitalist globalization, INGOs have been viewed as essential  
implementers of welfare, developmental and environmental policies and programmes.
17
 As 
a middle ground between market-led and state-led strategies, INGOs have taken over the 
service-provisioning once assumed to belong to the welfare state. Another trend is 
‘corporatisation’ which refers to the INGOs’ cooperation with TNCs in their social 
responsibility programs of TNCs (Kaldor, 2003b: 22; Clark, 2003; Kaldor et al., 2003: 8-
9).  The ‘new public management system’ and ‘corporatisation’ trends turn INGOs into  
‘sub-contractors’ of the state, IGOs, and TNCs by pushing INGOs to become more 
professionalized; by delinking INGOs from the grassroots interests; and, possibly, by co-
opting them (Chandhoke, 2002). Furthermore, the lack of ‘accountability’ and 
‘transparency’ minimizes the channels for correcting the democratic deficits of INGOs from 
inside the existing organizational structures unless they cultivate stronger links with 
grassroots. These shortcomings interact to render GCS an uneven and partial entity with 
respect to its promises since INGOs are considered to be the most influential visible actors 
within the GCS. Therefore, in sum, GCS reflects to a certain extent the structural 
imbalances and inequalities of the global system which it aims to change. 
However, similar to its major catalyst, the globalization process, GCS is not a 
finished project. Rather, it is an ever changing terrain in which organizations, groups and 
individuals continuously try to find novel ways of mobilizing, articulating claims, making 
demands and influencing the global power structure. Therefore, instead of attributing core 
characteristics to GCS in an essentialist fashion, GCS should be assessed as a political and 
social space with constantly changing structure(s) and relations.  
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 Rates of increases in the service related activities of INGOs between 1990 and 2000 are as follows: social 
service provisioning increased by 79%; health services by 50%; and education by 24% (Kaldor et al., 2003. 15-
16). 
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Furthermore, GCS emerges as a multi-faceted transnational terrain consisting of 
various relations and networks among diverse non-state actors including INGOs, TANs, 
social movements, and individuals. The narrow definitions that equate GCS with INGOs 
overlook its complex and heterogeneous character and generalize the problems specific to 
INGOs to the whole of GCS (Kaldor, 2003a; Kaldor et al., 2003). This multifaceted and 
multi-actor terrain of GCS has both facilitative and disabling effects on its actors. Different 
components of GCS affect contemporary social movements by providing transnational 
opportunities, and sometimes constraints. Yet, it is not easy to interact with INGOs because 
of shortcomings on both sides. Moreover, links with GCS actors might also create problems 
for local movements since these relations are used by their adversaries against them which 
decrease their prestige and legitimacy. In that sense, GCS is a crucial heuristic tool, yet to be 
used cautiously as Keane underlines (2001; 2003) in the analysis of contemporary social 
movements.  
Social Movements under Globalization and the Global Justice Movement 
        With respect to  social movements considered as a sub-category of GCS, two 
developments have become prominent under the capitalist globalization: enhanced levels 
of transnational activism in the form of transnational social movements (TSMs) and 
transnational campaigns; and increasing rates of interconnectedness and cross-border 
activities and links of local/domestic movements (Smith, 2004a; Rucht, 2009). 
Accordingly, a shift away from the state-centric view is discerned within the social 
movement literature as well. The formation of transnational social movements and 
networks and the development of cross-border links of domestic movements which are 
interrelated processes have received ample attention from social movements’ scholars. 
Accordingly, transnational structures and relations have become the major locus of social 
movement analysis (Smith et al., 1997; Smith, 1998, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Guidry et 
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al., 2000; Smith and Johnston (eds.), 2002; Tarrow, 2005; della Porta (ed.), 2007; della 
Porta et al., 2009).  
Transnational activism against capitalist globalization has undergone several 
phases. In the first phase, numerous new social movements engaged in cross-national 
activism and participated in NGO and social movement gatherings either on the fringes of 
the UN conferences or in the self-organized international meetings against a common 
enemy, the capitalist globalization during the 1970s and 1980s. Through these movement 
events, they have built links between activists across the world and at the same time, raised 
public consciousness about global issues. Transnational activism against capitalist 
globalization became widespread throughout the world through the extension of  their 
focus of issues in the form of separate transnational campaigns and protests against the 
IGOs and TNCs and meetings in parallel summits throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Sklair, 
2002; Rucht, 2002; Pianta, 2007). With their enhanced binding power combined with 
public visibility through high levels of media attention, world summits including G7/8, the 
World Bank, IMF, and WTO meetings have been receiving ample reaction from social 
movements and other GCS actors that are critical of the capitalist globalization and the 
undemocratic process of these meetings (Pianta, 2001).
18
 Accordingly from the late 1980s 
on, social movements and GCS actors have been launching parallel summits on the fringes 
of world summits by combining street protests and conferences as well as transnational 
campaigns against TNCs.  
The first phase of the transnational activism against capitalist globalization 
consisting of dispersed transnational campaigns and parallel summits has ended with the 
Seattle Protest in 1999 against the ministerial meeting of the WTO which constitutes a 
major turning point for transnational activism, displaying some novel features. Based on 
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World summits are the major global governance form used by the members of the capitalist globalizers’ 
network in which governments, supranational organizations, and IGOs meet for framing global issues, 
defining rules, and setting policy-guidelines for individual states. 
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the previously cultivated transnational ties such as the Direct Action Network (DAN) and 
previous campaigns, activists as well as non-movement organizations with various 
concerns such as the environment, human rights, trade imbalances, indigenous rights, 
inequalities, and labour issues both from the global South and North – mostly from the 
latter, though- have joined together against an international target, the WTO. It is the first 
time a transnational mobilization has achieved widespread visibility in the eyes of the 
public and power holders at unprecedented levels mainly due to tremendous media 
coverage that the Seattle protest has received. In addition to the realization of North-South 
collaboration, the Seattle protest has boosted the feeling of efficacy among activists and 
has become a model for  subsequent protests since Seattle protestors have achieved a solid 
success in disrupting the WTO meeting (Smith, 2002a; Rucht, 2002). In the following two 
years, other similar transnational street protests were staged during the world summits.
19
 
Within this second phase, issues and strategies have started to become diffused, integrating 
separate mobilizations and street protests which have been heavily used as a dominant 
protest form (Pianta, 2007). In that sense, the Global Justice Movement (GJM) has 
emerged and become the most prominent strand of the TSM sector since the late 1990s 
(della Porta et al., 2006). 
The third phase has started with the formation of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 
Porto Allegre in 2001. In the following years, subsequent world social forums were 
organized in various cities in the Global South. This was followed by the launch of social 
forums modelled after the WSF at regional, national, and local levels as well as thematic 
social forums.
 
Social forums have the novel characteristics of being independent events of 
the GJM unattached to official summits, and of being organized in the Global South ( ibid.) 
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 In the following years, transnational protests have been staged during the official meetings of the TCC such as 
the IMF-World Bank conference in Washington in April 2000, the IMF- World Bank meeting in Prague in 
September 2000, the G20 meeting in Montreal in October 2000, the EU summit in Nice in December 2000, 
the meeting for creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the EU summit in Göteborg in June 
2001, and the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 (Rucht, 2002).   
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With social forums, the GJM has attained a permanent infrastructural basis for debate, 
exchange of views and experiences, and deliberation of goals and alternative solutions 
which was absent during the former phases (Rucht, 2002). As a response to the mounting 
accusations of employing violence and acting in a reactive fashion both from their targets 
and the media, the GJM activists concentrate on the prognostic aspect of their struggles 
which refers to the processes of discussing alternatives to capitalist globalization and 
formulating their collective identity and strategies. Moreover, social forums themselves 
serve as a site for practicing the aspired participatory democracy model so that a wide 
range of groups and individuals with varying identities, concerns, aims, and strategies 
coexist and collaborate within the same terrain without dominating one another. In other 
words, social forums are the on-going, dynamic processes of networking, negotiating, 
exchanging experiences and information, formulating a permeable and tolerant collective 
identity of “being against the capitalist globalization which preserves pluralism and 
diversity” (Rucht, 2002; Glasius and Timms, 2005; della Porta et al., 2006; Pianta, 2007). 
Hence, the GJM marks the development of a “movement of movements” which gathers 
together separate and fragmented mobilizations with common aims and concerns against 
capitalist globalization.  
The GJM participants carry out a laborious work of formulating a permanent and 
consistent master frame which preserves the heterogeneity of frames and which resonates 
with the individual frames of the participant movements. Subsequently, the master frames 
of “social injustice” and “democratic global order” emerge (della Porta et al., 2006). 
Hence, without letting one movement dominate others, different cultures, concerns and 
identities are captured by the master frame of ‘global justice’ and the collective identity of 
being ‘ones against the capitalist globalization’. Tarrow argues that transnational activism is 
successful in ‘frame bridging’ but fails in ‘frame transformation,’ referring to the lack of 
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new values and reframing processes (Tarrow, 2005: 62). However, given their main 
aspiration of maintaining the diversity of values, identities, and frames, the GJM activists’ 
attempt to form a flexible, permeable, enduring, and interconnecting master frame can be 
defined as a new process of achieving frame interdependence.    
Another novel aspect is bringing issues related to distribution back into contention. 
Within the GJM, class based inequalities and polarization have again become one of the 
major concerns in movement mobilization which points at the dynamic of combining ‘old’ 
conflicts with ‘new’ issues (Sklair, 2002; Kaldor, 2003a; della Porta, 2007b). Accordingly, 
the GJM activists put effort in bridging NSM frames of environment, gender, human rights, 
indigenous rights, and peace with labour movement frames which is evident in the mass 
participation of labour unions and labour related NGOs -‘traditional’ or new- in streets 
protests and the Social Fora (Waterman and Timms, 2004; Waterman, 2005).
20
  
Finally, the GJM groups make use of a heterogeneous repertoire of action, tactics and 
strategies which are also subjected to debate and negotiation and which entail non-
conventional protest forms on top of conventional ones, signifying a return from the trend of 
‘normalization of protest’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 119).21 They also utilize some innovated 
forms of action such as counter-summits and parallel summits, global action days, and 
transnational campaigns and boycotts in their adapted forms which are all facilitated by the 
availability of the new media (della Porta et al., 2006: 119).
 22
 In sum, the GJM has emerged 
                                                 
20
 The transnational labour movement has lagged behind its counterparts in terms of developing itself into a 
strong transnational movement against global capital, reminiscent of its initial ‘internationalist’ outlook , due 
to lack of resources and inappropriate framing of globalization (Sklair, 1997; Waterman and Timms, 2004; 
Evans, 2005). Yet, the ‘new’ labour associations with their non- hierarchical and less bureaucratized 
organizational structures, mainly originated in the Third World, emerge as the most promising branch of the 
labour movement to adapt itself to the master fame of global justice (Waterman, 2005; Waterman and 
Timms, 2004). 
21
 The use of violence is a major issue of debate for the GJM activists. For instance, groups of Black Bloc 
protestors staged violent acts in Seattle, Gothenburg, and Genoa, and these are attributed to the whole of 
street protests by the media. This has led to the stigmatization of the protests by the power holders.   
22
 Global days of action refer to demonstrations and protest events simultaneously staged in different cities 
throughout the world with a common goal and target(s) over a specific issue in order to mobilize and give voice 
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at a time when public interest and trust in conventional politics and its actors have been at 
minimum levels especially in the Global North. While the TCC’s hegemonic discourse of 
“There Is No Alternative” (TINA) dominates the global political context, the GJM activists 
come into the scene by questioning the validity of the consensus based liberal democracy 
model. In that regard, the GJM has started a new cycle of protest all around the world in 
which not only transnational campaigns and coalitions flourish under the master frame of 
‘global justice’, but also national and local movements over issues related to global justice are 
mobilized at increasing rates and articulate themselves to the “movement of movements” 
(della Porta, 2007a: 11). There are many local environmental movements around the world, 
including but not limited to, the Chipko movement in India against the hazardous impacts of 
the industry on forest areas (Haynes, 1999), the Narmada movement in India against large 
dam constructions (Khagram, 2004), the Green Belt Movement in Kenya against the 
construction of a ‘world media center’ in Nairobi destructive to green parks (Haynes, 1999), 
rubber tapper’s movement against the logging industry in Brazil (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), 
the Ogoni’s movement against the operations of Shell resulting in enhanced levels of 
environmental destruction (Haynes, 1999; Bob, 2005), and .As it is evident in these 
nationally or locally oriented at first glance, local movements frame their issues in relation 
to capitalist globalization directly or indirectly and integrate themselves in the GJM 
through transnational networks. Put differently, they all forged links with transnational 
actors and defined their issues beyond environmentalism by incorporating aspects of human 
rights, democracy, and development (Haynes, 1999).Changes in the scope, content, and 
structure of social movements facing a new polity at the local, national, global levels 
                                                                                                                                                        
to people around the world as a ‘global public’ (Pianta, 2007: 12). The protests against Iraq with the participation 
of millions constitute a good example.   
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necessitate a revised approach to social movements analysis which is attempted in the 
following sections.   
Analyzing local movements challenging capitalist globalization: 
The civil rights and student movements of the 1960s which have spun-off other new social 
movements such as environmental movement, feminist movement, peace movement and 
identity movements have led to the invigoration of social movement studies. Since the 1960s, 
various approaches have emerged aiming to explain these movements as a form of political 
action staged by aggrieved individuals and groups in their pursuit of targeted goals. Despite 
their focus on different aspects of social movements, these approaches, notably Resource 
Mobilization (RM), New Social Movements approach (NSM), and Political Process Theory, 
commonly treated social movements in a state-centric fashion by taking national contexts as 
their unit of analysis. The American based RM theory which was popular in the 1960s and 
1970s focused on the availability of resources to a social movement and the ways of 
mobilizing and managing those resources in their analysis of the 1960s movements (Zald and 
McCarthy, 1979). Put differently, RM theorists overwhelmingly focus on ‘how’ social 
movements are created with any kind of contention content by taking grievances as a constant 
factor. 
23
 A central role is placed on social movement organizations (SMOs) that mobilize and 
manage material resources such as time, money, jobs, right to goods and services, and labour 
and non-material resources including faith, friendship, moral obligations, authority, skills, 
commitment and legitimacy (Olson, 1968; Oberschall, 1973; Zald and McCarthy, 1977; Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, SMOs constantly try to convert bystanders into 
                                                 
23
 In general, according to the RM approach, common grievances and beliefs about causes and remedies for the 
grievances would not lead automatically to the emergence of social movements since deprivations and 
grievances exist in many setting but social movements are not mobilized in each case (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977).  
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adherents and adherents into constituents in order to develop a strong resource basis 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1220-1221).
24
 
On the other hand, theorists of the European counterpart of the RM theory, the NSM 
approach, commonly aim to explain ‘why’ social movements come into existence in relation 
to macro-structural transformations, interlinking them to micro-level processes of identity 
building in their analysis. Marking the transition in industrial societies as ‘post-industrial’ or 
“programmed” (Touraine, 1985); “technocratic”, “late- capitalist” (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 
1985) or “information” (Melucci, 1985, 1994, 1996) society, NSM theorists claim that a ‘new 
politics’ has emerged during the post-war period.25 The ‘new’ actors of this period consist of 
the new middle classes with high educational backgrounds and economic security who are 
mainly employed in personal and service based occupations; “peripheral”/ “decommodified” 
groups such as middle-class housewives, students, retired, and unemployed whose life 
chances and conditions are directly determined by bureaucratic and patriarchal institutions; 
and some elements of the old middle class whose interests are threatened (Offe, 1985: 833-
834; Habermas, 1981). These actors resist the process of ‘colonialization of the life-world’ 
which is the intervention of the ‘steering mechanisms’, the state and the market, in the private 
life sphere by attempting to shape it along the rationality of growth (Habermas, 1981; Offe, 
1985); and against the political and economic system and their institutions which are 
constituted according to “the rationality of production and control” which have inherently lost 
their capacity of self-correctiveness. Therefore, the terrain of the ‘new’ conflicts has become 
culture, including the processes of ‘cultural reproduction’, ‘social integration’ and 
‘socialization’ which have replaced the ‘old’ conflicts overwhelmingly played out over 
                                                 
24
 Adherents are those who share the goals of a social movement, but do not participate in a movement actively. 
Constituents refer to the ones who provide resources and maintain that constituency base. Bystanders are those 
people who do not oppose the goals and/or preferences of a SMO (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). 
25
 ‘Old politics’ whose primary actors are industrial classes, capitalists and workers is defined as politics 
revolving around issues of economy, social and military security (Melucci, 1994; Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 
1985; Offe, 1985). 
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material production. In other words, new conflicts in the late-capitalist societies are not 
caused by “problems of distribution”, rather they are related to the “grammar of forms of life” 
(Habermas, 1981: 33). Revolving around these new conflicts, NSMs struggle over symbolic 
resources constantly construct and renegotiate identities (in order to cope with the high flows 
of information); and bring forth expressive and personal claims. While doing that, NSMs 
operate in the social domain, in other words at the level of everyday practices and culture 
(Melucci, 1984; 1992; 1994:102). In their mobilization, NSMs such as the feminist 
movements, the peace movement, the environmental movements, and identity movements 
employ loose, decentralized, and open organizational structures reflecting their ideal of 
participatory democracy, they utilize extra-parliamentary channels for achieving social 
transformation. 
26
 
Both approaches employ a nation-based view since their analysis are inevitably confined 
within a given national context either with respect to resources, SMOs, constituents and 
adherents or states, welfare regimes, and national markets. From the 1980s on, another 
theoretical approach, Political Opportunity analysis (PO)/ Political Process Theory (PPT) has 
become dominant within the field of social movements studies.
27
 The PPT approach puts an 
explicit emphasis on national political structures in which social movements are embedded. 
By employing national political contexts as their explanatory variables, the proponents of the 
PPT explain the variations in mobilizations, strategies and success of social movements either 
comparatively with respect to differences among national political structures (Kriesi, et al., 
1995; Kitschelt, 1986) or longitudinally regarding changes in political opportunities within a 
                                                 
26
 Even though RM and NSM approaches have been taken as competing theories, their focus on different 
features of social movements makes them rather complementary and compatible which have made valuable 
contributions to the contemporary social movement approaches (Canel, 1997). 
27
 This approach was first called as the Political Opportunity Structures (POS) analysis which has implied a 
special emphasis on structures. However, after receiving criticisms of neglecting agency, processes, and non-
structural political elements in their analysis of political contexts’ impact on social movements as discussed 
below, its proponents renamed their approach as Political Opportunity analysis or Political Process Theory (PPT) 
which will be used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.  
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national context over time (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1995; Koopmans, 1993).
 28
 In doing that, 
the PPT studies the social movements’ links with institutional politics, and in that regard, the 
state emerges as an important component in the analysis of social movements whose 
structure, behaviour and responses shape the dimensions of ‘opportunity-threat to challengers 
and facilitation-repression by authorities’ which are crucial conditions for social movement 
mobilization. In that regard, according to the students of the PPT, the state is both the target of 
contention and the fulcrum that mediates the struggle between two non-state opponents (Tilly 
2004; Tarrow, 2011: 71-72).
 
 
The basic heuristic tool utilized in all the PPT studies is the political opportunities and 
constraints that either, respectively, facilitate or threaten social movements. Among various 
PPT approaches, Tarrow’s (1998, 2011) formulation has been accepted as the most 
comprehensive and full-fledged description of political opportunities.
 29
  Tarrow claims that 
political factors and the developments in political contexts which have more weight in the 
emergence and development of contentious politics in comparison to social and economic 
factors can work either as opportunities or constraints. When these changing dimensions of 
political context encourage people to enter contentious politics, they become opportunities. 
On the other hand, if they discourage people from staging their grievances as social 
movements, they operate as constraints (Tarrow, 1998: 19-20).  
According to Tarrow, political opportunities consist of five dynamic elements. 
Additionally, two long-lasting characteristics of a political context make up the stable 
                                                 
28
 Proponents of the PPT attribute a crucial role to the state in their analysis. They explain the historical 
development of social movements in direct relation to the historical formation of the centralized national states, 
the consolidation of national territories, and the formation of national political spheres as well as revolutions of 
print and associational life. Accordingly they claim newly emerging ‘citizens’ within a national territory direct 
their contentions towards the state and express their grievances at the national level based on a modern repertoire 
of action which is ‘cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous’ since the 19th century (Tilly, 1995: 45-46).  
29
 POS dimensions are defined in various ways by different POS theorists including McAdam (1982), Kitschelt 
(1986), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (1996), Van der Heijden (1997), and Tarrow (1998). Yet, insertion of various 
variables led to a lack of clarity with respect to the dimensions of POS (Meyer, 2004; Rucht, 1996; McAdam, 
1996; Meyer and Gamson, 1996; Rootes, 1999). Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) claim that the concept of POS 
is “…in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement”. 
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elements of political opportunities-constraints. Starting with the former set, the dynamic 
elements include:  
1) The increasing access to the political system: When political participation channels are 
enhanced for the social movement actors, challengers are provided with some incentives, and 
they find better grounds for mobilization and efficacy (Tarrow, 2011: 165).  Election periods 
are one instance, because power holders are more responsive to the claims of social 
movements as their potential voters (Tarrow, 1998: 77-78).  
2) Shifting alignments: The instability of political alignments which is measured best by 
electoral instability appears as another dimension of opportunities. New coalitions, the 
changing prospects for governments and opposition parties lead to ‘uncertainities’ among 
supporters and increased hopes of influence and success among the challengers (Tarrow, 
2011: 165). As for the undemocratic societies, any kind of political instability turns out to be 
an enabling factor for contentious politics since electoral competition is not well-grounded 
and regularized (Tarrow, 1998: 79).  
3) Divided elite structure: The divisions among and within elites because of internal 
conflicts, first, encourage people who lack sufficient resources by providing incentives for 
taking more risks. Second, these divisions mobilize a section of the elite who are excluded 
from the power structure to take the side of the aggrieved people (Tarrow, 2011: 166).
 
 
4) Having influential allies: Allies with extended capabilities and power help social 
movements in their contention against power holders. Allies who “can act as friends in court, 
as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf” encourage the 
excluded masses to mount collective action their claims (Tarrow, 2011: 166).  Social 
movements have a wide array of potential allies including interest groups, other movements, 
elites, intellectuals and the media. Political parties, especially the ones on the left, exist as the 
‘natural’ allies of social movements, especially in the democratic societies (Kriesi et al., 2003; 
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della Porta and Diani, 2006: 213-214). For instance, a split within the Left and the emergence 
of the New Left parties which have eventually become the ‘natural allies’ of the NSMs 
facilitate the  NSM movements throughout Europe (Kriesi et al., 2003). Also certain 
movements have forged permanent alliances with specific political parties which appear as 
their ‘natural allies’ such socialist Parties for the labour movement. However, the alliance 
structures built between those ‘external groups’ and social movements do not only contain 
relations of solidarity, mutual support and cooperation in a monolithic manner as expected, 
but also competitive and conflictual relations which might undermine social movement 
activities (Rucht, 2004: 208-209).  
5) Repression: It is the state which holds the monopoly of legitimate use of violence in 
modern political structures. In that regard, states appear as the major actor of controlling 
protest by using its police and military sources.
 30
 Yet, the use of physical coercion to control 
social movements is not the only means used by the state.  The state also utilizes pre-
cautionary methods to raise the costs for its challengers through non-physical means such as 
protest permission requirements, cutting funding, financial aid restrictions, and tax laws 
known as “channelling protest” (Earl, 2003). Furthermore, ‘protest control’ is not limited to 
the actions of the state, but non-state actors such as counter-movements might also employ 
coercive methods (Tarrow, 2011). Accordingly, a change in the level or kind of overall 
repression –mostly arriving from the state- operates as opportunity or threat for social 
movements (Tarrow, 2011). 
These dynamic/volatile dimensions of POS do not exist separately, but rather they open 
the window of opportunities for social movements by interacting with each other. They are 
                                                 
30
 States employ different methods of exercising repression which is evident in the varying styles of ‘policing 
protest’. As an important aspect of state repression, ‘policing social protest’ is done in two major ways: ‘tough’ 
policing, which is diffused and applied to a large number of movements, aiming at rigid implementation of law 
with no room for bargaining, exhibiting  low levels of toleration towards challengers by using massive amounts 
of force (even resorting to illegal tactics); and ‘soft’ policing which supports  a tolerant attitude towards social 
movements selectively by using minimal amounts of force based on a more flexible implementation of law 
allowing  for negotiations with social movement actors (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004: 218). 
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more open to change over a shorter period of time, and they depend on the immediate political 
context. Furthermore, when different social movements or even different sections of the same 
social movement are considered, the dynamic dimensions operate in varying ways (McAdam, 
2003). The impacts of same opportunities might also change for the various stages of the 
same social movement (Meyer, 2004). These elements are dynamic in the sense that 
movement actors might expand or diminish opportunities for themselves, for other 
movements, for counter-movements, and for elites and political parties (Tarrow, 2011). 
In addition to the dynamic/volatile dimensions, Tarrow also includes stable elements in 
his PO framework. The stable elements are related to the state structure and the characteristics 
of political relations between state and society which have been institutionalized in 
conjunction with the historical formation of states and which are long-enduring and difficult 
to change. First, state strength is the capability of states to implement policies, determined by 
the degree of centralization of state structures and the degree of separation of state powers of 
judiciary, legislative and executive. Depending on these variables, states are classified either 
as strong or weak in its ideal-typical sense (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 2003; Tarrow, 
2011).  Second, the prevailing strategies are the informal procedures followed by the power 
holders when implementing some state policy which determines the states’ choices of 
response to challengers. Prevailing strategies bring in the agency factor which is absent in the 
state strength dimension and constitute the political culture of a given context. They develop 
over a long period of time and are internalized by political power structures, making political 
structure either inclusive or exclusive (Kriesi et al., 2003: 33-34; Tarrow, 2011: 177-178).
31
  
In fact, despite its prevalence within the field of social movement studies, the PO 
analysis in its original version has been criticized because of some major shortcomings and 
                                                 
31
 The prevailing strategies are described as “...the procedures typically employed by members of the political 
system when they are dealing with challengers” by Kriesi et al. (1995: 34). With respect to subcategories of 
prevailing strategies, on the one hand, integrative strategies consist of “facilitative”, “cooperative” and 
“assimilative” acts of states. On the other hand, exclusive strategies are state responses that are “repressive”, 
“confrontational”, and/or “polarizing” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 33-34). 
 59 
 
biases such as lack of clarity with respect to its dimensions (Rucht, 1996; McAdam, 1996; 
Meyer and Gamson, 1996; Rootes, 1999; Meyer, 2004); over-emphasis on structures and 
neglect of the role of agency of social movement actors and cognitive structures which are 
essential for translating opportunities into action (Goodwin and Jaspers, 2004; Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996); its focus on movements with direct political orientations and claims neglecting  
movements depending on social and cultural factors (Rucht, 1996: 189; Goodwin and Jaspers, 
2004)
32
; and its political reductionism which prioritizes the effects of political factors by 
disregarding cultural aspects such as the attitudes and behaviour of potential constituents, 
social aspects such as availability and characteristics of networks, general stratification, and 
class structures (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996).  
Facing such criticisms, the students of the PPT have started reformulating their theories by 
incorporating in their analysis different movement aspects, namely mobilizing structures and 
framing (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988; Diani 1992, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 
1996a; Tarrow, 1998, 2011; della Porta and Diani, 2006).
33
  In these studies, opportunities, 
mobilizing structures and framing processes are taken not as independent, but rather as 
interacting factors that affect the development, mobilization and outcomes of social 
movements (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996a; Tarrow, 1998, 2011). 
Framing refers to all the cognitive work carried out by social movement actors to interpret 
events and conditions surrounding them including political changes so that they can define the 
opportunities/constraints resulting in mobilization with enhanced levels of belief in efficacy; 
define their grievances which enable them to define sources and figure out solutions; 
construct their identity and identify their opponents; harmonize their personal values, beliefs, 
and ideas with movements’ goals, strategies and meaning systems; and, in short, to establish a 
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 Kriesi et al.’s (1995) analysis of NSMs in Europe with respect to POS exemplifies one of the few exceptions.  
33
 Mobilizing structures and framing processes are built on internal structures of organizational structures and 
resources emphasized by the RM approach and cultural features of a movement such as meaning and identity 
brought forth by the NSM approach, respectively. 
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meaning system for their activities (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992; Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004). In that regard, frames are “interpretive 
schemata that simplify and condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and 
encoding subjects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s 
present or past environment” (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137).  
Framing process is subdivided into three categories with respect to its ‘core’ tasks: 
diagnostic framing, through which issues are interpreted and problems are defined by naming 
what is wrong and why and by labelling the  responsible; prognostic framing, through which 
solutions to the problems are presented and justifications for the choices of patterns of action, 
alliances, strategies and tactics are provided ; and motivational framing, through  which 
activists are endowed with reasons to stage their social movement actions (Snow and Benford, 
2000; Noakes and Johnston, 2005). As pointed out by Gamson (1992), ‘injustice framing’ by 
which unjust events and conditions are defined is an indispensible component of framing 
process since all movements rely upon them.
34
 
In order to be successful, movement frames should meet the criteria of ‘cultural 
resonance’ with respect to their target population and the cultural structures social movements 
are embedded in. A successful frame is, first, one which acquires a high credibility level by 
sustaining consistency in beliefs, claims, tactics and framing; by achieving empirical 
credibility regarding a solid match between social events and frames; and by finding frame 
articulators who are more credible in the eyes of the target population. Secondly, frames 
should occupy a central place for the targets of mobilization with respect to their beliefs and 
values (‘centrality’); have direct reflections in social reality (‘empirical fidelity’); and should 
resonate with the existing cultural narrations (narrative fidelity’) (Benford and Snow, 2000: 
619-622). In that regard, frames link individuals and social movements. To maintain such 
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 Even though Snow and Benford (2000:615) agree that ‘injustice frames’ are found in most of the movements, 
they argue that are not necessarily found in every movement since religious movements, self-help movements, 
and other identity oriented movements do not include  an injustice component in their framing  .  
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links, in other words mobilization of individuals, activists employ some specific strategies of 
‘frame alignment’ described by Snow et al. (1986). First, frame bridging refers to the process 
of conjoining previously unconnected but ideologically relevant frames between social 
movements or social movements and individuals. Second, frame amplification is the process 
through which movement frames are clarified by underlying values and beliefs from a large 
pool so that individuals can relate their immediate situations with the social movements’ goals 
and values once ‘deception’, ‘indifference’, ‘ambiguities’ and ‘uncertainties’ of individuals 
are overcome. Third, frame extension is the enlargement of movement frames beyond their 
primary issues by including the values and interests of potential adherents. Fourth, frame 
transformation takes place when old meanings are discarded and new ones are formulated 
(Benford et. al, 1986). 
All these processes of framing are achieved as a result of social interactions between 
social movement actors and extensive negotiations taking place over meanings. Hence, 
framing is an on-going and dynamic process which is shaped by the deliberate strategies of 
activists and which subsequently undergoes a constant change throughout the trajectory of a 
movement. Besides, framing is not only done among the social movement activists, but rather 
it goes beyond the control of social movement adherents since other actors including the 
media, the state, and counter-movements are also involved in the process by providing their 
own frames over the issues of movements (Noakes and Johnston, 2005; Noakes, 2005; 
Walgrave and Manssens, 2005; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Empirical evidence shows that as 
their degree of inclusiveness and flexibility increases, frames appeal to a broader population 
and have more mobilization power (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000). 
Enhanced levels of flexibility and inclusiveness lead to the formation of ‘master frames’. A 
dominant frame overarches a whole movement and inspires sub-development of SMOs’ 
organizational frames (Benford and Snow, 2000). 
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A growing number of studies argue that POS and framing processes interact and operate 
mutually and in recurring patterns. In other words, movements are affected by political 
opportunities which are constantly being shaped and re-shaped by framing (Valocchi, 2005; 
Cadena-Roa, 2005; Walgrave and Manssen, 2005). Accordingly, framing has been introduced 
to POS theory as a crucial aspect since political changes are not opportunities unless social 
movement actors themselves perceive and interpret them as factors which will facilitate their 
activities and increase the chances of success. In other words, “[a]n opportunity unrecognized 
is no opportunity at all” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 283). By describing framing as a 
contentious process which takes place inside a movement, Gamson and Meyer (1996) claim 
that constant struggles between different groups belonging to the same movement occur over 
which meanings should be attributed to related events and political conditions.       
Identity is another crucial component of social movements which is examined in 
relation to framing. Identity formation is described as an on-going, dynamic, and fluid process 
as a result of which boundaries with respect to values, beliefs, goals, and strategies of actors 
of a social movement are marked which distinguish social movement groups from their 
adversaries as well as from other groups of the same social movement. In this way, bonds 
between social movement actors are strengthened so that relations of solidarity, trust and 
commitment are maintained, and different experiences of collective action are connected to 
each other within an established meaning system. Subsequently, an intra-movement 
consciousness of “we-ness” is formed alongside their identification of “others” (Poletta and 
Jasper, 2001; Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Hunt and Benford, 2004).
35
  By developing 
common  aspirations, values and beliefs of movement participants who have no direct and -
face-to face relations with their comrades through building collective identities, channels of 
help, mutual support, and information circulation are enabled. Webs of solidarity increase the 
                                                 
35
 Identity construction is not solely an ideational process. Instead, some contextual factors such as 
policymaking, interactions with authorities and already existing political cleavages within a political structure act 
as “sources of identity” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 111-113). 
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activists’ strength, motivation and encouragement to face risks while decreasing costs of 
social movement activity. Yet, collective identities of social movements are not homogeneous 
and rigid entities. Rather, individuals participating in a movement hold a multiplicity of 
identities stemming from social groups he/she belongs to such as class, gender, and ethnicity. 
In that regard, “movement identity” is, “in reality, largely a contingent product of negotiations 
between collective images produced by various actors and various organizations” (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006: 99). Therefore, social movements form their collective identities mostly 
inclusively, articulating different positions and identities through negotiations and bargains.  
On the other hand, mobilizing structures refer to all those forms of organization, 
tactical repertoires, modular tactical repertoires, and networks which enable initial social  
movement mobilization and its sustenance (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996b; McCarthy, 
1996; della Porta and Diani, 2006; Tarrow, 2011). Recent conceptualizations of 
organizational structures go beyond the narrow understanding of the RM approach which 
gives primacy to SMOs as the representative of a whole social movement. Rather, social 
movements are described as complex and heterogeneous networks composed of individuals, 
groups, and organizations in various forms and characteristics, sharing common underlying 
values, goals and collective identities ( Rucht, 1996; McCarthy, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani, 
2003; Clemens and Minkoff, 2004; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In that regard, SMOs stand 
as important nodes among others, but they are far from dominating the whole social 
movement. Della Porta and Diani (2006) categorize SMOs as “professional movement 
organizations” and “participatory movement organizations.” The former refers to SMOs with 
full-time leadership, small or non-existent membership base or membership on paper. On the 
other hand, the latter entails SMOs that rely on grassroots and are shaped by participatory 
democracy ideals. This category is sub-divided into “mass-protest organizations” which 
combines their participatory democracy ideals with formal organizational structures and 
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“grassroots organizations” which are more horizontal, more localized and less structured 
organizations with fluid membership based on solidaristic and ideological incentives (Della 
Porta and Diani, 2006). Accordingly, all other sorts of networks that operate either as 
locations of mobilization or as sources of solidarity and commitment are part of mobilizing 
structures including informal-non-movement networks of family, friendship, work, and 
neighbourhood; formal-non-movement organizations like unions, churches, and professional 
associations; and informal-movement organizations like activist networks, affinity groups and 
memory communities (McCarthy, 1996: 145). These components are linked to each other 
through ‘complex webs of exchanges, either direct or mediated’, so that nodes (groups, 
organizations, or other entities such as neighbourhoods) within a network are bound to each 
other by one or more types of relations (Diani and McAdam, 2003). Furthermore, with respect 
to initial recruitment and mobilization, social movements rely on already existing social ties 
and social settings as long as activists reformulate shared meanings and identities by 
reshaping them suitable for their struggle (McAdam, 2003).
36
  
With respect to tactical choices, they are made by social movements in line with their 
general strategies in pursuit of their goals during their protest activities. Social movements 
choose their tactics based on some basic criteria of displaying their strength in numbers, 
making their potential for causing disruption/or damage visible, and strengthening their 
internal commitment to their objectives.
 37
 Through their tactics, social movements convey 
messages both to power holders to take action along social movements’ claims; to bystanders 
and allies with the purpose of increasing their constituency bases; and to adherents in order to 
strengthen solidarity and commitment relations within a movement. In fact, choosing tactics is 
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 Passy (2003) and McAdam (2003) define mechanisms respectively under different names as follows: a) 
structural-connection/recruitment attempt, connecting a potential activists to a recruitment effort in which 
individuals interpret frames, build their identities, and establish political consciousness; b) socialization/identity 
movement linkage, connecting the established identity to a movement opportunity and converting political 
consciousness into movement action; c) decision-shaping/positive influence attempts, influence of other 
individuals actions within the network.       
37
 Della Porta and Diani (2006) identify these criteria respectively as ‘the logic of numbers’, ‘the logic of 
damage’, and ‘the logic of bearing witness’. 
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a contested process which occurs as a result of social interactions among various movement 
actors including activists, opponents, and allies (McAdam, 1983; Della Porta, 2006). Within 
the repertoires of action, which comprise of ways of doing protest known to movement actors 
and expected by opponents and bystanders, there is a wide array of tactics for social 
movements which are basically categorized as conventional, disruptive and violent (Tarrow, 
2011). The process of choosing which tactics is to be used is constrained by several factors 
both external and internal to a movement. First, certain political contexts are more conducive 
to certain types of tactics. In that regard, the openness of political opportunities and stable 
elements of POS are factors which affect the tactical choices of movements. Furthermore, 
different stages of a protest cycle influence tactical choices (della Porta, 2006: 189-190; 
Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 273-274; Tarrow, 2011). In addition, internal processes of social 
movements such as organizational structures
38
, cultural frames, and the structural power of 
the participants
39
 are also decisive on movement tactics (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 274). 
Furthermore, social movements tend to make their choices with a proximity to previous 
movements adopting older forms of action in order to gain legitimacy through using ‘myths’ 
and heroes’ of the past (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 182).  
Furthermore, social movements might borrow tactics from other movements through 
diffusion processes. Different social movements continuously interact, emulate, and borrow 
tactics from each other and adapt them to their case. Therefore, each time social movements 
start their protests and struggle, they “…do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in 
each conflict” (McAdam and Rucht, 1993: 58). The underlying mechanism in this process is 
                                                 
38
 The relationship between organizational structures and tactics is a debated question. One line of research 
indicates that as organizations’ presence increases, movement tactics become more conventional and social 
movements become more institutionalized (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Staggenborg, 1988; Kriesi et al. 1985). 
However, others argue that more confrontational tactics are also employed by social movements with formal 
organizations as in the cases of homeless people’s movement in the US (Cress and Snow, 1996, 2000) and 
Greenpeace (Wapner, 1995).   
39
 It is often observed that social movement actors with less power and resources within the social, political, and 
economic structures such as the unemployed, the homeless, or racially and ethnically excluded groups are more 
inclined to employ disruptive tactics (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 277).  
 66 
 
diffusion. Diffusion refers to the spread of ideas and practices from one social movement to 
another across or within political and cultural contexts directly or indirectly (McAdam and 
Rucht, 1993; Chabot, 2002; Soule, 2004; Tarrow, 2005, 2011).
40
 In fact, diffusion does not 
only take place with respect to tactics, since frames as well as organizational structures also 
diffuse from one movement to another. There are four basic elements which are required for 
diffusion to take place: a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation, and channels of transmission 
(Soule, 2004: 295).  When an innovated tactic is perceived to be resonant with the goals and 
frames of another movement, the latter one, i.e. the adopter, applies that tactic to its own 
situation. Snow and Benford (1999) define four types of diffusion, arguing that diffusion does 
not solely take place between similar contexts and that social movement participants are 
active agents within the diffusion process who strategically borrow and/or promote and frame 
ideas and practices. These types of diffusion are reciprocation, adaptation, accommodation, 
and, contagion (Snow and Benford, 1999).
41
 The diffusion of tactics points at the fact that 
another way of maintaining repertoires of action is through ‘learning’. It is either inherited 
from the past movements or modelled from other movements (della Porta and Diani, 2006). 
However, it must be stated that social movements do not solely stick to the available 
repertoires of action inherited from the past. In order to draw the attention of public and the 
media and to take authorities and opponents by surprise, social movements try to innovate and 
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 Direct diffusion is based on direct network relations and affiliations under which activists and groups directly 
interact and communicate with each other through personal linkages between transmitters and adopters. 
Diffusion might also take place in-between social movements with no linkages and affiliations in cases when 
there are no network ties, i.e. non-relational diffusion, through the channelling of the media (McAdam and 
Rucht: 1993). The diffusion of ‘shantytown protests’ throughout the American educational institutions as part of 
the Student Divestment Movement in the U.S. during the 1980s (Soule, 1997), and the use of sit-ins and 
nonviolence protest in the Civil Rights Movement which are adopted from India are two striking examples for 
the diffusion of movements tactics. 
 
41
  Snow and Benford (1999) define each diffusion type as follows: reciprocation, in which both transmitters and 
adopters are actively staging reciprocal efforts; adaptation, where adopters take an active role and import ideas 
and practices by modifying imported forms according to their own political and cultural contexts; 
accommodation, which occurs when transmitters are active agents who amplify their ideas and practices to 
resonate with a targeted group of adopters and their socio-cultural contexts; and, contagion, in which both 
transmitters and adopters are both as objects of diffusion travel from one movement to another unintentionally.     
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use new tactics and adapt older ones to new situations. Hence, repertoires of action have an 
innovative aspect as well (della Porta and Diani, 2006). Previous movements’ repertoires of 
action might affect tactical choices of a social movement in the opposite direction as in the 
case of the Bergama movement. Bergama activists adopted non-violent civil disobedience in 
contrast to the left movement groups using violence, and enriched it with innovative protest 
forms since they considered earlier forms inappropriate for their own situation in their fight 
against capitalist globalization.  
As reviewed above, the social movement literature has come a long way with increasing 
number of studies combining multiple aspects crucial in the analysis of social movements, 
informed by the contribution of various traditions in the literature. In addition to the synthesis 
approach they have employed previously, three prominent scholars of social movements, 
McAdam, Tarrow and  Tilly (2002), have made further efforts at reaching a comprehensive 
theoretical framework  that accounts for not only specific social movements but contentious 
politics in general. According to the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) analysis, basic 
components of social movements, i.e. opportunities/threats, mobilizing structures, framing 
and repertoires of action, stressed by the classical approaches are still relevant for the 
emergence and development of social movements. However, all these components of social 
movements are combined through recurring processes and mechanisms that work as “the 
connective fabric variables of interest to students of contentious politics” (Tarrow, 2011: 
186).  They justify labelling the basic components, respectively, as attribution of 
threat/opportunity, organizational appropriation, social construction, and innovative collective 
action, by claiming that this is mainly because all different stages and components of social 
movements rise on relations between different social actors and they are being produced and 
reproduced through the interactions among social movement actors, opponents and third 
parties.   
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In sum, the synthesis model which is built on the POS approach has been able to 
formulate a more comprehensive understanding of the social movement process in 
comparison to previous approaches. As such, it is relevant to analyzing certain aspects of the 
Bergama movement as shown throughout this section. Yet, it stops short of integrating all the 
significant aspects of contention in Bergama. That is because the transcendence of single-
focus models is still insufficient with respect to its state-centrism. The synthesis model 
continues to take national contexts as its unit of analysis. Social movements under 
examination have been depicted as existing within some national political cultural structure 
which is the only factor that shapes all the movement processes. Furthermore, the nation-state 
has still taken as the main target and/or fulcrum of social movements, despite major 
transformations globalizing dynamics have produced. Although PPT relates social movements 
to political structures, they remain incomplete since the PPT studies fail to investigate the 
impacts of capitalist globalization on the formation of discontent and its translation into 
mobilization. Therefore, all this analysis should be extended to the local and transnational 
levels, taking into account changes in political contexts to analyze local movements under 
capitalist globalization such as the Bergama movement. 
In fact, there have been a growing pool of studies analyzing the relationship between 
social movements and globalization (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Smith and 
Johnston, 2002; Bandy and Smith, 2005a; Tarrow, 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a; della 
Porta, 2007c; Smith, 2008; ; della Porta, et al., 2009). Within this burgeoning literature, 
many scholars argue that activism against globalization predominantly takes place within 
domestic contexts, attributing a primacy to national contexts in the age of globalization 
(Meyer, 2003; Tarrow 2005; Rootes 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005a; Imig and 
Tarrow, 2009). Additionally, it has also been stated that even if a local movement raises its 
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contention to the transnational level, its ‘strength’ remains local, regional, or national 
(Tarrow and McAdam, 2005). 
        In his analysis of causal links between globalization and social movements, Tarrow 
(2005) argues that the contemporary state of the world rests upon two simultaneous and yet 
separate processes which intersect at certain instances: ‘complex internationalism’ – “a dense, 
triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, 
the opportunities and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors 
to engage in collective action at different levels of this system”[italic in original] (Tarrow, 
2005: 25); and ‘globalization’ which is narrowly defined as “increasing volume and speed of 
flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and forces that connect actors 
between countries” [italic in original] (ibid: 5). Based on his bifurcated model, Tarrow argues 
that the “complex internationalism” which refers to the growing ‘triangular’ interdependence 
between states, international institutions and non-state actors provides a ‘framework’, ‘a set of 
focal points’ and ‘structure of opportunity views’ for transnational social movements (ibid: 3). 
In other words, this bifurcated model suggests that while globalization is the source of new 
grievances and new actors, social movements are mobilized in venues created by “complex 
internationalism” in which social movement actors “congregate, cooperate, conflict, and 
frame their demands” (ibid: 5). Within ‘complex internationalism’, mobilization of local and 
transnational movements against neo-liberal globalization depends on six processes identified 
by Tarrow:  
a) global issue framing (utilizing ‘international symbols in the framing of domestic 
contention),  
b) internalization (contending against ‘external’ pressures within domestic contexts);  
c) diffusion (adoption and adaptation of strategies, tactics, forms of contention, and framing 
from other settings),  
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d) scale-shift (changing the level of coordination of collective action);  
e) externalization (bringing domestic issues and conflicts to ‘international’ sphere and making 
claims against ‘international’ institutions or ‘foreign actors in a vertical way) 
f) transnational coalition formation (creation of horizontal networks among groups with 
similar concerns and demands) (Tarrow, 2005:32-33). 
 
        These processes realized through various mechanisms of frame bridging, brokerage, 
implementation, certification, and attribution of similarity are categorized into three groups 
along the domestic-international axes with respect to sites of activism and range of issues. In 
the case of a) and b), contentions remain domestic since no permanent cross-border links are 
established. Even though repertoires of contention are brought together with c) and d), being 
temporary and open to decreasing domestic militancy again precludes transnational 
contention. Lastly, it is the processes of e) and f) which create the conditions for durable 
transnational movement structures. According to the model of Tarrow which assumes 
differentiation of domestic and international levels, the state and its institutions continue to be 
the primary targets and fulcrums of social movement mobilization which leads Tarrow to be 
sceptical about the emergence of ‘truly’ transnational social movements (Tarrow, 2005; Imig 
and Tarrow, 2009).
42
 On the other hand, sporadically occurring transnational protests and 
activisms are the work of rooted cosmopolitans with flexible and multiple identities who link 
domestic claims to each other through their brokerage rather than a permanently available 
GCS (Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and della Porta, 2005). In a similar vein, Rootes (2005) argues 
that even though transnational environmental movement networks have been formed as a 
result of increasing interest in environmental issues in the EU bodies, they are neither dense 
nor active. Also, national environmental SMOs are more inclined to entrench their struggles 
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 In their analysis of the impact of the EU as a supranational political governance structure on European social 
movements, Imig and Tarrow (2001:17-18) claim that the European social movement actors overwhelmingly 
direct their protests at their national governments even if they frame their grievances in terms of  European 
policies.  
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in local contexts, and they tend to direct their contention towards national authorities due to 
the scarcity of resources, the absence of a European public, recurring opening and closing of 
political opportunities at the national level, and familiarity of  action forms at the national 
level (ibid: 25). Additionally, environmental protests are mostly staged at the local, regional, 
or national levels because of the relative ineffectiveness of the EU bodies in terms of 
implementation of policies and the lack of convergence of issues and concerns across Europe 
(Rootes, 2003). Therefore, in spite of a transnationalization trend among the national 
environmental SMOs, it is a ‘limited’ one since emerging transnational political opportunities 
have brought constraints such as unfamiliarity with transnational arenas and the lack of 
resources (Rootes, 2005). 
 Therefore, these analyses agree upon the view that transnational activism occurs in an 
episodic fashion without forming permanent organizational structures at the global level. 
Protests over globalization related issues, on the other hand, mostly occur in the form of 
domestic movements against their national states and its agencies (Imig and Tarrow, 2001, 
2009; Tarrow, 2003, 2005; Rootes, 2004, 2005). True enough, many local groups suffering 
from the negative impacts of capitalist globalization choose to stage protests at the national 
level directing their contention towards their states. Yet, the question of whether it is the same 
national context under capitalist globalization remains unanswered.   
 In his analysis, Tarrow describes the current global system as a combination of 
globalization and ‘complex internationalization’ characterizing them as different but 
interrelated systems. Tarrow attributes a central role to states by claiming they are influential 
and powerful actors within IGOs which have been formed based on the ‘transgovernmental 
relations’ among states in the first place. In that sense, having a prominent role at the IGOs 
which are the main locus of decision-making regarding developments at the global level, 
states dominate the world polity as well as the triangular relationship between states, non-state 
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actors, and IGOs according to Tarrow’s model. Put differently, Tarrow fills in generic 
globalization by ascribing the state a prominent role and depicting a ‘political’ globalization 
process led by the states. Yet, technocratic bureaucrats who are detached from their national 
interests and other transnational non-state actors such as TNCs are also actively involved in 
decision-making and agenda-setting processes within IGOs whose policies go beyond the 
interests of individual states and reflect the interests of the TCC. As indicated by scholars 
such as Sklair (2002), Sassen (2007), and Smith (2008), TNPs take place within territorial 
units of states by de-nationalizing these contexts, making them integral to capitalist 
globalization. Therefore, states are one of the active carriers of capitalist globalization 
rather than passive bearers of the impacts of globalization. Local populations mobilized 
against capitalist globalization perceive states as such which is confirmed by the findings 
of this research. Hence, it is important to bring grievances back in the analysis of social 
movements by combining them with political contexts, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes, in order to grasp how local movements relate themselves to the GJM. 
With respect to opportunities at the transnational/global level, the necessity to adapt 
POS to the global level has been recognized in the context of increasing transnational 
practices. However, scholars who adapt POS to global politics posit either a ‘multi-level’ 
structure in which social movements shift their activities among different political levels 
(Sikkink, 2005; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005b; della Porta et al., 2009) or a “nested 
opportunity structure”  in which local, national,  and international structures form concentric 
circles (Rothman and Oliver, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Meyer, 2003). These accounts assert a 
hierarchy between different political levels. However, as Sassen (2007) argues, global 
political order can be best described as a ‘multi-scalar’ system that does not entail a 
hierarchical ordering of scales. Local movements are directly connected to each other by-
passing national levels at enhanced degrees of magnitude, scope, and simultaneity so that they 
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are “...not confined to moving through a set of nested scales from the local to the national to 
the international but can access other local actors whether in the same country or across 
borders” (Sassen, 2007: 207-208). Multi-scalar politics is mainly enabled by information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) used on top of long-enduring utilization of the 
‘traditional’ media. By exchanging information and strategies, local movements manage to 
engage in global politics directly while concomitantly remaining particularistic and domestic 
in their struggle (Sassen, 2007). As Rootes (1999) has pointed out, it is an imperative for local 
movements to raise themselves to national and transnational levels in order to be effective. 
Apart from resource based reasons, it is a necessity for local movements since their 
grievances are directly related to global structures and dynamics. In that regard, emergence of 
the GJM signifies a further step taken toward bringing local movements together as a solid 
movement since it is also the framing of problems, targets and identities that are shared in a 
loose, flexible, and dynamic fashion  while preserving heterogeneity and diversity. In this 
manner, domestic movements are exposed to global opportunities and constraints as well as 
they are to their national opportunity structures 
 
Transnational/Global Opportunities: 
The global structure lacks a governance configuration equivalent to the state. Instead, 
numerous non-state actors including organizations, group, and individuals engaging in 
transboundary practices and relations as well as various economic (IGOs like the IMF, WB, 
WTO), political (the EU and the UN) and legal (the European Court of Human Rights -
ECHR) institutions at transnational and supranational levels provide opportunities for  both 
domestic and transnational movements. In that sense, it is necessary to extend the classical 
POS analysis to the transnational level in order to understand the global opportunities that 
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exist for local movements like the Bergama movement. Accordingly, I will apply Tarrow’s 
POS that is formulated at the national level to the transnational level.
43
 
Having access: Having access to decision-making bodies is a crucial window of 
opportunity at the national level. However, the global political order which does not contain a 
political structure equivalent of the state lacks the most crucial mechanism of representative 
democracy – elections. This reduces the chances of gaining access to decision-making centres 
at the international and supranational levels. On the other hand, the global centres of decision-
making such as IGOs, supranational governance structures, and particularly the UN provide 
some channels of access to social movements even if to a limited extent (Bandy and Smith, 
2005b). From the 1990s on, UN conferences have become one of the main global sites for the 
non-state actors to convene (Smith, 2004b). Involvement of INGOs and social movements in 
these conferences endowed them with several opportunities such as interacting with actors 
influential in global decision-making; learning about global issues, policies, and  rights 
granted by international treaties and agreements; and developing grounds for common 
understandings of global problems, identifying shared goals, formulating solutions to these 
problems, and networking among movement participants. Also, participation in UN 
conferences contributes to global-local linkages since participants convey conference 
decisions and contacts afterwards. Furthermore, the UN conferences operate as training 
grounds in that social movement groups get to observe how global decision-making 
mechanisms work and how a multiplicity of views and positions co-exist within the same 
terrain which subsequently serves as a template for their own events (Smith, 2004a). On the 
other hand, IGOs like the World Bank and the WTO are fairly closed structures providing 
either no representation or a symbolic one at best.
44
  
                                                 
43
 I will combine stable elements and dynamic elements given the short history of supranational structures and 
their more dynamic institutional characteristics in comparison to nation-states. 
44
 Please see Van der Heijden (2006) for a further discussion. 
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With respect to supranational organizations, movements face very low levels of access 
to the EU- meaning SMOs have no institutional embeddedness, no formal access to 
information, and no participation in the decision-making processes, but they are allowed to 
lobby and negotiate with authorities as in the case of environmental movements (Rucht, 1997: 
207; Rootes, 2005; della Porta and Kriesi, 2009: 15). As the findings of this research show, 
the EU has provided opportunities for the Bergama movement beyond its national borders. 
Even though Turkey is not a member state, the Bergama activists have brought their issue to 
European Parliament through the brokerage several influential allies.  
Having influential allies: Under the capitalist globalization process, a new set of potential 
allies appear including GCS actors such as INGOs/TSMOs, ‘epistemic communities’, and   
members of supranational/transnational institutions such as the UN and the EU (Smith, 2004a; 
Bandy and Smith, 2005b; della Porta, 2009). Many INGOs/TSMOs are themselves part of 
TSMs, constituting crucial, yet not the sole or the most important, nodes within TSM 
networks. They carry out a variety of important roles in the formation of  transnational 
campaigns and coalitions including linking individuals and (national or local) groups to 
each other and to global politics, coordinating activities, circulating information, and 
contributing to the maintenance and sustainability of collective identities and solidarity 
given the heterogeneity of TSM actors (Smith, 2004a). TSMOs are also vital allies at the 
transnational level for all kinds of local movements either trying to articulate themselves to 
the GJM or targeting their own states which makes them part of transnational networks.
45
 
TSMOs contribute to the process of bringing local social movements together in new 
network forms, and they assist local movements in relating local conflicts to their global 
                                                 
45
 A good example is the Narmada Valley Project movement which started as a local movement but was unable 
to achieve success. With the involvement of INGOs in their struggles in 1985, the local movement was turned 
into a transnational campaign which has led to the withdrawal of the World Bank form the project in 1993 
(Khagram, 2004).  
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sources, which is a difficult task for local movements given the complexity of the global 
order. 
    Apart from linking local movements to transnational activism, TSMOs provide 
opportunities for local movements in their individual struggles.  As a result of the “boomerang 
effect”46, TSMOs increase constraints and pressures on local movements’ targets by linking 
local or national-level conflicts to international law and global norms. Also, TSMOs provide 
substantial resources for local movements, mostly in the form of funding, strategies, technical 
knowledge, rights and policies stemming from signed and ratified international 
treaties/agreements, and information about other similar local mobilizations and issues in 
other parts of the world. Since TSMOs attend and monitor global negotiations in global 
summits, they disseminate knowledge about negotiations and decisions to local movements. 
Moreover, they bring local conflicts to the global agenda by informing the global elite about 
their issues (Smith, 1998). They also provide legitimacy and certification for local movements 
by enabling them to have access to transnational events and conferences through their links 
with global decision-making centres.  
Nevertheless, building alliances with INGOs/TSMOs is not an easy task. First, there 
are structural constraints relating to the “the North-South divide” since INGOs/TSMOs are 
concentrated in the global North (Smith, 2004b). This divide is also evident in the sceptical 
views of the Southern activists who perceive Northern INGOs as representatives of their 
governments or in the biases of Northern INGOs stemming from different class, cultural, and 
ethnic backgrounds (Smith, 2002).  Second, the overall process of transnational cooperation 
through INGOs is a competitive one. According to Bob (2005), “marketing of rebellion” 
occurs when local movements have to adjust themselves to the interests, agendas, framing, 
tactics and organizational structures of transnational actors in order to get the attention and 
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 The “Boomerang Pattern” identified by Keck and Sikkink occurs when there is a blockage in the domestic 
political system. By forging links with allies outside their national contexts, local movements aim to increase 
pressure on their state through the transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 12). 
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support of INGOs/TSMOs. INGOs/TSMOs support local movements not only based on their 
philanthropy, but also in line with their own organizational interests. Given the limited 
number of INGOs/TSMOs and the scarcity of their resources, local movements might go 
unnoticed or ignored by INGOs/TSMOs unless issues, tactical choices, cultures, ethical basis, 
and organizational structures match (Bob, 2005). In that regard, organizational forms of 
INGOs/TSMOs with respect to the level of bureaucratization and the degree of connections 
with formal world politics also play a role in establishing alliances with local movements 
(della Porta and Rucht, 2002: 2).  
Although IGOs are one of the main targets of the GJM, they might provide 
opportunities for TSMs as well (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999; Smith, 2004a). IGOs 
occasionally tend to support and coalesce with TSMOs. On the part of IGOs, the main reason 
for alliance with TSMOs is to attain two resources which they lack, knowledge and 
legitimacy. Meanwhile, TSMs are endowed with material and nonmaterial resources such as 
funding, certification, and information (Passy, 2009). Moreover, social movements require the 
essential standards of liberal democracy, even if they are critical of representative democracy 
in general, to achieve success within the contexts they are operating (Sklair, 1995). In that 
regard, domestic movements mobilized over global justice issues also aspire to democratize 
their political environment. IGOs are among the fulcrums that these domestic movements 
refer to, to put pressure on their governments in cases of democratization of authoritarian or 
pseudo-liberal regimes (della Porta and Kriesi, 2009).    
Lastly, ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) which consist of transboundary networks 
of experts and scientists act as allies of local movements. Support of ‘epistemic communities’ 
mostly coming in the form of providing scientific information about technically complicated 
issues is important for resource poor local movements since they can make use of this 
information in their struggles against the TCC (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999) .  
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Divided elite: Another global opportunity that exists for social movements is the fact that the 
global elite, mainly made up of the TCC, is not unified in their political views on the global 
order.
47
 Held and McGrew (2007) categorize the capitalist globalizers into four groups with 
respect to their political views: neoliberals, liberal internationalists, institutional reformers, 
and global transformers. The ‘cosmopolitan social democrats’ –an overarching label for the 
latter three- opt for a capitalist global order in which global governance structures are 
strengthened in varying degrees. According to their model, both global and domestic civil 
society actors occupy a central position in addressing local problems created by globalization 
and implementing policies accordingly. In this context, the global elite who express worries 
about the detrimental impacts of the capitalist globalization especially about rising 
inequalities and environmental destruction might serve as useful allies. Alliances between the 
critical elite and the GJM at all levels can be achieved over specific issues to attain short-term 
goals. Nevertheless, divisions within the global elite provide opportunities for social 
movements to exploit the vulnerabilities of the discourse of the capitalist globalization (Sklair, 
2002: 284). Evidence from this research showed that divisions within the globalizing elite 
constitute an important opportunity utilized by the Bergama activists. There has been a rising 
concern about environmental issues in the EU (Rootes, 2005). As an institution complying 
with capitalist globalization, the EU’s environmental concerns and its specific sensitivity to 
the mining issue in Bergama has been used as leverage against the mining TNCs.     
Shifting alignments: The model on which global policies are built has shifted over time from 
the “Washington Consensus” to the “Post-Washington consensus” as discussed above. The 
new model which underlines the importance of institutions for the proper working of the 
global market has gained ascendancy among the global elite. The new agenda also 
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 Especially after the Asian crisis in 1997, several CEOs, businessmen, academics, and IGO members belonging 
to the capitalist globalizers’ network such as Bill Gates, George Soros, Joseph Stiglitz, Ravi Kanbur, and John 
Browne have raised criticisms to the neo-liberal form of the capitalist globalization by underlining inequalities, 
problems with finance, environmental destruction, and the Washington consensus in general (Sklair, 2002: 282). 
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increasingly includes GCS actors, especially INGOs, which enhances their access to resources 
as well as their role in the formation and application of global policies, albeit limited, as 
consultants and sub-contractors of globally applied policies (Chandhoke, 2002). The more 
welcoming global context increases the capability of INGOs, including the ones that take part 
in the GJM to carry global justice related local issues onto the global agenda. On the other 
hand, alignments within the network of democratic globalizers which lead to connect various 
issues together prepare the grounds for collaboration of various social movements.  
Use of force: Since an overarching political authority corresponding to the state is 
absent at the global level, the monopoly of using force is still in the hands of individual states 
within the global order. Therefore, in their conflicts with local populations, the TCC use state 
forces and means in order to suppress movements which underscores a complete overlap 
between national and global opportunities.       
.          On the other hand, the emergence of transnational political opportunities (TPO) does 
not amount to the disappearance or irrelevance of national POS since globalization is an on-
going process under which the world is globiliz-ing, rather than globaliz-ed. Under these 
circumstances, national contexts and states still present political opportunities (and 
constraints). However, national POS should be used cautiously since national political 
contexts are being transformed and reshaped –mostly in the form of de-nationalization- as a 
result of TNPs that states themselves are a part of. Globalization sourced conflicts intersect 
with ‘older’ conflicts and structures within national political power structures. In other words, 
new political power structures mainly revolving around the rival networks of the capitalist 
globalization merge with ‘older’ conflicts and structures, producing transformed national POS 
which cannot be isolated from global processes. In that regard, national political spheres are 
not intact contexts operating solely as filtering mechanisms for global opportunities, but 
rather, local-national and global political levels are enmeshed together.  
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   Impacts of globalization on national POS can be discerned in many instances. For 
instance, in national contexts of governments which are more involved in global politics in 
terms of membership in international organizations and the number of international treaties 
signed and ratified, there are higher levels of citizen participation in TSMOs which implies 
better connections with transnational networks (Smith and Wiest, 2005). Also, global 
processes and TNPs affect alliance structures in national contexts, reshaping relations 
between social movements and left-wing parties. Moderate left-wing parties in Europe and 
elsewhere which have traditionally been considered to be the best potential allies of social 
movements have lost their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of movements since they 
mostly employ capitalist globalization-friendly views and policies. Concomitant trends of 
‘professionalization’ and ‘bureaucratization’ of left-wing political parties are also factors that 
disrupt alliance possibilities  Centre-left political parties distrust  the GJM and its national and 
local counterparts, perceiving them as a threat. Thus, emerging ideological positions and 
organizational structures of left-wing parties minimize the chances of cultivating alliances 
among these actors. Yet, this general trend plays out differently throughout European 
national-contexts depending on whether left politics is divided or united (dell Porta, 2007b). 
On the other hand, Green Parties and radical left-wing political parties build alliances with the 
GJM(s) in order to  expand their electoral basis in their competition with centre-left political 
parties  (Sklair, 2002; della Porta, 2007b: 244).  
Another indication that  ‘inherited’ national structures and global dynamics enmesh 
together to produce globalizing national contexts is the cross-national variation of merging of 
‘old’ issues of class and ‘new’ issues of identity, environment, anti-war and others. In that 
regard, national class structures play a role in shaping GJM in terms of the “degree of 
institutionalization of class cleavage”. It is more probable to have labour-NSM alliances 
where class conflicts are less tamed or institutionalized as in the Southern European 
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countries of Italy, France, and Spain in comparison to the Northern European countries 
where class conflicts are more institutionalized and ‘class discourse’ is marginalized (della 
Porta, 2007b).
 
National elections still matter in the sense that governments that are threatened 
by the loss of their electoral support might side with movements against some global policies 
as in the case of the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
(Sklair, 2002).    
As the findings of this research confirm, as a local movement that framed its grievance 
in relation capitalist globalization, Bergama activists used three levels of polity 
simultaneously. Put differently, during their mobilization, the Bergama peasants carried out 
all movement activities such as framing, mobilizing, finding allies, exploiting vulnerabilities 
of their opponents and authorities at all levels without prioritizing one over another. As they 
considered themselves part of other mobilizations against capitalist globalization elsewhere 
around the world, they became an example of those local environmental movements which 
constitute the backbone of a global environmental movement which is yet to come in the 
future, as stated by Rootes (1999b). In order to understand the Bergama movement whose 
cause has been revolving around a new axis of capitalist globalization which cross-cuts all 
three levels, an analysis based on enmeshed political opportunities should be adopted.   
In sum, the findings of this analysis confirm that local, national, and transnational 
scales of polity are interwoven as their boundaries are being transcended and interdependently 
reshaped. In chapter 3, the historical analysis of Turkish politics reveals that the Turkish 
political and economic structures have been transforming since the 1980s under the influence 
of capitalist globalization. The state-dominated modernization from above model has shifted 
towards a neo-liberal structure which culminated in increasing power and influence of non-
state actors, formation of new alignments, rise of local actors and political agencies, and 
emergence of new issues in politics as shown in chapter 3. As such, the Turkish political 
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context revolves around a new political axis between proponents and challengers of capitalist 
globalization around which pre-existing conflicts still remain, albeit in their adapted forms. 
Yet, chapter 3 also shows that this is a process, and the political actors dominating the state 
structure since the 1980s act as ‘regressive globalizers’ facilitating capitalist globalization 
especially in the field of economy, while simultaneously putting a break on liberal democratic 
measures.    
Chapter 4 delves into the analysis of how the Bergama activists mobilize with respect 
to their organizational structure which is assessed from a network perspective. The chapter 
confirms that it is organized as a decentralized, flexible, and multilayered network at the 
grassroots in which four sub-networks intertwine: pre-existing networks of friendship, 
kinship, and village(s) as well as civil society networks were used extensively while the 
movement elite and NGOs acted as nodes connecting various sub-networks which facilitated 
the expansion of the movement from local to transnational in reticulated form. In terms of 
movement strategies and tactics, chapter 4 also shows how the Bergama movement has re-
interpreted pre-1980 repertoires of action, as well as how the Bergama activists have utilized 
innovative forms of action in a way that would not lead to alienation among its constituency 
and the general public.  
According to the findings of this research, framing processes occupy a central place 
for the Bergama movement with respect to mobilization of peasants, utilization of political 
structures and processes, and building alliances with other actors. As shown in Chapter 5, the 
Bergama activists framed their struggle as an environmental as well as a human rights 
struggle in reference to injustices produced by capitalist globalization. In doing that, they 
articulated frames which resonated with values, beliefs, and norms of the Bergama peasants 
resulting in a successful mobilization. Additionally, the construction of flexible frames and 
the use of master frames which are shared by GJM activists elsewhere facilitated the 
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extension of their movement network. Also, the actions of state actors and opponents have 
been filtered through these frames which in turn affected their perceptions of political 
opportunities available to them. Moreover, they have employed master frames of 
environmentalism, human rights, and anti-globalization which are also used by the GJM 
activists. Finally, the collective identity process of the Bergama movement analyzed in 
chapter 5 confirms that social movements attempt to form their collective identities mostly 
inclusively, articulating different positions and identities through negotiations and bargains. 
Even though the community based ‘peasant’ identity was emphasized, it was not an exclusive 
identity since it was reconstructed along basic norms and values commonly shared by activists 
outside the villages which made it possible to maintain extended networks of support and 
solidarity despite internal conflicts and vulnerability. 
As the literature indicates, national political opportunities are still indispensible to 
local mobilizations regardless of whether they are struggling against capitalist globalizing 
forces or not. As the findings in chapter 6 underline, the Bergama peasants interpreted various 
dimensions of their national political context as opportunities. In that regard, elections, 
shifting alignments, divisions among elite, and availability of allies at the national level were 
all perceived as opportunities. However, I show that that none of these national opportunities, 
including the availability of influential allies which has been the most effective of all, were 
sufficient. On other hand, the availability of local opportunities which compensated for the 
lack of widely open national opportunities facilitated the movement in terms of activity at the 
national and transnational levels.   
As analyzed in Chapter 5 and 7, the Bergama activists identify their suffering as a 
result of the hazardous activities of the TNCs whose interests are in conflict with theirs. As 
such, the Bergama activists locate themselves within the ranks of the network of democratic 
globalizers in their struggle against the forces of capitalist globalization. Subsequently, they 
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forge links with other actors of the democratic globalizers network including INGOs, foreign 
politicians, epistemic communities, and transnational advocacy networks, much like other 
local movements struggling over the detrimental effects of capitalist globalization. These 
links, in return increased their capacity in terms of resources, support and pressure on their 
opponents. Also, they utilized supranational and international organizations such as the 
European Parliament and International Court of Human Rights all of which is discussed in 
chapter 7. 
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Chapter 3:  
Social movements, civil society and political context in Turkey 
Turkey has been undergoing major structural changes since the 1980s. Economic, 
political, and cultural terrains are being reshaped under the globalization process which alters 
traditional structures. One consequence of transformation is the emergence of new social 
movements (NSMs) and political actors involved in issues of environment, women’s rights, 
religious rights, and ethnic rights. However, this is not to say that the traditional cleavages and 
conflicts arising from the processes of modernization and capitalist development in Turkey 
are resolved. Rather, the impact of globalization including structural changes and emerging 
inequalities as well as new opportunities amalgamated with long-established contentions. 
Accordingly, the relations between the state and social movements are redefined and a new 
political context has come into being for social movements. In order to understand the 
Bergama movement which is one of the main purposes of this thesis and place it in this new 
context, it is necessary to provide a historical account of older social movements and the 
economic and political context of Turkey in which they were mobilized.   
In this chapter I will evaluate the historical foundations of and the contemporary 
changes in the political context of Turkey in which the Bergama movement has emerged. To 
that end, a brief historical and sociological account of modernization and development 
processes of Turkey is called for to outline an overview of state society relations and relations 
between different social classes as well as their transformation under the globalization 
process.  This will make for a better understanding of the formation of civil society actors and 
social movements in Turkey which provides a general setting for the analysis of the Bergama 
movement. 
1923-1980 State Tutelage: 
The Turkish nation state was founded in 1923 by the civilian and military elite under 
the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. The republican elite’s ideological outlook was shaped by 
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nationalism and secularism influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and positivism.  The 
republic was a modernization project carried out by the republican elite from above who tried 
to differentiate itself from the Ottoman Empire. However, in reality, the formation of the 
modern nation-state was concomitantly a rupture and continuity with its Ottoman past. As a 
political and social modernization project, the Kemalist transformation was a radical break 
with the imperial-patrimonial empire whose basis of legitimacy was religion and its symbols. 
With the removal of personal rule, the formation of the republican Turkey meant a transition 
to a secular nation-state under an overwhelming modernization project. On the other hand, the 
republican regime displayed continuity with its Ottoman past with respect to its political 
power structure and centre- periphery relations.
1
 Therefore, Turkish modernization can be 
best described as a radical reorganization of the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire under 
the rubric of a nation-state (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 168; Mardin, 1991: 65; Keyman, 2005).  
In order to modernize the society and create a Turkish nation-state, the republican elite 
pursued a model of ‘state-centric modernity’ between 1923 and 1980 (İçduygu and Keyman, 
2003; Keyman, 2005; Öniş and Keyman, 2007). The ‘state centric modernity’ consists of four 
basic interrelated parameters. First, the state occupies a central and dominant role as the active 
agent of the modernization project, controlling almost every aspect of politics and social life. 
Kemalism was a modernization project that aimed at creation of a rational ‘modern’ nation. 
Second, ‘national developmentalism’ constituted the economic pillar for the modernizing 
elite. Accordingly, the ‘developmental’ state regulated, directed and actively carried out 
capitalist development in a context of limited capital accumulation and insufficient 
industrialization.  
                                                 
1
 Centre-periphery conflict refers to the historical cultural, political and economic divide between the ruling class 
consisting of the sultan as well as military and civilian bureaucracy whose power increased with the 19th century 
on, and ruled masses that did not have any political power. Accordingly, the main ontological aim of the centre 
was to maintain power without letting any centrifugal powers appear to share its authority and power. Reforms 
imposed from above by the centre in order to restore its power widened this divide throughout the 19
th
 century 
(Mardin, 1969). 
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Third, the Kemalist elite viewed society as an organic unity. Different class interests and 
individualistic claims were denied by the state elite (Keyder, 1989). In the ‘organic vision of 
society’ (Keyman 2005) society was designated to consist of different occupational groups 
with ‘duties and services to the state to reach the contemporary level of civilization’. 
Consistently, individual rights and liberties have not been taken into account and demands of 
participation, pluralism, and participation have been ignored by the Kemalist regime (Öniş 
and Keyman, 2007). Another parameter that complemented the ‘organic vision of society’ and 
maintained the sociological foundations of the state-centric modernization was the ‘republican 
model of citizenship’. The republican regime turned masses into ‘citizens’ by granting certain 
political rights. Yet, citizenship was defined in a specific way by disregarding basic civil and 
social rights, but instead with strong references to secular national identity and prioritization 
of “national interest over individual freedoms, duties over rights, and state sovereignty over 
individual autonomy” (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 277).  
During its early decades, the republicans ruled Turkey under ‘state-dominant mono-
party authoritarianism’ (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 70). The core of the republican elite 
consisted of a tripartite structure of civil bureaucracy, military bureaucracy and their party, the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP). 2 The republican elite made up an extremely narrow core 
that excluded almost all groups under the motto of ‘despite people, for the people’.3 The 
civilian and military bureaucracy had a prominent position within the political power structure 
maintaining control over all aspects of economic, social and political spheres.  
As the mono-party regime became consolidated, any form of opposition stemming 
from the periphery was seen as a threat to the regime. The state allowed civil society 
organizations (CSOs) as long as they remained within the limits of the Kemalist ideology 
                                                 
2
 In fact, there was a close link between the party and state. The state institutions and the party organization were 
officially declared to be congruent at the 1936 party congress (Zurcher, 2005). 
3
 Only a group of local notables were allowed to be a part of the RPP, but their role remained secondary and 
subordinate to the civilian and military elite (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 70). 
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(Alkan, 1998). Under this restrictive rule of the CHP, numerous associations were closed 
throughout the 1930s, and social rights such as the rights to strike and lockout and right to 
unionize were prohibited.  
With the introduction of multiparty democracy, the Democratic Party (DP) which 
emphasized economic and political liberalization as well as religious sentiments backed up by 
a coalition of commercial capital, market-oriented landholders and subordinate social classes 
such as the small peasantry, the urban poor and workers as well as religious groups came to 
power in the 1950 elections (Sunar, 2004; Keyder, 1990). However, despite the relative 
democratization and vibrancy of civil society experimented with during this period, the 
‘Jacobin institutions of the mono-party regime’ were taken over by the DP and used for 
similar purposes of repressing the subordinate classes and civil society actors during the later 
stages of its rule (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986; Yücekök, 1998; Tosun, 2001).    
  CSOs such as public professional organizations, foundations, cooperatives, and 
associations existed since the early periods of the Republic. However, these CSOs acted as 
‘the constitutive units of the organic vision of society’ and were seen as the activation sites of 
the top-down modernization of a backward society. Also by underlining duty-based 
citizenship, they emphasized ‘the moral primacy of the services to the state and nation over 
rights and freedoms’ and contributed to the reproduction of ‘the unity between the state and 
republican model of citizenship’ (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 278). This structure of the civil 
society remained unchanged even after the introduction of multiparty politics. 
1960s-1970s: 
Still maintaining its power and prominent role within the political context, civilian and 
military bureaucracy coalesced with industrial capital and the Kemalist oriented intellectuals 
and university students against the DP which was considered to be ‘anti-revolutionary’ in a 
Kemalist sense’ (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986; Keyder, 1989). The democratic order was 
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interrupted with the 1960 military coup supported by this coalition. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, a specific kind of national development model, Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI), was applied. The main purpose was to develop and support a strong national industry 
under the protection and coordination of the state (Keyder, 1994; Keyder, 1989). The ISI 
model which rested on a social consensus between the state, industrial capital and workers, 
since the short and mid-term interests of workers and the bureaucracy overlapped with the 
long term interests of the industrial capital (Keyder, 1989: 199).
4
 Accordingly, the civilian 
bureaucracy collaborating with the intelligentsia restructured the political and economic 
system by making the liberal flavoured 1961 constitution and establishing new political 
institutions which expanded individual rights, civil liberties and associative freedoms (Sunar 
and Sayarı, 1986; Zurcher, 1994)   
The ‘liberalized’ political structure in the 1960s and 1970s vitalized civil society and 
social movements in Turkey. Combined with the structural changes following rapid migration 
and industrialization, associational life blossomed and many public professional associations, 
foundations, cooperatives and associations were formed between 1960 and 1980. Yet, the 
numerical increase in associational life and the apparent vibrancy of civil society do not 
represent any radical change with respect to the ‘state-centric modernization’. As such, civil 
society actors were not independent of the state. (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 278).  
In terms of social movements, student and workers’ movements were on the rise given 
the new political opportunities as well as structural changes throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
As a result of rapid migration from rural to urban and fast pace of industrialization, the 
working class expanded in numbers. Extensive rights including rights to strike and collective 
bargaining were granted to the workers with the 1961 Constitution. At the same time, the ISI 
                                                 
4
 The industrial bourgeoisie was in need of a domestic market in which they could accumulate capital because it 
was too weak and fragile to compete with external market forces. For that purpose, state protection and 
interference was demanded by the industrial capital. On the other hand, they were also willing and, moreover, 
able to raise wages and give certain social rights to workers. Their main aspiration in doing that was maintaining 
a domestic market of consumers with a certain level of purchasing power (Keyder, 1989). 
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model provided suitable grounds for the improvement of the conditions of workers with 
respect to their wages. The favourable legal, political and economic conditions provided new 
political opportunities for the workers, and consequently labour initiated activism with the 
1960s onward.  
First, with the introduction of the bill of rights, a more liberal political context had 
come into being during the 1960s and the subsequent relaxation of state control over labour 
organizations provided opportunities for the workers movement. The number of unions and 
unionization rates increased which led to a diversified trade union structure. The 
establishment of the Union of Revolutionary/Progressive Workers Confederations (DİSK, 
Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) in 1967 which followed a more militant and 
socialist line of unionism contributed to the invigoration of the workers’ movement in Turkey 
(Akkaya, 2003). On the other hand, even though they still lagged behind the DİSK in terms of 
labour action, the Türk-İş also became more inclined to stage labour movements during the 
1970s, competing with the DİSK (Akkaya, 1996: 109).  
Second, the multiparty political system itself provided workers the opportunities to 
access the political system through elections and acquire influential allies among political 
parties that competed with each other along the left-right axis. Third, the formation of the 
legal socialist party, the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), and its participation in elections was a 
turning point in Turkish politics since it accelerated the diffusion of socialist discourse and 
politics into the political context.
 5
 Despite the fact that the TİP remained a small party with 
limited electoral support and in the parliament only for a short term, it had major impacts both 
on the workers movement and the general political dynamics of the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
                                                 
5
 The Turkish Workers’ Party (TİP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was founded in 1961 by twelve union activists. In 
organizational terms, the TİP was similar to European social democratic parties, whereas its ideological outlook 
was Marxist, yet not Leninist (Belge, 1989: 41). The TİP got around 3% of the votes and won 15 seats in the 
parliament in the 1965 elections. The TİP’s electoral support mostly came from ‘progressive middle classes’ 
rather than workers in the urban centres and from ethnic and religious minorities, Kurds and Alevis in the rural 
sites (an Islamic sect) (Samim, 1981: 68-69).  
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years following the founding of TİP, the political axis in Turkey revolved around the Left-
Right division. On the other hand, the TİP had a spill-over effect on trade unions since 
disagreements within the conservative union Türk-İş came to the surface in relation to TİP 
which led to the formation of radically oriented DİSK.   
Additionally, fearing the loss of electoral support because of increasing popularity of 
left wing movements, the CHP announced a ‘left-of-center’ program in 1965 (Eroğul, 1987: 
149). In the 1970s, the CHP shifted from the ambiguous ‘left-of centre’ approach to a better 
elaborated social democratic ideological stance. However, the transition in the ideological 
outlook of the CHP did not include a total rejection of its bureaucratic-elitist past. First of all, 
social democracy in Turkey did not originate from Marxism.
6
 Moreover, they adhered to 
Kemalist tenets by putting emphasis on its ‘populism’ and ‘statism’ ideas which were seen as 
essential components for achieving a more egalitarian society (S.T.M.A.: 2201). In fact, 
CHP’s take on social democracy  referred to a radical version of populism according to which 
the CHP advocated a position of ‘being on the side of people’ against dominant power 
holders.
7
 The ideological shift resulted in the increase in the vote shares of the CHP. Within 
its electoral base, workers had a considerable share.
8
 As a result of all of these changes, the 
Turkish political scene witnessed an increasing level of labour activism throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.
9
  
                                                 
6
 In spite of acceptance of class inequalities, their program was not Marxist in the sense that it did not envision 
class struggle. Social justice, social security, and individual freedoms were the main components in the RPP’s 
social democracy.  At the same time, private property and private entrepreneurship were specified as basic 
freedoms (Ayata, 1990, 1992) 
7
 The CHP did not criticize the bureaucratic reformism of Kemalism. Instead, the party re-interpreted and 
reformulated ideological premises of Kemalism like ‘populism’, ‘progressivism’ and ‘statism’ under a 
‘democratic left’ discourse as they called it. (S.T.M.A., 1988: 2204; Erdogan, 2000: 28).       
8
 With the radicalization of the trade union movement and the political polarization of society, the traditional 
statist politics of the CHP was revitalized in an attempt to keep society together and to secure the existence of the 
state (Samim, 1981). 
9
 Despite increasing constraints on unions during the military intervention 1971, labour activism climbed to 
unprecedented levels between 1972 and 1980 due to the fact that political alliances and the ISI model remained 
the same (Akkaya, 1996).   
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Another major mobilization in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s was the student 
movement that emerged before the 1960 military coup. With the extended liberties and rights 
under the 1961 constitution, university students were allowed to establish organizations and 
participate in political parties. Moreover, the military regime and its subsequent governments 
were more inclined to permit student mobilizations as long as they stuck to the Kemalist ideas 
and order. Accordingly, between 1960 and 1965, student organizations were formed at an 
increasing rate, and they overwhelmingly supported Kemalist principles and the 1960 regime.  
From 1961 on, the student movement changed its course with the diffusion of socialist 
and Marxist ideas especially with the impact of the TİP (Belge, 1983; Alpay, 1988).  The TİP 
became a platform through which socialist ideology diffused into the student movement and 
shaped the later discussions and fragmentations within the leftist movements (Samim, 1990). 
Yet shortly after, divisions occurred between the parliamentary socialist camp which 
advocated remaining within the existing legal structure and forming a mass workers party, 
and supporters of  the ‘national democratic revolution’ (the MDD), which proposed  
discarding the feudal elements and struggling against the threat of imperialism (Alpay, 1988; 
Samim, 1990).
 10 
On the other hand, the 1968 movements across Europe caused a spill-over 
effect in terms of galvanizing the student activism in Turkey as elsewhere. Subsequently, the 
first radical and extensive student protests took place in Istanbul and Ankara in 1968.
11
 From 
then on, different types of student and workers actions and protests were staged almost on a 
daily basis. The growth of student radicalization led to the emergence of many leftist extra-
                                                 
10
 In contrast to the ouverist approach of democratic socialism which points to the workers as the vanguards of 
transition to socialism, The MDD approach advocated a revolutionary process to be started by a coalition of 
workers, peasants and the poor against feudalism and imperialism in Turkey under the leadership of workers and 
with the support of the military (Belge, 1990). 
11
 Students occupied universities in Istanbul and Ankara demanding university reforms in June 1968.  Another 
major event was the protests against the visit by the 6
th
 fleet of the U.S. navy (STMA, 1988; Belge, 2007: 36). 
The student movement accelerated and numerous demonstrations and boycotts were staged with the ignition of 
these events.  
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parliamentary socialist groups who were impatient with the low electoral support of the TİP. 
The TİP started losing all its popularity and became fragmented (Samim, 1990).  
The student movement became more inclined to radicalize and use violence at the end 
of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. After the military intervention in 1971, 
numerous leftist/student activists subscribing to different versions of Marxism spun off from 
the MDD group (Samim, 1990). Throughout the 1970s, the left/student movement was shaped 
by violence and armed struggles with the ultra-nationalist anti-communist counter-movements 
as well as among the different fractions of the Left which culminated to the level of civil war 
(Belge, 1983: 1962).  
In comparison to the movements of the 1960s elsewhere in the world, the student 
activists in Turkey discovered the ‘old’ left rather than the ‘new’ left throughout their 
struggles in the 1960s. Student/left activists, in their struggle with authority and power, did 
not bring a genuine critique to the Kemalist ideology to a full extent. Instead, by doing frame 
bridging (Snow et al., 1986), they interpreted the basic tenets of Kemalism, i.e. ‘statism’, 
‘progressivism’, ‘populism’, ‘republicanism’, ‘secularism’ nationalism’ as being compatible 
with their anti-imperialist and national developmentalist rhetoric (Belge, 2007: 45-46). 
Without questioning the Kemalist ideology’s self-attributed transformative ‘will’ in their 
actions, they tried to take over the leading role in the transformation of society with similar 
methods since their grassroots support remained limited. 
In sum, there was an explosion of workers’, left/student, and reactionary 
ultranationalist movements in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Certain changes both 
in the political and economic structures facilitated the emergence of these social movements 
and led to a cycle of contention. However, the impact of these movements on the political 
context in general was limited since these social movements did not alter the fundamentals of 
the state-centric modernization and state-society relations in Turkey radically. Instead, it 
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reproduced the authoritarian elements by producing ideological polarization and 
fragmentation as well as violence at the horizontal level within the society. As Göle has 
suggested, the utopias of the left/student movements were detached from ideology that is in 
direct relation with reality, and they suffered from the ‘single-actor syndrome’ so as to deny 
diversified identities and horizontal relations (Göle, 1994: 216-217). CSOs as the potential 
participants of social movements remained under the strict control of the state as a result of 
‘use of civil society’ by the state. During the 1960s and 1970s, associational life was also 
affected by the division along the left-right axis. Most of the CSOs held ideological 
aspirations, sharing the utopian visions of achieving control of the power structure and 
transforming the society. They could not themselves transform into structures independent of 
the state. 
 
Post-1980: Neoliberal agenda and adaptation to capitalist globalization 
Post 1980 Turkey has undergone vast political, economic and social change under the 
influence of capitalist globalization. The turning point was the military coup in 1980 which 
aimed to restore the power of the state and restructure the social and political order along the 
traditional Kemalist ideology. The new military regime carried out unprecedented levels of 
destruction of Turkish political and civic life. Most of the existing political and civil society 
organizations were dismantled with the aim of restructuring the political context on a tabula 
rasa. The military regime’s repression occurred in the form of closing of all the pre-1980 
political parties; suspending the activities of radical union confederations such as DİSK; 
banning the majority of associations and unions; arresting  people both from the right and, 
overwhelmingly, from the left including politicians, unionists, students, professors and 
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journalists
12
; putting pressure on universities and the media; and violating human rights 
through the use of torture (Ahmad, 1994).    
However, unintentionally, the brutal and repressive military regime led to the radical 
transformation of the inward-looking and state-centric social, economic and political actors. 
In contrast to the 1923-1980 period, the trajectory of Turkish modernization as well as the 
role of the state and its perception by the society was immensely altered as a result of 
transnational economic and political dynamics. Hence in this section I will argue that: 1) from 
the 1980s on, the developments in the political, social and economic spheres in which social 
movements rise and mobilize constitute a turning point in Turkey and 2) capitalist 
globalization, transnational relations and supranational political structures such as the 
European Union (EU) are decisive on the post-1980 social transformation so as to situate 
social change in Turkey at the intersection of global, national, and local dynamics.  
During the post 1980 period, the dominant role of the state in the economy and its 
national developmentalist approach had come to an end. The ISI model, no longer a viable 
choice for development either for the state or for the large industrial bourgeoisie, was 
abandoned in favour of neo-liberalism which had become the hegemonic ideology throughout 
the global economy since the 1970s. The big industrial capital that has been nurtured under 
the auspices of the state until then, wanted to free itself from state tutelage and its arbitrary 
nature, integrate with the global markets and act beyond the domestic market (Keyder, 1997: 
47).  
Under these circumstances, the economy shifted towards an export-oriented free 
market model. Due to the main objective of establishing open financial and trade policy 
regimes in the post-1980 period, neoliberal adjustment and stabilization programs were 
undertaken by the military regime and the following civilian governments. These policies 
                                                 
12
 By the end of 1980, around 30 thousand people had been arrested. After one year, 122,600 arrests were made 
(Zurcher, 2005: 279-280). 
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mainly consist of liberalization of trade and foreign currency regimes, shifting state 
investments from manufacturing to infrastructural development, relaxation of import policies 
by eliminating import quotas, and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) (Öniş, 1998: 460-
461). 
 The outcome was the rapid integration of the Turkish economy into global markets 
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s (Toprak, 1994; Keyder, 1997; Öniş, 1998; Sunar, 2004). 
State interventionism at the micro-economic level was minimized, and considerable levels of 
financial liberalization, deregulation and export promotion were achieved through subsidies 
and tax-cuts in congruence with the programs. Global economic transformations and its 
impacts on Turkey have been one of the major factors that triggered the questioning of ‘state-
centric modernity’ and caused the crisis of the strong state tradition in Turkey. These 
economic transformations were accompanied by further transformations within the political 
and social context. Particularly, the European Union (EU) as part of the political globalization 
process stands out as a great influence over the transformation in the social and political 
context in the post 1980 period.  
Turkey-EU relations and its impact: 
Turkey first applied formally for Associate Membership of the European Economic 
Community in 1959. However, there were no major advancements in the relations between 
Turkey and Europe until the mid 1980s due to economic and political reasons (Öniş, 2003).By 
the second half of the 1980s, the relations had been re-established with the efforts of the 
liberal government of the Motherland Party (ANAP). The first change came in the economic 
terrain with the entrance of Turkey into the Customs Union in 1995.
 
The next significant 
development is the European Council Summit meeting in Helsinki in 1999 in which Turkey 
was offered the candidacy status it was denied only 2 years ago.  
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Since the announced aim of Turkey’s accession in the mid 1980s, the EU’s shadow 
has been on the Turkish political and social life with respect to democratization and 
liberalization. The reform process starting with the candidacy status in 1999 resulted in major 
constitutional reforms, several legislative packages, a new Civil Code and a new Penal Code. 
A National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis was adopted. Further reforms were carried out 
at the institutional level in terms of democratizing the state structure and adapting to civilian- 
based politics. The solid impact of the EU was discerned as Turkey embarked on a major 
reform process starting in 2002 when the Bergama movement was already in decline. Yet, the 
EU was perceived as an opportunity by the Bergama activists since Turkey aspired to join the 
EU during the peak times of their mobilization. In that regard, they approached the European 
Parliament (EP), asking them to put pressure on the Turkish state and the TNCs. Another 
European institution, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) existed as an opportunity 
at the transnational level through which the Bergama activists could further prove their cause 
legally. 
The erosion of ‘state-centric modernity’: 
The aim of the 1980 coup was to restore the Kemalist order by preventing ideological 
polarization and fragmentation. It attempted to restructure the society by controlling the 
politically mobilized social actors caused by the ‘liberal’ political and legal framework in the 
1960 and the 1970s. (Özbudun, 2007: 179).The repressive military intervention and its 
constitution curbed the power of civil society and social movements to a large extent. 
However, the restructuration of the political context by the military produced some 
unintended consequences in the subsequent years (Toprak, 1994; Göle, 1994, 2000). During 
the 1980s, civil society actors started gaining their autonomy from  state control, and 
paradoxically, the military intervention acted as a ‘catharsis’ for this development by 
redefining state-society relations (Göle, 1994: 217). As Toprak notes, “[p]aradoxically the 
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coup which set out to destroy the institutions of civil society helped to strengthen the 
commitment to civilian politics, consensus-building, civil rights and issue-oriented 
associational activity” (Toprak, 1994: 95). Combined with the impact of globalization, the 
vibrancy of civil society has contributed to “the emerging legitimacy and representation crisis 
for the state and its state driven modernity” (Keyder, 1997: 47).  
This paradoxical situation was caused by the interaction of the responses to the 
repressive military regime and impacts of globalization which resulted in the questioning of 
state-centric modernization in Turkey. First, diffusion of the capitalist globalization in Turkey 
has shaken the centrality of the state in economic issues which faced representation and 
legitimacy problems (Öniş, 1997; Öniş and Keyman, 2007). The state could no longer uphold 
national developmentalism as an ideological instrument since globalization of the Turkish 
economy “reduced significantly the power and legitimacy of national developmentalism as an 
effective ideological device of the strong state to dictate the rules of the economic sphere in 
its regulation of economy” (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 279-280). With the neoliberal agenda 
pursued in the economy, there was a discursive and normative shift in the society. Liberal 
notions of individualism, entrepreneurship, and pragmatism were sounded altering socio-
political values. Accordingly, individuals tried to carve up independent economic spaces 
distinct from the state. This has led to increasing calls for democratization of state-society 
relations and individual rights and freedoms (Göle, 1994; Özbudun and Keyman, 2002; Öniş 
and Keyman, 2007).  
Second, the ‘legitimacy’ and ‘representation’ crisis of the state deepened especially 
with the 1990s on as new identity claims of the Islamic and Kurdish movements have become 
prevalent (Toprak, 1994; Keyder, 1997; Keyman, 2005; Keyman and Öniş, 2007). Political-
cultural Islamic and Kurdish identities have released themselves from the republican 
definition of citizenship and acted as centrifugal forces, making demands and claiming 
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recognition after a long period of suppression. The revival of Islamic and Kurdish identities 
emphasizes other sources of identity in effect dismantling the ‘organic vision of society’. In 
that regard, the meaning of modernity has changed since ‘alternative modernities’ emerged 
based on an emphasis of democratization (Göle, 2000; Keyman, 2005). The globalization 
process in general has contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the state by displacing its 
prominent role in politics since it provided a “global point of reference in politics which has 
begun to be utilized by these new actors at the global-local nexus” (İçduygu and Keyman, 
2003). Therefore, the state is no longer perceived as the ‘primary political context’ in which 
civil society actors were included in a limited and controlled manner. New social actors who 
operated at the global-local nexus transcended the boundaries of national politics as well as 
inserting culture and civil society into the political sphere as prominent elements (Keyman, 
2005). In that regard, the EU which is seen as part of the globalization process acted as a 
catalyst. The accession process to the EU has led to the questioning of the supremacy of the 
state. With the EU related reforms, new opportunities emerged for new political actors. Also, 
the EU provided a supranational terrain where political and cultural demands could be made. 
Accordingly, all the political once repressed found an opportunity window to escape from the 
state tutelage.  
Revival of Civil Society and Social Movements: 
Given these changes, the political context took an utterly different shape in the post-
1980 period. As neoliberal discourses came to prevail, policy oriented politics predominated, 
and undermined class based revolutionary action. This has led to the emergence of alternative 
mechanisms of resistance and political expression such as NSMs and civil society action. 
Consequently, the post-1980 period witnessed the emergence of a vibrant civil society in 
Turkey. During the 1983-1989 period, in the context of neoliberal policies carried out by the 
neoliberal ANAP and the overwhelming discourse of minimizing the economic role of the 
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state and bureaucracy, the concept of civil society has been associated with liberalism in the 
sense that it is viewed as a replacement for the state in certain fields (Tosun, 2001). NSMs 
organized by new actors revolve around new issues such as human rights, the environment, 
women’s rights, gay/lesbian rights, ethnicity (the Kurdish movement) and religion (Islam) 
which have increasingly become concerns for many civil society actors.  
The prevalence of civil society in the post-1980 period was accompanied by a 
quantitative increase in CSOs during the 1990s. The number of associations reached an 
unprecedented level. In comparison to the pre-1980 period, the new organizations of the 
1990s have been more inclined to remain issue-oriented (Toprak, 1994: 104). This 
quantitative improvement has occurred alongside a legal liberalization which started in 
the mid-1990s. Several articles of the 1982 constitution regarding civil society were 
amended in 1995.
13
  Further amendment packages were implemented in 2001 and 2004 
with the impact of the EU (Özbudun, 2007: 195). The gradual legal liberalization 
provided a more open political context. 
The links between civil society actors including NGOs, voluntary associations, and 
grass-root groups started to strengthen with the civil society symposiums organized among 
civil society organizations during the 1990s. Furthermore, the second United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II) conference held in Istanbul in 1996 
enabled forging links among approximately 1500 CSOs during the preparation stage of the 
conference, and it also contributed to the formation of transnational links between Turkish 
and foreign NGOs (Uğur, 1998: 221-222). Furthermore, several campaigns were launched 
that mainly revolved around citizenship rights and democratization.
14
 These campaigns 
                                                 
13
 In 1995, extensive amendments were made in Article 33 which is about freedom of associations. The 
bans on the political activities of civil society organizations were removed. CSOs attained the right to 
collaborate with political parties and other CSOs (Özbudun, 2007: 185).   
14
 The most successful campaigns are: ‘A million signature for peace’ (Barış İçin Bir Milyon İmza), One 
Minute of Darkness for Permanent Enlightenment’ (Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık) (Tekay, 
2003) and the Initiative for a Civilian Constitution (Mahçupyan, 2003)  
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mobilized large masses and brought together a wide range of CSOs and individuals with 
diverse ideological orientations.  
In fact, civil society has been evaluated in Turkey as the harbinger of democratization in 
the sense that it proposes alternative channels for overcoming the legitimacy crisis of 
representative democracy and the state (Bora and Çağlar, 2002). It has been widely maintained in 
the academic and public life that civil society has challenged and transformed the top-down, state-
centric political sphere in Turkey. These arguments are valid to a large extent, but despite its 
positive impact, civil society’ contribution to democratization remained limited. The recent 
formation of Kemalist CSOs exemplifies the ‘boundary problems of civil society’. As the 
state-centric modernity and the Kemalist project underwent a crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, 
numerous Kemalist-oriented CSOs, the Association of Kemalist Ideology (ADD, Atatükçü 
Düşünce Derneği) and Association in Support for the Contemporary Living (ÇYDD, Çağdaş 
Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği) being the most prominent, were  formed. These civil initiatives 
frame their concerns by claiming that the national and secular identity, the sovereignty of the 
state and the Kemalist ideal of ‘will to civilization’ are under threat with the extension of 
‘anti-revolutionary’ forces made up of pro-globalizers, liberals and Kurdish and Islamic 
movements. In a reactionary and defensive attitude, they demand the restoration of Kemalist 
principles by strengthening nationalist and secularist premises while attempting to increase 
the hegemony of Kemalism by creating its mobilization in the society (Erdoğan, 2001). In this 
way, even though they remain outside the state, their ‘civicness’ is debatable since they have 
‘strong normative and ideological ties with the state power’ (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 
229). Also, identity claims and ideological orientations created cleavages within civil society 
which complicated the formation of networks (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). 
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Similar to other NSMs, environmental activism emerged as an effective and full-
fledged movement only with the 1980s on.
15
 Starting with the mid-1980s on, numerous 
environmental initiatives took place. In fact, together with the women’s movement, the 
environmental movement became the harbinger of NSMs in Turkey. This was mainly due to 
the fact that the environmental movement had favourable political opportunities since power 
holders perceived environmentalism as an apolitical and non-ideological movement which 
would not pose a threat to the political and economic order. Additionally, the application of 
the free market model based on economic growth brought a significant burden on the 
environment through large-scale infrastructural projects. The Turkish state made decisions of 
such economic investments without taking local population’s opinions and environmental 
concerns into account (Cerit-Mazlum, 2011). Resultantly, various rural as well as urban based 
environmental mobilizations occurred in the mid-1980s and 1990s throughout Turkey. These 
mobilizations mainly focused on issues of locally-unwanted-land-use (LULUs) especially 
regarding energy, tourism and urban planning projects which threatened green areas.
16
 
Starting with the mid-1990s on, it is possible to observe the ‘institutionalization’ and 
‘professionalization’ of the environmental movement alongside the local environmental 
mobilizations.
17
 Numerous environmental organizations with formal organizational structures 
using diversified resource channels including funding from formal institutions were formed, 
and they started emphasizing activities such as building environmental expertise, awareness, 
                                                 
15
 Before 1980, a nascent form of environmental activism existed revolving around a small number of 
environmental organizations. These organizations overwhelmingly upheld preservationist approaches and lacked 
grassroots basis. They remained as elite-based organizations whose members consisted of middle class 
professionals (Adem, 2005) The two exceptional events were the villagers’ demonstrations in Samsun against a 
copper plant in 1975 and another demonstration staged by fishermen in order to protest water pollution in the 
İzmit Bay in 1978 (Adem, 2005; Cerit-Mazlum, 2011). 
16
 The campaign against the project of Gökova thermal power plant, the campaign against the Project of Aliağa 
thermal power plant, the campaign against the construction of touristic sites in the natural habitat of the Carretta-
Carrettas, and campaing against the anti-nuclear power plant Project in Akkuyu, Mersin are among the most-
well-known and successful, either in terms of stopping the projects or raising consciousness,  (Keskin, 2003; 
Adem, 2005; Cerit-Mazlum, 2006) 
17
 The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 
Istanbul in 1996 constituted turning points for institutionalization of environmental activism in Turkey.    
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fund-raising and research (Adem, 2005: 78). The institutionalization process culminated in 
‘internationalization’ during the 2000s in which environmental organizations steered their 
wheels towards involvement in international projects and utilization of international funding 
resources.  
In sum, civil society in Turkey has flourished in the context of ‘relative 
autonomization of economic activities, societal groups, and cultural identities’, and 
consequently, the primary axis of doing politics has shifted from state to society (Göle, 1994; 
Keyman and İçduygu, 2003). In that regard, NSMs with new claims and issues replaced the 
‘old’ social movements of the pre-1980 period that aimed for central political power and ‘total 
rejection of the system itself’ (Göle, 1994: 214-215). Horizontal relations improved within 
society through the establishment of networks and new opportunities which provided the basis 
for formation of social movements with the mobilization of different organizations and 
individuals. However, as I have shown, it would be misleading to treat civil society as a 
monolithic entity. In that respect, certain aspects of civil society render it vulnerable to the ‘uses 
and abuses of civil society’ by the state and other political/social actors. The globalization process 
has also had a major impact on the shaping of civil society. The further impacts of globalization in 
terms of restructuring the political context in Turkey and civil society will be discussed in the last 
section. 
Further impacts of globalization: 
Capitalist globalization has transformed the political context by producing new 
political divisions and alliance structures in Turkey. The traditional centre-periphery divide 
has been redefined as the political and economic interests of social actors are being reshaped 
along the capitalist globalization. The social actors determine their positions vis-a-vis 
capitalist globalization, as pro- or con-, depending on their interpretation of the globalization 
process as an opportunity and/or obstacle for their economic and political interests which are 
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still influenced by the traditional centre-periphery divide. Accordingly, parameters such as 
relations with the state, adaptation to the global markets, expression of cultural identities, and 
demands for democratization are decisive for social actors’ novel political positions. The 
traditional formulation of ‘Westernizing’ and ‘modernizing’ centre versus ‘reactionary’ and 
‘traditional’ periphery is no longer valid since the general political positions of pro-
globalization and anti-globalization have emerged both within the groups at the centre and the 
periphery. In other words, globalization and traditional cleavages of centre-periphery have 
interacted and rendered a new political cleavage structure in Turkey revolving around the 
capitalist globalization axis. The restructuring of the political sphere bears some important 
consequences for social movements in the sense that new alliance structures and political 
opportunities have arisen with respect to political and social actors.  
 Political parties which are one of the main allies of social movements have been 
affected by these changes. Until the end of the 1990s, it was a transition period of 
repositioning in the political sphere. The neo-liberal party ANAP that remained in power 
between 1983 and 1989 focused on the economic aspect of globalization and applied policies 
for restructuring the economy with the aim of integration into global markets. From the end of 
the 1990s on, direct impacts of globalization can be discerned more concretely. As political 
actors have entered the process of redefining their ideological stances with respect to the 
globalization process through their political articulations, its conflicts crystallized in party 
politics and civil society, creating a major cleavage between proponents and opponents of 
capitalist globalization.  
The Turkish political parties of the centre-right adapted themselves to capitalist globalization 
by integrating their populist outlook and conservative concerns into capitalist globalization, 
emphasizing the economic necessities of economic growth by redefining cleavages within 
society (DeLeon et al., 2009). On the other hand, liberal democracy and basic rights were less 
 105 
 
of a concern, either attached to particularistic concerns or neglected due to national 
sovereignty concerns.  In that sense, the centre-right moved closer to the network of neo-
liberal globalizers by reformulating their ideological positions as ‘regressive globalizers’.18 
On the other hand, the centre left party, the CHP had a more ambivalent political articulation. 
Prioritizing ‘territorial unity’ and secularism, CHP had a more negative view of capitalist 
globalization. Yet, as indicated in Chapter 6, the CHP employed a nationalist and state-centric 
approach in their opposition to capitalist globalization rather than a multicultural, pluralist and 
democratization oriented approach. On the other hand, its national developmentalist approach 
remained intact. Given its sceptical and ambivalent attitude towards EU accession based on 
fears of losing sovereignty (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 220), CHP relied on a unique approach 
of ‘Westernization despite the West’, based on anti-imperialism, nationalism, and strict 
secularism (Yerasimos, 2001). 
This dichotomous political structure that revolves around globalization changed the 
political context for social movements. As discussed above, globalization has fostered civil 
society in Turkey during the 1990s both indirectly, through eroding the centrality of the state, 
and directly, through the expansion of global civil society and its normative and institutional 
contributions such as the global language of human rights. By starting to act along the global-
local nexus, “…civil society organizations find for themselves ‘a space to do politics’ 
between the failure of the nation-state and transnationalization of politics and democracy...” 
(Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 226).  
However, civil society actors have diversifying views on globalization. As Özbudun 
and Keyman (2002) indicate, a majority of civil society actors either employ a ‘strong 
scepticism’ as a result of which they evaluate globalization as a new form of imperialism; or 
‘mild scepticism’ according to which globalization is considered as a process with both 
                                                 
18
 Please see Chapter 2 for a detailed account of ‘regressive globalizers’. 
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positive and negative impacts, the former in terms of challenging state power and protecting 
civil rights globally, and the latter in terms of destructive consequences of liberalism and free 
market ideology.   
  In this context, those civil society actors that are under the influence of the ‘old’ left 
as well as the ones with Kemalist orientations that remain closer to the state have accused pro-
EU civil society actors as ‘compradors’ that collaborate with the ‘imperialist West and 
Europe’ (Bora and Çağlar, 2002: 344-345). Transnational actors are framed as ‘foreign 
forces’ that aim to destroy the national integrity of Turkey, when they forge links with 
civil society actors that keep their distance from the state (and Kemalism) such as 
Islamic and Kurdish groups as well as the Bergama peasants (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 178) . 
The Bergama movement also had to contend with such a framing when the Bergama 
peasants were accused of ‘fraternizing with the enemy’ in relation to their transnational 
links. The Bergama movement has emerged in the changing political context of Turkey 
discussed at length above. The movement constituted by the mobilizing structures, 
frames, domestic and transnational political opportunities, is a perfect case of the 
intersection of local, national and transnational practices as will be shown in the next 4  
chapters.  
 107 
 
Chapter 4: The Bergama Movement 
 
In this chapter, I will analyze the internal structure, dynamics and mechanisms of the 
Bergama movement. In order to do that, I will discuss the mobilizing structures, collective 
identity formation and framing processes of the Bergama movement, underlining its 
significant and unique characteristics as a local movement. More specifically, first, I will 
describe the initial mobilization process by focusing on the initial efforts of the movement 
elite and activities of the Bergama peasants. Second, I will show peasants’ mobilization which 
marks the second stage of the movement. Third, I will explain the movement’s organizational 
structures, tactics and strategies.
1
  
The gold-mining issue which set the the grievance of the Bergama Movement dated 
back to the  late 1980s and early 1990s when mining was privitized and opened to 
transnational corporations in Turkey. After being founded as a joint venture in 1988, Eurogold 
found gold reserves in Ovacık-Bergama, and it obtained the permissions and licences from the 
related Turkish ministries to run a gold mine in the region until 1994. As Eurogold launched 
its publicity activities and preparations for constructing the mine, discontent with gold-mining 
began to emerge which turned into the protacted struggle of the local population against the 
Ovacık gold mine. 
The Bergama movement occurred in three stages.
2
 In the first stage of 1994-1996, as 
the mayor of Bergama, Sefa Taşkın gathered information about the detrimental impacts of 
cyanide based gold mining with the help of scientists, CSOs in İzmir, and Greenpeace, he 
engaged in forming an anti-gold movement network in the region. The level of discontent 
among the local population of Bergama villages was not high initially. As a result of 
consciousness raising activities carried out by Taşkın and scientists based on the hazards of 
the cyanide-leach method at the villages, the number of peasants opposing the gold mine 
                                                 
1
 Please see Appendix D for a chronology of events. 
2
 Please see Appendix E for the periodization of the Bergama movement.  
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increased at an accelerating pace. In order to halt the Ovacık gold mine project, 652 Bergama 
peasants and Senih Özay, the attorney of the peasants who carried out the litigation process 
throughout the movement filed three lawsuits requesting annulment of the licence granted by 
the Ministry of Environment in 1994. The rejection of the peasants’ petition by the local court 
in 1996 marked the start of the prolonged legal struggle against the Ovacık gold mine and 
transnational mining companies. The date of November 15th, 1996 was a turning point for the 
Bergama Movement because the Bergama peasants staged their first protest which took in the 
form of a sit-in, blocking the highway between İzmir-Çanakkale for 6 hours in response to the 
cutting down of trees as part of the mine construction. Duing this second stage, anti-goldmine 
protests escalated under the leadership of Oktay Konyar between 1996 and 1997 which 
transforming the intial responses into a full-fledged movement. The Bergama movement 
network was further extended with the participation of CSOs, scientists and environmentalists 
outside the İzmir region and sub-networks comprised of various actors from Bergama, İzmir, 
İstanbul, and Ankara. All these sub-networks operated in collaboration with each other 
complementing each other’s activities. Simultaneously, in order to increase pressure on the 
Turkish government and the mining TNCs the Bergama activists moved their struggle beyond 
their national boundaries extending and intensifying links with scientists, NGOs, advocacy 
network, journalists and politicians outside Turkey which were already forged during the first 
stage. Under the adept leadership of an environmental activist, Birsel Lemke, the Bergama 
activists’ claims were voiced at the European Parliament, the International Human Rights 
Court, and anti-mine/environmental networks outside Turkey. In spite of the successful 
mobilization in terms of the immense media and public attention the protests received, legal 
victories, and international notice, the Turkish government remained non-responsive to the 
demands of the Bergama Movement, and the TNCs continue to extract gold to this day. The 
Bergama Movement entered a decline period in the early 2000s, which sets the third stage. 
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After their last protest in 2004 with the participation of a small number of peasants in 
İstanbul, the movement demobilized. Factors such as the exhaustion of the peasants because 
of escalating costs due to the long endurance of the movement, emerging conflicts between 
the spokespersons/leaders of the movement, and stigmatization efforts of their opponents led 
to the end of this mobilization. 
Throughout the mobilization, the involvement of the local elite who worked as 
spokespersons/leaders was crucial given the unpromising conditions for such a mobilization. 
Those movement elite such as Sefa Taşkın, Oktay Konyar, Birsel Lemke, and Senih Özay 
who were educated middle class members with environmental concerns did not only act as 
local allies. Rather, they became a part of the Bergama movement as ‘de facto’ leaders under 
a coalitional leadership model. They performed extremely crucial functions such as public 
representation, coordination, framing, brokerage, resource provision, and strategy setting.
 3
 In 
that regard, the crucial role of movement ‘leaders’ should be taken into account in each 
component of the Bergama movement, be it framing processes, organizational formation, 
tactics and strategies, and evaluation and utilization of political opportunities, which will 
beanalyzed in the following chapters. 
Building Mobilization: Initial works of scientific contention, networking, and publicity 
in Bergama  
The movement against mining TNC(s) did not start immediately after the first 
appearance of Eurogold in the region. On the contrary, most of the Bergama villagers 
supported the mine project. Their optimism stemmed from the idea that the mine would bring 
development, prosperity and new job opportunities to their region (P/A 2). In a similar vein, 
the local government of Bergama welcomed the company since the gold mine was believed to 
create considerable economic input and job opportunities for the region (E/E 3).  
                                                 
3
 Please Appendix F for the personal biographies of the spokespersons/leaders. 
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The initial confrontation with Eurogold started with the efforts of a local social 
democrat politician, Sefa Taşkın, who served as the elected mayor of Bergama between 1989 
and 1999. Taşkın’s first contact with Eurogold was at a meeting with Eurogold’s 
representatives in 1989 which was called by Eurogold with the objective of informing the 
local government about their activities and the gold mine planned to be built 10 kilometres 
away from the town of Bergama. The meeting was part of the promotional effort of the TNC 
to get the support of a local political figure for their project. As a civil engineer capable of 
dealing with highly detailed technical information, Taşkın was not satisfied with Eurogold’s 
accounts of the project. He started inquiries about the gold extraction process with the 
cyanide-leach method and tried to get technical information from sources other than 
Eurogold.  
“I watched a documentary on TRT (Turkish Television and Radio Organization) [the Turkish public television 
channel] about gold mine accidents a few days before our meeting Eurogold. Then, some questions popped up 
into my mind” (E/E 3). 
  
Taşkın first called upon various chambers of engineers in İzmir to conduct research on 
the issue of gold mining, and subsequently, two civil society organizations, the chamber of 
civil engineers and the chamber of mechanical engineers, prepared separate reports on gold 
mining with cyanide leach method which documented all the risks it entailed. Additionally, 
scientists from İzmir and İstanbul sympathizing with Taşkın’s opposition and criticizing the 
cyanide leach method also joined in the work of collecting scientific evidence about the risks 
of the cyanide-leach method. As Taşkın indicates, the preliminary scientific work done is the 
essential building block for the later success of the mobilization since they were armoured 
with highly technical knowledge and not dependent on the information by Eurogold (E/E 3). 
Furthermore, it helped them to substantiate their claims against Eurogold which had supported 
the viability of the mine project by relying on scientific arguments made by some pro-mine 
scientists.    
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“The man we faced was a professor from Ege University who worked for the company. I am seen as a mayor 
who is trying to make a showcase. Who would believe in us? We had to beat them scientifically. And we did it. 
There are also patriotic scientists like İsmail Duman from İstanbul, the ones in İzmir. Also Prof. Korte worked 
really hard in Germany. We have beaten them scientifically. Does it damage the environment? Yes, it does. 
Nobody can say gold mining with cyanide leach method does not destroy the environment. If we did not achieve 
this, neither the villagers nor the public in general would have been convinced” (P/A 1). 
 
Based on the mounting evidence about the hazards of cyanide leach method and 
scientists’ warnings, Taşkın extended their anti-gold mine opposition to wider circles. At this 
point, he confronted not only Eurogold, but also pro-mine scientists, organizations, and 
politicians who defended the project as both beneficial and harmless. For instance, in a public 
meeting, Taşkın defied the pro-gold mine scientists by claiming that the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) that they prepared was misleading since all the risks in 
relation to cyanide leach method were overlooked in the report (E/E 3). Throughout his 
struggle with Eurogold and its affiliates, Taşkın extended the work of scientific data 
collection. For that purpose, a subdivision working on the subject was launched within the 
Bergama municipality. This subdivision collected data about gold mining both from Turkey 
and around the world. In order to elevate the level of contention against the gold mine project, 
Taşkın decided to bring the issue to the public’s attention. From then on, Taşkın frequently 
appeared in debates especially on local television channels. He also organized several press 
conferences in order to voice their rejections and doubts about gold mining in Bergama. In 
sum, all these efforts were carried out in order to bring the issue onto the agenda of the public 
and power holders and subsequently to widen their public support (E/E 3).  
Meanwhile, several local politicians, environmental activists and lawyers both in 
Bergama and İzmir joined in Taşkın’s efforts. Birol Engel, the head of a local environmental 
organization named Çev-Der, supported Taşkın in his confrontation with Eurogold. In fact, 
Çev-Der was among the first to provide aid by participating in the activities of gathering 
information about the issue (E/E 3). On the other hand, several lawyers with environmentalist 
concerns who had been working as members of the Commission of Environment under the 
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İzmir Bar Association departed from the commission by criticizing the rigidity of the Bar 
association. With the aim of being more active in local environmental issues, they formed the 
İzmir Lawyers for the Environment group which was informally organized without any links 
with formal bureaucratic structures. After being informed about the issue in one of their 
meetings, they got in touch with Taşkın and participated in the movement which was in the 
making (Özay, 2006; E/E 1). Senih Özay, one of the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers, 
volunteered to become the legal representative of the Bergama peasants and carried out the 
legal process of the movement as well as supervising other lawyers supporting the movement.  
In sum, during its initial phase, the Bergama network’s activities mostly revolved 
around collecting scientific information, building the local component of their network, and 
publicizing the incident at the local/national level. On the other hand, grassroots mobilization 
and protest activities remained very limited and weak. Galvanization of mass mobilization 
and creation of a full-fledged movement was possible during the second stage when different 
strategies and frames were used.  
Initial Mobilization of the villagers: 
As described above, during the initial stages of the Bergama movement, actors like 
Sefa Taşkın, Senih Özay, and Birol Engel overwhelmingly decided on the shape of the 
confrontation with Eurogold. Peasants remained at the fringes of these efforts even if they 
were not totally absent. In fact, while Taşkın tried to raise public awareness and draw the 
attention of authorities during the initial phase, he concomitantly addressed the villages 
neighbouring the Ovacık mine. In order to recruit peasants living in the villages near the mine 
to the resistance, he occasionally met with the muhtars (elected heads of villages), and a 
committee of muhtars were formed in order to build relations with the villagers (SefaTaşkın 
in Reinart, 2003: 41-42). Furthermore, several panels on the cyanide issue and gold mines 
were organized in the villages such as the “Farewell to Gold” panel in Çamköy on 15.03.1994 
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with the participation of around 1000 people (Kuzey Ege, 1-15.03.1994).  Yet, the efforts of 
Taşkın and his friends achieved limited success since mobilizations of villagers remained 
erratic and small in numbers. Some villagers from each village who were sceptical from the 
start took the side of Taşkın and his friends, and only a small group from the villages attended 
panels, conferences, and meetings in Bergama and İzmir (P/A 9, 16). This was partly due to 
the initial strategies of the elite which mainly revolved around alerting the general public and 
getting the support of influential allies such as scientists and NGOs. Activities were mostly 
located in the town of Bergama and city of İzmir, and only a limited number of peasants 
participated in these events as contributors to Taşkın’s efforts (E/E 3; P/A 11). In other words, 
in its initial phase, the Bergama movement remained elite- and urban- based in which 
peasants who would be the people directly affected by the detrimental effects of the mine 
were located at the periphery of the mobilization efforts.   
          In fact, the invisibility of peasants during the initial stage displayed a contrast to the 
Küçükdere-Havran mobilization, another anti-gold mine mobilization in the nearby Edremit 
Bay region which achieved success in terms of stopping the project in a very short period of 
time. As noted by the spokesperson of GÜMÇED (Southern Marmara Environment and 
Protection and Association), a regional environmental civil society organization which has 
been prominent in the Küçükdere-Havran movement, the quick success of the Küçükdere-
Havran mobilization was partially due to the incorporation of the whole population in the 
region into a widespread mobilization just before the gold mine project had been 
implemented. As one of the interviewees from GÜMÇED who was involved in the Bergama 
movement as a supporter claimed, 
“In the beginning, the Bergama movement was centred at the Bergama municipality. Sefa Taşkın has been 
accused of using the issue as political material for his own benefit which is not true. He was not ill-intentioned at 
all. We learned many things from him [about the cyanide leach method and its hazards]…The main problem is 
that they should not have organized the panels in Bergama, but in the Ovacık village. In Küçükdere, we have 
carried out all our activities at villages. GÜMÇED meetings were held in the villages by opening stands. 
Villagers have kept listening to what we have discussed as they continued with their daily lives. Moreover, you 
need to have independent and strong environmental organizations. Otherwise, when the opposition is pegged to 
the civil government, you cannot separate it from party politics. When Sefa Taşkın is involved, others from 
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different political parties do not participate. Sefa Taşkın should have been one of the components of the 
movement rather than a leading figure” (E/E 13). 
    
Besides, even if it had been intended by Taşkın and his friends, it would have been a 
difficult task to convince and mobilize peasants in the first place in the case of Bergama (E/E 
3). When it was first announced, the majority of peasants were content about the fact that a 
gold mine would be opened in their region and responded positively to the project. Many of 
the peasants who possessed land in the location either sold or were willing to sell their lands 
to Eurogold since the corporation offered them prices above market land values (P/A 1, 6, 9, 
10).
4
 Additionally, peasants expected the opening of new job opportunities as well as 
invigoration of trade activities in the region with the arrival of Eurogold. Therefore, since 
most of the peasants were hoping to achieve immediate economic gains from Eurogold, the 
number of villagers actively participating in the anti-gold mine panels and talks remained as 
low as 10 to 15 per village (E/E 3; P/A 9, 11).  
In 1996, Sefa Taşkın and Çev-Der made a change in their strategy and decided to 
focus more on mobilization of villagers. The main reasons for such a strategy shift are 
threefold. First, the elite’s initial efforts were far from reaching a solid result since the mine 
project continued to be put into effect. Second, the required legalistic and scientific 
infrastructures which would provide solid grounds for a successful mass mobilization were 
established (E/E 3). Third, grassroots mobilization would have provided legitimacy for their 
legal and political initiatives which would in return strengthen their resistance. According to 
the environmentalist lawyers who were part of the movement, legal successes were largely 
dependent on grassroots protests (E/E 1). One good case which exemplified the interrelation 
between legal and grassroots aspects of the Bergama movement was the protest in Ankara in 
May 1997 to influence the court when the Supreme Court was in the process of making a 
                                                 
4
 Even some of the villagers who participated in the forefronts of the struggle later on sold their lands when the 
company first arrived (P/A 1). 
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decision about case over the Ovacık gold mine (P/A 9). Therefore, it was decided that mass 
mobilization was required alongside legal and scientific activities in order to create a stronger 
opposition to the mine: 
“We thought we would not be able to stop it [the gold mine project] only through panels, press releases, or 
symposiums. Then, staging active protests in combination with legal and scientific struggles were on our 
agenda” (P/A 15). 
 
Based on these premises, empowerment of the local population was seen as the next 
necessary step to be taken in the resistance against the gold mine.  The first action Sefa Taşkın 
and his friends took was to inform the villagers more extensively about the dangers of the 
cyanide leach method. For that purpose, visits of professors and scientists from İstanbul and 
İzmir to the Bergama villages took place with greater frequency. The main objective of the 
informative meetings was to warn villagers and increase awareness about the risks they faced 
if the mine ever were to start operating (P/A 2, 30). Additionally, documentaries about gold 
mining were shown, and open public discussions were organized at the coffeehouses in each 
village (P/A 5). Consequently, there was a shift in the mood and attitude of peasants, and the 
number of people supporting the anti-gold mine resistance began to increase steadily. From 
then on, peasants claimed the Bergama movement as their own, and they were positioned as 
the central subjects both by themselves and other activists within the Bergama movement 
network in their discourses and practices.  
“What happened after 1996 was that the local population started to claim their own problems and come to realize 
that all the word and authority belonged to them” (P/A 4). 
 
“We went to the highway on foot – this was our first protest, and we blocked the highway. I was so frightened 
when we were on our way to the highway! Trees were still being cut down; we could hear the machines working.  
Construction [of the mine] had not started back then. There was a huge crowd. ...Previously, when the 
gendarmerie had arrived to collect taxes, peasants had been so afraid that they went into hiding. We confronted 
the sub-governor. Women were so furious...Men said “Don’t do it, he is the sub-governor”. [We said] “What if 
he is. We will express our concerns”” (Özyaylalı in Reinart, 2003: 52). 
  
The first massive peasant response occurred just after Eurogold started constructing 
the mine site in 1996. It was the critical point when the gold mine project started to 
materialize in the eyes of the peasants who had already began to develop scepticism about the 
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project. With the cutting down of approximately 3,000 pine trees and 1,500 olive trees in the 
field of the mine as part of the construction, mass protests were triggered (E/E 1, 3; P/A 15). 
The detrimental effects of the mine became clear for peasants who were disappointed and 
furious about the striking physical change in their environment.  
“They called me in the evening saying that they [miners] were cutting the trees. They were asking me what to 
do. They [peasants] were the ones who did not believe what I have been telling them and who were saying that I 
was trying to become famous on my way to being a MP. I told them at that time of the day, there is nothing to be 
done and they should wait for the next morning. In the morning at 8 o’clock, there were almost 500 people 
waiting for me...They asked me what to do. I told them that I would call the Ministry of Forestry. However, I 
also told them ‘But even if they make it stop just to avoid any upheavals, they will eventually continue’” (E/E 3). 
  
As soon as villagers realized the mine would cause a permanent destruction of their 
environment, the first mass mobilized protest took place. Villagers staged a sit-in protest and 
blocked the İzmir-Çanakkale road for 6 hours on November 15th, 1996 (P/A 9). From then on, 
villagers from 16 villages located within the Bakırçay plain where agriculture and the 
environment is threatened by the gold mine conjoined to resist against it  which constituted a 
turning point in the opposition to the gold mine. Peasants living in the region mobilized and 
started to protest at increasing rates.
5
  
However, mobilization varied across villages. Rates of participation were the highest 
in the villages neighbouring the gold mine, namely Çamköy and Narlıca. In fact, villagers 
from these two villages were also the most active in terms of visibility, participation, and 
involvement in different stages of the mobilization including preliminary work, panels, and 
protest activities which continued even during the decline period of the movement. Vibrancy 
and commitment achieved in Çamköy and Narlıca were mainly due to the spatial proximity of 
                                                 
5
 Since the beginning of the mass mobilization, the Bergama activists claimed that 17 villages in the region 
participated in the movement However, throughout the process, some of those villages dropped out from the 
movement. I t was even stated in some of the accounts that one village did not participate in the movement at all 
(P/A 1). Yet, the Bergama activists continued to speak on behalf of 17 villages. That was also evident in the 
‘Epigraph of 17 Villages” which was erected in Çamköy in 1997 as the monumental manifestation of the 
Bergama movement. Even though it was named after 17 villages, only 15 villages – Çamköy, Narlıca, Pınarköy, 
Ovacık, Tepeköy, Süleymanlı, Kurfallı, Bozköy, Sarıdere, Eğrigöl, Çaltıbahçe, Yalnızev, Küçükkaya, 
Süleymanlı, Aşağıkırıklar – were mentioned in the narrative (see Appendix G). That was due to the inclusiveness 
of the movement since activists claimed that they were their ‘people’ and they were under threat whether they 
were mobilized or not (E/E 2). Furthermore, the enunciation of drop-out villages would show the movement as a 
vulnerable and weak one.  
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these villages to the mine site since their village borders were adjacent to the mine’s. First, the 
place where trees were cut down which ignited the first protest was the property of Çamköy. 
Additionally, part of the mine site which was bought from the peasants was either former 
property of Çamköy villagers or state owned land put into the use of Çamköy residents. 
Second, Narlıca faced contamination of their water resources during the construction of the 
mine for which the mine was held responsible by the villagers (P/A 15). Accordingly, it was s 
in Çamköy and Narlıca that the immediate and visible impacts of the gold mine were felt most 
directly. In that respect, ‘spatial proximity’ is one of the determinant factors of the attitudes of 
activists in peasant mobilizations against mines since the level of radicalization increases 
among peasants residing closer to mines (Snow and Soule, 2010: 107).
6
  
Yet, the “spatial proximity” factor only partially explains the higher mobilization rates 
in Çamköy and Narlıca. Another village, Ovacık, is even closer to the mine in comparison 
with the other two villages since the walls of many houses were adjacent to the mine pit. 
However, rates of mobilization and participation in Ovacık did not reach the levels achieved 
in Çamköy and Narlıca. Ovacık is the closest village to the part of the mine pit where 
explosives are used. In addition to the sound pollution created, dynamite use just underneath 
the village caused severe visible damages to many houses such as cracks on the walls (P/A 12, 
20). Even though the detrimental impacts of the mine were felt directly and extensively, 
mobilization of the Ovacık villagers remained sporadic, and only approximately half of the 
Ovacık population participated in the resistance against the mine. The limited mobilization in 
the Ovacık mine was mainly caused by the differences in peasants’ approach and attachment 
to land and their environment. According to the peasants’ accounts from Çamköy, Narlıca, 
and Ovacık, Ovacık villagers were not enthusiastic about joining the movement because 
                                                 
6
 Similarly, “…those peasants who were ecologically proximate to the mining municipalities became the most 
radical because of increased exposure to the miners’ leadership and ideology” (Snow and Soule, 2010: 107). 
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residents of Ovacık village mostly consisted of immigrants who had arrived from Bulgaria in 
the 1950s. On top of the late settlement of its residents, the Ovacık village was removed from 
its original location in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake in 1939 and re-settled in 
today’s location. It is commonly indicated by the interviewees that as a consequence of these 
factors, residents of Ovacık village have less attachment to their land which is reflected in the 
lower mobilization rates in Ovacık.  
“Çamköy was established long before in comparison to ours [the Ovacık village]. Here, about 70-80% of the 
village population migrated from Bulgaria. The state granted them 1 to 2,5 acre piece of land for each….5 acres  
of land for 4 people. 1 acre for each. For instance when one married and moved to İzmir, he sold his land. But 
others couldn’t buy it…They do not have any possessions. But they have needs, so most of them... [the Ovacık 
villagers] wanted the gold mine” (P/A 20). 
 
According to the interviewees, divided structure in Ovacık with respect to peasants’ 
stances towards the mine was caused by the fact that migrants who settled relatively late in 
the region were more used to the idea that their village can be removed somewhere else if 
they faced a cyanide related disaster (P/A 18). In contrast, in Çamköy and Narlıca villagers 
had been living in their villages for a couple of centuries which was also underlined in their 
frames as part of their collective identity. Also, higher turn-out rates from Çamköy and 
Narlıca were seen as an effect of higher levels of land possession by villagers on an individual 
basis which, in return, increased their claim on their land (E/E 10).  
In sum, the second phase of the movement started with the mass mobilization of the 
peasants. In this phase, prior anti-mine efforts which revolved mainly around informing 
villagers and forming general public awareness was turned into a full-fledged movement 
based on various grassroots forms of protest, the process of forming a collective identity, and 
strengthening solidarity relations. Protests based on civil disobedience acts and related 
mobilization efforts which became an indispensible and central component of the Bergama 
movement during the second phase will be further analyzed in the following sections. 
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Mobilizing Structures 
a. Organizational structure: 
The Bergama movement was organized as an informal and flexible network consisting 
of multiple and heterogeneous actors in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, and gender. The 
network mainly included peasants from 17 villages neighbouring the Ovacık gold mine as 
well as politicians, scientists, environmental activists, and civil society organizations at the 
local, national, and transnational level. The overall movement network was highly 
decentralized since there is no one single social movement organization (SMO) which 
dominated the whole network.  In 1995, a quasi-SMO was formed under the name of the 
Committee of Environmental Execution (Çevre Yürütme Kurulu-ÇYK) consisting of civil 
society organizations, village committees, and local activists in Bergama specifically 
coordinating resistance against Eurogold in Bergama (P/A 15). Yet, ÇYK never became a 
central social movement organization which made all the decisions and controlled every 
activity within the movement. On the contrary, the committee had a limited coordination role, 
and this role of the committee phased out after a short while since coordination activities were 
mainly carried out through personal contacts in a highly informal manner. These personal 
contacts were sufficiently intense, permanent and efficient which led separate sub- networks 
to work in an interdependent and coordinated fashion throughout the movement.  
The Bergama movement network has concentrated on four major sub-fields: legal 
action and science; political initiatives and relations; transnational activities; and grassroots 
based protests. Activities within each sub-field have been mainly carried out by three sub-
networks which can be classified as follows:  
a) the grassroots sub-network based in Bergama concentrating on the protest 
activities;  
b) the legal-scientific sub-network mainly organized in İzmir carrying out the legal 
and scientific aspects of the mobilization; and  
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c) the transnational sub-network forging links with transnational actors and carrying 
the anti-mine activities to the transnational level.  
 
A separate sub-network did not develop in relation to the political relations subfield. 
Instead, all the sub-networks were engaged in the bargains and negotiations held with the 
power holders and political allies by utilizing personal contacts of various prominent actors 
from each sub-network. In fact, none of the specialized sub-networks acted in an independent 
or isolated fashion. Rather, they were all interlinked and worked in collaboration with each 
other by cross-fertilising their activities. With the intricate structure of the sub-networks, a 
continuous information flow and support among the sub-networks were maintained 
facilitating their actions. For instance, the prolonged legal action regarding the Ovacık mine 
would not have succeeded unless it was backed up by protest activities, which indicates 
coordination between the Bergama protestors and lawyers. As one of the lawyers of the 
movement states: “However it is … the persistent grassroots activities of the peasants and 
their altruism which made it happen [achieving court decisions in favour] rather than our 
technical skills” (Özkan, 2004: 6). In fact, the Bergama peasants were prioritized by all the 
sub-networks who rested their legitimacy on the peasants by presenting themselves as 
advocates of the “peasants’ contention” (E/E 5, 17, 18). However, even though peasants were 
described as the real owners of the Bergama movement, all the sub-networks kept their 
‘relative autonomy’ during their activities. In other words, none of the sub-networks including 
the grassroots sub-network dominated or controlled the activities or decision-making 
processes.  
Within this horizontal and interwoven structure, several individuals -both from the 
elite and peasant sections of the movement- within each network achieved prominent 
positions due to their knowledge, skills, connections with other networks and influential allies 
throughout the process. Yet, individuals who stuck out were not considered as “leaders”. 
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Instead, from the viewpoint of interviewees, these prominent actors were seen as the 
‘spokespersons’ of the movement exercising the roles of coordination and management of 
activities. In other words, these prominent actors are not considered as the formal leaders of 
the movement since a single leadership model was not adopted in contrast to hierarchical 
organizational structures. As one of the peasant respondents pointed out: “There is no leader 
here. Everyone is a leader” (P/A 11). By rejecting a formal leadership structure, they intended 
to convey the message that the Bergama movement genuinely belonged to the peasants living 
in the region. In this way, they could ward off any unfavourable counter-framings of the 
movement and pre-empt any stigmatizations based on depiction of their movement as 
manipulation of ‘ignorant’ peasants by ‘ill-intentioned’ leaders. Also, the aim was to inhibit 
any possibility of interests of individuals or an SMO to overshadow peasants which would 
have made the latter’s claims secondary. Lastly, they wanted to apply a participatory 
democracy model in their movement as much as possible since democratization and 
empowerment of ‘people’ were their master frames.  
The decentralized and flexible character of the overall Bergama network enabled its 
components to act and organize autonomously. Each network employed distinct forms of 
organizational structures which will be assessed in the next section.  
a.1: Organizational Structure of the Grassroots Sub-network   
In the absence of a formal SMO overarching the whole movement by cross-cutting 
different movement sections, the grassroots sub-network was organized in a highly informal 
and horizontal way. Grassroots activities in relation to tactics, strategies, framing, and 
management of resources were carried out through webs of interpersonal links between 
villagers. The closest organizational model to a formal SMO which was used in the villages 
was ‘villager committees’. These committees were formed in each village and were composed 
of a number of prominent villagers with distinct characteristics due to their ages, skills, and 
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influence within their communities as well as the officially elected heads of villages (muhtar). 
Members of the committees were chosen by the villagers themselves on a consensual basis in 
each village. Yet, villager committees did not function as organizations which make decisions 
in the name of peasants. Rather, village committees moved with the objective of ensuring 
villagers’ choices and views and participation in general decisions-making (E/E 2). Secondly, 
they also coordinated villagers during their protest activities. Additionally, frequently held 
open meetings at each village in which every villager had the chance to express his/her views 
complemented the work of the committees to render a democratic movement process.  
Evidence from diverse cases of social movements suggests that interpersonal and 
organizational network ties pre-dating social movement mobilization constitute the basis for 
the initial participation of individuals in movements. These network structures are crucial 
since they connect two or more individuals and organizations to each other that enable 
information flow. Through these links, individuals learn about causes, goals, frames, and 
tactics of a movement, and in that sense, individuals’ decisions to participate in a movement 
largely depend on these interpersonal connections. In a similar vein, pre-existing interpersonal 
links nested in the intra- and inter-village networks provided the basis for villagers’ 
engagement in the anti-mine movement. The Bergama peasants already had bonds of trust and 
solidarity among themselves based on the built-in relations of friendship and kinship.
7
 Also, 
collectivist practices and work-based aid exchange among peasants in agricultural production 
to maintain their livelihood had operated as additional factors strengthening village based 
solidarity relations. Hence, previously established solidarity and trust relations provided a 
social infrastructure for grassroots mobilization, and they facilitated the spread of anti-gold 
mine ideas and sentiments as well as rapid mobilization of peasants throughout villages once 
peasants were brought to the centre of the struggle during the second phase of the movement. 
                                                 
7
 Kinship plays an important role in the Bergama villages. Each village was composed of a couple of families 
which were connected to each other through marriage. On the other hand, bonds of kinship are not prevalent at 
the inter-village level.   
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On the other hand, inter-village relations and networks were not as dense as the intra-village 
ones. Villagers shared the same plain for earning their livelihood which led to shared concerns 
among villages. Additionally, the villages were in contact with each other through shared 
celebrative events like weddings and individual acquaintances. More importantly, there were 
no significant conflicts between villages based on land or any other issue.  
Apart from their facilitative impact on the initial mobilization, village based networks 
were utilized extensively at other stages of the movement, especially in terms of sustenance of 
the peasant mobilization. For instance, kinship relations were brought forth occasionally in 
order to ensure individuals continued to adhere to the movement especially at the possibility 
of changing sides when the movement entered stagnation periods. 
The pre-existing village networks were adapted to the movement ideals and goals. In 
that regard, village public spaces where interpersonal relations are traditionally reproduced 
such as coffeehouses were turned into anti-mine sites. Traditionally, coffeehouses found in 
every village in Turkey are central locations which connect village residents to each other. 
They are mostly found at the centre of villages. This physical centrality of coffeehouses 
entails a symbolic importance in the sense that they are the main public spaces where peasants 
meet and interact with each other during their leisure times. Accordingly, coffeehouses are the 
public spaces where villagers share and transmit information regarding their community 
relations, daily lives and work. This was also the case in the Bergama villages since peasants 
met to exchange and circulate information about events and people in their own villages, 
neighbour villages, Bergama, İzmir, and Turkey in general. Coffeehouses are also political 
spaces since they are the sites where most of the discussions about local and national political 
developments take place.  
Given this centrality of coffeehouses in the village community life, they have been 
crucial for the Bergama mobilization in several ways. First, since coffeehouses are spatial 
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gates opening to the outside world, efforts of scientists, lawyers and environmental activists 
mainly took place at coffeehouses. Informative meetings were held, and documentaries and 
information films were shown, opening the issue to discussion among peasants especially 
during the initial mobilization efforts (P/A 7). Second, coffeehouses remained as the main 
meeting spots when high levels of mobilization were achieved. They served as loci where 
post-protest discussions were held with the purpose of assessing their protest activities, 
responses of the police, tactical pitfalls and the media accounts. Those are the places where 
television is watched and newspapers are read collectively which enable them to discuss the 
media accounts about their struggle. Third, coffeehouses were also significant spaces for 
convincing or enforcing individuals to mobilize.  Exerting peer pressure stood out as one of 
the most effective mechanisms used by villagers, and it was at the coffeehouses where 
community pressure on individuals was strongly exercised in order to enhance mobilization 
among peasants. Especially during the peak of their mobilization, the pro-mine villagers were 
excluded from the coffeehouses which meant their communities were excluding the peasants 
who were in favour of the gold mine project.  
As a result of the re-organization of relations within coffeehouses in the context of the 
anti-mine movement, traditional relations revolving around coffeehouses were radically 
transformed. As the links with non-villagers supporting the movement intensified 
coffeehouses became more ‘friendly’ and inclusive spaces, and ‘strangers’ were welcomed to 
participate in talks and debates. 
However, deliberative activities of peasants taking place at coffeehouses have been 
limited due to the fact that coffeehouses are exclusively male dominated spaces where women 
are traditionally excluded. The lives of women who occupied a crucial role in the movement 
were mostly confined to the private sphere. They appeared in public on the streets or when 
they participated in festive events such as weddings. In fact, coffeehouses were not formally 
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closed to the women, but it was not a social habit for them to go to the coffeehouses. In 
comparison to urban sites, public space and social life is characterized by unequal access of 
women in these villages despite a relatively relaxed approach to women’s appearance in the 
public sphere compared to other rural areas in Turkey.  
The mobilization for Bergama changed these circumstances to a certain extent as 
female villagers became politicized and constituted a second village based network in 
addition to coffeehouse based networks of male villagers. Lacking a public space of their own 
equivalent to coffeehouses, women socialize and interact with each other mostly at meetings 
at houses or during their work on the field. These two separate networks are mainly linked 
through households in which men and women bring in and exchange information from their 
own network (P/A 9, 15). With the start of the grassroots mobilization, gold mine issue 
became a major point of debate in the women’s networks during their meetings at homes. 
Gradually, women started joining in meetings at coffeehouses, and they became more 
publicly visible. Besides, women who refrained from socializing with men in public got 
involved in protests shoulder to shoulder with men. In other words, conventional distinctions 
between male-female and private-public sphere were transcended (P/A 5, 15). 
Transgression of gender distinctions constitute an important turn for the Bergama 
movement. Not only had the women appeared more in public by taking part in a struggle 
concerning their community and contributed to the increased the numbers and diversity of 
protestors, they also performed an important role in terms of general mobilization of the 
villagers. From the start, female villagers were keener on resisting against the gold mine, and 
acted as vanguards in terms of mobilizing villagers as a whole (E/E 6; P/A 28). In fact, 
according the social roles attributed to women, they were in charge of child-care, and the 
health of household members as well as contributing to livelihood maintenance activities. 
According to the male peasant activists, women were seen as more concerned with and 
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sensitive to the risks associated with human life due to this traditional household division of 
labour, (P/A 5, 28).  
Female villagers took over the important task of extending resistance against the gold 
mine throughout villages. In order to mobilize the male villagers on a wider scale, female 
villagers went on a ‘sexual strike’ for about six months in order to mobilize men of the village 
who were not participating fully. Women held that they would refrain from sexual activities 
unless men are fully involved in the movement (P/A 4; Yeni Yüzyıl, 17.05.1997). 
Furthermore, prominent female peasants such as Sabahat Gökçeoğlu who led the female 
villagers’ sub-network became publicly well-known figures. Gökçeoğlu’s frequent 
appearance in the media as one of the spokesperson of the Bergama movement conveyed the 
message to the public that their movement was beyond gender differences (Cumhuriyet, 
20.07.1997; Yeni Asır, 01.10.1997).  
In terms of movement resources which are crucial for sustaining a successful 
movement, the grassroots sub-network proved to have an erratic resource configuration. 
Peasants were endowed with rich immaterial resources such as solidarity, commitment, and 
comradeship. This is because all these relations of trust and reciprocity were already present 
in their previous village networks which were extensively utilized during their struggle as 
described above. However, they had difficulties in terms of maintaining material resources. In 
terms of financial resources, money was needed in order to meet direct costs such as travel 
expenses and accommodation during protests away from Bergama or when peasants go to 
distant cities to participate in panels and seminars. For those purposes, peasants collected 
money among themselves to cover the expenses (P/A 11, 15, 27). Yet, even though the 
Bergama villagers are prosperous compared to villagers from other rural parts of Turkey, 
financial contributions they made burdened them since their income was just above 
subsistence levels (P/A 8, 11). Also, money collected among peasants could meet protest 
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expenses partially. Therefore, additional financial support was required, and consequently the 
grassroots sub-network relied on some external financial sources. Many supporting groups 
and individuals outside of the villages brought in material, as well as symbolic, resources. The 
Bergama municipality when Taşkın was in office became the major financial and technical 
supporter of the Bergama activists. All sorts of municipality facilities such as vehicles, 
computers, telephones, and faxes were put into the use of the Bergama peasants during their 
protests. The municipality was crucial in terms of providing financial resources since funding 
required for protests arrived both from the municipality itself and secondary actors through its 
business relations.  
Besides, civil society organizations, neighbouring local governments, and 
sympathizers living outside Bergama made occasional contributions to the Bergama peasants 
by providing accommodation, food, and travel facilities during peasants’ protests in their 
region. For instance, during their 8-day long protest march to Çanakkale which was about 300 
kilometres away from Bergama, food and accommodation needs of peasant activists were met 
by supporting municipalities, civil society organizations, and individuals in towns that the 
Bergama peasants passed through (P/A 9, 14, 21). 
Other material resources like labour and time required for the protest activities seemed 
to be abundant at first glance. Involvement of the majority of peasants from 17 villages 
surrounding the Ovacık mine meant thousands of peasants were ready to devote their time and 
labour prepare and perform protests. However, peasants had to bear considerable levels of 
direct and indirect costs in relation to protest activities. Apart from direct costs like state 
repression, peasants faced major indirect costs in relation to their livelihood as they 
participated in protests. Nearly all villagers in Bergama depended on agriculture for their 
livelihood. During the peak of their movement when protest activities were frequent, 
peasants’ agricultural activities were disrupted. According to the accounts of interviewees, in 
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the year the number of protests peaked, they staged 88 events, in total around 370 for the 
overall movement. The number of protests was as high as 2 per week during the peak of their 
movement in 1997 and 1998 (P/A 26, 27). When the preliminary and aftermath stages were 
taken into account, a protest event took a minimum 3 days (P/A 26). They had to spend their 
time in protest sites instead of working on their field which endangered their harvests. 
Frequent participation in protests bears detrimental impacts on the peasants’ livelihood since 
agricultural work is tightly scheduled and is dependent on seasonal conditions, not giving 
peasants the option of postponing their work.  
In order to overcome these indirect costs, peasants employed several strategies. First, a 
household based division of labour was created throughout villages. Each household member 
took turns in participating in protests. Accordingly, when one or two household members 
went to protests, the remaining household members carried out the agricultural work on the 
field (P/A 9).  
“We are small farmers who are working on land. It is us who are doing the work but no one else. Each family is 
responsible for its own piece of land. And if there is no farming done, we are hungry. Hence, we have arranged 
schedules. If I were to go for a demonstration, my wife would have stayed and worked on land. But, we still have 
lost too much” (P/A 11).  
 
Another mechanism which villagers utilized in order to overcome indirect costs of 
protest was imece, a traditional village based practice. In its conventional use, imece refers to 
collective work done in a village for the collective good of the village. Villagers adopted this 
traditional practice in their movement according to which peasants who stayed at villages 
during protest provided help in their agricultural work for their neighbours who attended 
protests (P/A 11). Additionally, the protest schedule was arranged by taking the workload of 
farms into account. Unless there was urgency, the number of protests was kept low during 
plantation and harvest times when peasants were busier with their agricultural activities. If it 
was inevitable to organize a protest during those busy times due to circumstances, the ones 
who had more work to do were allowed not to participate (E/E 2; P/A 15). 
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a.2: The Legal and Scientific Sub-network: The Elele Platform and others 
While the grassroots based protest activities were mainly carried out by the Bergama 
villagers, scientific work and legal activities were mainly concentrated in the city of İzmir to 
which Bergama is administratively linked. The proponents of anti-gold mine movement 
including scientists, university professors, lawyers and civil society organizations with 
environmental concerns in İzmir organized themselves as a network under the name of İzmir-
Bergama İçin Elele Hareketi Platformu (İzmir Hand-in-hand for Bergama Movement 
Platform; hereafter the Elele Platform) in order to support the Bergama peasants. The initial 
support came from several professional chambers of engineering and medicine in response to 
Taşkın’s efforts to extend their resistance to İzmir. The supporting chambers formed their 
own  ‘gold commissions’ in order to make research and collect data about gold mining related 
issues such as risks of contamination of underground waters, tailing pond standards, 
earthquake related risks, and general risk evaluation of gold mines (E/E 17, 18). Yet, these 
activities remained scattered and uncoordinated until several professional chambers and 
academicians supporting the movement decided to conjoin in 1992. Subsequently, the gold 
commissions of various chambers were combined together which constitute the backbone of 
the Elele Platform (E/E 17). 
Concomitantly, several lawyers from the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers group 
including the prominent actors of the legal process, Senih Özay and Arif Ali Cangı, as well as 
the head of the İzmir Bar Association at the time being, Noyan Özkan, joined the newly 
forming Elele Platform. These lawyers, who undertook the role of being legal representatives 
of the Bergama peasants during their struggle, worked in collaboration with the scientific 
flank. In this way, legal action over the Bergama movement was substantiated since legal 
cases were backed up by scientific and technical information on gold mining.  
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Overall, the Elele Platform was organized as a relatively decentralized and loose 
organization with the participation of 22 chambers and 25 other types of NGOs including 
environmentalist associations and trade unions as well as the İzmir Lawyers for Environment. 
Still, the Elele Platform acted like a quasi-SMO by displaying formalized structural 
characteristics in some ways. They held regular meetings on a monthly basis to discuss and 
decide on strategies and legal and scientific actions. In terms of the management of 
organizational resources, they maintained a financial resource base through the fees paid by 
its member organizations. There was an elected spokesperson and secretariat of the platform. 
Yet, these positions rotated annually and each member organization took over the 
spokesperson role in turn in order to share the workload. In this way, they aimed to avoid the 
effect of ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ which is often faced by formalized and hierarchical 
organizational structures. They also intended to prevent any groups or individuals from 
moving ahead of the Bergama peasants. In that regard, none of the participant groups 
dominated the SMO. Additionally, a horizontally built egalitarian and democratic structure 
was encouraged (E/E 14, 17, 18).  
Even though the Elele Platform was initially established to support the anti-gold mine 
movement in Bergama, they eventually extended their focus to other environmental disputes 
and contentions in the nearby regions of İzmir as well. They followed the developments over 
similar gold mine projects in Eşme-Uşak and Efemçukuru-İzmir and provided legal and 
scientific assistance aiming to spread resistance to those regions.  
The Elele network’s endeavours  of providing scientific evidence and carrying out 
legal action against the mine continued alongside grassroots activities and in collaboration 
with  peasants, Oktay Konyar, and Sefa Taşkın (E/E 14, 16, 17, 18). As one of the movement 
barristers, Noyan Özkan, states: “However it is … the persistent grassroots activities of the 
peasants and their altruism which made it happen [court decisions in favour] rather than our 
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technical skills” (Özkan, 2004: 6). Thus, the legal and grassroots dimensions overlapped 
throughout the movement. Moreover, the grassroots activities became the most influential 
force in terms of even affecting the court decisions and keeping the movement alive.  
However, despite the constant information flow between the Elele network and the 
Bergama peasants, members of the Elele network did not actively participate in civil 
disobedience actions of the peasants. Rather, as one its members underline, they focused on 
scientific and legalistic activities emphasizing that scientific objectivity they pursue was their 
ontological characteristic as scientists and legal people: 
“We never actively contributed to the civil disobedience acts. We haven’t participated in the protests 
either. Chambers have clear positions. We acted according to the principle of scientific objectivity and 
our responsibility of informing the public with impartiality. All our work is up to scientific standards. 
For example, against the reports which were prepared by the government in 1999, we encouraged 
TMMOB to write a critical report in 2001 which has not been challenged yet” (E/E 18).    
 
a.3: The Transnational Sub-network 
The Bergama activists also moved their contention beyond their national borders. In 
their struggle against some transnational actors, they tried to get the support of international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), foreign politicians, and the general public outside 
their national territories. In doing that, their main objective was to confront TNCs and put 
further pressure on them as well as the Turkish state at the transnational level. The 
transnational dimension of the Bergama movement was made possible through the activities 
of the transnational sub-network which was composed of a variety of actors including INGOs, 
foreign politicians, members of green parties in Germany and the European Parliament, and 
individual activists. In terms of its organizational structure, the transnational sub-network 
organized in a highly decentralized and non-hierarchical form in parallel with the other 
segments of the movement network. The prominent figure who coordinated the transnational 
dimension of the Bergama movement was Birsel Lemke, an environmentalist who resided 
half of the year in Germany. Through her personal contacts in Germany, Birsel Lemke made 
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the Bergama movement known to several parliament members, scientists, journalists, and 
NGOs with whom she already had contacts. Furthermore, other links were utilized to bring 
the issue to the European Parliament. In addition, another stream of transnational links was 
forged in Australia through the work of another Turkish originated Australian, Emet 
Değirmenci, who launched a campaign against the Australian originated TNC, Normandy. 
Moreover, links were maintained with several INGOs and advocacy groups such as 
Minewatch, Mineral Policy Centre, and Mineral Policy Institute. All these transnational links 
were managed through the brokerage of individuals with extensive relations. In that regard, 
the lack of a formal organizational structure was partly due to the insufficiency of resources 
on the side of the Bergama activists in Turkey. Apart from Üstün Bilge-Reinart, an academic 
who managed communication with actors outside Turkey at the later stages of the movement, 
and Taşkın, there were few activists with good foreign language knowledge and technical 
skills required for the Internet use, even among the university educated activists. As Bilge-
Reinart stated:  
“Energy in Turkey is very limited. People direct their efforts in their own specialized fields. For instance, 
lawyers are working hard. I admire A.A.C. [one of the environmentalist lawyers], but foreign language becomes 
a problem. He does not know any English, German or French. Then, [transnational] links cannot be furthered. I 
happily accept to make translations and I do it in many cases. However, there is a limited number of people with 
limited energy. Priority [of activists in Turkey] is their own specific struggle [hereby referring to the local 
contention]. Then, efforts put into transnational links are seen unnecessary” (E/E 34). 
 
These resource based difficulties either inhibited or delayed possible transnational 
links with similar movements elsewhere. For instance, Greek activists mobilizing against a 
gold mine project in Halkidiki, Thessaloniki (Greece) had difficulties when they tried to 
contact and interact with the Bergama activists. An elite participant of the Halkidiki 
movement described their difficulties in contacting the Bergama activists as follows: 
“[U]ntil we met with Üstün we had a communication problem because we couldn’t find anyone. I couldn’t find 
anyone who spoke English. Üstün was not involved in the Bergama until lately because she was in Canada. 
When she got back to Turkey, she was a new blood to the movement. So she helped us by maintaining 
communication with Konyar who had absolutely no contacts until then. They had helped to make the story 
known to Greece” (E/E 33).  
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b: Repertoires of Contention 
The Bergama movement used a rich repertoire of action containing various protest 
forms ranging from conventional protests to non-conventional disruptive actions. All the 
protest forms utilized were formulated and staged based on their underlying strategy of non-
violent civil disobedience (E/E 2). Basically, civil disobedience refers to “...a strategy based 
on the limited breach of rules and aimed at rendering protest as visible as possible, grabbing 
media attention to highlight the activists’ cause through the intensity of their commitment” 
(della Porta et al., 2006: 149). In other words, through civil disobedience acts, activists push 
the limits of legality and disobey existing rules and laws by referring to their general 
citizenship rights in a peaceful manner with the aim of conveying their demands and 
messages to the public and authorities, especially with the help of the media.   
At the root of civil disobedience lie the ideas and ideals of Gandhi. Throughout his 
‘experiments’ with activism in South Africa and India, Gandhi formulated the concept of 
‘satyagraha’ which combines satya, literally meaning truth, and agraha, referring to ‘force’. 8 
Based on the concept of ‘satyagraha’, Gandhi proposed a set of activism guidelines through 
his books, articles, letters, speeches, and telegraphs in order to overthrow British rule and 
achieve self-governance in India. According to Gandhi, violence is the weapon of the weak 
and ‘cowards’. Instead, activists should behave in a non-violent fashion without attacking or 
insulting their opponents. In order to achieve that, movements should be organized under a 
code of discipline according to which obeying movement leaders is crucial. Activists should 
be self-reliant, open to communication and be ready to face opponents’ repressive measures 
of being taken into custody or being arrested. The essential stages of the Gandhian activism is 
formulated as continuous negotiations and arbitration with authorities, creation of publicity 
over issues at stake and preparing the masses for participating in direct actions such as 
                                                 
8
 Satyagraha is defined by Gandhi in his own words as: "Truth (Satya) implies love, and firmness (agraha) 
engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force….[Satyagraha is] the Force which is born of Truth and 
Love or non-violence…” (Gandhi 1928: 102 cited in Chabot, 2000). 
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demonstrations, economic boycotts, non-cooperation and civil disobedience (CWG 
www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/VOL019.pdf; Chabot, 2000). In that regard, Gandhi proposes an 
active type of civil disobedience by rejecting passive resistance. In fact, protest forms used by 
Gandhi such as strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts have already been used by modern 
social movements. Yet, Gandhi has added a new meaning to these forms by coming up with a 
new code of discipline (Chabot, 2000, 2002). Starting with the American Civil Rights 
Movement and student movements of the 1960s, numerous movements from all around the 
world including most of the branches of the Global Justice Movement used the Gandhian civil 
disobedience by adopting it to their own contention and contexts (Chabot, 2000).  
In a similar vein to many contemporary movements against capitalist globalization, the 
Bergama movement participants opted for non-violent disruptive civil disobedience being 
under the influence of Gandhi’s ideas and activism (E/E 2). Yet, the Bergama peasants did not 
have any specific and detailed prior knowledge about Gandhi. In fact, civil disobedience in 
general has not been a well known and widely employed protest form in Turkey, let alone 
using Gandhi’s principles in movement repertoires, even though it is a widespread strategy 
which has diffused into many diverse contexts and is practiced by various social movements 
all around the world since the mid 20
th
 century. Gandhi’s principles entered the Bergama 
movement’s repertoire of action through the brokerage of Konyar who stood out as the main 
decision-maker with respect to protest strategies and tactics. He developed his knowledge of 
Gandhi and civil disobedience by reading Gandhi’s translated work. By reformulating 
Gandhi’s principles through adding traditional symbols and cultural codes, Konyar set the 
idea of civil disobedience as the master strategy of the Bergama movement.  
“I am an admirer of Gandhi. I have read about Gandhi for many years. I value him immensely. One of the most 
respectful ways of resistance under the new world order, within the fallacy of globalization is for citizens to 
participate in decisions regarding their lives without resorting to violence. People should learn not to act 
violently. That is what Gandhi did. This is civil disobedience. I have applied Gandhi’s ideology to my country 
during the 2000s in such a disciplined, almost academic manner as to become exemplary for all  civil society 
organizations, trade unions, political parties, and the people” (E/E 2). 
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 In spite of the lack of historical, culture or contention-wise proximity with the Indian 
Independence Movement, the Bergama activists chose and adopted non-violence strategy 
because according to their evaluations it was the most viable path to follow which ensured 
their legitimacy and the acceptance of their movement in the eyes of the public and power 
holders. In other words, they commonly agreed upon the idea that not resorting to violence 
was the best means to make their claims by achieving support of bystanders. Furthermore, 
they also intended to avoid stigmatization by their opponents by presenting themselves as a 
genuinely new movement distinct from older movements which resort to violence in their 
protests:   
“Since the 1960s, our country has witnessed a lot of violence. Violence is not approved. People suffer many 
losses. As a result of pressure from the IMF policies, WTO, and the World Bank, the country has inclined toward 
right-wing politics. What is to be done? A new understanding fostering a unity which is non-violent but resistant, 
non-violent but organized, and non-violent but influential is required. DİSK [Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers’ Unions], KESK [Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions], or other civil society organizations could 
not achieve that. Leaving aside the fact that they are not radical [innovative], these organizations are not even 
trusted by the society or the workers because of their worldviews, their relations with the capital, and their 
general position”(Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59).  
 
With the goal of displaying worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, i.e. WUNC, 
of their contention (Tilly, 2004), the Bergama activists employed a multiplicity of protest 
elements and forms which were all shaped by their master strategy of non-violent civil 
disobedience. Many of these protest forms had already been used by other movements, and 
the Bergama activists borrowed them, adapting them to their own situation. In fact, the 
multi-form action repertoire of the Bergama movement resembled the GJM activists’ 
repertoire. By slightly adapting Smith’s (2002) categorization of protest action in the Seattle 
Protest, the repertoire of action of the Bergama movement can be analyzed under three 
headings: scientific research and education; disruptive action and mobilization; and symbolic 
mobilization. 
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b.1: Scientific and Educational Activities 
Educational activities constitute a crucial part of the Bergama movement’s repertoire 
of action. These educational activities consist of all types of training, panels, meetings and 
discussions held either by the supporting scientists or lawyers through whom the Bergama 
peasants have acquired various sorts of valuable information, skills, and knowledge.  In a 
way, educational activities make up the infrastructural backbone of the protest activities since 
skills, knowledge, and information were used at different stages of the movement. 
Educational activities took place in two major forms:  training on nonviolent action and 
scientific education.  
Training on nonviolent action: Throughout the movement, peasants acquired skills and 
knowledge about staging direct action and public demonstrations in a non-violent fashion. 
Training regarding non-violent protest action is handled in two parts: legal training and 
protest training. Since the early phases of the movement, peasants went through a detailed 
legal training. Lawyers from the İzmir Lawyers for Environment group continuously 
informed peasants about their constitutional rights as citizens. The first aim was to empower 
the Bergama peasants as citizens and to strengthen their belief in their efficacy by reminding 
them of their citizenship rights which, in turn, had the impact of fostering participation of 
peasants. The second aim was to enable peasants to develop full-fledged knowledge about 
their citizenship rights, who could then defend themselves legally and justify their actions by 
referring to their constitutional rights when they were put under custody or when they were 
brought to court. Using the thorough knowledge they accumulated on citizenship rights, 
peasants even stepped in during their cases in the courts and pointed out misapplications of 
legal procedures by the state forces during their protests as if they were the attorneys:  
“After 1980, the law on Meetings and Demonstrations was implemented in order to repress activities of making 
collective demands and to hinder civil movements with the purpose of creating a tamed society. According to 
this law, state forces should make an announcement of ‘You are violating the law no. 2911. You are acting 
against the law. Disperse’. Only then crime occurs. In our training sessions, we learned about this. But the police 
usually did not make the announcement even though they should have. In one of the trials, the judge asked an 
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old female peasant who attended one of the marches whether she was aware of the existence of the law no. 2911. 
She said she was and added ‘The ones protesting know about it’. The judge continued by saying ‘Then, you 
violated the law’. The old peasant responded, ‘No, we did not. The gendarmerie did not make the announcement 
with a megaphone’. After this, gendarmerie brought 20 megaphones to each protest” (E/E 2).       
 
The other part of civil disobedience training was the protest training regarding the 
behaviour and strategies of peasants during protests. This type of training was carried out 
under the supervision of Konyar in order to provide peasants who overwhelmingly lacked any 
previous protest experience with non-violent protest skills. For these purposes, they organized 
regular training sessions among themselves in villages in which techniques of non-violent 
protest were discussed, learned, and practised. Paradoxically, though, these training sessions 
over non-violent protest were managed in a way that much resembled military-training. This 
was mainly due to the objective of maintaining discipline throughout protests which was 
adapted from Ghandi’s principles. Peasants who were first-time activists practiced sit-ins and 
marches. Another purpose of these trainings was to provide peasants some level of physical 
training in order to increase their stamina during protests which required physical fitness (E/E 
2). They have also acquired knowledge about how to act during their confrontations with the 
state forces without resorting to violence or when they were put under custody which was 
essential to keeping the integrity of their non-violent civil disobedience acts.  
Scientific education: Alongside protest training, the Bergama activists went through 
an intense and extensive scientific education which enabled peasants to attain information on 
the highly technical issue of gold mining. As Rootes (1999) states, knowledge on 
environmental issues is positively correlated with increased efficacy levels of individuals. As 
people are more knowledgeable about the environmental risks they face, environmental 
concerns are expressed less as ‘personal complaints’, and there is a greater chance of 
redressing those issues through political actions (Rootes, 1999). On the other hand, given the 
complexity of environmental issues and the mass media’s tendency to report ‘events’ rather 
than ‘processes’ with respect to environmental issues, people mostly rely on limited 
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information which easily lead to confusion, anxiety, and panic (ibid). In that sense scientific 
educational activities of scientists and experts were highly valuable which enabled the 
Bergama peasants to recognize the global aspect of their problem and led them to take action. 
Accordingly, scientists from İzmir and İstanbul occasionally visited villages and informed the 
peasants about the hazards of the cyanide leach method by presenting them with data about 
gold mining. Scientific training also entailed exemplification of gold mining accidents from 
all around the world, summarizing scientific reports about the risks of the cyanide-leach 
method, and the geographical characteristics of the Bergama region with special emphasis on 
underground waters, earthquake risks, and fertility of their land which was threatened with the 
mine (P/A 28).  
Peasants’ access to information over the highly technical issue of gold mining 
facilitated the movement in three major ways. First, scientific education raised awareness 
about the possible detrimental impacts of gold mining. This, in return, accelerated the initial 
mobilization of the peasants. Furthermore, through scientific education, peasants were able to 
make their diagnostic and prognostic framing of the issue on a more solid basis by widely 
using the scientific data about gold mining. 
Second, peasants who were endowed with the knowledge of operation of gold mines 
and potential risks continuously monitored activities in the mine and reported any abnormal 
developments to the scientists and authorities. As one of the scientist interviewees points outs, 
peasants observed and reported the release of waste water into a creek running alongside the 
mine. (E/E 17) In that sense, peasants provided valuable information from the mine site which 
was put into the service of the research section of the scientific network.    
Third, as peasants developed a full-fledged understanding of the risks of gold-mining, 
they appeared as conscious citizens in the media. Consequently, peasants whose previous 
knowledge about gold mining was very limited became quasi-‘experts’ who discussed 
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technical issues even with scientists and experts. When they conveyed their messages to the 
public and authorities through the media, peasants cited academic material and use the same 
wording of scientists in their speeches (E/E 9). In this way, peasants could present themselves 
to the public as well-informed activists rather than ignorant and manipulated peasants. 
Moreover, some of the movement elite themselves turned into ‘experts’ over the issue of gold 
mining who conducted research on the cyanide leach method on their own . For instance, 
Taşkın actively contributed to the scientific research by publishing a book on gold mining and 
the cyanide leach method (Taşkın, 1998). In his book, he analyzes the structures and 
configuration of mining TNCs all around the globe by defining their links with the Ovacık 
mine and enlists various cyanide leach method related accidents and disasters from all over 
the world with the purpose of raising consciousness about the risks of gold mining in 
Bergama. Overall, technical scientific work was crucial, since the Bergama activists could 
ward off the pro-mine camp’s accusations which imply that peasants’ resistance was simply 
caused by lack of knowledge and ignorance.  
Another set of activities that was performed by the Bergama activists in relation to 
education was witnessing acts. Groups representing the movement including Bergama 
peasants as well as Konyar and Taşkın visited places outside their region with mine-related 
environmental damage. In one of these witnessing acts, the Bergama activists went to see the 
abandoned copper mine in Lefke, Cyprus on 29.01.1997 to observe the long term impacts of 
cyanide use on the environment (Milliyet, 30.01.1997; P/A 6, 9, 16).
9
 Another witnessing act 
was performed on July 9
th, 1997 when around 300 peasants headed by Konyar and Taşkın 
tried to visit the old lead mine in Balya, Balıkesir in order to observe the environmental 
                                                 
9
 Copper and minerals mine in Lefke has been run by Cyprus Mining Corporation (CMC), an American mining 
company based in Cyprus, now owned by AMAX. The mine was closed in 1974 due to intervention of the 
Turkish army and alleged exhaustion of ores. Since then, wastes containing dangerous arsenic compounds have 
been unmonitored, and trenches keeping waste have not been restored which resulted in severe degradation of 
the environment (http://www.cyprusaction.org/humanrights/environment/lefke/, access on 15.09.2011).   
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damages created by the mine.
10
 However, the Bergama activists met with gendarmerie 
obstruction and they were not allowed to complete their visit. In the following months, the 
Bergama peasants repeated their visit to Balya, and this time, they were able to enter the mine 
site (Radikal, 11.09.1997; P/A 9). All these witnessing acts served mainly two purposes. First, 
peasants who went to these polluted sites talked about their observations when they were back 
in their villages.  
“When we were back, we told everyone what we saw. They got cancer, they got blind. Balya is lost” (P/A 9). 
 
In this way, they raised consciousness among peasants about the risks they faced. 
Second, they intended to draw the attention of the public and authorities by providing proof 
for their rightful cause justness. For that purpose, activists also complemented their 
witnessing acts with colourful protests in order to make sure their visits would appear on the 
news. 
11
 
b.2: Public Demonstrations and Direct Action 
The second set of protest actions of the Bergama movement was composed of various 
direct action forms formulated along the general strategies of non-violence and civil 
disobedience. Throughout the movement, the Bergama activists staged numerous contained 
and disruptive protest forms ranging from public demonstrations and marches to sit-ins, 
invasion and symbolic acts.  
Contained protest forms such as public demonstrations, marches, meetings, and 
petitioning had already existed in the repertoires the ‘old’ movements of the working class 
and student movements in Turkey. In other words, as is the case in the liberal democratic 
                                                 
10
 Mining activities in Balya started as early as 1839. The lead mine at Balya was handed over to a French 
company called «Société desmines de Balya-Karaaydın», and it ran the Balya mine until 1939-1940 when the it 
was closed by the Turkish government. Remaining waste in tailing ponds containing high levels of lead, zinc, 
and arsenic have caused immense environmental damage since it is estimated that around 2.1 million tons of 
waste spilled as a result of rains and floods. Balya is still under the threat of severe environmental damage 
(Öngür, 2003; Cumhuriyet, 28.05.2011). 
11
 For instance, they staged a sit-in protest with banners on the plane to Lefke in order to present a colourful 
scene for the journalists on the plane (Yeni TV, 05.03.1997).  
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societies, these protest forms had previously become routine, and considered as part of 
‘normal’ ways of doing politics, even if in a limited and restricted way, by power holders in 
Turkey. Even though the Bergama activists recurrently employed contained protest forms, 
they mostly staged these protest forms in distinct ways. The reasons for that are twofold. First, 
the Bergama activists tried to differentiate themselves from the ‘older’ movements. In that 
regard, the Bergama activists questioned the effectiveness of the ‘old’ movements’ repertoires 
of contention since earlier repertoires of action contained occasional use of violence in their 
anti-American and anti-imperialistic struggles. By underlining the novelty of their movement, 
the Bergama activists brought forth the view that employing ‘older’ repertoires exactly is 
useless and old-fashioned in the times of the capitalist globalization.  
“There are also democratic ways of resisting. In the old times, when I was young, the car of the American 
Ambassador was burnt. We used to say “Yankee go home!” I think these kinds of protests are outdated. .... In 
order to challenge a global power, you need to have an organized resistance. This should be done without 
committing crimes, without violence, without being provoked; based on citizenship identity and in a free 
manner...” (O. Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59). 
In this way, they aimed to remain legitimate in the eyes of the power holders by stating that 
they were not a simple continuation of old movements which were associated with political 
turmoil during the pre-1980 period.  
Secondly, they aspired to receive the attention of the mass media and the public by 
signalling distinct features as a movement. Given the mass media’s tendency to highlight 
violence-oriented protests which is a part of its “newsworthiness” criteria, it was crucial for 
the Bergama activists to discover novel and striking ways of doing peaceful protests in order 
to find themselves place in the news. 
“We staged interesting protests in order to draw the attention of the public. In this way, we were able to tell 
about our demands. Otherwise, you take a megaphone and walk on the streets. That type of protest does not grab 
the attention of people. But if you stage events which have not been done before and which people are not 
accustomed to, people pay more attention. Unconventional protests can find room in the media- especially for 
grabbing attention of the media and the public. Almost all of our protests have been reported by the media” (P/A 
15). 
 
“During when a group travelled to İstanbul [for the Bosphorous Bridge protest], a small bunch of us went to 
İzmir for another protest. There were around 25 people. We staged two different protests simultaneously. In 
İzmir, we interrupted a concert at the İzmir Fair. .....One MP there recognized us. He gave us support. And then 
everyone applauded us. Those types of protests were really effective. Protest does not happen only by walking” 
(P/A 8).   
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With these objectives, they stuck to non-violence as an indispensible feature of their 
actions during their struggle against global powers. The Bergama activists deliberately and 
meticulously tried to refute violence throughout their protests.  
“We had to find new methods which would dominate the police without agitating them. . We had to be 
sympathetic and gentle.......I was fascinated by Gandhi as I read his work. He drove them [the imperialist forces] 
crazy. We are doing that as well. It is uncertain when or where we do become visible. Or when we 
appear....Where we walk....What we will do suddenly....”(Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 59). 
 
Conventional protest forms such as public marches and demonstrations constituted the 
bulk of the Bergama peasants’ protest activities which led them to achieve public visibility 
and recognition. They adapted these conventional forms to their own situation by introducing 
various innovative features. Accordingly, the Bergama activists shaped many of their 
demonstrations, especially the larger scale ones that intended to receive attention of the 
national and international media and public outside their region, around specific themes.  
“We were thinking and deliberating what to do about protests...The main objective was to remain on the public 
agenda. If newspapers and televisions covered our protests, we would not be off agenda. However, if you appear 
with the same sort of protest every day, no one takes you into account. If protests are innovative, the media 
attention continues. They always come. Otherwise, they won’t. That’s why we tried to stage different protests” 
(P/A 20).  
 
Innovative forms of protest were shaped around specific themes underlining a certain 
aspect of the Bergama contention and the peasants named many of their demonstrations along 
these themes. One of the most well-known thematic demonstrations was the “Yetti Gari!” (a 
local expression meaning ‘enough is enough’). On December 23rd, 1996, several hundred 
peasants from the Bergama villages staged this public demonstration marching half-naked 
only with their underwear on the streets of Bergama, and they distributed pamphlets to the 
public during the protests which was defined by a peasant activist as “an event which would 
never be staged by any peasant normally” (P/A 9). With ‘nudity’, the Bergama peasants 
intended to convey the message that peasants were about to lose everything they possessed 
including their bodies and were ready to do anything to stop the gold mine. Indeed, it was one 
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of the most successful events of the Bergama peasants since the protest received a wide media 
coverage which aided the escalation of public awareness about the Bergama movement. 
Additionally, the nudity protest which was exclusively staged by male peasants upheld a 
symbolic significance with respect to the internal relations of the movement. It was a 
‘transformative’ act on the part of the Bergama villagers since they collectively practiced a 
socially unacceptable behaviour for a common goal. 
“We gathered in Bergama on Sunday in front of the CHP building. First, he [Konyar] got half-naked. We were 
surprised. He said “Get naked”. We stared each other. We have never gotten naked [in public] before. It is 
shameful behaviour. You are breaking a taboo there...Eventually, the majority of the crowd got naked and rushed 
into the street. This protest dubbed the “nudity protest” received wide media coverage which led the public hear 
about the Bergama movement. After stepping out the door, there was no more shame or fear. We walked through 
Bergama and distributed pamphlets. We toured around. We were out of our shells. And the rest followed. If you 
tell me to get naked now, I will do it right here” (Tahsin Sezer in Reinart, 2003:61).  
  
As implied in the words of the peasant interviewee, this protest event based on the 
collective act of breaching traditional customs and social codes enabled peasants to create 
new ties along the lines of their contention based on their already existing solidarity as 
members of the same community. In other words, through the nudity protest, traditional 
village based relations were being revitalized and reformulated in such a way that new types 
of bonds of commitment and solidarity developed among peasants which were essential for 
the sustainability of the movement. The ‘nudity protest’ was the symbolic display of the 
peasants’ commitment to their cause not only for the general public, but for themselves as 
well. In that sense, the “nudity protest” signified a turning point for the movement in which 
peasants overcame barriers of shame, taboo, and social pressure which eventually led to 
increased levels of commitment and participation in the subsequent protest events.   
“We even walked half naked only with our underwear on the streets in order to protest. For us, it was 
unacceptable [to appear half naked in public]. However, it was Konyar who got naked first and then we did it. 
Now it is not a big deal for me. In order to protest, I can even do it here” (P/A 11). 
 
Later on, the Bergama activists occasionally repeated the “nudity protest” outside 
Bergama. Around 200 activists walked [half]-naked in Istanbul on February 14th, 1998 which 
was forestalled by the police, and in response it was turned into a sit-in (Milliyet, 15.02.1998). 
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They protested the International Arbitration Treaty again half-naked in Ankara on July 16th, 
1999 and 43 peasants were arrested (Radikal, 17.07.1999).  On 24.12.1999, the Bergama 
peasants made another ‘nudity’ protest outside the Ministry of Energy in Ankara, this time 
protesting the nuclear energy plans of the government (Milliyet, 25.12.1999). When 
supporting the mobilization against the Ilısu Dam which would submerge the historical town 
of Hasankeyf underwater, the Bergama peasants went to Hasankeyf in the South-Eastern part 
of Turkey under the leadership of Konyar and protested against the dam project with their 
clothes off on December 5th, 2002 (Bianet, 06.12.2002). Even during the decline phase of the 
movement when the rate of protests dropped sharply, the Bergama peasants continued 
demonstrating half-naked as in the example of a demonstration in Istanbul staged by about 50 
Bergama peasants on September 14
th
, 2004 (Milliyet, 15.09.2004). As correctly identified by 
a peasant activist, “nudity protest” was an innovative protest form practiced first by the 
Bergama activists, and it became modular and entered the repertoire of action of other social 
movements elsewhere in Turkey (P/A 15).
12
  
The anti-mine activists staged other thematic demonstrations throughout their 
movement. On November 25
th, 1996, the “coffin demonstration” was organized in Bergama 
with the participation of around 3000 demonstrators during which 2 coffins were carried with 
Chopin’s funeral march playing at the background which symbolically pointed at the fact that 
they were facing a fatal risk (Cumhuriyet, 26.11.1996). Another demonstration was staged in 
the İzmir Adnan Menderes Airport when the peasants sent Taşkın off to Belgium in order to 
contact the European Parliament members for support. This time the peasants took off their 
shoes and held them up in the air saying “Miners have taken everything from us but our 
shoes” (Radikal, 12.02.1997).  
                                                 
12
 Various mobilizations including workers of the public enterprise of İstanbul Electricity, Tramway, and Tunnel 
Organization (İETT) claiming their wage differences, peasants from Manisa protesting against the construction 
of a large-scale waste disposal facility, and unions opposing privatization of a state-owned aluminium factory in 
Seydisehir, borrowed and staged “nudity protests” (Radikal, 18.11.2008; Milliyet, 19.11.2006; Bianet, 
11.06.2001). 
 145 
 
On May 28
th, 1997, peasants made a protest called the “Apache Walk” by dressing up 
like American Indians and putting on face paint as reminiscent of the American Indians’ 
traditional war-paint. They declared a ‘symbolic war’ against the gold mine (Milliyet, 
29.05.1997). With this protest, they referred to the American Indians in history in a different 
social context, and they intended to draw attention to the fact that similar attacks have been 
taking place elsewhere in the world by comparing their condition with that of the American 
Indians whose land was taken by Europeans a few centuries ago. They staged a demonstration 
called the “Cap and Tie March” on June 8th, 1997 in İzmir, during which traditional caps were 
worn to symbolize their peasant identity as well as ties which expressed that they were 
concomitantly “civilized” citizens entitled to all citizenship rights. At the end of their 
demonstration, they delivered their petition to the governor of İzmir (P/A 9; 
http://www.reocities.com/siyanurlealtin/duyuru.html, last access on 10.09.2011). Another 
thematic demonstration was “March With Donkeys” during which peasants walked with their 
animals to the sub-governor’s office in Bergama. Showing that all species are defending their 
right to live, they underlined that lives of all the species were under threat because of the gold 
mine (Evrensel, 17.02.2000; P/A 9). 
However, not all public demonstrations were organized exclusively as thematic 
demonstrations. There were numerous conventional demonstrations during which activists 
simply gathered and marched with banners and slogans, mostly during the locally staged 
protests.
13
 Rather than targeting the general public and media attention, the Bergama peasants 
aimed to strengthen intra-movement bonds, keep mobilization alive, to display their 
determination, and show that their opposition continues to the TNC(s) with these locally 
oriented demonstrations (E/E 2).  
                                                 
13
 These demonstrations were described as “smaller scale protests” and “hit and run protests” by one of the 
peasant activists (P/A 9). 
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All these public demonstrations were held in combination with disruptive actions. 
Disruptive actions were symbolic expression of peasants’ discontent about the misapplication 
of rules and laws by the state. They challenged the state authorities by conveying the message 
that they were refraining from their citizenship duties unless the Turkish state exercised its 
own duties towards its citizens rather than siding with the TNC(s). In other words, the 
Bergama activists underlined the violation of rule-of-law principle and their previously 
achieved citizenship rights which were supposed to be under the protection of the state. In 
order to underline the “unlawfulness” of their situation, they practiced a series of disruptive 
civil obedience acts which are defined by the Bergama activists as occurring at the ‘borders of 
law’. 
“We did not clash with the police. We tried to do our protests in sympathetic way for the public. These protests 
were not legal, but they were not illegal either. Lawyers were defining those borders for us” (P/A 11). 
 
With disruptive protests, the Bergama activists basically aimed to interrupt the daily 
life of the general public, the usual practices of the state, and operations of the mine in order 
to display their determination. With that purpose, the Bergama peasants staged numerous sit-
ins at public spaces and either closed or slowed down traffic in Bergama, İzmir, İstanbul, and 
Ankara. In one of their most well-known acts, a group of Bergama peasants chained 
themselves to the fences of the Bosporus Bridge in İstanbul on August 26th, 1997 which was 
closed to pedestrians (Sabah, 27.08.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 27.08.1997). During this protest 
which caused a major interruption of the already troublesome İstanbul traffic, they presented 
themselves in such colourful ways using banners and slogans that they managed to draw 
immense media and public attention at the national level (P/A 8, 9, 11, 27). Later on, they 
repeated the Bosphorous Bridge protest on March 25
th
, 2002 with the participation of 36 
peasants who were then taken into custody for making an “illegal” protest by disrupting the 
traffic (Radikal, 26.03.2002).  Other locations frequently used for sit-ins were highways. In 
August 1997, the peasants marched towards Çeşme, a touristic town 88 kilometres west of 
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İzmir, in order to meet with several ministers who were attending a meeting organized by the 
Aegean Association of Industrialists and Businessmen. However, the peasants were not 
allowed to enter Çeşme by the state security forces, and they were kept waiting on the İzmir-
Çeşme highway. In response, peasants staged a sit-in protest and closed the highway to traffic 
for a couple of hours (Milliyet, 03.08.1997).  Similarly, İzmir-Çanakkale highway which is 
one of the busiest transit routes which lies next to the mine pit and villages were closed to 
traffic numerous times by the peasants. On 27 May 2001, around 300 peasants dressed up in 
commando camouflage to escape from the gendarmeries that were protecting the mine site. 
Their aim was to threaten the mine administration with burning themselves in front of the 
mine as a protest with the fuel oil that they brought with them. However, as a result of the 
intrusion of the police, there were clashes and Konyar was taken into custody. Peasants 
organized a sit-in by closing the İzmir-Çanakkale road which lasted until Konyar was released 
(Milliyet, 28.05.2001). 
The Bergama activists also intended to disrupt regular administrative activities of the 
Turkish state with their protests. On November 30
th
, 1997, the majority of peasants in 7 
villages- Pınarköy, Çamköy, Narlıca, Ovacık, Yalnızev, Tepeköy, Süleymanlı and Aşağı 
Kırıklar- surrounding the Ovacık gold mine did not participate in the population census which 
was legally required (Yeni Asır, 01.12.1997; Reinart, 2003: 109). In this protest, peasants 
used a word play in their framing, based on the double meaning of the word ‘count’ in 
Turkish which refers to both ‘to be counted at a census’ and “to show respect”. In doing that, 
they intended to send power holders the message of “we will not be counted by the state 
which does not count us” (P/A 1, 2, 28). In other words, they indicated that they would not 
practice their citizenship duties unless the state in Turkey fulfilled its responsibilities towards 
its citizens.  
“We did not participate in the census. We did it as a protest. It was a communal act. It was a conscious act. We 
do not let the state count us if that state is not taking into account what we say” (P/A 5). 
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Last, but not the least, the interruption of the operation of the mine was among the 
major objectives of the Bergama peasants. For this purpose, they employed various tactics 
including invading the mine pit, putting the mine pit under siege, and disrupting their public 
relations activities. The mine pit was occupied by the Bergama activists twice throughout the 
movement. In April, 1997, thousands of villagers accompanied by some activists from the 
town of Bergama entered the mine site with their tractors and occupied the mine pit for about 
12 hours. Activists demanded to meet with either the President of Turkish Republic or the 
Minister of Environment in order to get the promise of indefinite closure of the mine. As a 
result of the negotiations held with the state authorities, the governor promised to close the 
mine temporarily based on his authority to maintain public order (Cumhuriyet, 23.04.1997; 
Radikal, 23.04.1997; P/A 9, 11).   
The second invasion event took place during when feelings of discontent and tension 
escalated among peasants about the continuing mine construction despite the decision of the 
high court to the contrary. With the spread of rumours that the cyanide was being transported 
to the mine site, a large group of peasants blocked the roads going to the mine pit area on June 
30
th
, 1997. During this protest, several intrusions into the mine took place (Cumhuriyet, 
02.07.1997; P/A 8).   
Similar to the road-blocking protest, the mine area was put under siege numerous 
times by the Bergama activists. By forming a human chain which was a common protest form 
of the peace movement in general and staging a sit-in, the Bergama peasants blockaded the 
mine pit in order to prevent the arrival of 18tons of cyanide (Hürriyet, 24.03.1999). In July 
2001, around 500 peasants waited outside the fences of the mine pit each night and monitored 
the mine with their flashlights from 11:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m. in order to prevent an illegal 
operation of the mine despite the decision of the Izmir Administrative Court to close the mine 
(P/A 10; Bianet, 17.07.2001).   
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With respect to the disruption of the public relations work of the TNC(s), on June 21
st
, 
1996, the Bergama peasants intruded on the press meeting of the Australian ambassador 
David W. Evans who advocated cyanide leach method by claiming that the method did not 
entail any risks. With their banners and slogans, the Bergama peasants who were led by 
Konyar did not allow the press conference to end by harassing the Australian ambassador 
during his speech, and they took over that meeting and turned it into their own press 
conference (Cumhuriyet, 22.06.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 22.06.1997; P/A 9; P/A 27).   
Despite the fact that CSOs and environmentalists supported the Bergama peasants, 
their forms of protest were more contained, as they rarely staged acts of disruptive protest. On 
February 15
th
, 1997, around 15 protestors interrupted the meeting of Eurogold with journalists 
in Istanbul to draw attention to the illegality of the mine project based on the court ruling 
which was disregarded (Radikal, 16.05.1997). 
In addition to the non-violent disruptive protests, conventional protest forms like 
petitioning and press conferences were also utilized. There was a distinction between 
conventional and unconventional sets of protests with respect to their participants. 
Demonstrations, whether thematic or conventional, were overwhelmingly dominated by 
peasants. When other activists were allowed to participate, they appeared only as ‘secondary’ 
participants who were incorporated into the demonstrations as supporters of the peasants. 
“They [civil society organizations, environmentalists] also joined us during our demonstrations. However, they 
had to be like us. For instance, they could not open their own banners or state their organizations’ names. They 
could participate as if they were peasants. Still, differences could be discerned. Therefore, we [peasants] were 
always in the lead, and they followed us” (P/A 20). 
 
 
Apart from the intention of displaying the Bergama mobilization as a peasants’ 
movement without being overshadowed by other civil society organizations, political parties 
or other movements, there were instrumental reasons for such a separation. The main 
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aspiration was to be able to control the protesting mass to avoid intrusion of ‘external’ actors 
leading to provocations or manipulations. 
“The thing we were careful about was that everyone should know every other person who appeared in the protest 
site. Every villager should be able to recognize people from their own villages. The aim was to prevent 
infiltration of provocateurs or terrorist groups. For example, someone might throw a stone at police or punch a 
soldier. They are people as well. They respond.  Protest becomes provoked. Then prosecutors, the state won’t 
allow protests. They won’t let us march on the streets” (P/A 15).  
 
 On the other hand, petitioning campaigns have been launched in a more inclusionary 
fashion containing all supporters from Bergama, İzmir, and the rest of Turkey. In fact, 
petitioning campaigns were mostly organized by the civil society organizations supporting the 
Bergama movement in İzmir and Bergama, and the names of supporting civil society 
organizations and groups were openly declared. One of the major petitioning campaigns 
initiated by civil society organizations was called “Call from the Bergama People; Cyanide 
Gold Mine Should Be Closed”. It was launched with the objective of calling on state 
departments to implement the court decisions and the signatures were handed to the Turkish 
president, prime minister, and the Ministry of Environment in November, 1997 (Yeni Yüzyıl, 
15.11.1997). This was mainly due to the fact that petitioning was a more controlled way of 
displaying numbers since messages were clearly set in a narrative beforehand and it was not 
possible to diverge from these narratives. On the other hand, controlling masses during a 
march was a harder task. Therefore, the objective of displaying numbers was exceeded by 
concerns about keeping the movement intact during demonstrations. 
b.3: Symbolic events:  
Throughout their movement, the Bergama activists mobilized symbolic resources and 
made extensive use of them in their protests. Symbols were used mainly in two ways. First, 
they were incorporated in protests and utilized as part of their disruptive acts as stated above. 
In that regard, in many of their demonstrations, marches, and sit-ins, the Bergama activists 
made use of various elements such as nudity, shoes, torches, chains, animals, and outfits. 
Secondly, the Bergama activists organized distinct symbolic protests in order to draw the 
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attention of the media and the public. In these symbolic protests, traditional cultural codes are 
used frequently, albeit in their adapted forms. In doing that, the Bergama activists aimed to 
eliminate the possibility of alienation of the villagers from protests activities, and they 
conveyed their messages to the general public in familiar codes. For instance, wedding 
ceremonies which are the one of the major celebratory occasions bringing the whole village 
community together were used as part of the protests by the Bergama activists. Village 
weddings also appear as festive events which strengthen relations between villages since 
friends and relatives from neighbouring villages also participate. As part of celebration 
custom, it is common to use gold and golden jewellery as wedding gifts to the hosts of the 
wedding which entail symbolic and economic significance in terms of displaying the 
generosity and status of the ones giving gifts to marrying couples. Accordingly, the wedding 
celebration of Konyar’s daughter which was held in two villages, Çamköy and Narlıca, in 
September, 1997 turned into an anti-gold mine protest in which banners against the mine were 
carried and gold-made wedding presents were forbidden in order to convey the message that 
gold is not an inevitable part of people’s daily lives.14 Another related symbolic protest 
regarding the daily use of gold was a campaign launched under the name of “Donate Your 
Gold Bracelets to the State” which was launched in January 2001. The aim was to collect one 
gold bracelet from each household in the Bergama villages and give the collected amount to 
the state which was calculated to meet the annual gains of the state from the mine. 
(www.ntvmsnbc.com, 29.01.2001).  
The Bergama peasants held a picnic on May 18
th
, 1997 with the participation of 
thousands including peasants as well as anti-gold mine environmentalists, scientists, NGOs 
and politicians from different parts of Turkey. The purpose of this event dubbed “Before 
Cyanide Contaminated Its Waters” was to show symbolically what their life had been like in 
                                                 
14
 In fact, the bride said “NO” in the actual ceremony symbolizing the no to the mine. Fortunately, it did not 
prevent the marriage. 
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relation to the environment before the gold mine appeared in their region. During the picnic, a 
monument of “Epigraph of 17 Villages” was erected in Çamköy on which a summary of 
history of their struggle, environmental features of their region, and damage done to the 
environment was engraved (P/A 9; Radikal, 19.05.1997; Cumhuriyet, 19.05.1997).
15
   
Additionally, the Bergama activists frequently resorted to stage symbolic acts 
resembling street theatres which belonged in the repertories of action of feminist movement, 
peace movements and the Global Justice Movement in general. During these symbolic 
performances, they employed traditional cultural symbols as well as historical symbols and 
acts specific to Western societies. For instance, the Bergama peasants staged a street theatrical 
act by performing the symbolic act of putting tar and feathers on Eurogold executive manager 
Jack Testard, portrayed as a cowboy and chased out of their region (Kuzey Ege, 24.02.1997). 
In this protest, the Bergama activists borrowed the act of tarring and feathering which was 
perceived to be a part of their opponents’ cultural heritage since it originated in feudal Europe 
and American colonies. 
 Popular culture was used as a source for their themes and symbols. One striking 
example is the diffusion of a comic character as one of the symbols of the movement. In their 
accounts of the Bergama movement, the media attributed the name Obelix, a character from 
the French comic book called Asterix, to one of the Bergama activists showing him as one of 
the symbol of the movement (Hürriyet, 16.07.1999). 16 Apart from the physical similarity of 
Bayram Çavuş, the storyline of the comic book revolving around the underlying theme of 
                                                 
15
 Please see Appendix G for the whole text.  
16
 The analogy drawn between Bayram Cavuş, a leading peasant activist, and the cartoon character Obelix was 
mainly caused by physical likeness, since Bayram Cavus, a moustached and overweight peasant wearing striped 
pyjamas during nudity protests, looked quite like Obelix. The media which is generally fond of using catchy and 
popular symbols in its framing, employed this analogy frequently and used ‘Obelix’ interchangeably with the 
Bergama peasants in many of their story headings such as “Obelix has worn his pyjamas” to indicate that the 
Bergama peasants have reinvigorated their protests (Sabah, 31.10.2000) and “Obelix from Bergama is Against 
Arbitration” to indicate the Bergama peasants resistance against the International Arbitration (Hurriyet, 
17.07.1999). In a similar vein, Konyar was dubbed Asterix again because of his physical appearance and 
oppositional attitude. 
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resistance of a small village against the invasion of the Roman Empire was found to be 
parallel to the Bergama movement which was agreed by activists as well.  
“It is the story of resistance of a small village in Galia against a huge power, the Roman Empire. There is 
[describing Obelix] the foolish looking, but strong hero” (P/A 15).  
 
Discovering that it was found sympathetic by the public, the Bergama activists did not refute 
this media framing.  On the contrary, Bayram Çavuş was brought to the frontlines of their 
protests.
17
 In fact, the use of a popular culture element, ‘Obelix’ as a symbol was not a 
strategic move of the Bergama activists calculated beforehand. Rather, it was a contingent 
development which was then seen as beneficiary for the movement (E/E 29). On the other 
hand, the use of popular culture has led to internal debates within the movement. For instance, 
one activist criticized Bayram Çavuş - Obelix analogy by saying that it led to reputation loss 
for the movement when peasants were likened to comic characters because it was diluting the 
significance of their cause (E/E 3). 
On the other hand, they frequently used traditional cultural symbols in order not to 
alienate peasants and the general public form protests. In another street theatre protest, they 
performed the act of planting a fig tree as a symbol of demolishing the gold mine. They 
referred to the proverbial saying of “planting a fig tree at their home” which can be roughly 
translated as “we will destroy the homes of those who destroy ours” (Kuzey Ege, 24.02.1997).  
In May 1997, the peasants who wanted to display their faith in the success of their movement 
staged the “tin protest”. By playing tins as if they were drums, they symbolically celebrated 
the future departure  of the TNC(s) and closure of the mine making a  reference to the Turkish 
proverb of “playing tins after his/her departure” that means showing joy after someone is 
displaced or enforced to leave a position (Yeni Asır, 26.05.1997). In another performance act, 
peasants symbolically presented 17 types of zucchini which were produced in their region and 
                                                 
17
 Obelix became a modular protest symbol which diffused to other movements in Turkey. The eadministrative 
head of Karasu village of Bartin in the north of Turkey appeared in the similar clothing and employed the name 
Obelix to convey the message that they would confront the planned fuel-oil power energy plant construction in 
Bartın like the Bergama peasants (Sabah, 09.04.2001). 
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sent it to İmren Aykut, former Minister of Environment, who said she was exhausted with the 
protests of the Bergama peasants by using proverbial saying “Bergama peasants gave the taste 
of zucchini” (P/A 27, 28; Milliyet, 28.07.1997; Reinart, 2003: 92-93). Overall, in comparison 
to more structured movements with SMOs, the Bergama movement’s repertoire of action was 
not always strategically established and controlled. As happened in the case of using Obelix 
as a symbol, coincidences and contingencies also played a part.    
Counter strategies of the pro-mine camp: 
a. The TNCs in Bergama: Eurogold/Normandy/Newmont 
Eurogold was established as a joint venture on August 29
th
, 1989. Eurogold has a 
complex configuration of partners and shareholders. Initially, Eurogold was formed based on 
the partnership of two mining TNCs, namely Normandy-Poseidon and Metall Mining 
Corporation, respectively possessing 66.67% and 33.33% of the shares. The latter company is 
owned by Metallgeselschaft, a gigantic mining corporation originally based in Germany 
(Taşkın, 1998). The mining sector displays a very complex web-like structure at the global 
level in which numerous companies are affiliated with each other.
18
  
Throughout the process, shareholders of Eurogold themselves as well as partners’ 
shares in the joint venture have changed due to the changing trends in the global markets, 
Eurogold handing over to Normandy Poseidon which then turned over to Newmont Mining 
Corp.
19
 Finally, a Turkish company, Koza, has bought all the shares of the Ovacik mine from 
the world's largest gold producer Newmont Mining Corp for $44.5 million. Establishing a 
gold mining company called the Koza Altın Limited, the Turkish company has been 
producing gold and silver in the mine to this date.  
                                                 
18
 For instance, Posedion Gold (POSGOLD) is a unit of Normandy Mining. Other two minor partners in 
POSGOLD are AMP and Minorco. 
19
 In 1994, shares changed hands altering the partnership structure of Eurogold. Between the year of 1994 and 
1999, Normandy Poseidon/ BRGM  held 67% of the shares, and the remaining 33% of the shares belonged to 
Inmet Mining Corporation. In March 1999, Normandy bought the shares of Inmet Mining Corp, and the name of 
the operating company was changed to Normandy in 2000 (TMMOB, 2003; Taşkın, 2003). In February 2001, 
Normandy has sold the mine to Newmont Mining Corp. After running the mining related activities for 4 years, 
Newmont ended its operations in Ovacık and sold the mine to Koza. 
 155 
 
Cyanide leach method is considered to be the most economically feasible method by 
the gold industry. Based on this method, first, ores are brought to the surface and crushed. 
Then crushed soil is put into heaps and washed with cyanide. The chemical solution is 
collected at the bottom of heaps and sent to a mill where gold and silver are separated. 
However, it is not only the gold which is decomposed as a result of this process, but heavy 
metals found in soil including lead, zinc, arsenic, copper, and others are also released. 
Combined with the large amounts of cyanide used, these heavy metal complexes constitute 
the waste sludge produced by the cyanide leach method. 
b. Strategies and activities of the pro-mine network: 
“If it is a chess game, we are one of the players. We know how to play chess. We might not be as strong. Still, 
we know our strength” (E/E 3).  
 
 As stated by one of the Bergama activists, movements are like a chess game in which 
activists and their opponents on each side determine their strategies, envisage their 
adversaries’, and make moves and countermoves. In other words, they are strategy based 
incidents in which moves of each set of actors are interdependent. The Bergama activists set 
their strategies and decided on tactics with the aim of forestalling the gold mine. On the other 
hand, they adapted their actions to the changing circumstances which were partly shaped by 
the acts of their opponents. Therefore, it is crucial to understand which tactics and strategies 
TNC(s) followed throughout the process.  
The pro-mine camp consisting of the mining TNC(s) as well as journalists, scientists, 
civil society organizations, and politicians endeavoured to prove that the gold mine was risk 
free and, subsequently, to undermine the anti-mine movement. As the major actor of this 
camp, the TNC(s) employed various tactics ranging from more conventional acts revolving 
around building good relations with locals and gaining the trust of the general public to more 
specific acts such as staging symbolic acts, distributing incentives and organizing a counter-
movement. Starting with the latter set of activities, the strategy of convincing the local 
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population through providing benefits occupied a central position within the TNC(s)’ 
repertoires of action. For that purpose, Eurogold’s initial activities were concentrated on 
building good relations with the peasants through implementing social responsibility projects 
which would benefit all the villagers. Eurogold renovated village mosques, built facilities for 
public use like wedding houses, and improved sewage and water supply systems (P/A 9, 11). 
In doing that, miners targeted the villagers as a whole community and tried to convince them 
that living standards would be improved with the operation of the gold mine. Additionally, 
temporary incentives were also offered by the mining company. Building on peasants’ 
traditional/religious values, Eurogold organized large dinners during fasting times (Ramadan) 
and provided sacrificial animals for cheaper prices during the religious holiday of sacrifice 
(P/A 5, 15, 27; Kuzey Ege, 05.01.1998, 19.01.1998, 02.02.1998).  
Eurogold recognized the importance of coffeehouses and placed them at the centre of 
its public relations efforts. For instance, in order to promote their mine project and get the 
consent of the villagers, Eurogold proposed to repair and improve coffeehouses. As part of 
their promotional strategy, the corporation constructed a modern wedding house just within 
the perimeters of the garden of the village coffeehouse at Çamköy.  However, the villagers 
interpreted the act as a form of ‘charity’ and, moreover, as bribery through which Eurogold 
intended to ‘buy’ them.  
“One day the executive manager of Eurogold came here….He told us that they wanted to build a mosque…They 
made a promise of building our roads…I asked “Why do you plan to do it here? What is our significance?” We 
already had our drinking water. However, Bozköy which is across that hill did not. I said “If you are doing a 
favour, go and do it over there. They need it”. Or Alacalı [another village] needed a new mosque. He talked 
about job opportunities and school. I said “Go to the South East [of Turkey]. They have none of these”. It was a 
give and take relationship. He said “we have business with you”. After that incident, I completely lost my trust in 
the miners” (P/A 11). 
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As a response, the Çamköy villagers used the building for the wedding house for their own 
purposes in relation to their struggle against the gold mine, and they turned the building into a 
library where they stored their documents and archives (P/A 5, 11).
20
 
As a result of the escalation of the anti-mine movement, Eurogold made a tactical change 
which was furthered by successive TNC(s). They began to approach peasants on an individual 
basis rather than treating them as a community. The mining company offered jobs and money 
to individuals who were perceived as influential key figures in their villages (P/A 1, 11, 30).
 21
 
Furthermore, TNC(s) put some peasants on payroll even though they did not work in the mine 
(P/A 8, 15, 28). 
“Narlıca [village] was the focal point. They [the miners] called their muhtar and told him that it was over… They 
gave him a job in the mine. They also employed 35-40 men close to him. Then, Narlıca broke up” (P/A 15).   
 
Interviewees commonly considered TNC(s)’ acts of distributing selective incentives as 
effective in terms of achieving the goal of undermining their movement. Divisions were 
created among peasants starting with Narlıca village which was one of the most active in 
protests. In that sense, it was the beginning of the end (P/A 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 28). 
In a similar vein, TNC(s) played on the political preferences of villagers in order to create 
cleavages within the movement. For that purpose, the TNC(s) formed an executive board 
consisting of people with left wing orientations after figuring out that most of the Alevi villagers 
were politically left-leaning.  
“They came to me and said ‘You are a social democrat. We are as well. Let us give you money and work 
together in collaboration. Let’s take your men from your village, too’” (P/A 15).  
 
Another tactic used by TNC(s) was to stage performative acts to dispense with doubts 
about the hazardous risks of the mine. Several managers including the chief executive of 
Normandy drank the water taken from the tailing pond at a press conference in order to prove 
                                                 
20
 By the time interviews were conducted, the building was emptied and was not being used due to internal 
conflicts within the movement. Documents and archives were taken by one of the peasant activists and displayed 
at his house. 
21
 Peasants blamed the company for sending researchers who worked for the company allegedly in order to 
analyze the social and economic structure of villages. With the data obtained, influential individuals like 
muhtars, religious leaders, and other people with high status were identified, and they became the key targets of 
the TNC(s) (P/A 4, 9).  
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the cleanness of waste water and the effectiveness of the filtration system. Furthermore, 
during the same event, a couple of peasants who were working at the mine swam in the tailing 
pond to display that it was harmless to human health (Radikal, 13.07.2001; Radikal, 
14.07.2001).
22
 Also, ducks were brought to the mine to settle in the tailing pond to show that 
there was no harm to living species around the mine pit.
23
  
Another move of the TNC(s) was to organize and support a pro-mine mobilization 
among the Bergama peasants. On the same day that the Bergama peasants were staging their 
protests on the Bosporus Bridge for the second time, about 360 peasants who were working at 
the mine and their families marched on the streets of Bergama demanding that the mine 
should not be closed. The demonstration which was organized by a conservative mining 
workers’ trade union, Maden-İş, was named as ‘The Most Environmentally Friendly Gold 
Mine Should Continue Operating”. Pro-mine peasants, mostly activists in the Bergama 
movement previously, indicated that they were after their livelihood and wanted to contribute 
to the economy of the country by continuing to extract gold ' (Radikal, 26.03.1997; Milliyet, 
27.03.1997). When the mine was closed temporarily in 2004 (at the time owned by 
Normandy), workers from the mine formed a short-lived counter-movement. Calling 
themselves “Matrix miners”, pro-mine peasants staged several protests and met with the 
Bergama movement’s lawyers.24 They claimed that the mine was closed as a result of Lemke, 
Konyar and Özay’s complaints. In their protests, they aimed to convey the message that not 
all peasants in Bergama were against the mine, and some of them became the victims of the 
anti-mine movement since they lost their jobs (Milliyet, 01.09.2004; Radikal, 01.09.2004; 
Hurriyet, 02.09.2004; Kuzey Ege, 04.10.2004).    
                                                 
22
 Two of these peasants were diagnosed with cancer in the following years. The Bergama peasants took cancer 
cases as a proof for the hazards of the gold mine waste. 
23
 The Bergama activists questioned the “duck operation” by saying that the ducks were the species most 
resistant to the impacts of cyanide (E/E 3; P/A 5, 9).  
24
 In order to show their grievance symbolically, counter-movement activists shaved their heads and wore black 
sun-glasses provided by the mine for security purposes at work. They claimed they employed those black glasses 
as their symbol like it was used by the characters in the movie “Matrix” which implied that they were living in a 
similar condition of distorted reality as depicted in the film (Hurriyet, 02.09.2004).  
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Additionally, TNC(s) pursued a wide range of regular public relations activities to 
gain trust and legitimacy. These TNC activities consisted of issuing press releases, giving ads 
to newspapers, and organizing conferences and symposiums over gold mining. The main 
objective in these events was to show the safety of gold mining and the economic benefits it 
would have brought. The underlined themes consisted of the legal status of the Ovacık gold 
mine based on permits and approvals of the Turkish government ministries, minimized risks 
associated with cyanide leach method and its widespread use around the world, and their 
respect for local population’s concerns and demands (Turkish Daily News, 27.04.1997).  
Diversions from the main strategy of non-violence: 
Protests of the Bergama activists achieved high levels of success in terms of obtaining 
the attention of the media and the public. Their repertoire of contention was enriched with 
innovative elements which were harmoniously combined with conventional elements. 
Furthermore, the Bergama activists achieved consistency over the strategies of non-violent 
civil disobedience. Yet, there have been a small number of incidents in which violence was 
used by some sections among the activists. First, the peasants were accused of using acts of 
ludditism and vandalism by entering the mine and overturning two trucks, burning an 
ambulance, and breaking computers and furniture belonging to Eurogold when they put the 
mine pit under siege in order to prevent the arrival of cyanide tanks (Turkish Daily News, 
03.07.1997). However, there was no clear evidence that it was the peasants who practiced 
vandalism, and the peasants continuously rejected the alleged vandalism acts claiming it was 
a ‘provocative’ set up organized by Eurogold. 25  
Second, a public relations office of Eurogold was bombed in İzmir on July 19th, 1997, 
which caused physical damage, but no casualties (Milliyet, 20.07.1997). Eurogold authorities 
                                                 
25
 In the end, 7 villagers were taken into custody by the gendarmerie. In their defence, they claimed that they 
neither damaged any property of the mine nor clashed with the police forces. They argued that the law was on 
their side in any case and there was no need for any violence. The villagers argued that they were only protesting 
the continuing activities of the mine. Moreover, they claimed the process of custody was ‘one-sided’ and 
‘arbitrary’.  
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accused the Bergama activists, claiming that illegal radical left-wing groups infiltrated the 
movement and, furthermore, that some activists were deliberately collaborating with them. 
However, the Bergama peasants rejected the claims, as stated in the words of Taşkın in a 
press conference: 
“The Bergama people are utterly against violence. However, the just cause of Bergama movement is being 
stigmatized by provocations which we believe are circulated by Eurogold. We condemn the bombing incident 
regardless of whoever did it. We perceive it as an act of provocation. We find the suggestion that the Bergama 
peasant movement is being infiltrated by some underground organizations absurd” (Sabah, 21.09.1997).     
In order to ward off accusations and symbolically clarify their absolute preference for non-
violence, the Bergama peasants visited the Eurogold Office in İzmir and brought flowers to 
Eurogold to condemn the attack. Yet, concomitantly, they did not refrain from protesting 
Eurogold by staging a picket in front of the Eurogold office during their visit (Sabah, 
21.09.1997).  
However, these violent acts were relatively minor considering the duration and scope 
of the movement. Protest activities such as invasion, blockades, and demonstrations which 
meant physical confrontation with opponents are usually open to such diversions in strategies. 
However, violence was continuously rejected as a consequence of discussions among 
themselves as well as Konyar’s efforts.    
“When we invaded the mine site as thousands, we had fuel-oil tins in our hands. We said “Chief, let’s burn the 
place down” [to Oktay Konyar]. He said “No!”. We, as thousands, could have torn down the mine. But we 
trusted law and we did not” (Kurhan in Reinart 2003:70).  
 
Also, the Bergama activists were highly meticulous about how far they breached laws 
during their protests. As part of their civil disobedience strategy, they violated certain laws, 
but these acts did not have permanent impacts, and they did not give physical damage to 
public or private property or endanger any lives. Rather, they opted for disrupting public life 
and state practices temporarily. The acts of violating laws were used as specific means to 
direct attention to the legal and political injustices that they were living through. Hence, they 
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lingered at the borders of legality - breaching laws to a certain extent, but also basing their 
actions on their constitutional rights and, in that sense, not completely shedding legality. Their 
demonstrations had an illegal aspect since they usually did not attain permissions for their 
demonstrations needed for the protests to be ‘legal’ according to the Law on Meetings and 
Demonstrations, as stated above. On the other hand, apart from disrupting the public life 
shortly, they did not resort to any illegal acts during the protests. Training provided by the 
lawyers form Izmir was a crucial enabling factor for the peasants to keep their actions within 
the boundaries of non-violent disobedience since the lawyers lectured the peasants about the 
loopholes in the law. The “Kuvay-ı Milliye march” to Çanakkale exemplifies how the 
Bergama peasants deliberately and strategically chose to violate laws when they found it 
necessary. In November, 2000, 62 Bergama peasants marched to the city of Çanakkale, about 
300 kilometres away from Bergama, which took 8 days. The main goal of this particular 
march was to visit the martyrdom in Çanakkale and symbolically draw attention to their 
action of defending their land. During the march, they solely walked on the safety lane in a 
disciplined way without blocking the vehicle traffic in order to undermine any interventions 
of state forces (P/A 26). 
When the general course of the protest activities are evaluated, thematic 
demonstrations occurred as large scale demonstrations with the participation of large numbers 
of peasants displaying Tilly’s (2004) concept of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment) strikingly. However, throughout the movement, numbers of demonstrators 
started declining. Rather, more unconventional protest forms were staged on more frequent 
basis. The eventual decline of peasants’ participation in protests is perceived to have some 
detrimental effects on the course of the movement. According to a number of interviewees, 
the decrease in numbers has resulted in loss of their legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes 
of the public and authorities. This was mainly due to the belief that the decrease in numbers of 
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villagers led the public to think that the Bergama movement was a marginalized action of the 
few: 
“With the gradual shrinking of protests from many buses full of peasants to one bus events, credibility of the 
movement declined... Also peasants are directed to take part in all sorts of protests which are not related to our 
cause. In principle, we support those local populations all. But, why do you actively go to Muğla and engage in a 
protest against road construction in Muğla?” (E/E 3).    
 
Yet, it would be misleading to treat organizational structures and repertoires of contention as 
static elements. They were all affected by framing processes and interpretations of changing 
political opportunities. Due to changes in their opponents’ strategies and counter-framing as 
well as alterations in opportunities, organizational structures and movement strategies and 
tactics underwent changes which will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 5: Framing of the Bergama Movement 
 
 
As in all social movements, framing processes through which social movement actors 
formulate and set their shared meaning over their grievance constitute a crucial place in the 
Bergama movement. Accordingly, the Bergama movement activists were continuously 
engaged in the work of framing, defining the causes of their aggrieved issue, finding solutions 
to problems at stake, and generating discourses to convince people to mobilize. In doing that, 
they aimed to construct a coherent and convincing set of values and meanings for themselves 
as well as for bystanders and opponents. In this way, movement activists were able to 
“construct a discourse oriented towards convincing citizens of their legitimate reasons for 
protest” (della Porta and Piazza, 2008: 58). In the mean time, the Bergama activists also 
constructed their identity and that of their adversaries through these discourses. All these 
different dimensions of framing done by the activists affected other aspects of their 
movement, so that mobilization, evaluation of opportunities, and choice of strategies and 
tactics were being shaped in direct relation to established frames. On the other hand, the 
Bergama activists’ opponents, i.e. the TNC(s) and the state, as well as bystanders and the 
media also rendered their own frames about the contended issue of gold mining. Each set of 
actors tried to accentuate their own frame which resulted in a fierce frame competition. As the 
Bergama activists were faced with counter-frames and counter-strategies of their opponents, 
they constantly adjusted, adopted, and modified their own frames throughout the movement 
which was also reflected in the corresponding changes in their organizational structures, 
strategies and tactics. In addition to the competition with their opponents, the Bergama 
peasants went through an intense process of deliberation over their frames among themselves 
which sometimes led to intra-movement conflicts. Therefore, framing processes of the 
Bergama movement played out in a highly competitive, interactive and, resultantly, dynamic 
fashion in which discursive, strategic, and contended framing processes identified by framing 
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theory transpired  as movement participants deliberated on who they were, what they 
opposed, and what they wanted through various framing strategies such as frame 
amplification and frame bridging. In the following pages, I present an analysis of the Bergama 
movement’s collective identity construction and framing processes by discussing diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational frames produced by the activists. I also examine the framing of 
capitalist globalization of the Bergama activists separately in order to understand how local 
contention was linked to macro-structural processes. 
 
Collective Identities of the Bergama Activists:  
 
Identity construction was a difficult matter for the Bergama movement given the 
highly complex structure of the extensive Bergama network which contained a multiplicity of 
actors from diversified social, economic and political backgrounds. In order to maintain a 
coherent collective identity, values and concerns of each participant had to become congruent. 
It was one of the major concerns of the activists to construct an inclusive collective identity 
which would allow a wide participation. In order to achieve that, peasants were brought to the 
centre of the movement as the victims who would be adversely affected by the gold mine, and 
the movement was referred to as a ‘peasant’s movement’ by all activists participating in the 
network. Apart from the discursively prevalent ‘peasant’ identity, activists coming from 
outside the Bergama villages commonly identified themselves as environmentalists –of any 
kind-  which was also constituent in the construction of peasant activists’ collective identity. 
Hence, the collective identity of the Bergama movement was composed of a multiplicity of 
identities built on some shared values such as environmentalism and democracy.  
The initial step was to differentiate adherents and opponents of the movement, i.e. the 
process of naming “us” vs. “them”. Basically, peasants identified themselves as a local 
community whose land, environment and, hence, health and livelihood were endangered. 
More specifically, they presented themselves as peasants who were defending their land and 
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environment against the attacks of some external intruders, i.e. TNC(s). Therefore, they 
emphasized communitarian and territorial aspects of their struggle in their definitions of who 
they were.  
As in the case of many local movements, communitarian-based collective identities 
usually transcend cleavages of class, gender, ethnicity, or religion (della Porta and Piazza, 
2008: 59). This general trend was also relevant in the Bergama movement. Accordingly, 
strong local communitarian commitments overcame social cleavages of religion, ethnicity, 
and gender. With respect to their ethnic backgrounds, villagers were highly diversified, 
consisting of second or third generation immigrants from Bulgaria (Pomaks), the former 
Yugoslavia (Boşnaks), Albania, and Salonika as well as nomadic Turks (Yörüks) who had 
been settled in the region centuries ago (P/A 24, 27; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003: 53). Peasants’ 
religious backgrounds were similarly diverse. Even though villagers were overwhelmingly 
Muslim, they were divided into two sects of Islam as Alevis and Sunnis. Alevi and Sunni 
populations have been spatially divided since members of each sect resided in the separate 
villages established as either Sunni or Alevi villages. Out of all the villages participated in the 
movement, 3 of them - Narlıca, Tepeköy, and Pınarköy- were exclusively Alevi villages 
where community life has been predominantly organized along Alevi beliefs, ideas, values 
and teachings (P/A 9, 11, 15).
 1
  In fact, when the general political and social structures of 
Turkey with respect to Alevi-Sunni relations are considered, there are certain historically 
rooted political and cultural impediments against Sunni-Alevi collaboration. As a community 
with distinct traits and social organizations, Alevis had been involved in various struggles 
against the domination of Sunni rule in history. Cultural differences remained the same during 
the secular republican rule which worked as a source of unrest and conflict between Sunnis 
                                                 
1
 Alevism is a different sect in Islam. It is a branch of heterodox Islam which combines Islam with the nomadic 
Turkish culture in the 16
th
 century. The Ottoman state, considering the Alevi population a deviation from Islam, 
tried to control and suppresses it constantly. The Alevi population became advocates of the Kemalist regime and 
secular order since they are seen as safety check mechanisms against Sunni Islamic rule.  Today, the Alevi 
population makes up 15-20% of the general population in Turkey (Yavuz, 2005: 96-100). 
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and Alevis throughout Turkey.
2
 However, in the case of the Bergama movement, the Alevi 
villagers participated in the mobilization against the mine shoulder to shoulder with the Sunni 
villagers. It was commonly agreed that the peasants from three Alevi villages were the most 
active and radical protestors - both by Alevi peasants and their fellow Sunni activists (E/E 2, 
11; P/A 11, 17, 22, 24, 25).   
Firstly, the absence of prior conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups in 
the region facilitated the unification of Sunni and Alevi villagers over the same cause.
3
  
“It [the movement] improved solidarity and friendship relations among peasants. Pınarköy, Tepeköy and Narlıca 
are Alevi villages. Çamköy, Sağancı, Aşağıkırıklar, Ovacık, Süleymanlı are Sunni villages. Until that point 
[when the movement started], there was no soreness between those villages. Yet, on top of that, those [good] 
relations became stronger” (P/A 15). 
 
Secondly, the issue of environment itself cut across any social cleavages. As a result of 
Taşkın’s and his friends’ initial efforts of informing the peasants about the environmental 
risks of gold mining, the peasants who had deep connections with land and agriculture arrived 
at the conclusion that their soil, water, and, subsequently, their livelihood were under threat. 
Since it was a matter which concerned all villagers regardless of religious sect or ethnicity, 
these social cleavages were easily transcended. One of the interviewees described this 
transcendental character of their contention by saying “When it is a matter of life and death, 
there is no Alevism or Sunnism. The mine will affect us all” (P/A 15).4 
  
                                                 
2
 From a historical point of view, Alevis in general have been marginalized and dominated by the Sunni rule 
which resulted in major social and political tensions and struggles both during the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Turkish Republican period. Accordingly, the contemporary Alevi identity is constructed by referring to numerous 
Alevi uprisings in history. There have been two violent public outbursts against the Alevis during the 1990s. A 
Sunni group set a hotel on fire where famous Alevi intellectuals were staying in Sivas in 1993 and 37 people 
were killed. Another major clash occurred between police forces and inhabitants of Alevi neighbourhood, Gazi 
mahallesi, in İstanbul in 1995. 
3
 It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the reasons for the lack of a legacy of religious based conflicts in 
the region.    
4
 Konyar’s familial background with both Sunni and Alevi lineages was also a factor which facilitated coalition 
building among Sunnis and Alevis. As underlined by one of the Greenpeace activists involved in the movement, 
having both Alevi-Kurdish and Sunni-Turkish origins made it easier for Konyar who was an influential figure for 
the mobilization of the villagers to approach peasants from different ethnic and religious origins equally even 
though he had an exclusively secular attitude throughout the movement (E/E 29). 
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On the other hand, collective identity is a strategically reconstructed phenomenon 
contingent upon the circumstances that activists face (Griggs and Howarth, 2002). As such, 
the already existing ‘peasant’ identity was reshaped based on the conditions of mobilization, 
along the lines of environmentalism. By highlighting their close relation with the 
environment, the peasants described themselves as inhabitants of the land, living in peace 
with nature and depending on soil and water for their livelihood. They also attributed 
themselves agency in protecting their land and environment as their genuine owners (P/A 3, 8, 
11). Additionally, they claimed to be the guardians of historically significant region 
Pergamon, Bergama’s ancient antecedent. By referring to the great contributions made to 
humanity in Pergamon such as paper produced by Alexandrians, they emphasized that they 
were peasants who were defending a legacy of humanity instead of being backward minded 
locals rejecting modern technology (see Appendix G).    
They also specifically described themselves as “peaceful” in order to indicate that they 
were the victims of external attacks (by the TNCs) rather than troublemakers (see Appendix 
G). The transformation of the “peasant” identity could be discerned in the way they attributed 
negative characteristics to their pre-movement peasant identity. They described their pre-
mobilization selves as submissive, ignorant, and coward villagers. However, in their redefined 
peasant identity, they were fellow citizens entitled to citizenship rights and confident in their 
efficacy in influencing political decisions (P/A 5, 7, 11).  
On the other hand, they identified their opponents as anyone who supported gold 
mining with the cyanide leach method. They saw the TNC(s) as their major opponent as the 
primary source of their grievance. Additionally, sections of the state which facilitated TNC(s) 
as well as pro-mine scientists, journalists, and engineers who supported the Ovacik gold mine 
project were defined as their opponents.  Overall, profit-orientation with no regard to the costs 
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to the environment and human life was highlighted as the main point of divergence between 
opponents and themselves: 
“Worldviews are different. They chose making money. And we chose life” (P/A 15).     
Collective identity is directly related to the interests and values of a social movement 
group since identities are built on and shaped by the interests and values of participants. The 
Bergama activists’ interests were transformed due to changing conditions. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the Bergama peasants overwhelmingly believed that gold mining would 
serve their material interests since they were expecting economic gains. However, as a result 
of interactions with the anti-mine activists like Taşkın, scientists, environmentalists and 
lawyers, they took a contrary position by prioritizing cyanide related risks over economic 
gains from the mine. This time, they advocated that the closing of mine would serve their 
interests. Hence, the collective interest(s) of the Bergama activists was redefined due to 
changing circumstances – such as becoming better informed at this particular instant.  
Bergama peasants attributed uniqueness to their movement and identity when 
comparing themselves with peasant movements in general. Notwithstanding the explicitly 
enunciated peasant character of their movement, they made clear distinctions between 
themselves and other peasant movements such as the long duration of their movement, the 
sustainability of their mobilization, the multiplicity of their issues, and the universalistic 
approach that they upheld. Accordingly, one peasant activist stated that:  
 
“The Bergama movement lasted for 13 years [setting the starting date as 1989 when Eurogold first arrived in the 
region]. Maybe you can’t find that anywhere around the world. It lasted long. I think it is a success…..No protest 
lasted for 13 years. Peasants are the most ignorant sections of a society. They are the last ones to march. There is 
usually no consciousness among peasants. So, it takes courage to attain that consciousness and stage protests” 
(P/A 11). 
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In a similar vein, one of spokesperson of the movement underlined their differences form 
other peasant movements elsewhere:  
 
 “There are many differences between us and other peasant movements. First, they are not widespread. They 
have conflicts over land issues or agricultural controversies with their governments. In terms of the way they do 
their movements, those movements do not last long. They protest for a couple of times” (E/E 2). 
 
Local environmental movements entail characteristics which make them more prone to 
becoming Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) movements since their interests and orientations 
might easily be formulated along parochial and egoistical lines (Della Porta and Piazza, 2008; 
Snow and Soule, 2010). In other words, local environmental resistances which are mobilized 
over issues of Locally-Unwanted-Land-Use (LULUs), mostly reject large development 
projects in order to protect their own territory instead of pursuing universal principles of 
environmentalism that extend to similar projects elsewhere. Yet, despite its communitarian 
approach, the Bergama movement did not turn into a NIMBY movement. In their goals which 
were clear, specific and coherent, the Bergama activists aspired to close down the gold mine 
in their region in order to protect their territory and community. However, they did not remain 
parochial in terms of their goals and interests as the focus of the movement included local, 
national and global levels in congruence with the enmeshment of these spheres under the 
capitalist globalization.
5
 They frequently announced that they opposed similar projects which 
were planned in other parts of Turkey as well as the world.  
Besides, they did not restrict their contention solely to the issue of gold-mining. The 
Bergama peasants staged protests and gave support to other movements over numerous issues. 
They participated in the peace movement network formed at the national level in Turkey 
against the war on Iraq, taking part in the peace demonstrations (Bianet, 11.04.2003; Bianet, 
10.11.2004). Concerned about the controversial development projects in the South-eastern 
part of Turkey, they forged solidarity links with the mobilization against the Ilısu dam 
                                                 
5
 Please see chapter 2. 
 170 
 
construction which would submerge the ancient town of Hasankeyf in the South-eastern part 
of Turkey. They supported the activists from Munzur, Tunceli in the opposition of the latter to 
dam constructions and gold mining exploration work (Bianet, 05.06.2001).
6
 They also joined 
forces with anti-nuclear activists resisting the nuclear power plant project planned in Akkuyu, 
Mersin, participating in anti-nuclear demonstrations (Sabah, 29.03.1998).  On October 16
th
, 
1997, the Bergama peasants and Konyar visited one of the villages of İzmir, Efemçukuru, 
where another gold mine project was planned. The purpose of this visit was to inform and 
warn the peasants about the hazards and risks of gold mining and to initiate an anti-gold mine 
mobilization in Efemçukuru as well (Yeni Asır, 17.10.1997; Gazete Ege, 17.10.1997).7 A 
group of Bergama peasants were among the marchers in the May 1
st
 celebrations of year 2002 
in Istanbul (Radikal, 02.05.2002). Bergama peasants also showed solidarity with anti-gold- 
mine movements outside their national territories such as the anti-mine contention in 
Salonika, Greece. Therefore, even though they preserved their identity as a community, they 
also linked their struggle to various contentions taking place outside their local territory. In 
that sense, they did not limit themselves to their local and immediate interests, but expanded 
their contention to other issues and geographies. The Bergama activists were able to link 
themselves to a greater collective ‘we’ of a general environmental movement and anti-
capitalist globalization. In doing that they shifted the scale of their movement to national and 
transnational levels and addressed a multiplicity of issues. 
8
  
                                                 
6
 In a demonstration organized by the People of Tunceli Association in İstanbul, a group of Bergama peasants 
protested together with the Munzur activists in İstanbul, and they jointly sent a fax to the Turkish President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, demanding the cancellation of the dam projects in the Munzur Valley. During the protest, 
Konyar stated: “We are the real owners of this country…. Only Munzur or Bergama is not sufficient. We should 
multiply. We should claim lands and freedom of this country” (Bianet, 11.06.2001). In turn, activists in Dersim 
also supported the Bergama movement in their own protests by expressing their opposition to the Ovacık gold 
mine project (Cumhuriyet, 06.02.2005). 
7
 In the speech he made during their visit to Efemçukuru, Konyar said: “Until now, we staged over 80 protests 
just for Bergama. However, from now on, we will extend our protests to other places that are contaminated with 
cyanide, and we will raise consciousness among the people living in those places. We will enlighten people 
about the issue of cyanide” (Yeni Asır, 17.10.1997).    
8
 Diani (2003) indicates that social movements as networks differ from campaign coalitions and more 
particularistic NIMBY movements based on their construction of their shared and meaningful collective 
identities. In that regard, social movement actors renounce their particularities and link themselves to a broader 
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This transcendental aspect of their contention also enabled them to connect to other 
activists outside villages. In this way, the Bergama was able to become a huge network of 
networks entailing social movement actors from the urban segments of civil society who were 
predominantly university educated middle class people advocating ecological concerns in and 
criticizing the capitalist globalization. These sub-networks were connected to each other 
through several underlying themes and values such as environmentalism, democratization, 
and criticism of capitalist globalization. Based on these shared interests and values, a 
multiplicity of identities became articulated to each other. In other words, actors with various 
identities were gathered under an inclusive general collective “we”, which revolved around 
environmentalism, democratization and opposition to the capitalist globalization and served as 
a common denominator within the Bergama movement.   
 
Opponents’ framing: What the TNCs say 
 
When the Ovacık gold mine project was first announced, gold mining was an alien 
topic for the local population in Bergama. Eurogold, the TNC which initiated the project, 
came along with its own description of gold mining and its meaning for the region, producing 
the primary frames over the Ovacık gold mine. Therefore, issues of cyanide-based gold 
mining was introduced to the Bergama people through the frames of Eurogold. It was only 
then that the Bergama activists started developing their own frames in opposition to their 
opponents’.  Hence we start with the analysis of frames of TNCs. 
From the beginning, Eurogold tried to convince and get the support of the local 
population in order to pre-empt any resistance to their project. With that purpose, they 
intended to create a positive impression of the gold mine among the locals. Accordingly, 
TNC(s) defined the Ovacık gold mine as a ‘beneficial’ project in economic terms without 
                                                                                                                                                        
collective ‘we’. In this way, “[e]vents which could otherwise be the result of ad hoc coalitions and expressions of 
NIMBY orientations would then acquire a new meaning and be perceived as part of a larger, and longer-term, 
collective effort” (Diani, 2003: 303).  
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having any harms to the environment. These promises and claims were repeatedly expressed 
by the successive TNCs. TNCs repeatedly emphasized their frames through  ads, press 
releases, brochures and conferences with the objective of undermining the emerging anti-mine 
movement. Other actors of the pro-mine camp including the members of the government, 
politicians, miners’ associations, and pro-mine journalists, engineers, and scientists also 
shared and expressed the frames of the TNCs.  
In the accounts of TNCs, three major issues were predominantly stressed: the 
prospects for economic development, the environmental safety of the gold mine and services 
to the community. First, according to the claims TNCs, gold mining would bring considerable 
economic prosperity to Bergama and Turkey in general. The economic contribution by the 
Ovacık gold mine was proposed as high as 415 million dollars locally and 675 million dollars 
to the national economy, including the value added (Normandy, 2000: 7). Apart from the 
general contributions to the local and national economy, the TNCs as well as other proponents 
of the Ovacık gold mine recurrently stressed immediate economic gains for the local 
population. In their press releases and advertisements, the TNC(s) the gold mine promised 
new job opportunities for the local population which would resultantly decrease the 
unemployment rates in the region. It was argued that the Ovacık gold mine was already 
beneficial for the local economy since 340 people were employed during the initial 
construction and all the construction work of the mine site and related facilities was carried 
out by local and regional contractors. They promised at least 240 job opportunities at least 
80% of which would be allocated to the locals when the mine started its operations. 
Additionally, they argued that four additional jobs would be created for one job opening with 
the ‘flow-on effects” according to their estimations (Normandy, 2000: 7).  
Second, TNCs also underlined the harmlessness of the cyanide leach method to the 
environment. The argument of ‘environmentally-friendly mining’ was not among the initial 
 173 
 
frames of TNCs (E/E 3). However, with the rise of scientific challenges put together by the 
efforts of Taşkın, chambers, and scientists, Eurogold and its successors incorporated 
‘environmentally-friendly’ gold mining into their framing as opposition to the gold mine 
project mounted. Executives of the companies and other members of the pro-mine camp 
argued that as long as advanced technologies were used, risks were minimized with respect to 
environmental and human health. More specifically, they claimed that the risks of cyanide and 
waste leakages were minimized with the impermeable layer; wastes would contain minimum 
amounts of heavy metals; and there was a low risk of contamination of underground waters. 
Also, they added that the levels of dust produced during blasting, excavation, and 
transportation, noise pollution, and any damages during an earthquake were minimized with 
the available technology. In that sense, TNCs argued that the environmental and agricultural 
activities would not be damaged, with the further promise to rehabilitate the mine site after 
the closure of the mine (Normandy, 2000).  
Finally, the third set of claims revolved around proposed services which would be 
made available to the local community such as health care and housing provided by the TNCs 
(Normandy, 2000). In sum, throughout the process, it was recurrently argued by the TNCs 
that cyanide leach method which was used worldwide had no alternatives, and its risks to 
environmental and human health were minimized with the introduction of state-of-the-art 
technologies.  
In order to make these claims more valid and reliable, they got support from various 
pro-mine actors such as politicians, scientists, and civil society organizations. For instance, 
former Australian Environment Minister, Ross Kelly, announced that “[t]his [the Ovacık gold 
mine] will be the Rolls Royce of mines- the best in the world” with respect to the environment 
in a press interview in İstanbul (Turkish Daily News, 16.05.1997). At the same time, pro-mine 
CSOs carried active roles in terms of promoting the cyanide-based gold mining. The Turkish 
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Mining Development Foundation (YMGV) organized a seminar with the UN Department for 
Economic and Social Affairs Division for Economic and Social Development and Natural 
Resources Management, Natural Resources, and Environment Branch in İzmir in 1997. It was 
indicated by the YMGV that the seminar was for “consultation” purposes over the topic of 
gold mining which had until then been discussed without “scientific and technological basis” 
in their invitation letter sent to Taşkın (YMGV, 1997). This conference was seen as an 
attempt to convey pro-mine frames in order to convince the Turkish government and the UN 
that local people would not be harmed throughout the gold mining process in Ovacık. All 
these efforts were complemented with the ‘legality’ argument. TNC authorities constantly 
claimed that their activities were legal, and they complied with Turkish laws and democratic 
procedures in their operations (Cumhuriyet, 21.12.1996; Kuzey Ege, 15.04.1996).
9
  
The TNC(s) extensively used the local and national media in order to voice their 
frames. One of the methods used by TNC(s) for that purpose was to place advertisements in 
newspapers. Within these ads, various symbols and cultural codes were employed in order to 
make their frames resonant with the Bergama peasants’ values and beliefs. This was evidently 
discerned in the Eurogold advertisements placed in the local newspapers at the earlier stages 
of the process. The objectives in placing these ads were to build better relations with the local 
population and to prevent the transformation of growing discontent about the mine into a 
massive resistance. In the ads, the commonly used advertisement slogan was “Now is the 
harvest time for gold”. With this slogan, Eurogold referred to cultural values and traits of 
peasants and made an analogy between agriculture and gold production. By using familiar 
cultural symbols, Eurogold tried to make their interpretation of gold mining resonant with the 
peasants’ cognitive understanding. Eurogold stated that peasants would collect the economic 
                                                 
9
 In a press release, Jack Testard, the executive manager of Eurogold, underlined the fact that the operation of the 
mine was permitted by 7 governments and 11 ministries in Turkey giving approval with 700 signatures (Kuzey 
Ege, 15.04.1996).  
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gains from the gold mine as if they were in a harvest, but this time more economic value 
would be created.  
More specifically, in one of Eurogold’s ads, they showed two drawings of the location 
of the mine portraying before and after images in order to underline these economic benefits. 
In the pre-mine drawing, there was a hill surrounded only by trees and the pastoral life 
pursued by the peasants around the hill was depicted. In the image representing the aftermath 
of the construction of the mine, the hill was missing. The phrase read “That hill no longer 
exists. It turned into evil eye bead (nazarlık) for our babies, bracelets for our girls, job 
opportunities for our boys, food for households, and economic gain for our country” (Kuzey 
Ege, 15.08.1995). In doing that, Eurogold claimed that production of gold by consuming the 
hill on which the gold mine is built increases local welfare more than pastoral life, and it leads 
to economic prosperity and development of the region as symbolized by the houses built in 
the second drawing. In a similar vein, the TNC(s) enriched their argument by claiming that 
the operation of the Ovacık gold mine would mean development of the region and Turkey, i.e. 
sustainable development, by bringing forth the idea of the “catching-up” thesis. In one of their 
ads, the Eurogold asserted that that the prosperity and welfare of developed countries which 
rested upon gold could also be achieved in Turkey by using ‘advanced’ gold mining 
technologies which would not risk human health or the environment (Kuzey Ege, 
01.09.1995). 
In another advertisement, coining the phrase “[c]ontrolled use of pesticides for a good 
harvest will not harm human health”, Eurogold attempted to convey the message that the 
careful use of cyanide in the mine would prevent detrimental impacts, while bringing 
prosperity (Kuzey Ege, 01.08.1995). TNCs also used symbols of nationalism such as Turkish 
flags and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in order to gain the sympathy of the Bergama 
peasants and the general public, thereby indicating that their activities were in the interests of 
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the nation. Yet, these acts of TNC(s) were evaluated as deceptions by the Bergama peasants 
(P/A 5).  
Overall, when asserting their own interpretation of the Ovacık gold mine, TNCs 
viewed the Bergama movement as the mobilization of ‘ignorant’ peasants who were 
misinformed and misdirected by several ‘ill-intentioned’ local politicians pursuing their own 
interests (E/E 3). On the other hand, the Bergama activists were involved in the intense work 
of producing their own frames in order to invalidate the claims of TNCs about gold mining 
and their movement.  
Master-frames of environmentalism and human rights: 
Throughout the Bergama movement, activists employed two master frames, 
‘environmentalism’ and ‘human rights’ on which they constructed their diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational frames. Primary frames of the Bergama activists revolved 
around environmentalism since they were concerned about the risks of environmental 
degradation. Yet, they did not use environmentalism in its conservationist sense. Rather than 
aspiring only to protect the environment, they struggled over how the environment should be 
used without disturbing the ecological system. 
Bergama activists described themselves as a part of the ecological system whose 
livelihood and lives depended on nature. Accordingly, any disruptions and interventions in 
nature would have endangered their lives as well as other species’ (P/A 1, 9, 11; Kurhan in 
Reinart, 2003: 195; Yoldaş in Reinart, 2003: 191). 
I was born in Ovacik [one of the Bergama villages]. I grew up in Ovacık. In winter times, we were cold and 
freezing, but we did not cut even one branch of these pine trees. We ran out of money. We didn’t cut. We did not 
let any others cut them. We guarded those trees. Pine tree means life; it provides air [oxygen]. [However] they 
[miners] cut off thousands of them” (Umaç in Reinart, 2003: 45).  
 
As this quotation reveals, peasants’ material interests rested upon the ecological system, and 
as such, their environmentalism was shaped by the urge to prevent any intervention which 
would threaten the ecological habitat. Also, the Bergama activists constantly referred to some 
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non-material values as well. They emphasized the intrinsic value of life of every species- 
regardless of their use value, the protection of lands inherited from their ancestors, and the 
obligation to future generations to preserve nature.  
“If we lose this land, it means we lose our children and grandchildren. Which baby can grow up breathing 
poison? They say “we are going to produce gold here”, and we say “no, you cannot”….You can do it only by 
stepping over so many people. It is not an easy thing” (a peasant activist, Sabah, 31.10.2000). 
 
In that sense, they transcended the alleged divide between material and post-material values 
showing both sets of values might co-exist within the same environmental mobilization.
10
  
Given the clearly environmental dimension of their aggrieved issue, the Bergama 
movement was often classified by the media and bystanders merely as an environmental 
movement. Yet, the Bergama activists did not limit their contention to environmentalism only, 
but constantly emphasized that their struggle had a human rights aspect as well. When defying 
opponents’ frames and legitimizing their own causes, they claimed that their environmental 
conflict was intertwined with human rights issues. Hence, they attached their contention to 
human rights violations by bridging master frames of environmental injustice and human 
rights. In fact, environmentally hazardous projects carried out by TNCs and/or governments 
also cause devastating human rights violations across the globe. In any event, local 
populations’ rights to clean air, land, water, and healthy environment are infringed on by these 
projects, violating articles 3, 17, and 25 of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration (Adeola, 2001: 
53). Opposition by locals whose well-being, livelihood, lives, and cultures are endangered by 
development projects have been meeting with various sorts of repression and human rights 
transgressions. Issues of environmental degradation and transgression of human rights have 
been perceived as intertwined by various movements such as the Ogoni People’s movement in 
Nigeria (Bob, 2005), the rubber tapper’s movement in Brasil (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the 
Chipko movement in India (Haynes, 1999), the Narmada movement in India (Khagram, 
                                                 
10
 Doyle (2002) argues that there is a clear dichotomy between environmentalisms of the post-industrial and 
Third World societies in his study of anti-mine movements in Australia and Philippines. He reaches the 
conclusion that while Australian campaigners act on-post material interests, environmental actors in Philippines 
overwhelmingly have materialistic concerns and values.  
 178 
 
2004), and the Green Belt Movement in Kenya (Haynes, 1999). 
11
 Similarly, frame bridging 
between those two master frames was also evident in the Bergama movement. They claimed 
their human right to life was taken away from them. 
“The Bergama movement rests upon the universal declaration of human rights. It is all about our rights to live 
and about our future” (E/E 2). 
 
 
The emphasis on human rights was presented by the Bergama activists as a unique 
feature of their movement in order to raise the significance of their mobilization in the eyes of 
participants, sympathizers, and the general public which was seen crucial for maintaining 
participation and legitimacy. The Bergama activists stated that the Bergama movement was 
the first to relate gold-mining to human rights. According to the activists’ accounts, frame 
bridging in-between human rights and environmentalism in relation to gold mining diffused to 
other movements in other parts of the world as a result of their contention. 
“Now it [resistance against gold mining] goes hand in hand with human rights. This is a result of one of the court 
decisions we achieved in Turkey. People’s right to live. Article 56 [referring to the Turkish constitutional article 
on which the court based its decision]We incorporated this type of resistance to the agenda of human rights 
groups. Before, it was only the environmentalists who were putting the effort. Yet, this is not merely an 
environmental issue, but also a part of human rights. According to my humanist way of thinking, I am 
advocating rights of children, the elderly, flowers, and insects which cannot talk or vote. Therefore, 
environmental rights, human rights, and rights of the environment to blossom are the same” (E/E 5). 
 
 
Diagnostic and prognostic frames:  
By using these master frames and values as constitutive grounds, the Bergama 
activists meticulously produced their own diagnostic and prognostic frames throughout their 
network. In their diagnostic frame, they identified their grievances and formulated what their 
contention was about, which was the first step required for a successful mobilization. Besides, 
in order to gain credibility for their struggle in the eyes of bystanders, sympathizers, and 
opponents, they tried to provide solutions about their contended issues through the process of 
                                                 
11
 Ken Saro-Wiva, the leader of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, resisting against oil production in the Niger-River 
Delta by the Shell Petroleum Development Company sponsored by the Nigerian government, explicitly defined 
environmental rights as part of human rights in his statement to Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal: “The 
environment is man's first right. Without a safe environment, man cannot exist to claim other rights be they 
social, political or economic. The fact is that the very existence of Ogoni is seriously threatened, not being in 
control of their environment” (http://www.ratical.org/corporations/KSWstmt.html, accessed on 12.09.2011). 
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prognostic framing which went hand-in-hand with diagnostic framing. Through these framing 
processes, the Bergama activists defined various sets of risks which were raised by the Ovacık 
gold mine. Concomitantly, they proposed ways of compensating for the defects created by the 
gold mine project. When naming and defining what their contention was about, activists 
underlined four types of risks with environmental, social/cultural, economic, and political 
implications.  
First, environmental risks posed by the gold mine constituted the backbone of the 
Bergama activists’ diagnostic frames. Based on the scientific data provided by scientists, 
chambers, and INGOs, the Bergama activists highlighted several existing, as well as future, 
environmental hazards introduced by the activities of TNC(s). Basically, they described the 
environmental risks that they faced in two categories, namely problems during the 
construction of the mine and risks during the operation of the mine. In terms of the former set 
of problems, the Bergama activists argued that every stage of gold mining, regardless of 
whether cyanide was being used or not had detrimental effects on the environment. In other 
words, they argued that the Ovacık gold mine started to destroy their environment from the 
very beginning of the process when the mining complex and the mine pit were being 
constructed. Accordingly, they underlined the immediate impacts of mine construction such 
as deforestation as a result of the cutting down of many pine and olive trees in the 
construction site (P/A 1, 28; Bektaş in Reinart, 2003: 39). The Bergama peasants stated that 
they had personal attachment to the hill on which the mine pit was built. 
“We grew up in poverty. We know about poverty. We grew up on that land toiling. I know many things about 
that land....We, peasants, used to cut only one old pine tree once in a while to use it for warming ourselves. Then, 
Eurogold brought many machines, and they were cutting those pine trees. We used to like the environment, but 
we weren’t aware of it. When trees on that hill were being cut, I felt like committing suicide” (Gökçeoğlu in 
Reinart 53-54). 
On the other hand, they also drew attention to their economic loss since they would 
not be able to use products of the trees (P/A 28). Additionally, they mentioned the loss of 
species living in the area by perceiving it as destruction of their natural habitat in their frames 
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(P/A 2, 8, 28). Another revealed issue related to the mine construction was the sound 
pollution created with the dynamite blasts when the mine pit was being opened. Besides 
accentuating how blasts interrupted their daily lives by creating disturbance and fear at 
extreme rates, the Bergama peasants also claimed that dynamite use put their properties under 
threat since many of houses in the Ovacık village had cracks on their walls (P/A 12, 18).  
Even though these immediate impacts were consistently emphasized in their frames, 
the bulk of the Bergama movements’ diagnostic frames concentrated on devastating impacts 
that would be produced when the mine was open to production. The Bergama activists had 
deep concerns about the cyanide used during the gold production process, the preservation 
and control of wastes and last but not least, the over-exploitation of underground water 
resources. In their criticisms to the Ovacık gold mine, the Bergama activists initially 
questioned technological aspects of the safety of the Ovacık gold mine. During the initial 
stage of the mobilization, activists of the Bergama movement led by Taşkın indicated that 
there were major environmental risks specific to the Ovacık gold mine due to the 
backwardness of the technologies used by the Eurogold. These technical deficiencies were 
identified as the absence of a detoxification system and the substandard construction of the 
tailing pond (E/E 3). Indeed, Eurogold did not initially intend to place an impermeable 
membrane at the bottom of the tailing pond which would prevent leakage of waste into soil 
(E/E 10). However, facing the opposition of Taşkın and his friends, Eurogold was forced to 
change its plans, and the company took some safety measures by covering the bottom of the 
tailing pond with an impermeable layer. Taşkın felt dissatisfied with the measures taken by 
the gold mine company, and the Bergama activists pressured Eurogold and the Turkish state 
to place a detoxification system in the mine (E/E 3).   
“They came to us saying that they put layers at the bottom of the tailing pond...Then I asserted that we wanted a 
detoxification system. There is cyanide, and it is unacceptable if it is not detoxified. It harms the environment.... 
I did not know if there was such a system. However, we started the rumour that there was, and there was indeed. 
I insisted for the detoxification system. And the public got to my side as well” (E/E 3).  
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Facing a growing opposition, Eurogold applied a detoxification system called 
INCO/SO2. However, Prof. Friedhelm Korte, a worldly-known, respected German ecological 
chemistry scientist was invited to Bergama to investigate the detoxification system in the 
Ovacık gold mine, and subsequently, he revealed in his expert opinion that the implemented 
system was not sufficient to reduce the risks (E/E 23). Supported by that expert opinion, 
Taşkın continued his opposition. 
“A new executive manager, J.A., called me from the airport on his arrival to Turkey... He said that he had good 
news for us. They would build a detoxification system. I said let’s see....They changed their strategy. We were 
playing chess, and we cornered them....But they are building the detoxification system. What were we supposed 
to do? We started searching detoxification systems...We asked the whole world. Information was flowing in. We 
discovered that it was bogus. We contacted the executive manager of the company which developed this 
strategy....[after summarizing the defects of the detoxification system concluding that heavy metal wastes would 
remain intact even though cyanide was detoxified and new pollutants such as ammoniac would be released]. We 
happened to learn these. It is chess. Let them say we were inconsistent. New information arrived. We learned 
about the matter. We changed our strategy. We did not want detoxification anymore” (E/E 3).  
 
Bergama activists demanded from Eurogold to make improvements in the technology 
of the mine through negotiations. However, the Bergama activists continuously changed their 
prognostic frames during this stage even if their demands were met by Eurogold. Reasons for 
such diversions were threefold. First, Taşkın and friends lacked a thorough knowledge about 
the issue of gold mining. As they accumulated detailed information, they demanded new 
solutions from Eurogold dropping the old ones. Secondly, Taşkın and his friends intended to 
detain the operations of Eurogold which would buy time for them to obtain more knowledge 
and expand their contention. Third, in their initial confrontation, they did not want be 
perceived as ‘total’ rejectionists. By offering technology based solutions, they wanted to 
increase their credibility and prove their “good-intention” (E/E 3).   
As the process unfolded, the Bergama activists stopped demanding solutions of 
technology improvement. Instead, they focused on underlining the environmental problems 
that gold mining caused and asking first for the annulment of the project and then, for the 
closure of the mine. Dissatisfied with Eurogold’s moves, the anti-gold mine camp argued that, 
in spite of the safety mechanisms introduced, the gold mine continued to present major 
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environmental risks. The underlined risks could be classified into three main categories such 
as: the continuation of problems specific to the Ovacık gold mine, the general characteristics 
of their region, and the general problems associated with gold mining.  
First, Bergama activists interpreted the safety mechanisms as a deception on the part 
of Eurogold. Both anti-gold mine scientists and activists who relied on their accounts claimed 
that the filter system could only eliminate cyanide in the liquid parts of the tailing pond. 
Additionally, they claimed that the impermeable layer was insufficient to remove risks of 
contamination because the layer still did not meet the tailings dam construction criteria stated 
in the regulation of the Ministry of Environment, and it was interpreted as a ‘Potemkin 
village’ to ward off criticisms (E/E 3; P/A 28).  In other words, as one of the professors of 
metallurgy who was engaged in the Bergama movement network stated, the detoxification 
system was insufficient to remove the risks since cyanide and other heavy metals complexes 
in the form of solid waste precipitated at the bottom of the pond would remain untouched, 
and, on top of that, other threatening complexes would be produced during the detoxification 
process (E/E 9). Another criticism to the filter system was that it would be useless in terms of 
preventing acid rains and the evaporation of the waste water. Second, Bergama activists had 
doubts about the safety of the tailing pond after the departure of the TNC(s) from the region. 
Indicating that the TNC(s) did not undertake any responsibility for the waste ponds after the 
mine was completely exploited and became redundant due to their contract with the Turkish 
state, the Bergama activists argued that that wastes would be left utterly unattended. In 
claiming that, the Bergama activists displayed mistrust of the Turkish state by giving the 
example of environmental degradation in Balya, the copper mine in Western Anatolia which 
was closed down in the 1930s and questioned its capacity to control, monitor, and eliminate 
the risks of an environmental disaster since the state would become the de facto maintainer of 
the tailing pond (P/A 4, 28). Third, another rejection of the Ovacık gold mine stemmed from 
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the fact that tailing pond was built very close to the surrounding villages - only 150-200 
meters away from Ovacık, 100-150 meters from Çamköy, and 200-250 meters from Narlıca 
breaching the regulation of mines regarding human health as expressed in the TMMOB report 
(2003). Fourth, in terms of underground waters, the Bergama activists insisted on the fact that 
the gold mine would dry wells and lower the levels of underground waters because of the 
excessive use of water resources during the mining process which, in turn, would harm their 
agricultural activities (P/A 14, 27). 
Another component of their diagnostic frames revolved around the geographical 
characteristics of their region. The Bergama activists stated that Bergama and Bakırçay plain 
was not a suitable place to build a gold mine regardless of technologies used. First, they 
underlined the fact that the region laid in a first degree earthquake zone which makes the risks 
of cyanide leakages and spills higher (E/E 2, 3; P/A 25, 28). Second, it was pointed at the fact 
that the possibility of floods and high rates of evaporation due to the climate of their region 
posed dangers of contaminating air, soil, and underground and surface waters (E/E 9; P/A 9). 
All these claims were backed up by evidence and data about the problems of gold 
mining around the world. By using examples of cyanide-related cases from elsewhere, generic 
technological inadequacies of the gold mine sector were highlighted. In that regard, the gold 
mine industry which runs mines around the globe despite its major technological deficiencies 
was portrayed as a “heartless” and “ruthless” industrial sector which disregarded the 
environment and human life (E/E 2).     
Another important theme in the Bergama activists’ diagnostic frames was the 
unfavourable economic impact of the Ovacık gold mine. In fact, the problems in the economic 
field in relation to the gold mine were underlined mostly in order to undermine the economic 
promises made by the TNC(s) which in return would increase rates of peasant mobilization 
and defy the accusations that their movement contradicted national economic interests of 
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Turkey. In that regard, first, the activists aimed to challenge pro-mine actors’ promises of 
immediate economic benefits at the local level such as job opportunities. For that purpose, 
they stated that even if there were any possible improvements in employment rates, it would 
be temporary since job opportunities would have been available for the duration of the 
operation of the mine. However, after the gold ores were fully exploited and the Ovacık gold 
mine subsequently became redundant, there would be no more job opportunities provided by 
the gold mine (P/A 11).  They also questioned the extent of economic improvement in their 
region even when the gold mine was in operation. The activists pointed out the fact that only a 
limited number of positions were offered which would have a marginal effect on the local 
economy (P/A 11). Additionally, the opponents of the mine argued that the TNC(s) 
deliberately inflated the number of their employees as high as 600 and made many workers 
redundant in a short while in order to convey the message that the mine provided economic 
prosperity and job opportunities to the local population even though the initial plan was to 
hire around 300 people given the workload at the mine (P/A 9, 28). Therefore, the Bergama 
peasants perceived it as a strategic act of the TNC(s) to buy peasants and to undermine their 
movement. Yet, the swollen number of job positions was still miniscule when approximately 
10 thousand villagers residing in the nearby villages were considered (P/A 6). Also, the 
Bergama peasants argued that TNCs were pursuing a strategy of dividing the villagers by 
trying to hire one worker from each household (P/A 9, 27; E/E 10). According to the claims of 
the Bergama activists, working conditions and salaries at the mine were unsatisfactory in any 
case (P/A 11; E/E 10). 
 The Bergama activists also drew attention to the questionable economic non-feasibility 
of the gold mine when the possibility of an accident was taken into account. As one of the 
anti-mine scientists pointed out, any possible cyanide and/or waste spills would create 
incalculable amounts of economic and environmental damages. According to his estimations, 
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the costs that had to be covered in the case of an accident would have exceeded the economic 
value produced by the mine (E/E 8). 
Another theme which was underlined with respect to local economic gains was the 
unsustainability of the wealth acquired by peasants by selling their land. Peasants who sold 
their land to the TNC(s) moved to towns or cities like Bergama or İzmir. However, according 
to the interviewees, even though they received considerable amounts of money, the peasants 
who migrated ran out of money within a short span of time. By defining themselves as 
peasants who had been overwhelmingly involved in agricultural work only, they claimed that 
none of the peasants who emigrated had the know-how or entrepreneurship skills to start a 
business. Hence, after a short period of prosperity, peasants fell below their previous levels of 
wealth  
“If you sell your field, money quickly drains. We [peasants] do not have a mind for investment” (P/A 11).      
 
     Moreover, the Bergama activists stressed that that gold mine would deteriorate the 
local economy rather than bring prosperity. The Bergama activists asserted that the touristic 
and agricultural uses of their territory would diminish with the huge tailing pond containing 
cyanide and heavy metals (P/A 1, 9, 28). As on one of the Bergama peasants said, 
 “No one will buy our products on the market once they hear they are coming from Bergama. They will label 
them as cyanide vegetables or cotton” (P/A 1). 
 
Furthermore, in addition to the already existing tourism activities centred around the 
ruins of the ancient city of Pergamon, the Bergama activists proposed alternative touristic 
uses of their land. Underlining the fact that the Bakırçay plain was rich in terms of thermal 
water resources, the Bergama peasants argued that their region could be improved as a 
tourism centre by building thermal spas, a prospect never to be realized because of 
contamination of air and water (P/A 26).    
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 Another line of argument in the diagnostic frames with respect to economical 
problems caused by the Ovacık gold mine revolved around gold mining activities’ impacts on 
the national economy. According to the activists’ frames, the national economic gains 
propagated by the TNC(s) were misleading and exaggerated. It was argued that the 
declaration of the amount of gold to be produced from the ores was made by the TNC(s) 
themselves (P/A 11; E/E 9). Additionally, the fact that gold produced at the Ovacık gold mine 
would be processed abroad was interpreted as another setback to the national economy. 
Activists claimed the bulk of the exchange value produced would be sent off elsewhere 
without being introduced in the Turkish economy contrary to what the TNCs claimed. 
Therefore, the Bergama activists argued that the TNC(s) would exploit and transfer their 
natural resources which meant there would be no considerable additional economic value 
created for the national economy.  
In their third set of diagnostic frames, the Bergama peasants referred to the negative 
impacts of the gold mine on their social and cultural lives. The gold mining sector in general 
was defined by Lemke, a leading figure within the Bergama movement network, as a force 
which destroyed and negatively transformed social relations in places where they operated.  
“There is also the social contamination. Until so far we talked about cyanide and trees. However, there is also the 
social contamination. Cultural spoil. Workers are being brought. Peasants are being removed. Thousands of 
peasants are displaced when a dam is constructed. Then they form ghettos. Brothels [appear], all sorts of drugs 
[are used]…That is the case in Colombia” (E/E 5). 
 
In a similar vein, peasants perceived that their community life which was described as 
harmonious and peaceful previously was threatened by the gold mine. Impacts on the 
community life were mostly seen as a problem during the later stages of the struggle. Even 
though peasants were unified in solidarity at the beginning, they emphasized intra-community 
conflicts and disputes among “themselves” which emerged as a result of divisive strategies of 
mining TNCs. According to these claims, the gold mining companies sent some sociologists 
and anthropologists to do research in the villages. In this way, the Bergama peasants said, the 
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company analyzed the religious and ethnic composition of the villages and acted upon these 
differences (P/A 2, 4, 9; E/E 10, 13). For instance, the village of Narlıca which was an Alevi 
village used to be the most radical group during the protests. The interviewees claimed that 
the company figured out that Alevi villages were organized hierarchically, and they tried to 
get the muhtar (the elected head of the village) and the dedes (religious leaders) of Narlıca on 
their side by offering jobs and money in order to weaken the anti-mine mobilization. As 
others followed, Narlıca was divided into two camps, even refusing to share the same 
coffeehouse (P/A 1, 11, 12). Other similar splits between pro-mine and anti-mine peasants 
occurred in the other villages among friends and relatives which damaged overall communal 
relations (P/A 2, 6, 9, 11, 16).  
Last but not least, the Bergama activists highlighted political problems in relation to 
democracy in their frames. They argued that the gold mine project led to major democratic 
shortcomings by undermining its mechanisms. They recurrently emphasized that the gold 
mine project was put into effect without the consent of the local population. On the other 
hand, Eurogold initially insisted on the claim that their operations were continuing with the 
approval of the local population (P/A 5, 25). However, the Bergama peasants harshly rejected 
these assertions as indicated in the words of a peasant activist:  
“When the mining company first arrived, it collected signatures, most of them forged [in support of the mine]. 
They gave signature on behalf of others. Even the dead appeared on the list. The ones who migrated to Tracea. 
Muhtar [adnministrative head of the village] approved that. Company claims local people want the mine 
[showing signatures as a proof]. We disagreed, but there was no result” (P/A 25). 
 
For their views to be taken into account by the decision-makers, the peasants 
demanded a referendum to be held in the Bergama villages. The referendum demand was 
based on their right to participate in decisions over development projects as local inhabitants 
according to the Bergen Treaty signed and ratified by the Turkish state in 1988 (E/E 3; P/A 
9). However, their referendum demand was denied. Subsequently, the Bergama peasants 
launched an unofficial symbolic referendum on their own to display the scale of opposition in 
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the region. On January 12
th
, 1997, the referendum was held with the participation of peasants 
from eight villages. As a result of the referendum, all 2866 participant voted “No” to the 
Ovacık gold mine (P/A 9, 28; Reinart, 2003: 66; Kuzey Ege, 13.01.1997). In fact, according 
to a survey conducted for Eurogold in 1997 which leaked to the public later on, 87 % of the 
peasants living in the Bergama region were against the operation of the gold mine and 75% of 
the peasants believed that operation of the mine would do damages to them (Yeni Asır, 
18.09.1997).
12
  
Continuous refusal of their demands by the state was perceived by the Bergama 
peasants as exclusion of the people from decision-making processes over an issue which was 
directly affecting their lives. Hence, they depicted the TNC(s) and governments as agents of 
‘non-democracy’ who overlooked democratic practices and principles. In that regard, they 
criticized the working of democracy arguing the people’s demands were not reflected on the 
decision-making processes in Turkey. 
“Democracy is not fully implemented in Turkey... [System] does not operate along the demands of voters. 
Rather, it has its way of functioning” (P/A 6).    
 
 
Moreover, governments overlooked court decisions favouring the peasants, and they found 
loopholes to circumvent those court decisions. These acts were interpreted as a violation of 
the principle of the rule of law. According to the peasants, rule-of-law was unevenly applied 
only for the rich in Turkey, and when it came down to poor people like themselves, the law 
was violated (P/A 5, 11).  
Through all of these framing processes and identity construction, a coherent and 
resonant set of meanings was produced for the Bergama movement. These frames were 
produced and accepted by all the actors throughout the Bergama network. Diagnostic and 
                                                 
12
 According to the same survey, 59 % of the participants believed underground waters would be depleted as a 
result of the operation of the mine. 79% thought wastes would pose risks to the environment after the closure of 
the mine, and 60 % reckoned that the mining corporation would leave the tailing pond unsafe after its departure 
(Yeni Asır, 18.09.1997).   
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prognostic frames relied heavily on the technical information provided by the scientists and 
CSOs, which were then accepted and incorporated by the peasants. In their frames, there was 
a marked emphasis on science to enhance their frames’ reliability and validity. With respect to 
frame resonance, frame consistency was achieved because all the scientists, CSOs, peasants 
and other actors who participated in the Bergama network commonly agreed upon these 
frames complementing each other’s work. On top of that, having credible names like 
professors and CSOs within their network made their frames more persuasive. Additionally, 
the centrality of environmental frames was maintained by framing their environmental 
grievance as a life or death matter.  
Also, the experiences of the peasants during their struggle transformed their 
understandings of politics and democracy. Once confident in the rightness of their cause and 
the subsequent inevitable success of their mobilization backed up by scientific evidence and 
legal decisions, the Bergama peasants started to alter their perceptions of democratic 
conditions as they met with various sorts of repression and the Ovacık gold mine remained 
open. Consequently, they attached further meaning to their struggle such as fighting for 
democracy and justice. One of the previous spokespersons of the Bergama indicated that there 
was a gradual change in the attitudes of peasants towards the working of democracy in 
Turkey, and they developed negative perceptions as they realized that what they saw as 
political opportunities were shallow: 
“While they were saying if this government comes things get better, they have come to the understanding that all 
of them were in the same circle. They started questioning the system, military, governments, police. At the end, 
they have understood that there is no democracy in Turkey. They have realized that democracy can occur 
through their struggle” (E/E 11).  
 
Overall, all of these frames were articulated, produced, and expressed through the joint 
work of the Bergama peasants and their spokespersons as well as scientists, CSOs and 
environmental activists who did not only give support from outside, but became a part of the 
movement network. Through their frames, they continuously pointed to the injustice created 
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by the TNCs and the state with respect to environmental and human rights. In other words, the 
Bergama peasants participated in the movement in order to fight the unjust conditions they 
had to face in their individual lives. The ones who did not were labelled as ‘traitors’ who sold 
out their community, country, and more implicitly, humanity as discussed in the previous 
chapter. At the same time, while producing their injustice frames, the Bergama activists 
linked their conditions to the macro structural dynamics, such as capitalist globalization, as 
discussed below.    
 
Framing Capitalist Globalization: 
When bridging the master frames of “environmentalism” and “human rights”, the 
Bergama peasants made use of another master frame - “opposition to neoliberal globalization” 
as their underlying theme. Accordingly, instead of treating the injustices they faced as specific 
to their own situation, they perceived environmental problems and democratic deficits as part 
of a more general structural process. More specifically, they claimed that their grievances 
were caused and exacerbated by the forces of capitalist globalization (E/E 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 
13, 14, 19, 22, 29, 36, 40; P/A 9, 10, 11, 15, 17). In other words, the Bergama activists 
reached a consensus throughout their network over the interpretation of capitalist 
globalization as a system generating negative impacts like environmental degradation, 
inequalities and human rights violations. Yet, even though they related their grievance to the 
present form of the global system, there was no commonly accepted understanding of the term 
globalization throughout the network. Based on previous political views and positions, 
activists’ views on the content of globalization were diversified.  
Peasant activists mostly associated globalization with invasion of external forces (P/A 
1, 3, 5, 17, 26). In that sense, they claimed that their situation resembled the conditions the 
War of Liberation at the time of which the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire were 
invaded by the Allies’ forces just after the First World War. Therefore, globalization was 
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equated with imperialism, those terms used interchangeably by the peasants. Additionally, 
they had a more state-centric interpretation of globalization in the sense that they commonly 
attributed a decisive role to the First World states such the United States in terms of political 
and economic development (P/A 5, 11, 26).
13
 A nationalist rhetoric was noticeably present in 
the peasant activists’ frames of globalization regardless of their political stances. In fact, the 
political configuration of villages was diversified. Three Alevi villages -Narlıca, Tepeköy, and 
Pınarköy- were overwhelmingly social democratic while the majority of peasants in other 
villages were more inclined to the political right (E/E 3; P/A 15, 19). Yet, the aforementioned 
nationalist discourse was shared by all of the peasants.  
Also, nationalist symbols and narratives were extensively employed by the Bergama 
peasants in their protests. In addition to the utilization of Turkish flags in many 
demonstrations, heroic stories from the War of Liberation circulated throughout their network.  
“I can still remember Bayram Cavus [“Obelix”] telling stories from the War of Liberation. The enemy was on 
that hill, and our soldiers were at this point ready to beat them [talking about a protest site near villages]” (P/A 
9).  
 
Fighting against TNCs was seen as a duty to be fulfilled for the sake of their ancestors who 
gave their lives for their land (P/A 1). In the same spirit, references to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
and his victories against ‘foreign invaders’ were constantly made (P/A 2, 5, 9, 11). Their 
village committees were likened to the underground committees of the War of Liberation 
(P/A 28). Also, they claimed that it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who had ordered closing of 
the environmentally hazardous copper mine Balya, Balıkesir back in the 1930s (P/A 9, 16). 
The use of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a symbol was also evident in the discourses of their 
spokesperson, Konyar who stressed that their movement was also about anti-imperialism, 
rather than gold-mining per se. When a court case was filed against Konyar and several other 
Bergama activists for being involved in espionage activities, Konyar announced in a press 
                                                 
13
 The issue of Iraq invasion was constantly brought up during the interviews with the peasant activists. They 
argued that the war on Iraq was a proof of the U.S. domination throughout the world.   
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release that the leader of their alleged ‘underground organization’ was Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, and the Bergama peasants would not permit plundering of their country (Hurriyet, 
04.11.2000).  
The Bergama peasants also staged demonstrations revolving around themes of 
nationalism and independence. In September 2000, the Bergama peasants organized a picket 
in front of the old parliament building which was used during the early stages of the Turkish 
Republic. Holding Turkish flags and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, peasant activists 
said: “Our organization is the old Grand National Assembly of Turkey; our leader is Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk [italic added]” (Hürriyet, 24.09.2000) in order to criticize present-day political 
leaders, parliament members, and governments in Turkey for not being responsive to the 
people’s demands.    
 Another thematic demonstration was the “Kuvvay-Milliye” march in November 2000. 
In this event, 62 peasant activists and Konyar walked on foot for about 300 kilometres to the 
city of Çanakkale within a week (P/A 9).14 Çanakkale had a symbolic importance in the 
nationalist discourse. Its significance stems from the fact that the Dardanelles of Çanakkale 
hosted one of the major battles between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies’ forces during the 
First World War.
 15
 With this march, the Bergama demonstrators symbolically referred to the 
Independence War at the beginning of the 20
th
 century claiming that they are defending their 
land just like their ancestors.
 
 
 “After he landed in Samsun [where the Turkish Independence War was officially initiated], Mustafa Kemal 
gave responsibility to all the youngsters and elders of this country. He said, “Mobilize against imperialism if it 
ever puts the country under siege. Do not surrender”. Accordingly, we launched this march against the 
contamination of our land, the suffering of our people, and the antidemocratic practices in this country. We are 
walking to Çanakkale which symbolizes the defeat of imperialism in our country. We gave many martyrs there. 
We will show them and all others that we will not hand in our country to foreigners. If you follow us, we will 
walk with pride, courage, and respect. I call on the whole country to mobilize. With my respects” (Konyar 
addressing the gendarmerie, in Reinart, 2003: 132). 
                                                 
14
 Kuvay-ı Milliye is the name given to the militia forces during the Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922 
which formed the basis for the centralized Turkish army later on. 
15
 Even though the Dardanelles Battle was fought by the Ottoman Empire against the Allies, it was portrayed as 
part of the nationalist struggle in 1919-1922 which resulted in the formation of the Turkish nation-state. The 
Dardanelles War is used as a crucial symbolic event attributing to it an anti-imperialist dimension.  
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Themes of independence and anti-imperialism with an explicit nationalism flavour 
were important for maintaining the narrative fidelity which made their frames resonant.
16
 
Emphasis on similarities between the Bergama movement and the Independence War, called 
attention to the inherited identities of ‘grandsons’ of those who had fought against the 
“occupiers” and “colonialists” during the Independence War were emphasized. These 
identities were adapted to their own situation. The Bergama villagers themselves associate 
themselves with their ancestors rejecting a foreign force which tried to “occupy” their land, 
this time a foreign company (P/A 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17). In doing that, the peasants 
had the idea of fighting for a larger cause, and they felt that they were a part of the historical 
struggle of which they heard as they grew up which served as a motivational frame. 
Moreover, the nationalist elements employed in their discourses were also useful as a shield 
for deflecting accusations of betraying their country. By underlining those themes, the 
Bergama peasants tried to defy stigmatization of working against national interests of their 
country by opposing to gold mining.  
However, it would be misleading to define the Bergama movement as a purely 
nationalist movement. One symbolic indicator for this is the Bergama peasants’ visit to 
martyrdoms at the end of the ‘Kuvvay-ı Milliye’ march of both Turkish and Australian 
soldiers who died during the Çanakkale Battle (Duran in Reinart, 2003: 137-138). When they 
made their complaints about the Australian –based TNC, Normandy to the Australian martyrs 
symbolically, they were conveying the message that it was the TNCs which they were 
opposing, not the Australians in general.  
In fact, the nationalist framing was contingent on the fact that it was the TNCs which 
owned the Ovacık gold mine at the time. According to the accounts of the Bergama peasants, 
they would have also opposed cyanide-based gold mining even if the mine was operated by a 
                                                 
16
 According to Johnston and Noakes (2006: 12), narrative fidelity is achieved when “...resonant frames tend to 
mesh, draw upon, and synchronize with the dominant culture of the target, its narratives, myths, and basic 
assumptions”.  
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national company or the Turkish state since hazardous impacts of gold mining would have 
remained (P/A 1, 2, 9, 11).
17
 One of the peasant-activists expressed his views in the following 
way: 
“The only difference between the two is that state expropriates land, and TNCs buy land” (P/A 2). 
In addition to their emphasis on imperialism, they perceived capitalist globalization as 
a system which renders class polarizations so that subordinate classes suffer from the negative 
impacts of capitalist globalization throughout the world such as environmental degradation. 
“There are always poles in the world...Before, there was the bogeyman of communism [he refers to the 
bipolarized world during the Cold War]. Now, globalization is also creating poles in the world between the rich 
and the poor. It is not only the rich who live in this world. There are poor people and they are not alone” (P/A 5). 
 
 They specifically situated TNC(s) at the centre of their criticisms, relating their local 
grievance to the ‘attacks’ of TNC(s) for profit  and describing them as the essential global 
actors pursuing global interests(E/E 2, 3, 5, 15). In other words, they brought forth the fact 
that mining companies pursuing global interests led to environmental destruction in other 
parts of the world (E/E 2, 3, 5; P/A 5). Being disappointed with their own nation-state, they 
described states as part of capitalist globalization because the state was working together with 
TNC(s) instead of protecting them. In that sense, they indicated that TNC(s) and states joined 
forces, described by one of the peasant activists as “Company, state, nation-state. It means 
corporate-state” (P/A 5).   
Describing the central motive of the TNCs as profit-making, the Bergama peasants set 
their priorities as their livelihood, health and environment which is explicitly stated in the 
following words of one peasant activist: “they prefer money whereas we prefer life” (P/A 15). 
Based on this clearly put dichotomy between two sets of interests, the Bergama activists 
                                                 
17
 The Ovacık gold mine was taken over by a Turkish company called Koza Altın Ltd in2004. In fact, apart from 
a small number of demonstrations, protests were not sustained against the Koza Altın Ltd. Yet, it was because 
the Bergama movement was already in a decline stage due to intra-movement conflicts, exhaustion of peasants 
and the closing window of political opportunities. On the other hand, negative views towards the mine were still 
prevalent throughout the villages. As for its economic contributions, activists were still sceptical about the 
economic returns to the Turkish national economy since the Turkish company was accused of acting similarly to 
the TNC(s) in terms of their tax payments and declaration of gold amounts produced. 
 195 
 
positioned themselves on the ‘losers’ side since they bore the injustices produced by the 
capitalist globalization.  
“Honestly, as far as I can see, globalization is not something which benefits the poor. It seems more like the 
integration of the rich. I do not think it will provide benefits for the underclass” (P/A 11). 
 
They extended their criticisms to capitalist globalization by expressing their discontent 
about the ways in which democracy was (mis)applied under capitalist globalization. 
According to the Bergama activists, the impact of capitalist globalization aggravates the lack 
of state responsiveness to the citizens of Turkey. Moreover rule of law was being undermined 
as laws were being adapted to the interests of capitalist globalization. 
“Everyone has a right to live and right to live freely in this world. They confiscate the right of workers to 
unionize. All the laws, legal structures, and democracy are now in their interests….They have written their 
constitutions and [built] their democracies for themselves” (P/A 5). 
 
Urban segments of the Bergama network including spokespersons, lawyers, CSOs, 
and scientists, were composed of a multiplicity of actors with diverse political views. 
Activists from outside the Bergama villages overwhelmingly upheld a variety of left-wing 
political views including social democracy, new left, orthodox Marxism and Kemalist-left 
with nationalist tendencies as well as green politics. This heterogeneity in political views was 
reflected in their approaches to capitalist globalization. In spite of the general consensus over 
the interpretation of capitalist globalization as a detrimental process in its current form, views 
diverged over the content, shape and future of capitalist globalization.  
In terms of views over whether capitalist globalization was beneficial or not, activists 
diverged. For instance, one of the spokespersons of the movement with social democratic 
views argued that capitalism and globalization might be beneficial as long as its deficiencies 
were corrected: 
 “I believe ...the new capital [referring to global capital] is harming people and societies all around the world. 
People, on the other hand, resist it as in the case of Bergama or Porto Alegre. They are rightfully reacting against 
it, and they should. This is the case when we look at the historical development of humanity. Capitalism had 
beneficiary results for humanity for sure. But societies struggled against its harms as well. Class struggle 
developed. Even if production has increased in certain places as a consequence of global spread of capitalism, 
humanity should still fight against its detrimental impacts collectively. Workers were working for 12 hours a 
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day, but at the same time automobiles were produced. Distances which could be travelled in 2 days now take 
only 2 hours. However, concomitantly, working hours are reduced down to eight. We should do the same thing 
here. In other words, we should collectively resist against this type of globalism which is fuelled by 
corporations’ greed for more profit” (E/E 3). 
 
Another prominent figure within the Bergama movement who was in charge of managing 
transnational relations also saw globalization as a process which might have beneficial sides. 
Coming from a green politics stance, she drew attention to the environmental dimensions and 
claimed globalization to be beneficial as long as long as transnational business activities were 
reconciled with protecting the environment: 
“Personally I am not against globalization. Let them globalize olive oil [instead of gold mining]. Let them take 
care of oil tress. However, I do not want them to ruin everything with chemicals. It undermines my dignity 
especially in the name of olive trees” (E/E 3).  
 
On the other hand, another social democratic spokesperson remained more sceptical 
and negative about capitalist globalizations’ positive sides: 
“Globalization is an enormity. It is a fallacy. It is a system which is imposed on undeveloped countries 
destroying the labour of their workers, intensifying the violation of human rights, and opening land to 
multinational corporations. It is the same old imperialism we know from the Independence War. In those times, 
there were canons and rifles. Now they have their own power. They possess their own universities, the World 
Trade Organization, money, rent, planes. More specifically, they have their sanctions and quotas” (E/E 2). 
 
 
In their definitions of capitalist globalization, urban-based activists were divided into 
groups of reformist and rejectionist according to the typology of political positions towards 
capitalist globalization. Yet, it must also be stated that these categorizations were not crystal 
clear.  There were recurring shifts between positions in the discourses of the activists. For 
example, while describing capitalist globalization as a process with possible beneficial 
impacts, Taşkın also remarked that it was imposed on countries like Turkey which moved him 
closer to the arguments of rejectionists with nationalist or old-left orientations. 
“They pushed Africa below the poverty line. They have taken all of their gold, silver and mines. They destroyed 
their democracy. It is the same thing here. Nothing changes. That’s why globalization is the marker of 
catastrophe for countries like us. I believe these countries should be well-protected. We should become a 
producing country. Yet, we have become a consumerist country. We consume all the time. Purchasing power has 
decreased. Liberties are constrained. Democracy is crippled” (E/E 3). 
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Similarly,  activists with ‘old left’ stances closer to orthodox Marxist views made a more 
state-centric reading of capitalist globalization, saying that it was another label for 
imperialism dominated and directed by the First World countries. They were utterly critical of 
capitalism and described it as an inherently destructive system of exploitation with no 
promising features (E/E 12, 13, 14).  
What united these actors with diverging, yet close views within the same struggle was 
their reading of globalization as a form of attack by external capitalist forces. In that regard, 
they equated globalization with imperialism in general. It was partly the spill-over effect of 
the pre-1980 Leftist student movements.  One of the protests, in fact, symbolically 
exemplified this spill-over effect. In 1967, the sixth fleet of the U.S. navy had visited İstanbul, 
Turkey. The left wing student groups gathered and demonstrated against the sixth fleet by 
associating the presence of the U.S. navy in Turkey with American imperialism they were 
fighting against. It was a significant event in the sense that it symbolically pointed at the 
escalation of the left wing student movement in 1960s and 1970s. One banner used in the 
demonstration became one of the symbols of the student movement in the 1960s. On the 
banner, it was written “6’ncı Filo defol” which literally meant ‘The 6th fleet, get out’. By 
drawing on the same slogan, the Bergama activists used the same banner with a play on 
words. In Turkish altıncı has a double meaning: ‘sixth’ and ‘the ones opting for gold’. 
Nevertheless, even though imperialism was a recurrent theme in their discourses, each actor 
attached different meanings to capitalism and imperialism. State-centric thinking was 
prevalent in the discourses of the urban-based activists ranging from social democratic 
reformists to rejectionist ‘old’ Marxists, though in varying degrees.  
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Be they rejectionist or reformist, they all pinpointed the cultural-ideology of 
consumerism as the main pillar of capitalist globalization which was applied predominantly 
throughout the world: 
 
“Ideologues of capitalism might say all these developments are beneficial for humanity. Everyone drinks Coca 
Cola so that something enters their stomach. People eat hamburgers... However, if corporations’ benefits exceed 
people’s, this is not right” (E/E 3). 
 
Consumerism was also seen relevant to their specific aggrieved issue, and the interpretation of 
capitalist globalization as prioritizing consumerism was applied to their contention. As several 
prominent figures of the Bergama movement pointed out, gold was the least used metal in 
industrial production. It was mainly used as a consumer good in the form of jewellery or for 
its exchange value. Accordingly, they argued that since gold was not mainly used for primary 
needs, there was no need for gold production (E/E 1, 5). 
Another converging point in their frames of capitalist globalization was about what 
was to be done with respect to preventing detrimental impacts of capitalist globalization. In 
spite of their state-centric view, the majority of the urban-based activists advocated joining 
their forces with other movements and actors that were opposing capitalist globalization 
beyond their borders. In other words, the Bergama movement should be and was a part of the 
resistance against capitalist globalization according to movement participants. This was 
because capitalist globalization and more specifically, mining TNCs were creating similar 
detrimental impacts on local populations and the environment in different parts of the world 
(E/E 2, 3, 5; Özay, 1995). 
“Even though this movement is predominantly portrayed as an environmentalist movement, it is rather against 
imperialism and what multinational corporations are doing to my country in the name of sustainable 
development. In addition to our environmental and cultural heritage, we are trying to save our dignity. Today it 
is gold mining. But in the future it can be over a nuclear power plant or any other sort of imperialist attack. 
Therefore, one should see this movement as a resistance to globalization and global attacks” (E/E 2). 
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When they announced that they would provide support for the anti-mine activists in Greece 
and the Czech Republic who asked for help, Konyar and Taşkın explicitly declared their 
global perspective:  
“Our responsibility does not end with Bergama. We saved our own land, next is others’ land. First, we will 
struggle against the poison of cyanide in Turkey. We will organize people in Efemçukuru, Kaymaz, Gümüşhane, 
and we will support  their struggle. Then, we will help anyone asking help from all around the world” (Konyar’s 
statement in Yeni Asır 20.10.1997). 
 
“The decision of the [Turkish] State of Council is a first of its kind. We will translate it into different languages 
and it will set a precedent. Other than that, we will provide aid in the form of information as long as we can” 
(Taşkın’s statement in Yeni Asır, 20.10.1997) 
 
 
Also, Lemke explicitly mentioned the transnational aspect of contention over gold 
mining at the Alternative Nobel Prize ceremony in 2000 when she received the award. She 
finished her speech by saying “Hayır [No] to cyanide gold mining in Türkiye; Hayır [No] to 
cyanide gold mining in Greece; and Hayır [No] to cyanide gold mining in the world”.  She 
acknowledged and commended all actors involved in the Bergama movement including 
transnational ones in the same speech:  
“It is very important to stress here that strong friendships were forged between all people involved in our 
movement- of national and international origin” (Lemke, 2000). 
 
Moreover, some of the activists with New Left views openly expressed that there had to be an 
alternative kind of globalization in order to challenge the TNCs, which implied a global 
resistance: 
“There is a need for global governance. The company is a multinational. It is a partnership or monopoly of a 
world capital. If we could have managed it [a global struggle], things would have been different. These 
corporations use the advantage of being a world monopoly when they are building relations with the state. If they 
were a small company, they wouldn’t have lasted so long” (E/E 11).   
Despite several objections within the network to cooperation with ‘foreign” actors like 
INGOs stated by the rejectionist old-left actors, these views of the urban-based activists 
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juxtaposed with those of the peasant activists. Peasant-activists were predominantly willing to 
participate in transnational networks and collaborate with INGOs, scientists, and social 
movements outside Turkey, considering these links as beneficial for their struggle (P/A 2, 5, 
9, 11). Besides, peasant-activists viewed supranational political structures such as the EU, and 
legal institutions like the European Court of Human Rights as opportunities beyond their 
national borders which could make a major contribution for them (P/A 9, 11, 23, 25). As a 
result, the Bergama activists conjoined forces with actors beyond their borders and acted as 
part of a global resistance to capitalist globalization. 
Apart from their transnational links, another indicator for the global aspect of the 
Bergama movement was the protests they staged for specifically opposing capitalist 
globalization. While the Bergama activists contested capitalist globalization through their own 
struggle, they also organized anti-capitalist globalization protests over issues such as MAI 
talks and against actors of capitalist globalization in general. For that purpose, they 
demonstrated in İzmir, in support with the global justice movement activists protesting the 
capitalist globalization during the IMF and the World Bank summit in Prague in September, 
2000. Shouting anti-capitalist globalization slogans such as “Bergama, Prague, İzmir hand in 
hand against IMF!”, the Bergama peasants directly associated their movement with those of 
the global justice movement. In the press release of the same event, Konyar expressed the 
Bergama peasants’ views on capitalist globalization as: 
“We say no to the wild new colonialism created by IMF and the World Bank under the name of globalization in 
collaboration with all the international resistors in Prague. IMF and the World bank are the main supporters of 
cyanide gold [mining]” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 26September, 2000). 
 
 
In another event, around 40 Bergama peasants and Konyar formed a picket line in 
front of the building of the Ministry of Forestry in order to protest talks on International 
Arbitration at the Parliament (Hurriyet, 17.07.1999). They perceived international arbitration 
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as a process which would lead to confiscation of their established rights (E/E 2; P/A 5). 
Furthermore, they utilized transnational spaces such as the European Social Forum and forged 
links with like-minded activists, INGOs, and social movements in their struggle against 
capitalist globalization.
18
 Therefore, even though nationalist elements such as sentiments and 
discourses were present in their frames, the Bergama movement was much more than a 
nationalist opposition to capitalist globalization  
Finally, it is important to point out that, the Bergama activists also criticized the 
Global Justice Movement activists with respect violence used during the transnational protests 
in Prague, Seattle, and Genoa. Influenced by the media accounts of these protests in which 
violent actions of some protestors were brought forth, Konyar claimed:  
“Our resistance against globalization is different. I believe it comes up with new projects and aims against 
globalization and we should resist in this way. Whereas, in Genoa, Prague and Seattle, the way they oppose is 
violent. The anti-globalization resistance is the Bergama Movement itself. I mean, through civil disobedience. 
Without plundering the stores, throwing stones at people, and letting the police beat you, we can find ways to 
make them miserable” (E/E 2). 
Also, Konyar also points at differences between the socio-economic backgrounds of the 
protesters and the Bergama activists. As he described the GJM protestors as people from the 
First World, Konyar saw the Bergama movement as the movement of the people who were 
the real sufferers of of capitalist globalization (E/E 2). On the other hand, Taşkın had more 
positive views about the GJM protestors praising their resistance to capitalist globalization 
and considering them as part of the same struggle that the Bergama movement was engaged 
in. This opinion differences mostly stemmed from variations in the ideological orientations of 
Konyar and Taşkın which was reflected on the course of the Bergama movement.  
 
                                                 
18
 Please see chapter 8 for a detailed analysis. 
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Chapter 6: Political Opportunities at the Local and National Levels 
The Bergama peasants were both fortunate and unfortunate when they started their 
movement. They faced unfavourable conditions because national decision-makers opted for 
neo-liberal economic policies in continuation of the restructuration process since the 1980s 
1
 
The introduction of neo-liberal market policies had a direct impact on the Bergama peasants 
since the mining sector, the source of their aggrieved issue, was also a part of the 
restructuration process.  
Until the 1980s, the mining sector in Turkey was controlled and coordinated by the 
state, and mining activities were overwhelmingly carried out by related state institutions.
2
 
After the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, the state relinquished its direct 
involvement in mining and instead, concentrated on supporting private sector to engage in the 
mining.  State-run mining establishments were privatized. Additionally, policies aspiring to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) which facilitated global investment in the mining 
sector in Turkey were put into force. With the introduction of two laws in 1985 and 1994, the 
Turkish mining sector was opened to operations of mining TNCs (www.mta.gov.tr, accessed 
15.09.2011). As a result of these legal changes, the gold mining industry started to flourish 
with the activities of TNCs in Turkey. Overall, the transformations taking place in the field of 
mining provided the structural basis of the Bergama movement’s struggle.  
On the other hand, Turkish politics was also undergoing a change starting with the late 
1980s. By the 1990s, the repercussions of the repressive and brutal military regime of the 
1980s started to subside, if not disappear completely. Political life was reinvigorated with the 
                                                 
1
 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis. 
2
 One of the major state institutions in relation to mining was the Mineral Research & Exploration General 
Directorate (Maden Tetkik ve Arama Genel Müdürlüğü) which was founded by the state in 1935 for conducting 
scientific and technological research regarding mineral exploration and geology 
(http://www.mta.gov.tr/v2.0/eng/). Another mining related institution, Etibank, as a state-owned bank, was 
founded again in 1935 with the aim of, first, providing raw materials and mines to meet industrial needs and, 
second, of maintaining all sorts of capital needed for related activities. In 1985, Etibank’s role was lessened to 
granting mining licenses to private enterprises. The bank was privatized in 1998 and closed down in 2001.  
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gradual revival of political parties, CSOs, and new social movements.
3
 Several constitutional 
amendments were introduced which relatively softened the undemocratic features of the 
military regime of the 1980s. The gradual democratization process was accompanied by 
Turkey’s aspiration to enter the European Union. Negotiations were on track with the EU, yet 
half-heartedly on both sides (E/E 27).
4
  It was a subdued process which culminated in the 
rejection of candidacy of Turkey in 1997. There was a surprising turn around in 1999 and 
Turkey’s candidacy was accepted. By 2000, the process was revitalized. From then on, 
Turkey was in the process of connecting itself to the global political structure which had 
major implications for the process of democratization. 
Given these circumstances, the Bergama peasants were fortunate in terms of 
expressing their contention as a movement. In comparison to the suppressed political 
conditions of the 1980s, many actors of civil society and political parties were available for 
them to build alliances with both at the local, national, and transnational levels. Likewise, 
because of the relative heterogeneity of political actors, the Bergama peasants were able to 
forge links with different actors with various political standings and views which allowed 
them to build an extensive anti-mine network. In other words, there was both a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in the availability of allies for the Bergama movement in comparison 
to the previous periods.  
Equally important was the increasing state tolerance towards new social movements 
during the 1990s in comparison to earlier periods. Even though there were no major changes 
in its general characteristics of exclusiveness and non-responsiveness, the Turkish state 
selectively allowed social movements to continue their activities and protests. The 
                                                 
3
 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis. 
4
 In fact, the ‘modus operandi’ of Turkish modernizers consisted of application of European based structures and 
practices to the Turkish context in order to transform Turkey into a civilized country. In that regard, joining the 
EU meant the fulfilment of the modernization aspiration of the Kemalist regime. Yet, a concomitant reluctance 
also emerged among the Turkish power holders since participation in a supranational political structure would 
erode sovereignty of the state. 
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democratization process remained impartial and uneven. Limitations of the democratization 
process were apparent in emerging new identity claims with respect to religion and ethnicity. 
The Turkish authorities perceived identity claims of Kurds and Islamists as a threat to the 
secular ideals of the Kemalist regime and the unity of the state and nation, a perception shared 
by mass parties of the left and the right. In accordance with this perception, the state did not 
alter its exclusionist and repressive attitude completely, and applied excessive measures of 
repression, increasing the costs for those movements throughout the 1990s and the beginning 
of 2000s.
5
 On the other hand, the Bergama activists had a comparative advantage to identity 
based movement in terms levels of repression exerted by the state. The new social movements 
that emerged since the mid-1980s such as environmental and feminist movements were seen 
as ‘harmless’ which led the state to take a milder attitude towards these mobilizations. In sum, 
by the time Bergama activists started their movement, they found fertile ground in terms of 
political opportunities such as the democratization process in the aftermath of the military 
regime; the availability of influential allies like political parties and CSOs; and  mild state 
repression towards new social movements which was selectively carried out. 
National Political Opportunities 
a. Legal institutions as an opportunity: 
The Bergama movement was once described by a spokesperson as a battle against the 
mining TNCs fought on many fronts such as science, judiciary, institutional politics, and 
grassroots (E/E3). Among these, the legal struggle occupied a crucial place. Through legal 
actions and subsequent victories, the Bergama activists aimed to push the Turkish 
government(s) to close the mine and called on the Turkish state to act on behalf of its citizens. 
Furthermore, favourable court decisions gave impetus to grassroots mobilization throughout 
the movement since they strengthened the peasants’ belief that they were struggling for a 
                                                 
5
 Please see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis. 
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righteous cause. Accordingly, the Bergama activists primarily referred to the principle of rule 
of law and citizenship rights guaranteed by the constitution which was embodied in their legal 
actions. In that regard, believing that court decisions would have binding impact on the 
political decision-making processes, legal structure and practices were evaluated as 
opportunities by the Bergama activists.   
The prolonged legal struggle over the Ovacık gold mine which set off at the very 
beginning of the movement was supervised and carried out throughout the struggle by a group 
of lawyers from İzmir who were already specialized in environmental issues. Senih Özay who 
was one of the founding members of the first Turkish Green Party founded in 1988acted as 
the main legal representative of the Bergama peasants throughout the movement. He carried 
out the legal process in collaboration with Noyan Özkan, the then-president of the İzmir Bar 
Association, and lawyers from the Environmental Lawyers group in İzmir. The legal struggle 
consisted of two main components: lawsuits launched for the closure of the Ovacık gold 
mine; and the legal defence of various Bergama activists who were charged with being 
involved in illegal activities during their protests.  
The Bergama activists started their legal contention over the Ovacık gold mine shortly 
after the initial opposition of Taşkın and his friends in order to corner governments and 
Eurogold. Under the supervision of Senih Özay, 652 Bergama peasants brought the issue to 
court on November 8
th
, 1994. In 3 lawsuits filed against the Eurogold, the Bergama activists 
demanded the annulment of permissions granted by the Ministry of Environment since the 
gold mine would have detrimental impacts on their environment and health. Their claims 
were based on the scientific data provided by Taşkın, scientists, and CSOs regarding the 
serious risks that cyanide-leach method entailed. However, the local court dismissed the case. 
In response, the Bergama activists appealed to the higher court, the Council of State 
(Danıştay). On 13.05.1997, the Council of State ruled in favour of the peasants and dismissed 
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the decision given by the lower court. Based on the 17
th
 and 56
th
 articles of the Turkish 
Constitution regarding the right to life and the right to live in a healthy environment 
respectively, the Council of State decided that the
 operation of the Ovacık gold mine should 
be stopped since it did not benefit  the ‘public good’. Through press releases and official 
appeals addressed to the state authorities, the lawyers and the Bergama activists constantly 
pressured the Ministry of Environment and the İzmir governor to implement the high court 
decision. However, state officials refrained from taking any action claiming that the legal 
decision was not finalized yet. The ruling of the Council of State was finalized on October 
15
th
 1997, when the İzmir 1st Administrative Court decided to cancel the permit to extract 
gold with cyanide leach method referring to the “right to live in a healthy environment” 
(Cangı, 2003; Özkan, 2004;E/E 1, 16). Evaluating the court’s ruling as a decisive victory, the 
Bergama activists celebrated the closure of the mine by organizing a festival in one of the 
villages during which Özay addressed the Bergama peasants by stating: 
“From now on, none of the presidents, prime ministers, or governors can resist against this decision. It is over 
now. I do not believe anyone can resist against your claims anymore” (Cumhuriyet, 18.10.1997). 
    
Despite the optimistic mood of the Bergama activists, the Turkish government decided 
to re-evaluate all the permits and licences of the mine instead of closing it. Based on the 
investigations conducted as a result of the appeal of the Bergama Municipality and Bergama 
peasants, the Bergama Regional Court officially confirmed that the operations in the Ovacık 
gold mine still continued on December 12
th
, 1997.  As part of its strategy to circumvent the 
court decision, Eurogold presented a report to the Ministry of Environment claiming that 
additional precautions were taken at the mine while continuing construction. The Bergama 
activists, on the other hand, carried on protesting and monitoring with the aim of drawing 
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attention to the lack of implementation of court decisions and keeping the issue on the 
agenda.
6
      
On March 8
th,
 1999, the Turkish Prime Ministry ordered The Scientific and Technical 
Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), the national research organization, to form a 
commission of experts to investigate whether risks in Bergama mine were as significant as 
voiced in the juridical decisions and if so, to determine whether these risks could be avoided 
with additional precautions. In October 1999, TÜBİTAK issued a controversial report and 
declared that the company had constructed the mine according to proper safety standards and 
had also installed further precautions (TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG evaluation report, 1999). 7 
Based on the report of TÜBİTAK, on April 5th, 2000, the under-Secretariat of Prime Ministry 
instructed six related ministries- Ministries of Domestic Affairs, Health, Public Works, 
Energy and Natural Resources, Forestry and Environment- to authorize the operation of the 
mine by granting new licences based on the fact that the risks that the Council of State had 
specified no longer existed (Hürriyet, 13.06. 2000; Çoban, 2002; Reinart, 2003; Özkan, 2004). 
In contradiction to the binding court decisions, the ministries issued the new permits and 
licenses to the mine allowing its operations. Additionally, the Ministry of Health issued one-
year test run permission to Normandy, the successor company of Eurogold, and the mine went 
into trial production in May 2001. A group of villagers and the İzmir Bar Association filed a 
case demanding the cancellation of the “illegal instruction” given by the Prime Ministry in 
August 2000, and resultantly, on June 1, 2001, the 1
st
 Administrative Court of İzmir decided 
                                                 
6
 For instance, in March 1999, the Bergama peasants staged a protest by forming a human chain around the mine 
pit when cyanide was brought in. As a consequence, Eurogold had to move cyanide to another mining area in 
Kütahya away from the region. The Bergama activists traced the location of cyanide stocks of Eurogold, and 
they staged another protest in Kütahya (Reinart, 2003: 117). 
7
 In the report, the necessary technologies implemented are listed as a Ferric Sulphate unit, a carbonate barrier, a 
gas differentiator to the chimney, an additional reservoir, two additional measurement units and an additional 
wall to strengthen the waste pool. Also against the claims of an earthquake risk, the scientists in the commission 
argued that the fault line did not pass under the mine (TÜBİTAK- YDABÇAG evaluation report, 1999). 
However, all these arguments were challenged by anti-gold mine scientists CSOs s who claimed that the risks 
were deliberately overlooked or minimized in the TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG report (TMMOB, 2003; Reinart, 
2003).  
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that the permits given to the mine were illegal and the commission of the Prime Ministry was 
incompatible with the principle of rule of law (Cangı, 2003).  
In January 2002, the İzmir 3rd Administrative Court, and consecutively the Council of 
State, decided to cancel the mine’s licence of one-year trial production granted by the 
Ministry of Health. The court decision stated that the detrimental consequences likely to arise 
due to the hazards of cyanide leach method could not be compensated, was and ordered the 
Ovacık gold mine to be closed within a month (Cangı, 2003). In April 2, 2002, the mine was 
closed by the İzmir Governor after the İzmir Bar’s appeal to the Ministry of Health and the 
governor of İzmir to implement the decision.8 However, only one day after the closure, the 
mine was re-opened based on the Council of Ministers’ in-principle-decision on March 29th, 
2002 which stressed that the operation of the gold mine was a necessity for the economic 
welfare of Turkey. This decision also opened the way for full production of the mine. The 
İzmir Bar Association and its lawyers criticised the decision of the Council of Ministers by 
emphasizing the government’s ‘secret’ decision to be an action breaching the ‘rule of law’ 
principle.
9
 The State of Council reversed the principle decision of the Council of Ministers on 
June 23
rd
, 2004. Newmont Mining Corporation, the then-owner of the Ovacık gold mine, 
applied to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, presenting a new environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) report. On 27 August, 2004, the ministry announced that the operation of 
the mine did not entail any risks any longer based on the renewed report (Cangı, 2005). The 
1
st
 Administrative Court of İzmir suspended the validity of the EIA based licence issued by 
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry on 14 March, 2005. The 4
th
 Administrative Court of 
İzmir annulled the building scheme permit of the mine on 24 January, 2006. The Council of 
                                                 
8
 Right after the closure decision of the court, Normandy appealed to the government based on their contract 
which stated that company had the right to file for a compensation of 300 million USD in case the rights for the 
operation of the mine were cancelled (Milliyet, 06.01.2001). 
9
 Noyan Özkan who was then the head of the İzmir Bar Association and also a participant in the Bergama 
movement network, pointed out that the decision ruling was not ratified by the president, nor had it been 
published in the Official Gazette, thus giving the decision a secret status (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 18.06.2002). 
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State approved the local court’s decision to cancel the gold mine’s permits about the use of 
forest areas (Hürriyet, 25.07.2006). On December 30th, 2008, the Council of State approved 
the annulment of the permit issued for the mine based on the 2004 EIA report, and with the 
serving of the high court decision to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the legal basis 
of the Ovacık gold mine was undermined once more. In February 2009, another EIA report 
which stated that there were no impediments for the operation of the Ovacık gold mine was 
released. Attorneys of the Bergama peasants with the support of TMMOB launched a lawsuit 
for the annulment of the last EIA.    
 In short, even though the Bergama activists attained numerous victories in their 
prolonged legal struggle, the Ovacık mine continued to operate even though necessary and 
valid legal licenses and permits were annulled by court decisions. The mining TNC(s) 
circumvented court decisions with the facilitation of the Turkish governments throughout the 
process. In other words, the governments either found loopholes in the legal system or simply 
neglected the court decisions which enabled the mine to operate.
10
  
b. State responsiveness: 
Throughout the Bergama movement, the Turkish state and its various institutions acted 
in a non-responsive and exclusionist fashion, perceived as such by the Bergama activists. 
First, even though the Turkish state had been undergoing a structural change as a result of the 
economic and political transformations since the 1980s, various parts of the state did not want 
to lose their grip on society (İnsel, 1996). Resultantly, the state’s priorities of territorial 
integrity and security impeded the inclusion of civil society actors into decision-making 
processes, especially because of rising identity claims (Keyman, 2005). Second, 
developmentalism continued to be the basic premise of Turkish politics and source of state 
                                                 
10
 According the TMMOB’s report (2003b), Newmont lacked official permits or licences which were required to 
operate the Ovacık gold mine such as the Emission Licence and Sanitary Law permit from the Ministry of 
Health, Land Zone Plans, Local Land Zone Plans, Construction Licences, and Building Usage Licences from the 
Ministry of Public Works. Other permits such as the Temporary Mine Operation and Plant Selection Licences, 
and Site Selection Permission required from the Ministry of Health were expired.  
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legitimacy even under the neoliberal model. In congruence with the Kemalist tenet of the 
‘catching-up’ idea11, economic growth and development were seen as the remedy for societal 
problems and the central component of modernization under the neoliberal economic model 
(Adaman and Arsel, 2005b; Arsel, 2005). Accordingly, integration into the global market and 
investments of TNCs were seen as indispensible components of economic growth and 
development which made the state an ally of TNCs. In that regard, the Turkish state acted as a 
“regressive globalizationist” which applied the economic requirements of capitalist 
globalization, but remained reluctant about introducing political liberalism.   
These factors culminated in the negligence of societal demands by the state with 
respect to environmental issues. The Turkish state neither informed locals nor asked their 
opinions about the Ovacık gold mine project during its preliminary stage. The state 
overlooked the demands and claims of the Bergama peasants after the project was put into 
practice as well. Governments either did not interfere in the process or facilitated the work of 
the mining TNCs. Without exception, all governments were unwilling in applying the court 
decisions and closing the mine which was perceived as the main indicator for the non-
responsiveness of the state by the Bergama activists (P/A 5, 6, 9, 11). In fact, several ministers 
from various Turkish governments made supportive remarks about the Bergama movement 
throughout the process. In these statements, the government members promised to make the 
issue a part of government agenda in order to resolve the conflict and underlined the binding 
power of the court decisions. Furthermore, some government members even called on 
Eurogold to stop its operations until the final decision was made (Yeni Yüzyıl, 11.05.1997; 
Yeni Asır, 03.07.1997; Yeni Asır, 05.07.1997; Yeni Asır, 11.07.1997; Radikal, 13.07.1997; 
Radikal, 23.07.1997; Radikal, 21.08.1997; Cumhuriyet 29.08.1997; Kuzey Ege, 08.09.1997; 
Gazete Ege, 11.10.1997; Cumhuriyet, 21.10.1997; Kuzey Ege, 07.04.2003). Yet, the support 
                                                 
11
 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis. 
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of government members was tentative and inconsistent. For instance, shortly after her 
statements that the court decisions would be implemented and Eurogold would be asked to 
stop its operations, the then-Environmental Minister, İmren Aykut accused the Bergama 
peasants of ‘pushing the limits’ and claimed that the court decisions were not ordering the 
company to shut the mine down completely (Sabah, 13.07.1997; Milliyet, 23.07.1997; Kuzey 
Ege, Cumhuriyet, 29.07.1997; 20.10.1997). Similarly, although the then-State Minister in 
Charge of Mining, Kazım Yücelen, stated that Eurogold should comply with the court 
decisions, he concomitantly said that the Bergama movement went ‘beyond limits of 
tolerance’ (Yeni Asır, 11.07.1997; Sabah, 13.07.1997). On the other hand, other members of 
different governments predominantly made overt declarations for the working of the mine. In 
his defence of the Ovacık gold mine, the then-Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, 
Recai Kutan, claimed that cyanide gold mining did not ever cause any accidents leading to 
human life loss, and it would not have any permanent impacts on the environment (Radikal, 
28.03.1997). The then-State Minister in Charge of Mining, Teoman Rıza Güneri, depicted the 
Bergama movement as a ‘political show’ in which ‘ignorant’ peasants were manipulated 
(Zaman, 27.04.1997). The then-Health Minister, Osman Durmuş who had declined the 
Bergama activists’ request for a meeting in Ankara in 2001, claimed that the Bergama 
peasants were misled by forces which tried to harm the Turkish economy when justifying the 
controversial decision of the Council of Ministers in 2002 (Reinart, 2003: 145; Radikal, 
05.04.2002). Overall, these governments commonly brought forth three sets of economic 
factors for allowing the operation of the mine. First, they argued that closing the mine would 
bring along a huge burden on the national economy since the state would be forced to pay 
compensation for violating their agreements with TNC(s). Second, it was claimed that the 
Turkish economy would fail to receive a considerable amount of input expected from the 
working of the mine. Third, governments also referred to the alleged risks of scaring foreign 
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investors away from Turkey which were claimed to be detrimental for the mining sector as 
well as other sectors (Cumhuriyet, 21.10.1997). In fact, these claims were backed up by the 
other sections of the pro-mine camp in general including journalists and miners’ associations 
(Sabah, 11.09.2001; Sabah, 05.04.2005). Moreover, similar evaluations were expressed by the 
actors of the neo-liberal network at the transnational level. In the World Development Report 
2003, the World Bank gave the Bergama movement as an exemplar of local resistances 
interrupting ‘extractive industries operations’ which brought high direct costs to ‘the private 
sector, the public sector, and everyone else’ (The World Development Report, 2003: 78). 
Describing extractive industries as a necessary means to overcome poverty and achieve 
development, the World Bank advocated a more inclusionary project implementation process 
which would incorporate local populations and pre-empt any possible grievances. All the 
governments in power throughout the Bergama movement employed the same approach as 
that of the transnational capitalist class, summarized best in the words of the then 
Environmental Minister Ziyaettin Tokar: “We cannot be the poor guardians of rich resources” 
(Cumhuriyet, 29.05.1997).  
A similar attitude existed in the approaches of state institutions other than 
governments. The Bergama activists sent letters to the president of Turkey at the time, 
Süleyman Demirel, in order to get his support (Yeni Asır, 26.05.1997, 07.06.1997). However, 
even though Demirel said “[w]e cannot allow things which will put public health in danger” 
referring to the Ovacık gold mine (Milliyet, 03.08.1997), he assured the Eurogold executives 
that the Turkish state would comply with the previously signed agreements (Zaman, 
29.06.1997). Likewise, civilian and military bureaucracy espoused the operations of the 
mining TNC(s). On October 27
th
 2002, several top rank military officers visited the Ovacık 
gold mine plant and presented a plaque to the Normandy authorities, which was interpreted by 
the Bergama activists as an open display of military’s support for the gold mine (Radikal, 
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28.10.2002; Bianet, 20.02.2006; E/E 16; P/A 22). With respect to the civilian bureaucracy, 
governors and sub-governors in charge were constantly accused of not exercising their 
authority to shut the mine down based on the court decisions or forestalling the work of 
scientists who wanted to monitor the health standards in the region (Yeni Asır, 03.07.1997; 
E/E 2, 3, 17).  
General mistrust towards the state mounted gradually throughout the process (E/E 2; 
P/A 4, 28). In the initial stages of the movement, the peasants had high hopes with respect to 
their state. For instance, each election period and changes in the composition of governments 
were perceived as a political opportunity for winning their cause (E/E 9; P/A 6, 15). In 
addition to expressing their escalating hopes in ‘new’ governments, they put on hold their 
protests in order to see new governments’ approach (Yeni Asır, 29.06.1997, 01.07.1997). 
However, rising expectations with shifting alignments in the governmental structure declined 
throughout the process, since none of the governments took action against the mining TNCs 
(P/A 3, 6, 11).  
Overall, the state denied its own citizens’ rights in return for benefits from 
globalization such as FDI. As perceived by the Bergama activists, the state institutions and 
actors including governments, presidents, civilian and military bureaucracy were the allies of 
the mining TNCs looking out for their interests. Put differently, state authorities and 
institutions were more open to the TNCs in comparison to citizens. This was summarized in 
the words of one of the movement elite as follows:    
“They [Eurogold] even thought of giving a gold bar as a gift to President Demirel. However, they withheld this 
move because they feared public reaction. Then, the court decisions were applied for a short while. They were 
involved in lobbying activities at Ankara very strongly. They engaged ambassadors as well. They can easily get 
appointments from the prime minister and ministers. There has been an intense level of propaganda for gold 
extraction” (E/E 16).  
 
According to the villagers, what used to be nation-state was becoming the ‘company-
state’ under the globalization process which referred to the transfer of power of the state to the 
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transnational companies (P/A 5). In the initial stages of the project, Eurogold offered 
infrastructural improvements in the villages by building schools, mosques, and public 
fountains as part of its strategy to convince the locals and pre-empt any possible anti-mine 
opposition. However, peasants were sceptical about these offers since the company offered 
what the community already had rather than what they needed. Besides, the company targeted 
villages surrounding the mine plant rather than other villagers in the region which were in 
need (P/A 9, 11). As described by one of the movement elite, the peasants were puzzled with 
the fact that company was taking over the duties of their state by building roads, mosques, 
sewages, and schools: 
“To the company they say you are not the state. But, [they see that] the company does what the state is supposed 
to do” (E/E 5). 
 
Therefore, globalization exacerbated the traditional exclusionary character of the Turkish state 
since universalistic duties of the state were taken over by TNCs, and the state was reduced to 
protecting the company’s rights instead of its own citizens’ (E/E 6).  
On the other hand, the state was not a unified structure in the eyes of the villagers (P/A 
4, 10; E/E 2). They claimed that the judiciary was fulfilling its role of acting according to the 
constitution and legal codes, which set it apart from other state institutions. Facing a 
fragmented state structure, the Bergama peasants believed that they could benefit from the 
divisions within the state. In that sense, the Bergama activists viewed legal institutions as an 
opportunity to overcome the general non-responsive and exclusionary character of the state 
(E/E 2, 3). In that regard, they sued the government members at the time and deputy governor 
of İzmir, claiming that they acted against the constitution by failing to enforce the Council of 
State decision within the indicated 30-days time in 1997. On September 25, 2001, the 4
th
 
Division of Court of Appeal sentenced the then prime minister, 3 ministers, and İzmir 
governor to pay damages to the peasants for allowing the mine to run in violation of the court 
decision and   the principle of rule-of-law.  
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c. Political Allies at the National Level 
The Bergama activists were engaged in a laborious effort to find allies both at the 
national and local levels in order to widen and strengthen their movement network which in 
turn increase their effectiveness. Among the major supporters of the Bergama movement at 
the national level were NGOs, politicians, scientists, and journalists. With the support of these 
allies, the Bergama activists aimed to get the support of the general public and influence the 
national political decision-making centres to achieve favourable policy changes.  
The Bergama movement was first mobilized in the early 1990s when the 
environmental movement was expanding with more and new actors engaging in multiple 
issues. The timing of the Bergama movement meant that various environmental organizations 
and groups were available as allies. However, as Kousis (1999) indicates the presence of local 
movements and widespread environmental concerns does not necessarily lead to the 
formation of networks among environmental movement organizations (EMOs) at the national 
level. For instance, in Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal there 
have been a considerable number of environmental local movements that continue to exist as 
local initiatives without having any network ties. This is because environmental activism at 
the national level faced obstacles such as unfavourable political structures, lack of resources, 
and low levels of environmental commitment and consciousness in those countries (Kousis, 
1999). In a similar way, even though environmental activism escalated with respect to the 
number of environmental organizations and their areas of specialization, environmental 
initiatives failed to create an extensive and intensified environmental movement network. 
First, environmental groups failed to reach out to masses which meant that a grassroots basis 
could not be maintained. Secondly, although organizations were specialized in specific 
environmental issues, links among themselves continued to be weak. Rather, co-operation and 
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collaboration among environmental movement actors remained sporadic. Therefore, in spite 
of several successful campaigns launched against thermal and nuclear power plants, 
environmental movement actors remained scattered and isolated without a sustained area of 
convergence.
12
 Hence, the Bergama movement could not rely on a well-functioning and 
extensive environmental network at the national level. Instead, they received support from 
several environmental groups and organizations on a tentative and limited basis.   
The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and for the 
Protection of Natural Habitats (TEMA) was one of the national environmental CSOs which 
provided support for the Bergama movement. TEMA is an environmental NGO with a 
preservationist outlook which in general refrains from taking a critical stand, engaging mostly 
in legal struggles and lobbying.
13
 In fact, it was hesitant about giving support to the movement 
initially. It was only after the industrious efforts of one of the committed scientists, who was 
also on the TEMA’s board of advisors, that the link was established. Even though TEMA first 
indicated that gold mining with cyanide was not among their priority issues, the organization 
was convinced to give support as a result of successful framing of the movement elite. 
Accordingly, it was pinpointed that the violation of laws with respect to the Bergama case had 
a transcendental character beyond the issue of gold mining which had to do with the lack of 
implementation of the law in environmental issues: 
“TEMA initially gave support to the movement as a result of my efforts. I drew their attention by telling them 
about what was really going on in Bergama. They said “We are not involved in industry related contentions”. I 
replied them by saying ‘What does it mean industrial? It has a legal dimension. You cannot refrain from acting” 
(E/E 9). 
 
In order to support the Bergama activists, TEMA released several press statements in 
which the pro-mine scientists and governments were criticized for not behaving as principles 
                                                 
12
 Please see chapter 4 for a more detailed analysis of environmental activism in Turkey. 
13
 TEMA was founded in 1992 by several leading business persons and industrialists with the objective of 
combating soil erosion and deforestation in Turkey. As one of the most-well known environmental organizations 
in Turkey with a vast number of voluntary representative local chapters, TEMA mainly engaged in public 
awareness about environmental issues through campaigns and lobbying (Adem, 2005; Kalaycıoğlu and Gönel, 
2005). 
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and ethics of law and science required (Hürriyet, 15.06.2000; Hürriyet, 21.06.2000; Milliyet, 
23.06.2000). Moreover, TEMA also filed a lawsuit against the Council of State for shutting 
down the mine by claiming that running the mine without licences meant violation of laws 
(Milliyet, 23.06.2000). Another major event of TEMA for raising public consciousness about 
the hazards of gold-mining with cyanide was the conference which was organized with the 
participation of scientists in June 2000. Additionally, TEMA placed campaign advertisements 
in the newspapers (E/E 9). Yet, TEMA’s support was sustained only for a short span of time. 
Especially after the espionage case according to which the Bergama activists were accused of 
working for the interests of ‘external’ forces14, TEMA withdrew itself from the movement 
(E/E 9; Özkan, 2004).15 
Also, other national and local environmental organizations and platforms such as the 
Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (ÇEKÜL), Friends of the 
World Association,  Environmental Passengers Without Borders, the SOS Environmental 
Platform of İstanbul, the East Mediterranean Environment Platform, and the Adana 
Association of Environmental Volunteers displayed their solidarity with the Bergama activists 
through demonstrations and press releases (Cumhuriyet, 23.02, 1997). Involvement of these 
environmental organizations in the Bergama network contributed mostly to bringing the issue 
to the national public agenda. On the other hand, the Bergama movement facilitated 
environmental organizations to share the same platform.  
 With respect to the wider circle of civil society, numerous NGOs specialized over a 
wide array of issues such as human rights, law, occupational interests, tourism, and 
globalization as well as several universities backed the Bergama movement. Main supportive 
civil society actors at the national level consisted of the Civil Platform Against the 
                                                 
14
 Please see chapter 8 for detailed analysis. 
15
 Later on, Hayrettin Karaca, the founder and honorary president of TEMA, stated that gold should be extracted, 
yet, without damaging the environment since gold was a precious natural resource to be exploited for the 
national economy (Milliyet, 27.04.2008). Being an industrialist himself, Karaca’s statement was in contradiction 
with the Bergama activists who questioned the developmentalist logic.   
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Impositions of Chemical Engineering Industry (KİMDASKİ), the Anti-MAI Coalition in 
Turkey, the Progressive Lawyers Association, the Human Rights Association (İHD), the 
Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TURSAB), the Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) and its various member chambers, the Turkish Medical 
Association (TTB), Association for Support of Contemporary Living (ÇYDD), various Bar 
Associations, professors from Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ), Middle Eastern Technical 
University (ODTÜ), Aegean University, İstanbul University, and September 9 University 
(E/E 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 40; P/A 9, 11, 15). Among them, TTB, TMMOB and its member chambers 
stood out as the crucial allies that remained within the Bergama movement network 
throughout the process. First, they provided scientific information and expertise to the 
Bergama peasants which were mainly used during the legal cases. Furthermore, TMMOB 
released its own scientific reports criticizing the arguments of the TNC(s), governments, and 
pro-mine scientists (TMMOB report, 2001, 2003; TTB report, 2001). In that regard, criticisms 
of TMMOB and TTB were important resources for the Bergama activists to object to the 
controversial TÜBİTAK-YDABÇAG evaluation report on scientific grounds (Reinart, 2003: 
125-129; TMMOB report, 2001). Secondly, TTB, TMMOB and its member chambers 
released individual or joint press statements criticising governments publicly (Kuzey Ege, 
09.07.2001; Bianet, 03.04, 2002; Radikal 13.08.2003). Third, they staged protests in support 
of the Bergama activists (Yeni Asır, 05.10.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl, 16.10.1997). Fourth, they 
either filed lawsuits or appeared as supporters in courts. Additionally, TTB conferred the 
Bergama peasants its annual award for contributions to public health with the aim of 
increasing the visibility of the Bergama movement (Hürriyet, 05.11.1997).  
 Other civil society actors’ support came in the forms of providing resources for 
protests and legitimacy. For instance, TURSAB provided the Bergama peasants with buses to 
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travel and places for accommodation during their protests (P/A 15).
16
 Scientists and 
academics organized scientific meetings and conferences about the gold mining issue. Also, 
through press releases, meetings, and demonstrations, CSOs lent their names and reputation to 
the Bergama movement which increased its legitimacy. Additionally, many CSOs acted as 
friends at courts providing solidarity with the Bergama activists. For example, during the 
court hearing over the espionage case
17, representatives of the İHD, the EU Agency of 
Turkey, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, TMMOB, and Human Rights Foundation 
were present among the audience (Radikal, 27.12.2002). Moreover, CSO allies also tried to 
protect the Bergama activists against state repression. Drawing attention to the human rights 
aspect of the struggle, İHD made calls for the release of the protestors whenever they were 
arrested during their protests and kept it on the public agenda as it aimed to do with a press 
release when Konyar was in custody for 7 days in April, 2002 (İHD Press Release, 2002).  
Among all these civil society actors, the Civil Platform Against the Impositions of 
Chemical Engineering Industry (KİMDASKİ) and the Anti-MAI Coalition occupied 
important roles since not only did they provide resources and connections, but they were also 
involved in framing processes with respect to globalization. KİMDASKİ was a national 
advocacy network working on the issue of cyanide based gold mining. The main objective of 
KIMDASKI is to contest the spread of gold mining projects with cyanide throughout Turkey. 
In that regard, they warn locals and the general public about the gold mining projects and their 
possible hazardous impacts on environment. To that end, they carried out activities like 
translating documents on gold mining and participating in conferences to provide scientific 
information. KIMDASKI activists organized informative meetings in the Bergama villages 
through which they tried to raise consciousness among the Bergama peasants about capitalist 
                                                 
16
 Bergama’s historical value as a touristic site and its proximity to the touristic sites of İzmir and its surrounding 
worked as an advantage for the Bergama movement in terms of getting the support of TURSAB.   
17
In 2003, the Bergama protesters including Sefa Taşkın, Oktay Konyar, Birsel Lemke, and peasants were 
accused of engaging in acts against the national interests of Turkey in cooperation with the German NGOs. This 
case created a detrimental impact on the Bergama movement which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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globalization. In other words, they indicated that the grievances of the Bergama peasants were 
directly linked to capitalist globalization and the struggle against gold mining should not be 
confined within the limits of Bergama. Additionally, they underlined that similar processes of 
gold mining were taking place in other parts of Turkey in congruence with global level 
developments. KIMDASKI took over the role of establishing links between the Bergama 
peasants and other localities in Turkey which were under similar gold mining threats in the 
second half of the 1990s (E/E 40). 
 At the same time, the Bergama movement activists coalesced with the Turkish leg of 
the anti-MAI movement, the Anti-MAI Coalition. The Anti-MAI Coalition was established in 
June 1998 as a network consisting of several trade unions, political groups, environmental 
organizations and other critical CSOs from all over Turkey. In fact, the Anti-MAI Coalition 
was affiliated with KIMDASKI since founders of these two groups took part in both 
networks. The initial contacts of the Anti-MAI Coalition with the Bergama Movement 
occurred through KIMDASKI. Even though KIMDASKI had a transnational approach 
attempting to forge links with actors outside Turkey, none of its participants were fluent in 
any foreign languages. Gaye Yılmaz, one of the founders of the Anti-MAI Coalition and an 
academic doing research for trade unions and, assisted KIMDASKI in translating documents 
and maintaining KIMDASKI’s transnational links. She got in touch with the Bergama 
movement for the first time in 1996 through her work in KIMDASKI. Based on that link, the 
Anti-MAI Coalition activists developed dense relations with the Bergama movement activists 
when the coalition was formed in 1998. Alliance with the Anti-MAI Coalition served two 
purposes. First, the Bergama movement activists obtained information about capitalist 
globalization in relation to gold mining since the anti-MAI activists were involved in the work 
of accumulating general information on capitalist globalization.  
“....the ones who were leading the movement asked me for help about understanding political-economy aspect of 
the process and its links with globalization and international institutions which are my fields of expertise” (E/E 
40). 
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Secondly, the Anti-MAI Coalition also played an important role in sounding the claims of the 
Bergama movement outside the borders of Turkey throughout the global networks of anti-
capitalist globalization. In October 1998, the representatives of the Turkish anti-MAI group 
communicated the contentions of the Bergama movement in a speech during the protests 
against negotiations over the MAI treaty among the OECD countries in Paris.  Anti-MAI 
activists were also involved in the preparation meeting for the Seattle Protest in Geneva where 
they informed groups from different parts of the world about what was happening in Bergama 
with respect to the anti-mine movement. Additionally, the Anti-MAI Coalition activists 
distributed pamphlets about the Bergama movement to the environmental and agricultural 
groups during the Seattle Protests in 1999. Since Yılmaz, the spokesperson of the Anti-MAI 
Coalition, was also a prominent trade unionist, she had the chance to bring the Bergama 
movement to the agenda of international trade union meetings in which she participated.  
Overall, according to the framing of the anti-MAI movement activists, contention in 
Bergama was caused by the global system. They viewed cyanide-leach method based gold 
mining similar to the several problems of the capitalist globalization such as privatization of 
public services, commodification of nature, attacks on labour and other problems sourced by 
capitalism. Criticizing national perspectives, they related the Bergama contention to similar 
struggles taking place elsewhere both in Turkey and around the world. In this way, the anti-
MAI activists aimed to integrate Bergama movement in the broader resistance at the global 
level against the capitalist globalization.   
Lastly, even though many of the elite of the Bergama movement who maintained links 
with allies belonged to the political left tradition, the Bergama movement’s relations with 
trade unions remained weak. Leaving aside tentative and temporary support coming in the 
form of a few press releases and participation in several petition signing campaigns, trade 
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unions did not lend an open and solid support for the Bergama activists. This was mainly due 
to the structural fact that labour and environmental conflicts were treated as two separate 
issues both by trade unions and environmental groups in Turkey in general. As one of the 
prominent academics who worked for trade unions pointed out:  
“Trade unions were quite reluctant to support to the Bergama movement. This is because environmental 
problems are not perceived as class-based, structural or systemic issues in Turkey. It is not only labour 
organizations, but also pro-labour political parties and purely environmental organizations share this point of 
view. Both labour organizations and environmentalist groups have a sectarian approach to the issue, and they all 
lack sufficient knowledge about its political economy aspect. According to the unions, environmentalism is the 
domain of environmentalists solely. As for the environmentalist organizations, the environment is too important 
to mix with labour politics” (E/E 40). 
 
Overall, civil society actors at the national level were evaluated as crucial and 
effective allies by the Bergama activists. Yet, apart from TTB, TMMOB and its member 
chambers, the support of civil society actors at the national level fluctuated. At the peak of the 
protests, higher levels of support from the civil society actors were achieved. However, there 
was a decrease in the overall participation of civil society actors at the national level in the 
beginning of 2000s. This is due to several factors. First, the aforementioned structural 
problems of civil society in Turkey such as the inadequacy of resources, the lack of sustained 
networks, cleavages, and state tutelage inhibited a more coherent and sustained form of civil 
society support.
18
 Second, there were differences between the Bergama activists and civil 
society actors with respect to strategic and tactical preferences. This divergence sharpened 
after Konyar’s influence increased within the grassroots sub-network. In this period, the 
Bergama peasants opted for non-conventional, sudden, and expressive forms of protest which 
did not fit with more bureaucratically organized CSOs. One spokesperson of the Bergama 
peasants claimed civil society organizations did not have any grassroots basis, and CSOs were 
inflexible and formal when taking decisions (E/E 2). Third, as many peasant activists claim, 
the strategy of keeping non-peasants at a distance which was employed during the later stages 
of the movement, led to the decline in the civil society support.   
                                                 
18
 Please see chapter 4 for a detailed analysis. 
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Political parties were one of the main targets to forge alliances with the Bergama 
activists. Nevertheless, the Bergama activists strategically framed their movement as ‘beyond 
political party politics’ (P/A 2, 8, 15, 27, 28; E/E 2, 3, 7, 9, 11). First, they aimed to preserve 
their grassroots position without being incorporated by any political party organization. 
Accordingly, they constantly emphasized that the Bergama movement was an environmental 
movement of peasants dissociated from particularistic interests of any political parties. In that 
sense, it was important not to be mentioned together with specific political parties which 
would have damaged the image they intended to convey. In other words, they aimed to ward 
off potential accusations of being manipulated by a specific political party or a political group. 
Second, it was also important for the Bergama activists to get wider public and political 
support and sympathy as much as possible. In that sense, they intended to transcend existing 
political cleavages in order to widen their support base. Third, peasants and other activists 
within the Bergama movement were not monolithic in their political views. Accordingly, 
affiliation  to a specific political movement would have decreased levels of peasant 
participation in the movement. There was also the risk of losing non-peasant activists with 
varying political views. Finally, they did not want their aggrieved issue either to be used by 
politicians for their own political purposes or to be overshadowed by other issues (E/E 2, 3, 7; 
P/A 5, 8, 9, 11, 27). 
Yet, as the POS analysis underlines, political parties are important allies of social 
movements that provide resources, take issues to the formal political institutions, sometimes 
act as a shield against state repression, and provide legitimacy.
19
 Seeing political parties as 
potential allies, the Bergama activists constantly put effort in getting political parties as their 
allies. Yet, the general political party composition in Turkey turned this search into a difficult 
task for the Bergama peasants. This was mainly due to the fact that environmental concerns 
                                                 
19
 Please see chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of Political Process Theory. 
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and issues were not among the priority issues of any of the political parties including ‘social 
democratic parties’ pursuing a developmentalist agenda apart from several individual 
politicians and MPs.  
At first glance, Green Parties might be assumed to be another natural ally for 
environmental movements, given their shared concerns. Even though Green Parties appear as 
one of the means of influencing policy for environmental activists when and where Greens 
enter the parliament, the relationship between the two is uneasy. Green Parties are not 
consistently part of the environmental movement nor do they directly reflect the demands and 
interests of the environmental movement. Environmental movements strictly concentrate on 
environmental concerns. On the other hand, as parties contending in elections, Green Parties 
extend their agenda to other issues in order to ward off accusations of being ‘single-issue’ 
parties which creates a discrepancy between the agendas and concerns of environmental 
movements and the Greens (Rootes, 1997, 2004). In political contexts where they do not 
achieve electoral success, Green Parties move closer to environmental movements and they 
tend to ‘represent themselves as part of the environmental movement’ (Rootes, 2004. 624). 
The Bergama movement was deprived of even such a potential ally which would voice their 
struggle within the formal political circles. 
In fact, the Green Party of Turkey was founded in 1988 in the aftermath of the military 
coup, its foundation paradoxically facilitated by the political context in which all pre-existing 
political parties as well as political activity of CSOs were banned, since the incipient 
environmental movement was considered to be harmless and tolerated. The foundation of the 
Green Party in Turkey emerged out of the search for an organization that would bring the 
scattered environmental CSOs together (Ergen, 1994). In the short-lived phase until the party 
was closed, the Greens were active in organizing protests and campaigns for environmental 
problems together with the locals affected, cooperating with environmental organizations, 
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raising environmental awareness through the organization of conferences, meetings and 
seminars, and establishing networks with international environmental organizations and other 
green parties (Duru, 2002). In short, the Greens acted as an organization which is part of the 
environmental movement, rather than as a political party working to expand its electorate 
(ibid). Within a short span of time, conflicts within the party emerged, grouped around two 
main axes. One group argued that environmental problems could be resolved by improving 
the existing system while another group proposed radical change which involved the 
transformation of daily practices as well as the political system. The latter (İzmir Greens) 
argued that the party should engage more effectively with issues such as human rights, 
Kurdish rights, feminism, and anti-war struggles. They also approached sustainable 
development more critically (ibid: 11). These internal divisions culminated in a party congress 
in which all members decided to dissolve the congress, effectively ending the party in 1994.
20
 
Even though the Green Party did not exist by the time Bergama activists mobilized, its legacy 
was crucial. Many of the former members of Greens took active roles in the formation of the 
Bergama movement as local influential allies. The networks established among the local 
Green Party members in İzmir were still intact. These networks among various CSOs and 
individual activitists were extensively utilized especially during the initial mobilization period 
of the Bergama movement, when an anti-gold mining network was being formed beyond 
limits of villages. 
Lacking such as a potential ally, the Bergama peasants continuously tried to forge 
links with politicians from the mainstream political parties which had seats in the parliament. 
For that purpose, the Bergama peasants visited MPs and various political party representatives 
in the parliament (E/E 3; P/A 9, 10). Their aim was to convince these potential influential 
allies of the injustice of their situation with the intention of making an impact on decision-
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 The Green party was recently revived in 2008. 
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making processes. On April 24
th
 1996, a delegation of Bergama activists including muhtars of 
16 villages, Taşkın, and several politicians and environmentalists visited the Parliament and 
got in touch with MPs (Kuzey Ege, 29.04.1997) A second visit was made to Ankara on May 
7
th
, 1997 during which around one thousand Bergama villagers accompanied by Konyar and 
Taşkın visited the government members, MPs and other politicians (E/E 3; P/A 9; 
Cumhuriyet, 08.05.1997; Cumhuriyet, 09.05.1997).  
During the second visit to Ankara, the Bergama peasants managed to get acquainted 
with an MP from the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) who acted as one of their main 
supporters in the parliament (P/A 5, 9, 10, 22, 27, 28).  Işın Çelebi, who had already acquired 
information about the hazards of the cyanide leach method and the Ovacık gold mine, forged 
good relations with the Bergama peasants as an MP from the İzmir district (E/E 31). On 
August 2
nd
, 1997, the Bergama peasants travelled to Çeşme, İzmir where the ESİAD (Aegean 
Industrialist and Businessmen) Meeting was held in order to meet with the ministers. After 
being obstructed by the state forces, only 15 peasants and Konyar were allowed to meet with 
the ministers. In the aftermath of the meeting, Çelebi who had become a state minister by that 
time, visited the rest of the villagers waiting about a hundred kilometres away, and promised 
them to apply the legal decisions (E/E 31; Milliyet, 03.08.1997; Gazete Ege, 03.08.1997). 
Çelebi’s support continued in the form of making speeches, visiting Bergama and the villages, 
bringing the issue to the agenda of the parliament and the council of ministers during his term 
first as an MP and then as a minister (E/E 31; Hürriyet, 01.08.1997; Gazete Ege, 14.09.1997).  
However, Çelebi constituted an exceptional case within the ranks of the centre right 
wing parties including quasi-liberal Motherland Party (ANAP) and True Path Party (DYP). 
Even though ANAP had a more positive attitude towards the Bergama peasants when in 
opposition, it took a pro-mine position when it came to power (E/E 3; Cumhuriyet, 
09.05.1997). The other centre right party, DYP, as well as the other major political parties of 
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the right, the nationalist National Action Party (MHP) and the religious Welfare Party (RP), 
either remained indifferent when in opposition or sided with the TNC(s) when in government, 
advocating the view that the operation of the mine was beneficial for the national economy 
(Radikal, 28.03.1997; Yeni Yüzyıl 09.05.1997; 2002; Sabah 04.04.2002). 
On the other hand, the Bergama activists had high expectations from the parliamentary 
left parties as social democratic parties have been one of the major allies of new social 
movements and worker’s movements in general. However, links with the social democratic 
parties at the national level remained limited and were only based on alliances forged with 
several individual MPs from the People’s Republican Party (CHP). These MPs, mostly from 
the İzmir district, gave their support to the Bergama activists by carrying the issue to the 
parliament through numerous parliamentary inquiries and speeches (TBMM Report, 1996, 
1997a, 1997b, 1998); making statements to the media against the operation of the mine and in 
support of the Bergama movement (Kuzey Ege, 09.12.1996; Yeni Yüzyıl, 05.07.1997; 
Cumhuriyet, 15.07.1997);  and visiting villages in order to display their support (Kuzey Ege, 
07.07.1997, 21.07.1997; Hürriyet 20.10.1997). As a result of such actions, certain CHP MPs 
were seen as ‘sincere’ and ‘genuine’ allies by the Bergama peasants (P/A 14, 26, 27). Yet, the 
Bergama peasants found the support of CHP insufficient in advocating their cause.  
“Why didn’t Baykal [the then leader] come here? He sent Adnan Keskin [the then general secretary of CHP] 
instead. He should have come. There is a vote potential for his party here. We wouldn’t have eaten him alive 
(P/A 9). 
 
“We do not trust politicians anymore. I think we should not believe in the words of any political parties 
including my party [CHP]” – from the statement of Konyar when he was the Bergama County Chairman of CHP 
(Gazete Ege, 14.09.1997). 
 
Politicians from the other major social democratic party Democratic Left Party (DSP) 
remained more distant from the Bergama movement whether in opposition or in government. 
Only a few MPs showed occasional interest to the Bergama movement (Yeni Yüzyıl 
05.07.1997; Cumhuriyet 15 07.1997; Milliyet 30.03.2002). On the other hand, several MPs 
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from the DSP overtly defended the operation of the mine claiming it was a necessity for the 
national economy and accusing the Bergama peasants of acting in the interests of ‘foreign’ 
powers (Cevizoğlu, 2008; Kuzey Ege 29.01.2001). In fact, the controversial re-opening of the 
gold mine based on the TÜBİTAK report and the principle decision of the Council of 
Ministers were taken by the coalition government led by DSP which contributed to the 
growing mistrust for the leader of DSP, Bülent Ecevit (P/A 6, 10).  
 On the other hand, smaller and marginal parties of the Left, mainly socialists and 
communists, were in support of and willing to coalesce with the Bergama movement. In fact, 
smaller left-wing political parties which are outside the parliament are more prone to build 
alliances with social movements in general, in addition to existing ideological proximities in-
between the two. For the smaller political parties of the left, social movements appear as 
opportunities to expand their electorate basis and promote their parties in their competition 
with centre-left wing parties which mostly act like mass parties and may or may not lend their 
support to social movements (Kriesi et al., 2003; della Porta and Diani, 2006). That was also 
the case in Bergama since marginal left-wing political parties like the Labour Party (EMEP), 
Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖDP), and Workers Party (İP) were in support of the 
Bergama movement from the start (P/A 5, 6, 9, 11, 27; Kuzey Ege 09.07.2001). However, the 
Bergama peasants distanced themselves from these parties in spite of the availability of 
willing allies. Accordingly, the small left-wing parties were not allowed to take part in the 
protests visibly or speak on behalf of the Bergama peasants. In that sense, these parties 
remained as supporters only rather than becoming an integral part of the movement network. 
This strategic choice of the Bergama activists was in congruence with their general strategy of 
remaining autonomous from political parties. At the same time, the Bergama activists tried to 
prevent any perceptions of their movement as ‘marginal’ in the public eye and avoid any 
stigmatization of belonging to a certain political camp (E/E 2; P/A 27, 28).  
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According to the peasant activists, even though some alliances were forged with 
political parties especially when they were in opposition, these alliances were not sustained 
when political parties came to power. Having encountered 13 coalition governments 
throughout their movement, the Bergama peasants perceived election periods as an 
opportunity to get their claims accepted.
21
 However, when they suffered 13 disappointments, 
they changed their perceptions of political parties at the national level as opportunities. This 
was mainly due to the political articulations dome by the political parties under the process of 
globalization. As De Leon et al. (2009) have argued, political parties do not simply rest 
themselves on pre-existing cleavages within society. Rather, they engage in the work of 
‘political articulation’ which is reminiscent of framing processes of social movements. 
Political parties redefine and reconstruct grievances. Through the ‘process of interpellation of 
subjects’, social groups are brought together as part of a coherent ideological-political practice 
based on reconstructed grievances (De Leon et al., 2009: 198). Accordingly, centre-right with 
populist stances and the Islamic political camp with a national-communitarian and 
developmentalist approach gradually adopted globalization in their articulations, integrating 
neo-liberalism based on open-market reforms and FDI with conservatism (De Leon at al., 
2009). On the other hand, political parties of the centre-left underwent a ‘localized’ crisis in 
addition to the global crisis of the left throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  Excepting a short-
lived attempt to bring forth leftist tendencies
22
, the Kemalist tenets haunted the CHP which 
constructed its ideological framework on the backbone of secularism throughout the 1990s at 
the expense of its leftist inclinations (Kahraman, 2000; De Leon, et al., 2009). With respect to 
economic globalization, the CHP upheld a critical stance towards FDI stemming from its 
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 Please see Appendix H. 
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 The Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP), a spin-off party from the pre-1980 CHP, had a more or less 
European type social democratic program, and it stood out as an exceptional case. SHP advocated pro-
democratic ideas with respect to the Kurdish issue. During the 1994 elections, SHP coalesced with the pro-
Kurdish party HEP and enabled Kurdish politicians to enter the parliament. 
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nationalist and statist aspects of its political articulation. Yet, towards the end of the 1990s, 
the globalizationist Third Way approach was attempted which soon failed due to 
contradictions with its Kemalist premises, leaving CHP in an ambivalent position.    
In sum, from the 1990s on, the political parties in Turkey all complied with neo-
liberalism, even if to varying degrees. Political parties both on left and right underlined the 
importance of FDI in their party programs. In that regard, both centre right and centre left 
acted as ‘regressive globalizers’, seeking economic benefit from capitalist globalization but 
overlooking the liberal version of human rights and the principle of rule of law. The 
environment was not a prioritized issue in their programs.
23
 In that respect, they kept finding 
loopholes in the legal system to facilitate the work of the activities of the, in effect becoming 
a part of the TCC As a result, there was a misfit between the frames of the Bergama activists 
and political articulations of parties which hindered the process of building sustained 
alliances. 
d. Repression 
The Turkish state has a long history of repression towards social movements. It raises 
costs, sometimes excessively high in the form of military coups, for social movement 
participants by using various coercive means. Nevertheless, the state has treated social 
movements selectively in terms of using repression since the beginning of the 1990s. Facing a 
plethora of mobilizations over diverse issues with the rise of new social the movements since 
the 1980s, the form of state response and the level of repression has depended on the content 
of grievances. As long as a movement is s not perceived as a ‘threat’ to itself and to the 
economic and political system, the Turkish state approaches it relatively mildly. For instance, 
while the Kurdish movement which has been defined as a ‘threat’ to national integrity met 
                                                 
23
 None of the political parties put an emphasis on environmental issues in their election manifestos during the 
1991 and 1995 elections (Adaman, 1997). 
 231 
 
with harsh and brutal repressive measures (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997) the use of repression 
does not escalate to the same levels in the case of environmental movements.  
Therefore, the Bergama movement had a comparative advantage in terms of repression 
by the state. Moreover, the repertoires of action which were exclusively based  on non-violent 
civil disobedience protests was an additional factor for being subjected to relatively less 
repression and brutality. Still, the Bergama activists could not escape police brutality, arrests, 
or custodies. Rather, the state utilized a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing styles against the 
Bergama movement activists which led to a neither stable nor uniform type of state behaviour.  
For instance, the required permits for the aforementioned Kuvvay-ı Milliye march were not 
acquired from state authorities, making it an ‘illegal’ protest. Yet, the gendarmerie allowed 
the protest march from Bergama to Çanakkale. During the protests, the Bergama activists 
were also extremely vigilant and meticulous about remaining at the fringes of the legal-illegal 
divide, and not provoking state forces. This was mainly due to the training provided by their 
local allies such as lawyers.  
“They told us that it was a legal action as long as we walked just next to the road lines. If we were to walk one 
step inside those lines, it was illegal” (P/A 26). 
 
. 
In fact, the innovative protest forms were effective in preventing higher levels of 
police force brutality. Since the police and gendarmerie were not accustomed to such civil 
disobedience protests before, they were caught by surprise as they witnessed Bergama 
activists acting in surprising ways.  
“The police force has established a new section to learn what civil disobedience is. The police who have been 
trained to suppress movements by using force were surprised. In one of the incidents, we formed a line up 
composed of 7-8 thousand people because the cyanide tanks were being brought. We started our protest.  It was 
really hot. The police and the soldiers waiting for us were sweating. The village women gave their tissues, water 
and food to them. They were surprised. That is because they are not trained for such behaviour. The villagers see 
them as their sons and the soldiers see the villagers as their mothers. The soldiers are themselves mostly from 
villages. So the police have changed tactics. They started provoking. That’s what they want. In order to prevent 
that you cannot find a single stranger in our protests” (E/E 2). 
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 Still, the state forces did not refrain from exercising pre-emptive measures in order to 
deter the Bergama peasants. For example, in October 1994, gendarmerie did not allow the 
press meeting of the Bergama activists in Çamköy to take place outdoors as it was originally 
scheduled, but indoors, in order to limit participation and prevent any post hoc demonstrations 
(Kuzey Ege, 15.10.1994). Also, just before the visit of the then-President of Turkey, 
Süleyman Demirel, to Bergama, the İzmir governor imposed a ‘protest ban’ on Bergama 
activists by stating that Taşkın would be held responsible for any sort of protest (Kuzey Ege, 
15.11.1994).  
As the number of protests mounted, the methods of the police and the gendarmerie 
became diversified. A police force squad with a police panzer was entrenched on the mine 
plant in order to provide protection (Kuzey Ege, 17.03.1997). There were regular identity 
checks by state forces on the peasants’ way to their fields (P/A 8, 15). A commando squad 
was settled in the mine with the claim of preventing any clashes (Kuzey Ege, 21.07.1997). 
The Bergama peasants interpreted the deployment of the commando squad and their training 
in and around the villages as acts of psychological intimidation. In fact, it was a crucial 
incident which made the Bergama peasants reconsider their views of the state. According to 
the peasant activists, their own state was using military forces against them to protect the 
mining TNC (E/E 2; P/A 11; Konyar in Reinart 2003: 85). 
Apart from interventions of the state forces into the daily lives of peasants, 
demonstrations were interrupted by the police forces and the gendarmerie regularly. When a 
group of women from the Bergama villages marched to Bergama in order to present the sub-
governor of Bergama with a petition regarding unpermitted dynamite use within the mine pit, 
the police did not let them reach the district building and kept protestors on the streets (Kuzey 
Ege, 17.03.1997). Similarly, fearing that they were at risk of getting sick with silicosiderosis 
because of the mine wastes, the Bergama peasants staged a protest in order to call on the sub-
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governor to take pre-cautions. However, the gendarmerie did not let them travel from villages 
to Bergama with their vehicles. Instead, they walked for 10 kilometres to Bergama, and a 
delegation of 15 peasants was allowed to meet with the sub-governor. 
Arrests and detentions in custody were also among the commonly used means of 
repression by state forces to which numerous peasant activists as well as spokespersons were 
subjected (E/E 2, 3; P/A 9, 11, 16, 25). Throughout the movement, Konyar, Taşkın, and the 
Bergama peasants were arrested and put on trial many times during their contention (E/E 2, 3; 
P/A 8, 9, 11, 15, 17). Furthermore, investigations were conducted and lawsuits were filed 
especially about spokespersons based on various charges. For instance, 81 activists including 
Taşkın, Engel, and Konyar were accused of forming an illegal organization, violating the 
171th element of the Turkish Criminal Code. According to the accusations of the Bergama 
Administrative District, the village committees and Çev-Der were receiving financial support 
from several violent Marxist guerrilla groups and furthermore, they were acting under the 
direct influence of the extremist left-wing groups (E/E 3). On the other hand, Taşkın was 
charged with putting public resources of the Bergama municipality to the use of the 
movement, for instance by providing fuel used in peasants’ travels to protest sites. The State 
Security Court ruled out the case by saying there was no solid evidence supporting the 
accusations (E/E 3; P/A 11). In August 1997, he was again brought to trial for his 
involvement in protest activities as an elected mayor (Kuzey Ege, 25.08.1997). Konyar 
underwent several trials and was sentenced for conducting illegal protests. (Kuzey Ege, 
05.10.2001). 58 activists were put on trial for their roles in the invasion of the mine in August 
1997 (Kuzey Ege, 18.08.1997). 
Against all of these repressive measures by the state, Konyar and the peasants 
developed unique practices and special codes among themselves to be used during their 
protest events. Through these codes and practices which worked as safety mechanisms, they 
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were able to communicate among themselves during protests without letting the police or 
gendarmerie know what they were about to do. For instance, various kinds of whistles 
numbered in different ways referred to different protest behaviour such as ‘march’, ‘sit-in’, 
‘disperse’, and ‘gather’. In this way, they were able to detect infiltrators in their protest (E/E 
2). Besides, women were usually lined in front of the marching masses during their 
demonstrations. 
“Women had an advantage. If men walk in the frontlines, police and gendarmerie are more inclined to use 
physical force. That’s why women stood at the front when we marched. Our intention was to avoid fights and 
commotion” (P/A 20). 
 
Also the gold mine area was occupied on 22 April, 1997, when all the police forces and 
gendarmerie were in the town of Bergama taking precautions for the national holiday parade. 
Seeing the absence of the state forces as an opportunity to stage their protest, peasants 
occupied the gold mine building tents on site and organizing a picnic inside (P/A 15). 
On the other hand, concerns about avoiding repression led to changes in organizational 
structures which had a negative impact on the participatory democracy ideal of the Bergama 
movement (E/E 3, 11). The initial participatory organizational model was discarded and the 
movement’s decision-making processes became non-participatory. This was mainly due to 
state forces’ increasing capacity to take precautions for their protests as protest decisions were 
leaked. Instead, one of the spokesperson of the Bergama movement started deciding on 
protests and declared their action plans just before the protests took place only by letting a 
few “trustworthy” villagers in beforehand (E/E 2). 
 
“In these types of grassroots movements, democracy does not work well. I tried it a lot. We made a decision and 
said “we will stage a protest today. We won’t send our kids to school”. On the same night, we suffer a raid by 
the gendarmerie. The sub-governor comes. The governor comes. They convince people....In any case they avert 
protests. However, when I come in at the last minute and knock on windows, or when I gather people and put 
them on a bus, no one knows anything. One day the peasants gave decision among themselves and said to me: 
‘We talk about it [protest plans] because of our enthusiasm. Word spreads when we make preparations. You 
won’t tell us anything. You will come, and knock on our door...There is no more democracy [within the 
movement]. People participated in protests. However, there was no more a public decision-making process” (E/E 
2). 
 
 235 
 
 Despite all these repressive measures used against them, the Bergama movement did 
not stop protesting. When they went on a witnessing trip to the abandoned copper mine in 
Balya- Balıkesir gendarmerie forces intervened by beating the activists during the sit-in 
organized when the activists  learned that they were not allowed to enter Balya. According to 
the accounts of the peasant activists and spokespersons, it was one of the most brutal 
moments in the movement (P/A 8, 9, 11, 16, 22).  
“When the peasants were beaten, they became even more determined....They showed an incredible response. 
They were over-excited. We came back to the village with Sefa Taşkın. There was a huge crowd, everyone was 
gathered waiting for us. I thought everyone was afraid and we would have problems for the next protest. But we 
were learning new things. Even if peasants do not respond to violence with violence, they got more ready for 
struggle, and they behave in a more organized way. After the Balya incident, we staged many protests. I think 
the Balya incident explains the determination of the peasants” (Konyar in Reinart, 2003: 107). 
 
 The participation of peasant activists in demonstrations remained high even in the 
aftermath of the Balya beating or similar incidents when excessive police brutality was used. 
In that sense, police brutality did not work as a constraint with a negative impact on the 
mobilization of the peasants. First, the level of overall repression directed at the Bergama 
movement was relatively lower in comparison to other movements which were seen as a 
threat to the state, secular order, and land integrity. Secondly, the Bergama activists’ 
insistence on non-violent protest forms led police forces to refrain from exerting more 
repression as well since using massive force against peaceful protestors would have 
undermined the legitimacy of the state. However, police brutality had a cumulative impact in 
the long run causing the exhaustion of peasants, in combination with other forms of repression 
such as legal investigations and stigmatization acts, which eventually led to decrease in the 
mobilization rates of the Bergama peasants.      
Political Opportunities at the Local Level 
As discussed above, political opportunities were not widely open for the Bergama 
peasants at the national level. In contrast, the local political context presented more 
opportunities for them. Throughout their movement, the Bergama peasants built alliances with 
 236 
 
various politicians and civil society actors at the local level. In fact, many of these actors 
became committed activists. They joined the Bergama peasants in their struggle and 
constituted the Bergama movement network sharing the values, frames, interests and 
collective identity of the movement as discussed in the previous chapters. Furthermore, they 
took an active role and contributed to the formation of various elements of the Bergama 
movement such as strategies, frames, and protests. More specifically, the support of CSOs, 
scientists, and lawyers arrived mainly in the form of providing scientific information and legal 
aid. Additionally, they were engaged in protest activities, launching petition campaigns and 
staging demonstrations. They also connected the Bergama peasants with other supporters. The 
efforts of the local elite were valuable contributions for the Bergama peasants since they 
achieved credibility as well as resources. Furthermore, several local elite engaged in the 
movement as leaders/spokespersons. Thus, the line between allies and participants were 
transcended between the Bergama peasants and local civil society actors and politicians. 
From the start, the local political opportunities have been largely open for the Bergama 
movement. Initially, the local branches of each national political party, either left of right, 
gave support to Taşkın in his opposition to Eurogold, leaving aside their ideological 
differences. In that sense, local politicians acted independently of national political parties. 
Yet the coalition of local politicians did not last long. Due to the Bergama activists’ strategy 
to keep political parties at bay and the disapproval of their party headquarters, the majority of 
the local politicians stepped back and withdrew their support. On the other hand, the Bergama 
peasants were fortunate to keep two of their most influential allies on their side throughout the 
movement.  
One of these allies was Sefa Taşkın who was a social democratic local politician from 
the CHP and the elected mayor of Bergama between the years 1989-1999 during when 
mobilization was at its peak. As discussed before, Taşkın himself had initiated the Bergama 
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movement and stayed active within the Bergama movement network as one of the most 
important nodes. Taşkın’s permanent support facilitated the Bergama peasants in many 
respects. First, Taşkın provided legitimacy for the Bergama movement in the eyes of the 
public and within conventional political circles as the mayor of Bergama representing the 
Bergama peasants. Second, Taşkın utilized his political connections with national level 
politicians, MPs, civil society actors and scientists in order to bring the issue to the national 
political agenda. According to the peasant-activists, he acted as a gatekeeper forging links 
with MPs and politicians at the national level (P/A 9, 11, 27). Taşkın tried to bring the issue 
onto the agenda of all the parties even though he was as a member of the social democratic 
CHP (E/E 3). Still, since he had close and intense ties with the MPs from his own party, his 
work of building alliances mostly concentrated on CHP for practical reasons. Concomitantly, 
he effectively used his official position as the mayor of Bergama to forge links with civil 
society actors in İzmir, İstanbul, and Ankara. 
“Because he [Taşkın] has a wider social and political circle we have been able to forge links with professors. We 
have gotten in touch with the lawyers for the first time with his help. He sent us to people. With his reference we 
found people who could help us. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have been able to” (P/A 9).  
 
Third, he was the leading actor who was making speeches and press statements 
representing the Bergama peasants in the public. In this way, he became the ‘public’ face of 
the Bergama peasants in the media whose views and ideas were covered extensively (P/A 5, 
6, 9, 15, 27). However, as indicated in chapter 2, elites within a movement are constrained by 
their official positions since their existence in a movement is legitimated through the 
institutions they represent, and they feel the urge to amplify their behaviour (Caniglia, 2001). 
In a similar vein, Taşkın refrained from taking place in the disruptive civil obedience protests 
due to his position as the elected mayor of Bergama since quasi-legal actions during the 
protests could undermine his legitimacy which could in turn undermine the Bergama 
movement. Instead, he tried to convey the image that he was a mayor supporting the cause of 
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the Bergama movement. Otherwise, his credibility could be reduced and his commitment to 
the movement could lead to accusations of using the Bergama peasants for his own career 
(E/E 3). Hence, in spite of his close involvement in the movement, Taşkın also tried to remain 
outside protest activities (E/E 9; P/A 9, 15, 28).  
Fourth, Taşkın also acted as the major fund raiser. As the elected mayor of Bergama, 
Taşkın had extensive connections with businesses working together with the Bergama 
municipality, and Taşkın used his influence to get their support and opened channels of 
raising funds for their protests (E/E 3; P/A 11, 15). Also, Taşkın put the Bergama 
municipality’s resources such as vehicles, computers, and faxes to the use of the Bergama 
peasants. In order to pre-empt any possible accusations that could rise because of his official 
role, he brought the issue of gold mine opposition to the agenda of the elected municipality 
council in October 1994. As a result of the vote, he obtained full authority for dealing with the 
mine, contesting it through legal means, and other opposition activities. In this way, Taşkın 
achieved a legal and legitimate basis for his involvement in the anti-mine movement (E/E 3). 
Oktay Konyar was another influential ally who became one of the spokespersons of 
grassroots sub-network of the Bergama movement. When he joined the movement, Konyar 
was the deputy chairman of CHP. As a left-wing politician, he had been concerned about the 
detrimental impacts of the capitalist globalization. He saw the Bergama peasants’ contention 
as a good opportunity to oppose globalization actively and to create a substantial anti-
capitalist globalization resistance (E/E 2). Konyar got involved actively during the later stages 
of the Bergama mobilization. He became the spokesperson after he was elected the chairman 
of Çev-Der, a SMO-like network founded specifically about the Bergama resistance in 1996. 
He was an adept ‘leader’ in terms of strengthening solidarity ties and maintaining 
commitment among villagers mainly through the speeches he addressed to the villagers. 
Perceived as a ‘militant’ who did not abstain from bold protests, Konyar directed and 
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coordinated the protests as well. He also formulated innovative ideas about staging protest 
and direct action throughout the movement. Furthermore, he practiced the important role of 
managing relations with state forces when villagers confront them during their protests (E/E 
2, 9, 13; P/A 5, 6, 11, 15).  
With respect to the civil society scene, the İzmir district had a vibrant civic life which 
had a facilitative effect on the Bergama movement.
24
 In terms of civil society intensity, İzmir 
ranked as the third city in overall Turkey in 1995 (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006). The vibrancy of 
civil society in İzmir was discerned by the Bergama activists as well (E/E 2). As explained in 
chapter 4, Taşkın referred to universities and civil society actors in his opposition to 
Eurogold. Several occupational chambers and university professors with environmentalist 
concerns were ready to aid Taşkın in collecting scientific data on gold mining with cyanide. 
Additionally, the İzmir Environmental Lawyers conjoined their forces with Taşkın which 
provided the means for extending the struggle to the legal field. The Elele Platform which was 
formed by CSOs, lawyers, unions, and professors acted as the scientific and legal flank of the 
Bergama movement network.
25
 The Elele Platform’s work mostly revolved around providing 
resources such as information, legitimacy, and legal expertise.  
Yet, there were limitations to building alliances with CSOs in İzmir. Even though the 
Bergama movement activists aspired to connect with transnational networks outside their 
national territory as part of their strategies, the majority of civil society actors in İzmir were 
not involved in these efforts. Structurally speaking, CSOs in İzmir were overwhelmingly 
locally-oriented, and their connections with their counterparts operating at the national and/or 
transnational levels were weak (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006). In fact, two committed lawyers, Senih 
Özay and Noyan Özkan, made laborious efforts to move the Bergama struggle to the 
transnational level by maintaining connections with Greenpeace, filing a lawsuit at the 
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 In fact, the historical formation of civil society initiatives and organizations dates back to the 18th century, and 
the vibrancy of civil society in İzmir continued throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006). 
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 Please see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis. 
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European Court of Human Rights, and referring to international conventions signed by 
Turkey during the court hearings (E/E 1, 16). However, structural constraints consisting of 
legal impediments and insufficient resources appeared as obstacles for CSOs to develop 
relations with actors abroad. Resource incapacities mainly consisted of lack of foreign 
languages and the absence of pre-established transnational links (E/E 15). In terms of legal 
impediments, the İzmir CSOs suffered from a general problem. According to the law, civil 
society actors had to get permission either from the Ministry of Internal Affairs or from the 
Turkish government in order to engage in transnational activities or build links with actors 
outside Turkey. Getting official permissions was a complicated and long enduring process 
which appeared as an exhausting hurdle. (Erdoğan-Tosun, 2006: 75). Put differently, all types 
of civil society relations beyond national borders had to go through the filter of the state 
bureaucracy which curbed the CSOs’ drive to link with transnational networks. Additionally, 
nationalist/anti-imperialist views which prevailed among civil society actors in general 
prevented them from making further contributions to forging transnational links which led to 
internal tensions within the Elele Platform (E/E 14, 15, 16, 18).
26
  
In addition to the İzmir civil society actors, support arrived from an environmental 
SMO located in the Edremit Bay region, the Southern Marmara Organization for Protection of 
Environment and Culture (GÜMÇED).  GÜMÇED acted as one of the main allies of the 
Bergama movement in terms of support, information, resources, and sharing of experiences 
(E/E 12, 13, P/A 9, 11, 26). GÜMÇED was part of a wider network of the Küçükdere-Havran 
movement which was a local mobilization against another gold mine in Küçükdere-Havran 
located in the Edremit Bay region, about 100 km. in the north of Bergama and which emerged 
around the same time with the Bergama movement. In Küçükdere, a company named 
TÜPRAG, owned by one of the major gold mining TNCs, Eldorado, planned to operate a 
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 Please see chapters 4 and 7 for resource incapacities such as lack of a sufficient number of activists with 
foreign language skills. Also, please see chapter 5 for the predomination of anti-imperialist frames. 
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mine in Küçükdere-Havran in the first half of the 1990s. Locals including 14 mayors of 
different cities in the region, local peasants and environmentalists both from İzmir and the 
Edremit region launched a campaign against TÜPRAG, and they succeeded in stopping the 
project in its initial stage before the gold mine plant was built. For the Bergama activists, 
having links with the Küçükdere-Havran network meant sharing already existing experiences, 
networks, and resources (E/E 5, 30, 31; P/A 9, 11, 26).   
One of the movement elite, Senih Özay occupied a crucial position with respect to 
links with civil society actors at the local level. Özay, who was also the main legal 
representative of the Bergama peasants, contributed to the movement as a ‘broker’ who 
forged links with different environmentalists. Özay was among the founders of the first Green 
Party in Turkey. He had already actively participated in local environmental mobilizations 
around İzmir, and he had been working as the lawyer of several environmental organizations 
including Greenpeace. All these connections with the local environmentalist circles made 
Özay a valuable node within the Bergama network in terms of maintaining relations outside 
the villages and Bergama at the local and transnational levels. First, the Bergama movement’s 
efforts to find supporters and allies in the nearby regions and cities were facilitated by Özay 
since he voiced the claims of the Bergama movement within the environmentalist circles in 
İzmir and nearby localities like Küçükdere-Havran and took the first step to integrate them 
into the Bergama network. Second, activists mobilized within the Küçükdere-Havran 
movement network got also involved in the Bergama mobilization through the brokerage of 
Senih Özay who had himself actively participated in the Küçükdere-Havran struggle. The 
SMOs and individuals from the Küçükdere network provided constant support to the Bergama 
movement.  
Also, Özkan’s brokerage role as a local ally is crucial for the transnational dimension 
of the movement since he introduced Birsel Lemke to the Bergama movement who carried 
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out the transnational activities of the movement based on her connections abroad. Lemke, an 
environmentalist activist, had been involved in the Küçükdere mobilization. As a fluent 
speaker of English and German residing in Germany half of the year, Lemke had well-
established relations with politicians, scientists, journalists, and NGOs in Germany. After 
joining in the Bergama network, she became a prominent actor organizing the transnational 
aspect of the movement in terms of forging links with transnational actors and maintaining 
transnational relations of the movement (E/E 1, 5). 
Local politicians, i.e. the local ‘elite’, were discursively defined as ‘spokespersons’ in 
the accounts of peasant activists which was approved by Konyar and Taşkın as well (E/E 2, 3; 
P/A 5, 11). However, they often acted as ‘leaders’ in practice since they took the roles of 
directing the peasants during protests, inventing  new protest forms, and shaping the general 
path and character of the resistance. One of the main reasons for the de facto leadership of the 
elite was to achieve mass mobilization in villages. As one of the peasant interviewees 
describe, villagers were not accustomed to mobilizing and staging protests on their own 
unless some elite led them do so (P/A 11). Furthermore, leadership positions incidentally 
emerged as a result of certain advantages the movement elite had based on their ‘privileged 
backgrounds’. In terms of the social composition of ‘spokespersons’, all of them were well-
educated in contrast to the peasants, and they were from prominent middle class families 
within the region. Konyar, on the other hand, followed another path in terms of presenting 
himself, and he constantly expressed his peasant origins by describing himself as a ‘peasant 
kid’. It was a deliberate strategic act for building rapport and trust with the peasants since 
among all the movement elite, he was the one who remained closest to the peasants as the 
designer and manager of protests.  
Evidently, advantages attached to the ‘privileged’ backgrounds of the movement elite 
confer an inevitable leadership in terms of framing grievances, formulating ideologies, 
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writing, debating, conducting relations with the media, and arranging relations between 
internal and external actors (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 175). In combination with their 
educational and class advantages, the fact that the movement elite had activism background 
and experience prior to the Bergama movement provided grounds for taking over leadership 
positions. Overwhelmingly, the movement elite all came from left-wing ideological stances 
ranging from social democracy to socialism. Personal biographies of the movement elite 
which are shaped by leftist politics and activism provided useful inputs for the Bergama 
movement. Based on their prior activism and active political backgrounds, they brought in 
valuable political connections as well as knowledge about protest making. In that sense, they 
created a spill-over effect by enabling the diffusion of many tactics, strategies, and framing 
belonging to the left movement into the Bergama movement. Diffusion done by the 
movement elite is an important step for mobilizing the peasants, given the fact that a majority 
of the peasants, save a handful who had previously participated in leftist movements, lacked 
any prior activism experience. 
Within this multiple leadership structure, each spokesperson concentrated their 
activities within specific fields based on their skills, capabilities, and connections. 
Accordingly, there was a de facto division of labour. Taşkın concentrated more on the 
political dimension of the movement since he was the formal political figure with well-
established links with local, national, and transnational political actors. On the other hand, 
Konyar mainly focused on the grassroots, organizing protests and the mobilization of 
peasants. This division of labour was in congruence with the expectations of peasants from 
their ‘spokespersons’ which was to complement each other’s actions: 
“We asked them to split the roles. We wanted Sefa Taşkın to be our minister of external affairs and Oktay 
Konyar to be our minister of domestic affairs. That is because Sefa Taşkın is an excellent speaker who manages 
to communicate with the media and the politicians or who knows how to speak effectively in a panel. On the 
other hand, Oktay Konyar is a brilliant activist who goes into every kind of protest with us. That is one thing 
Sefa Taşkın could not do” (P/A 9).  
 
“Sefa Taşkın is an official political figure with good relations with the media and politicians. In that sense, he 
had a responsibility. He knew how to approach to the media and government in a subtle way, and he contributed 
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to our movement a great deal. However, Oktay [Konyar] is a fighter. He was on the roads with us, beaten and 
arrested with us. That was something Sefa [Taşkın] could not do” (P/A 5). 
 
However, it would be misleading to say that they were exclusively engaged in those 
fields. In fact, as the initiator of the movement, Taşkın was involved in every aspect of the 
movement from the beginning, and he did not totally isolate himself from other sub-networks 
since he continuously collaborated with the groups carrying out scientific and legal activities. 
In a similar vein, he was a crucial decision-maker about the protest events and lobbying 
activities abroad, as he was actively involved in many transnational events regarding the 
Bergama movement.  
The collaboration of Konyar and Taşkın eventually fell apart during the later stages. 
The two ‘spokespersons’ had diverging views about strategies, organizational structures, and 
ideological preferences which affected the frames of the movement. With respect to 
strategies, tensions among the elite over whether to concentrate their activities on extra-
institutional or institutional channels are likely to emerge within social movements. Gamson 
and Meyer argue that it is related to different ways of framing the political opportunities and 
deciding which strategy will open opportunities further, and the evidence from Bergama 
supports this view (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 284). Such discrepancies emerged as Konyar’s 
influence increased within the movement. Taşkın preferred using more conventional means 
such as conferences, panels, and press conferences as well as less risky demonstrations. On 
the other hand, Konyar employed extra-parliamentary methods and introduced civil 
disobedience acts into the movement mostly confronting state forces. In contrast to the rising 
‘militancy’ of protest activities, democratic and participatory organizational structure of the 
movement deteriorated (E/E 2, 3, 11; P/A 9, 11, 18). Also, anti-imperialist and nationalist 
themes started to gain ascendancy within the frames of the movement with respect to 
globalization (E/E 11, 40). Additionally, according to the peasant activists, emerging power 
struggles among the elite contributed to the crumbling of the cohesion of the movement elite 
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(P/A 1, 5, 9, 11, 27). In other words, tensions among the movement elite pointed at the closing 
of the local opportunities.   
As one of the peasant interviewees retrospectively claimed, conflicts among the 
movement ‘leaders’ was seen as one of the major factors which led to the decline of the 
movement. During the decline stage of the movement, peasants self-critically claimed that 
they could not create ‘spokespersons’ among themselves. The fact that ‘leaders’ were 
overwhelmingly from outside was considered as one of the factors which led to the 
dissolution of the movement since internal struggles between different spokespersons had 
detrimental impacts on the movement (P/A 11).
27
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Morris and Staggenborg argue: “Although members of the challenging groups usually provide the majority of 
leaders for their movements, it is not unusual for members of privileged outside groups to function in leadership 
positions within movements of oppressed groups” (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 177). 
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Chapter 7: Transnational Contention of the Bergama Movement 
In addition to their struggle against the mining TNC(s) at the local and national levels, 
the Bergama activists carried their contention outside their national boundaries both by using 
transnational political spaces and by allying with various transnational actors and 
organizations. Reasons for such a transnational move were threefold: First, in their fight 
against TNC(s), the Bergama activists perceived having influential allies and getting the 
support of public beyond their national borders as a necessary and crucial strategy in order to 
put pressure on mining TNC(s) from outside Turkey. 
“If you are going to contend at the world level, you have to learn who these companies are. If they are from 
Germany, France or Australia, you have to fight with them in those places as well. There is no line defence, but 
territorial defence [A famous quote expressed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the War of Liberation]” (E/E 3). 
 
Second, non-responsive and exclusionary attitude of the Turkish state, mostly in the 
forms of unwillingness to implement the national court decisions and the use of repressive 
practices made moving their grievance outside their borders more vital. In doing that, the 
Bergama activists aimed to corner and pressure the Turkish state to act in the lines of rule of 
law and democracy.  
“These international organizations help us because we ask them, [they do not act] not on their own accord. Why 
was this needed? ......, [T]here was a favourable court decision for Bergama, and these court decisions were not 
implemented.” (Taşkın, in Ceviz Kabuğu,2001) 
 
Third, the information exchange maintained through transnational links supported the 
Bergama activists by giving access to valuable information about the gold mining sector and 
mining TNC(s) which consequently strengthened their movement. Moreover, ideas as well as 
strategies and tactics diffused between movements and actors mobilized over the same cause. 
In this way, they were able to be a part of the globalizing resistance against capitalist 
globalization. As one of the spokespersons of the Bergama peasants underlined, transnational 
connections were significant for their movement in terms of getting information support, 
exchanging tactics, and most importantly, challenging globalization.  
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“Bergama villagers marched and protested in Paris and Berlin even before these talks about MAI have started. 
We had connections with people from India and Brazil. I am going to meet with Zapatistas as well [which did 
not happen]. We organized a press conference with Jose Bove. We learn something from his knowledge. He said 
he is learning from our tactics. We are gradually building networks with them” (E/E 2). 
 
Hence, transnational activities and links of the Bergama movement network 
constituted a crucial place within the course of the Bergama movement. In fact, one of the 
main arguments of this thesis, as spelled out before, is that transnational, national, and local 
political levels have become enmeshed under capitalist globalization. Transnational activities 
bear impact on the practices and developments at the local and national levels while local 
movements link and interact with transnational networks. In this chapter, I will analyze the 
use of transnational networks by the Bergama movement with respect to first, initial attempts 
of forging transnational links; second, cross –border relations with external political parties 
and politicians; third, the activities in supranational and transnational political and legal 
spaces; fourth, the alliances with INGOs and social movements; and finally, the responses of 
the Turkish state to transnational relations of the Bergama movement. The chapter ends with 
the evaluation of the Bergama movement in the general context of transnational activism.   
Initial Attempts of Forging Transnational Links: 
First contacts of the Bergama movement with transnational actors were made in 1992 
when the Greenpeace activist ship, Sirius, visited Izmir. Taşkın met with Greenpeace 
members in order to introduce their cause to one of the most well-known environmental 
INGOs across the world hoping to get information about gold mining in general. Even before 
this first attempt of building alliances with a transnational actor, the name of Bergama was 
expressed in the transnational space between Turkey and Germany. The name of Bergama 
was first heard in Europe before the Bergama movement took off.  In 1989, the Bergama 
mayor Sefa Taşkın launched a campaign to bring back the remains of the Zeus Altar from the 
Berlin Museum where it was located since the mid-19
th
 century to its original location, 
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Bergama. During the campaign “Zeus Altar belongs to Bergama, we want it back”, two 
protests were staged at the Pergamon Museum in Berlin (Milliyet, 08.07.1990; Cumhuriyet, 
03.08.1995; Milliyet, 09.08.1995).
1
 As a result of the wide coverage on the Zeus Altar 
campaign by the German media, the German public became familiar with the name of 
Bergama. Consequently, when the Bergama movement reached out to Germany, Bergama 
was already known by the German media, public and politicians making it easier to grab 
attention for their local contention (E/E 3, 6; Milliyet, 08.07.1990b).
 2
 Taşkın and members of 
the Bergama municipal council made a strategic move, staging a protest against Dresdner 
Bank on August 7
th, 1995, which was providing financial support for the Ovacık gold mine 
project when they were already in Germany for the second protest for the Pergamon Altar. 
During the protest in front of the Dresdner Bank building in Berlin, they hung a banner saying 
“Do not poison the ancient city of the Aegean with cyanide” in order to link their contention 
over cyanide gold mining with the Pergamon Altar and the ancient history of Bergama 
(Cumhuriyet, 08.08.1995).  
“But the interesting point was that the Bergama movement was called Bergama, and it was made public... 
Nobody in the world was interested in the Küçükdere movement. You can’t sell it. The marketing would never 
be successful. Because you can sell the word Bergama-Pergamon much better than Küçükdere in the 
international world. Otherwise, no one will listen. ‘Where are you from?’ ‘From Küçükdere. It [gold mine] will 
damage Küçükdere.’ ‘Really, uh I am sorry’. But if you say, it will damage Pergamon even though the mine is 
30 km away from Pergamon. But you have to give a name to things” (E/E 22). 
 
While Taşkın’s initial attempts of shifting the scale of their opposition continued, 
another mobilization was taking place in Küçükdere-Havran against Tüprag, which was 
formed by the German originated mining corporation Preussag AG. Activists of the 
Küçükdere-Havran mobilization consisting of mayors and villagers of the Edremit Bay as 
well as environmentalists and local CSOs directly launched a transnational campaign with the 
aim of stopping operation of the German originated mining corporation, Preussag, and its 
                                                 
1
 Taşkın, members of the Bergama municipal council, and their families organized a protest in front of the 
Pergamon Musum in Berlin in July 1990 (08.07.1990a). Another similar protest took place just in front of the 
Pergamon Altar with the participation of Taşkın and 200 protestors in 1995 (Milliyet, 09.08.1995). 
2
 The campaign over the Zeus Altar continued until the mid 1990s and ended without achieving success.  
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financial supporters such as Dresdner Bank. In that sense, they prioritized the transnational 
aspect of their contention over its local and national aspects.
3
 They forged links with credible 
scientists from Germany and asked them to prepare a report about the hazards of the gold 
mine project in order to undermine the claims of the mining company. On top of that, they 
staged innovative protest actions such as signing applications for asylum seeking to Germany 
in the name of 300 thousand residents in the region which was staged with the presence of the 
German ARD channel on March 23
rd
, 1995 (Cumhuriyet, 24.03.1995) and the presentation of 
the refusal of insurance companies when they wanted to insure themselves and their 
possessions against a possible cyanide related accident (Cumhuriyet, 15.04.1993). When 
Bergama movement started to take shape, one attorney-activist from the Izmir 
Environmentalist Lawyers, brought the issue of the Ovacik gold mine to the attention of the 
Küçükdere-Havran activists (Özay, 1995). Recognizing the similarities in their causes, those 
two mobilizations were considered as ‘twin movements’, and the Bergama movement was 
added into the already existing transnational efforts for the Küçükdere-Havran movement. 
Therefore, those two cases of cyanide-based gold-mining were presented to the allies - 
scientists, INGOs, political parties- outside Turkey as one, and the political spheres like the 
European Parliament were utilized for both movements. In the aftermath of the victory in 
Küçükdere-Havran, Birsel Lemke and Senih Özay who had already become a part of the 
Bergama movement network continued to unite their energy with Sefa Taşkın, and they all 
maintained transnational links for the opposition to the Ovacik gold mine. 
 Throughout the movement, transnational links were forged and sustained by several 
key actors within the network living both abroad and in Turkey. In fact, all these relations 
continued to build in a snow-balling fashion mostly through informal interpersonal relations. 
                                                 
3
 It must be noted that the support of one of the Turkish MPs had a tremendous impact on the decision of 
cancelling the gold mine project in Küçükdere-Havran as discussed in the previous chapter. Even though 
building alliances with a politician at the national level was determinant for the course of the mobilization, the 
protest actions of Küçükdere-Havran activists were mostly concentrated on Europe.  
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An SMO named Pergamon & Adramitteion (P&A) was founded for instrumental reasons such 
as having a fixed address and phone numbers with an official name which would make 
contacts easier and maintain transnational relations on a regular basis. Yet, the P&A 
consisting of only a few individuals never turned into a formal SMO with an organizational 
bureaucracy and hierarchy. P&A was never brought forth by the activists as a central SMO 
with formalized relations and a decisive role in making decisions about strategies (E/E 22). 
Rather, transnational links and relations were forged based on individual activists and their 
personal networking. Among those few activists with brokerage roles, Birsel Lemke stood 
out. She was a Turkish trilingual, university-educated environmentalist residing in Germany 
who was involved in the formation of the first Green Party in Turkey and the mobilization of 
the Küçükdere-Havran mobilization (Lemke, 2002b; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003: 47). She 
worked in collaboration with other actors from Bergama sub-networks such as lawyers and 
spokespersons, and she successfully carried the Bergama movement beyondthe borders of 
Turkey, especially concentrating her activities in Germany and Europe. In that regard, she 
used all her personal contacts and built an informal network between Bergama and 
Germany/Europe by forging links with scientists, European Parliament members, politicians, 
INGOs like FIAN and other activists outside Turkey. On the other hand, individual activists 
from other places such as Australia also joined in the network, extending the transnational 
space of the Bergama movement. As a result, the Bergama movement was integrated into the 
global anti-mining network composed of various INGOs and social movements.   
One of the first steps taken in terms of transnational practices was finding scientists 
and academics from abroad as allies. As discussed in Chapter 4, scientific research constituted 
one of the foundational pillars of the Bergama movement which fostered mobilization in 
several ways. On the other hand, the pro-mine camp, specifically the representatives of the 
TNC(s), argued that gold mining was a novel issue for the Turkish scientists and academics, 
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and that they lacked expertise over the topic. In order to ward off these criticisms, the 
Küçükdere activists contacted Prof. Friedhelm Korte who was described as the ‘founder’ of 
ecological chemistry (Özay, 1995: 27; Lemke, 2002a: 9). Korte visited the region in 1993, 
and 13 district mayors from the region asked him to write a report. Korte prepared an 
ecological chemical manuscript which was used both for the Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran 
movements. This report constituted the backbone of the scientific struggle against gold 
mining with cyanide which was frequently cited by other scientists as well as activists which 
the TNCs and pro-mine scientists could not disprove despite all their efforts to the contrary 
(E/E 3, 5, 22) Prof. Korte released another report in which he revealed his observations on the 
Ovacık gold mine only. Throughout his studies, he indicated that cyanide-based gold mining 
could not be considered a regular mining activity, but rather it should be treated as a chemical 
process which required rules and standards of chemical industry to be applied which was 
employed by the Bergama activists in their frames (Korte, 1999; Korte, Spiteller and 
Coulston, 2000; Lemke, 2000; E/E 3, 5, 16).
4
 In 1994, Prof. Korte was invited to Bergama by 
Taşkın, and he visited the region to investigate the newly introduced INCO-SO2 
detoxification system by Eurogold. Korte’s conclusion, stated in a letter to Taşkın, was that 
even though it would detoxify cyanide, with the detoxification process, other types of 
pollutants would be released. In that sense, as he repeatedly emphasized later on, despite some 
improvements achieved, INCO-SO2 was an insufficient system (Korte and Coulston, 1998; 
Lemke, 2002a; Lemke, 2002b). As Taşkın indicated in an interview, based on Korte’s 
findings, the Bergama activists declared that they were unsatisfied with the precautions taken 
by Eurogold, and they continued with their contention (Sabah 15.06.1997).  
Korte’s work continued in collaboration with other scientists both from Germany and 
Turkey. They organized symposiums and conferences over the subject of cyanide leach 
                                                 
4
 When the Bergama activists applied to the European Court of Human Rights, the contended TNC(s) were 
referred to as ‘chemistry companies’.  
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method. Apart from introducing the case of Ovacık gold mine into the academic literature, 
two declarations which were crucial for the advance of the Bergama movement were 
announced throughout the scientists’ work. On June 26th and 27th, 1997, a symposium on the 
subject of “the proven consequences of the planned gold extraction (using cyanide) in 
Turkey” was organized with the participation of 50 German and Turkish scientists at İstanbul 
Technical University in Turkey.  At the end of the final discussion of the symposium, Prof. 
Talınlı, Prof. Duman, Prof. Klein, Prof., Henden, Prof. Korte and Prof Mueller (the chairman) 
announced the ‘Pergamon Declaration’ which stated "[b]ased on current evidence, including 
the technologies involved and a knowledge of the natural and cultural environment, the 
planned extraction of gold in the Bergama region is not acceptable" (Pergamon Declaration, 
1997). 
In 1999, a follow-up conference was organized in Ören, Balıkesir, with the 
participation of Prof. Korte, other German professors, INGO members, and several leading 
actors from the Bergama movement. In the enunciated Conventus ’99 declaration, it was said 
that despite risk assessment reports produced on behalf of Eurogold such as the report by 
Golder Association, and the alleged precautions taken at the mine, conditions in the Ovacık 
gold mine did not change since the time of Pergamon Declaration. Additionally, it was 
claimed that Eurogold was hoping for Turkey’s entrance into the MAI process and the 
acceptance of arbitration laws for its business interests. Also, the Turkish state was called on 
to put the court decisions into force, and it was declared that gold mining would not lead to 
regional development (Conventus ’99 Declaration, 1999; Cumhuriyet, 27.07.1999).  
All the work done by Korte and others over the subject of cyanide-based gold mining 
in Bergama, Küçükdere-Havran and other locations provided valuable scientific information 
for the Bergama activists on which to rest their arguments during their legal and political 
struggles.
 
Besides, through having an internationally well-known scientist on their side as 
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their supporter, the Bergama activists gained credibility and legitimacy in the public eye and 
their opponents. Moreover, having a well-respected supporter encouraged peasants and 
strengthened their beliefs in their cause.
5
 Prof. Korte was also important in terms of 
confronting the sections of the German mining industry involved in the Ovacık gold mine 
project and bringing the case to the agenda of the European political institutions (Lemke, 
2002a).
 6
 
“My environmental advisor was Prof. Korte. Who is Korte?.....He is the advisor of the German President. 
Founder of the eco-chemistry [sub-discipline]. There is no other person as good as he is on this issue  in 
Germany....He is a powerful figure who can stand up to German lobbies like CEFIC and CERN. He did it. He is 
a very respected man. Then Preussag withdrew [referring to Prof. Korte’s contribution to the success of the 
Küçükdere-Havran movement]” (E/E 3).  
 
Political Spaces and Actors Beyond National Borders: 
a. Transnational politics 
During their struggle against the mining TNCs and their state, the Bergama activists 
utilized supranational political institutions and built alliances with political actors and parties 
in Europe. They forged links with the German Green Party and the Green members of the 
European Parliament (EP) perceiving availability of links these political actors and political 
spheres as opportunities to exploit. Through their alliances with these political parties and 
politicians, they approached the European Parliament and sub-national level parliaments in 
Germany (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2005). 
Allied foreign politicians and political parties facilitated the movement in several 
ways.  First, supporting government members and MPs were frequently in face-to-face 
                                                 
5
 Also, Prof. Korte solidly gave support to peasant activists in their protests. Together with Petra Sauerland of 
Food Information and Action Network (FIAN), they sent a support letter to the peasants during their “Kuvvay-ı 
Milliye” march letting them know that they backed their protests (Radikal, 17.11.1997).  
6
 As a response to continuation of Preussag AG’s operations in Turkey, Korte approached the President of the 
EU Commission on August 18th, 1999 in order to give information about the situation in Bergama (Korte, 
Spiteller, and Couston, 2000). 
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contact with the Turkish state authorities at official meetings. Such allies drew the attention of 
Turkish power holders when they brought up the aggrieved issue of Bergama during these 
meetings. In this way, the activists believed that they could bypass obstacles to accessing 
Turkish state authorities and bring their grievance onto the national political agenda. 
“If it is an international gold mining platform [we are facing], I you have to find an international platform within 
it...When they go to Brussels, [let’s say] a Turkish minister or the president goes to Brussels, somebody from the 
Greens asks “What about your gold mining?” You never have the chance to ask it but somebody, a friend of 
yours in the parliament asks it... All of a sudden the prime minister asks his assistant “What did he mean?” 
[Assistant says] “Yeah, we have this problem with gold mining”. [Prime minister asks] “Is it so big?” [Assistant 
responds] “Yeah, of course, it is big. Everybody heard about it.” [Prime minister says] “Uhh-uh, never heard of 
it!” (E/E 22). 
 
Similarly, foreign parliament members, political party members, and state authorities 
could approach Turkish authorities by using their official positions through other means- 
sending letters and contacting Turkish authorities directly. In their letters, transnational 
political allies demanded the Turkish authorities to comply with court decisions favouring the 
peasants. For instance, Halo Saibold, then Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Tourism in Germany/member of the Alliance 90/Green Party, sent a message to the Izmir 
governor when 37 Bergama activists were under custody in the aftermath of the occupation of 
the mine pit, and she asked the mayor for easy treatment of the activists under custody 
(Cumhuriyet, 24.04.1997). Saibold, this time together with Cem Özdemir, who was a Green 
member of the EP, sent a support letter to Taşkın to congratulate the court decision against the 
gold mine in May 1997 (Sabah, 18.05.1997). In another occasion, supportive MPs in 
Germany mobilized tour operators and other tourism companies in Germany to protest 
Eurogold’s activities in Bergama. As part of that initiative, important sectors of the German 
tourism industry such as TUI, the Association of German Travel Bureaus, the Union of 
Reisebusunternehmer (travel and coach operators), and Studiosus stated that they would 
cancel tours to Turkey if the gold mine started operating. Besides, the MPs themselves also 
joined the campaign individually and sent several letters to Turkish Ministries, stating that 
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Turkish tourism sector would be badly affected if the mine continued to operate (Hürriyet 
Daily News, 08.06.1997; Lemke, 2002a).
7
  
Also, supportive politicians from abroad made visits to the region. During their visits, 
these influential allies displayed their support for the Bergama activists to the general public 
and state authorities. These support visits were important for the peasants since they saw that 
they were backed up by influential people with credible names: “We happened to realize we 
were not alone in this huge sea” (P/A 9). At the same time, they contacted Turkish authorities 
asking them to comply with the rule-of-law and close the mine. Several Green and Social 
Democratic MPs, mostly from Germany, participated in the environmental tour to Bergama, 
Ida Mountain, and Ephesus on May 30th- June 9th, 1997.  The aim of the trip was to raise 
public consciousness in Germany about the controversial issue of Ovacık gold mine and to 
show their support to the Bergama activists (Hürriyet, 15.04.1997; Lemke, 2002a). 
Furthermore, Özdemir and Saibold personally met with the İzmir governor and requested the 
implementation of the court ruling and the closure of the Ovacık mine. They also underlined 
the importance of the local populations’ preferences and their inclusion in decision-making 
processes (Yeni Asır, 29.05.1997). Also, a delegate of German officials led by the Nürnberg 
governor met with Taşkın and gave their support to the movement in Bergama (Gazete Ege, 
08.10.1997).  
Secondly, foreign politicians aimed to compel the TNCs and their affiliates to stop 
their operations in Bergama through lobbying and pressuring. Wolfgang von Nostitz, a 
prominent attorney specialized in environmental issues and a former member of the EP, was 
introduced with the Ovacık gold mine through the personal contacts of Lemke. After visiting 
the region, he took action against the involvement of Germany-based corporations and banks 
                                                 
7
 A similar act was staged by Karl Born, the chair of TUI, one of the major tour operators in Germany, who sent 
letters to the Tourism Ministry and the governor of İzmir, indicating that touristic trips to Bergama and its nearby 
locations would be cancelled if the gold mining with toxic cyanide took place in the region (Der Spiegel, 
1997/04/14; Hürriyet, 1997/04/18). 
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in the gold mine project. He sent letters to Degussa which was claimed to provide cyanide to 
the Ovacik gold mine and to Dresdner Bank which was one of the financial supporters of the 
gold mining TNCs in Bergama.
8
 In the letters, he asked them to withdraw from the project 
based on the observations that the gold mine project did not meet the standards for protecting 
human life and environment. The ex-European Parliament member specifically demanded 
from Dresdner Bank to end its involvement in the project by referring to the agreement 
between the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and Dresdner Bank which stated 
that the bank could make investments abroad as long as standards in Germany were applied in 
the investment area (Lemke, 2002b: 2). Additionally, Karin Hagemann, the Head of the 
Economic Commission at the Parliament of Hessen State in Germany, contacted Dresdner 
Bank about its involvement in the Ovacık gold mine project (Lemke, 2002a: 14).  
As a consequence, Dresdner Bank withdrew from the project. Intensifying conflicts in 
the region played a part in their decision of withdrawal according to the vice president of the 
Dresdner Bank Project Finance Department (Milliyet-The Wall Street Journal, 05.05.1997). 
Additionally, burgeoning pressure in Germany was another factor for the withdrawal decision 
of Dresdner Bank as Reimer Hammann, the Green Party spokesperson from the Hassen State, 
stated during his support visit to the Bergama villages with Petra Sauerland of FIAN in June 
1997 (Cumhuriyet, 04.06.1997; Yeni Asır, 04.06.1997). The pressures exerted on Dresdner 
Bank were not turned into a campaign. However, in combination with political pressures by 
the Green politicians in Germany at the European Parliament, the media coverage over the 
Bergama issue made an impact (E/E 24, 27, 30). In fact, Lemke informed several journalists 
about the issues of Bergama and gold mining with cyanide. There was a news coverage of 
Dresdner Banks’ involvement in a controversial mine project in Turkey on one of the most 
well known German news agencies just before the decision of the bank. In that sense, the 
                                                 
8
 Among other financial supporters, there were Chase Manhattan Bank, Barclay’s Bank, Royal bank of Scotland, 
Manhattan Bank, and Barclay’s Bank. 
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timing of the decision strengthened the perception that the bank feared publicity of its 
involvement (E/E 30).  
The EP was another channel used by the Bergama activists in their transnational 
activities. Based on the candidacy status of Turkey, the EU and its institutions were regarded 
as opportunities to be exploited believing that the EU interference would put Turkish 
governments in a difficult position. In fact, the EP is not the most effective body of the EU in 
terms of being decisive on member or candidate states. Personal links were available with 
MPs at the EP, and through using these informal links, the Bergama activists established 
alliances with MPs especially from the Green Party (E/E 24, 27). On the other hand, having 
access to the EP was not a guarantee for passing resolutions. Since it is a big organization 
composed of many members with various political views, it is difficult to get the support of 
the majority of the members. However, the fact that Bergama movement was a grassroots 
movement made it easier: 
“At official institutions like the European Parliament, it is not an easy thing to find a majority for a social 
movement. In other words, we cannot pass every resolution. If there is an issue backed up by a grassroots 
movement, and if that issue is already widely known, it is much easier to pass resolutions. And the media is the 
most important means for that” (E/E 27).  
The first EP resolution regarding the use of cyanide leach method came on November 
17
th
, 1994. In the resolution, the Turkish state was called on to annul gold mining projects in 
Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran due to environmental risks. It was also stated that Turkey 
was obliged to protect the Mediterranean and its historic sites. Furthermore, Dresdner Bank’s 
involvement in the projects was also enunciated in the resolution (European Parliament, 
1994).  Even though the EP was seen as relatively ineffective, the impact of their resolution 
could be discerned in the activities of mining TNCs. 
“European Parliament is not a very influential institution, yet interestingly enough, it created an impact on 
companies in chemical and mining industries. The fact that their lobbies came to the parliament and engaged in 
informative work shows that parliament resolutions are not so ineffective” (E/E 27). 
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Furthermore, the fact that the EP put the Bergama issue on its agenda affected the 
European Commission as well (E/E 27). Accordingly, Bergama-Ovacık gold mine and the 
villagers became an issue in various EU progress reports on Turkey.  
Green members of the EP continued their support through other means as well. With 
the invitation of Claudia Roth, the then president of the European Parliament Greens Group, 
Sefa Taşkın made a speech at the EP addressing its members and asking them to pressure the 
European based companies such as Metallgesellschaft and Degussa to stop their activities in 
Turkey since their activities have caused major environmental disasters in different parts of 
the world (Sabah, 13.02.1997). Additionally, the EP members visited the region and gave 
their support by stating the mine in Bergama should be closed down and suggested to bring 
the issue to the UN Human Rights Commission (Sabah, 13.02.1997; E/E 3). 
Transnational political allies also facilitated the Bergama movement in ways other 
than lobbying and pressuring TNCs and the Turkish government. Birsel Lemke received a 
highly prestigious award, Right Livelihood Award, a.k.a. the Alternative Nobel Prize, in 2000 
for her role in the environmental struggle against the hazards of cyanide-based gold-mining. 
Indeed, these sorts of alternative awards are significant for social movements. As Bob (2005) 
indicates, prize committees have become part of the social movement networks operating at 
the transnational level. Seeing the Right Livelihood Award as an opportunity for voicing their 
contention to wider circles across Europe, the transnational political allies of the Bergama 
movement deliberately worked for Lemke to get this award. 
“We worked together with X [former member of EP] for Birsel to receive the Alternative Nobel Prize for the 
movement to be heard across Europe...Mrs. Birsel has been a muscular contender. This movement has become a 
symbol with her personality with this award. I believe it has been the first time such a thing has happened in 
Turkey” (E/E 27).
9
    
                                                 
9
 Even though the Bergama movement’s name reached a wider audience, and received immense attention, the 
award created problems among the leading activists of the Bergama movement stemming from disagreements 
about how to use the award money (Özay, 2003). 
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Efforts to find support from Europe continued even after the Bergama movement 
entered a decline period. In October 2004, the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European 
Parliament (Greens/EFA) organized a meeting on the issues of environment and agriculture in 
Turkey and the EU in İstanbul. Senih Özay and the representatives of the Bergama peasants 
who attended the meeting made a call to the members of the Greens/EFA to ask for support in 
their cause (BBC, 10.04.2004)  
b. Supranational Legal Institutions 
Despite all the court decisions in favour of the Bergama movement, the legal aspect of 
the mobilization entered a deadlock after the decision of the Turkish Council of the State in 
1997. Without exception, all the Turkish governments in power breached the principle of rule 
of law by ignoring court decisions and/or finding legal loopholes in order to continue the 
operation of the Ovacik gold mine. Having exploited all the national legal channels, attorneys 
of the Bergama activists decided to make another move, and carry their case beyond their 
national borders (E/E 1, 16). Subsequently, they brought their case to a supranational juridical 
institution, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In 1998, 10 Bergama activists, 
including the then mayor Sefa Taşkın, appealed to the ECHR claiming that the Turkish 
government did not implement the court decisions, thereby breaching the principle of rule of 
law by violating the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights 
(CPHRFR). Yet, because of the delays in the Turkish government’s defence which were 
viewed by the lawyers and peasants as a purposeful act to block the process, the court 
decision was belated (E/E 1, 16; P/A 11). On 10 November, 2004, the ECHR gave its decision 
in favour of the Bergama activists concluding that the CPHRFR’s article 6 (right to fair trial) 
and 8 (right to respect for private and family life) were being violated by the Turkish state. 
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Accordingly, the Turkish state was found guilty and sentenced to pay a compensation of 30 
thousand Euros to the applicants (ECHR decision, 2004).
10
 In 2006, the ECHR punished the 
Turkish state a second time, this time to pay 3,000 Euros to each of the 315 applicants based 
on the same violations (www.arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/366903.asp).
11
  
For the Bergama peasants, the importance of the ECHR decisions was not receiving 
compensation. They viewed ECHR as terrain where their cause would be proved once more. 
In fact, they believed that favourable ECHR decisions could make an impact on the policy of 
the state (P/A 9, 25). However, the Turkish government did not comply with the judgment of 
the ECHR and did not implement the necessary measures within the time limit set by the 
court which was three months. Ignoring the decisions of the ECHR and all the domestic 
courts, the Turkish Government issued a new permit to the mining company on 25 May 2005. 
One of the peasant activists summarized their opinion about this matter as: 
“It is important. However, what can the European Court of Human Rights do? Will they imprison the state?” 
(P/A 5). 
 
 INGOs as Allies: 
a. Greenpeace 
The activities of Greenpeace in Turkey dates back to 1992 when the Greenpeace 
activist ship, Sirius, arrived in Turkey for the first time. The purpose of the visit was to get in 
touch with the local population of İzmir in order to raise consciousness on environmental 
                                                 
10
 In the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights which was ratified by Turkey 
in 1954,  Article 6 is about the “right to afair trial”, and  Article 8 concerns “right to respect for private and 
family life (http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG ).   
11
 ECHR’s decision in 2006, i.e. “Öçkan and others v. Turkey, 46771/99 [2006] (28-03-2006)” is summarized 
as: “The case concerns the granting of permits to operate a goldmine. The applicants, and other inhabitants of 
Bergama, asked for the permit to be set aside, citing the dangers of the cyanidation process used by the operating 
company, the health risks and the risks of pollution of the underlying aquifers and destruction of the local 
ecosystem. The Court concluded a violation of Articles 6-1 (right to a fair trial) and 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life); it was not necessary to examine separately the complaints under Articles 2 (right to life) and 13 
(right to an effective remedy).” (http://www.righttoenvironment.org/default.asp?pid=91, last access on 
24.09.2011).  
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matters. In the following years, Greenpeace launched several campaigns in Turkey in the 
fields of hazardous ship breaking industry and sea pollution 
(http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/about/faq/ ). In 1997, Istanbul office of Greenpeace 
Mediterranean was opened making the presence of Greenpeace in Turkey permanent.
12
 
Greenpeace Mediterranean grew at a incredibly fast pace, reaching from two activists to 100 
volunteers and 6500 supporters in Turkey general within 5 years after it was formed (Keskin, 
2003). Yet, due to resource based difficulties as well as organizational priorities, the Istanbul 
office of Greenpeace acted selectively with respect to its campaign issues focusing on the 
issues of toxic substances, toxic waste trade, energy, ship breaking, and peace (Greenpeace 
website, (http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/about/faq/genel-bilgi, 23.09.2011). With 
considerable successes achieved in Turkey as a result of their campaigns, Greenpeace attained 
credibility and trust in the eyes of the public, and strengthened its benchmark stance for the 
environmental movement in Turkey.
13
 In that regard, various local mobilizations approached 
Greenpeace asking for support and aid (E/E 29). 
The Bergama activists were among those groups demanding support from Greenpeace. 
In fact, they made their first move before the permanent Greenpeace Office was opened in 
Turkey.  The first contact between Greenpeace and Bergama activists occurred during the first 
visit of Greenpeace to Turkey. Sefa Taşkın accompanied by muhtars of 15 Bergama villages 
visited the Greenpeace ship, Sirius, in İzmir on September 9th, 1992, demanding support for 
their contention against Eurogold. Greenpeace activists responded positively and promised to 
                                                 
12
 The Mediterranean Office of the Greenpeace which was founded in 1995 after the Mediterranean campaign 
run by the Greenpeace International in the prior ten years. The office works in countries like Turkey, Malta, 
Lebanon, and Israel where there was no official branch of the organization previously (Keskin, 2003: 100-101).  
13
 In Turkey, there have been several positive developments in some issues with respect to environment over 
which Greenpeace Mediterranean launched campaigns in Turkey.Greenpeace allegedly define them as their own 
success, yet no detailed analysis of the impact level of Greenpeace has been done so far. Some of these successes 
include but are not limited to: the cancellation of the nuclear energy bid in 2000 as a result of the joint campaign 
with the anti-nuclear platform; the removal and return of Spanish ship MV-ULLA’s waste to Spain in 2005; the 
prevention of the arrival in Turkey of ships containing hazardous waste materials; the contribution to the 
enactment of Renewable Energy Law in 2005 through lobbying activities and the release of a report on wind 
energy. For further actions please see Greenpeace Mediterranean website, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/about/history/ba-ar-lar/. 
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provide information and mobilize other international organizations in support for the Bergama 
activists (Milliyet, 10.09.1992).   
“It was in 1991 or 1992. The Greenpeace’s research ship arrived in at İzmir. We went to İzmir with the Bergama 
peasants by two buses. When we arrived, Eurogold representatives were already there. They were surprised. 
Greenpeace agreed to talk to us. We told about our confrontation. A female Greenpeace activist from New 
Zealand sent us a full sack of documents later on. We did not know anything about the issue back then. One 
Greenpeace activists gave us the address of Minewatch. Then, we asked for further information from them” (E/E 
3). 
Later on, lawyers from the İzmir Environmentalist Lawyers group who already had 
previous contacts approached Greenpeace activists asking for support. Ex-toxic campaign 
manager of the Greenpeace office in Istanbul was acquainted with the leading figures of the 
Bergama movement, Konyar, Engel, and Taşkın. He collected detailed information about the 
organizational mapping of Eurogold displaying all its partner corporations with the help of 
Greenpeace International and Greenpeace Germany, and he brought the issue to the attention 
of the executive director of Greenpeace Mediterranean. Local Greenpeace activists also 
documented these corporations’ involvement in accidents and illegal activities across the 
world. Besides passing this information to the Bergama activists, the Greenpeace 
Mediterranean activists produced an action plan consisting of doing further research on gold 
mining with respect to EU mining standards and actions of mining TNCs outside Europe, 
building a strategy of demonizing funders of the Ovacık gold mine project in order to cut off 
Eurogold’s financial support, and taking public action in support of the Bergama peasants 
(E/E 29). This action plan was offered to the higher echelons of the Greenpeace bureaucracy 
to be put into effect by the local Greenpeace activists. Concomitantly, Bergama activists sent 
letters to Greenpeace International, summarizing the Bergama movement and its legal 
situation, and underlining the urgency of the issue in Bergama. However, the answer of 
Greenpeace International was negative since they decided not to get involved in the Bergama 
movement officially or launch an official campaign under the name of Greenpeace since gold 
mining was not among their priority issues and they were not specialized on the topic (E/E 21, 
29).  
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 “Later on, Greenpeace told us that gold mining was not part of their global agenda by adding that they were 
mostly concerned with nuclear waste issues” (E/E 3).   
 
On top of that Greenpeace activists worried about the ‘burn-out’ syndrome which might have 
occurred when their insufficient resources were directed to more campaigns than they could 
handle (E/E 29). At the same time, there was some scepticism among the activists about 
Greenpeace’s involvement in their movement. This scepticism stemmed from the fact that 
Greenpeace had a formal and bureaucratic structure which would not fit with their activism, 
and that it had become a brand name which could swallow the grassroots aspect of the 
Bergama movement as expressed by a Greenpeace activist (E/E 5, 29): 
“I didn’t want Greenpeace to be involved in our movement. Their brand name would overshadow our 
movement” (E/E 5). 
 
Yet, Greenpeace did not pull back from the Bergama contention completely. 
Greenpeace International continued to share valuable information and their scientific 
observations on gold mining with the Bergama activists. More specifically, Greenpeace 
Austria was carrying out a campaign on the cyanide spill accident in Baia Mare, Romania, 
and Greenpeace activists sent findings and observations about the incident  to the Bergama 
activists, thinking that the campaigns might be joined (E/E 21) Additionally, the local 
Greenpeace activists remained in contact with the Bergama movement and gave their support 
in terms of providing logistics, helping activists in their relations with the media during their 
protests, and participating in symposiums and panels. Moreover, through personal contacts, 
they discussed and exchanged views about tactics and strategies (E/E 21, 29). Accordingly, a 
limited level of mutual influence between the local Greenpeace and the Bergama activists was 
realized especially with respect to the general characteristics of their tactics, even if not in 
terms of individual tactics. An ex-Greenpeace activist underlined this point by saying:  
“Oktay [Konyar] was a direct action activist, and he led peasants to direct action. Just like Greenpeace, he 
organized protests which were planned by a very limited number of people and which were announced to the 
media at the very last minute. Meaning, their tactics were very similar to Greenpeace’s. And they have taken a 
very right decision. They moved out of Bergama. They did not limit themselves to one place only. If a nuclear 
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power plant is to be built in Akkuyu, Greenpeace has not contended in Akkuyu. It contended in Ankara and 
Istanbul. The Bergama people also moved out of Bergama and went to İzmir [to protest]. These people, who had 
never seen Istanbul or set foot on the Bosporus Bridge, appeared there. They made a picnic in the Sultanahmet 
Park [hereby, referring to the protest picnic organized in a park in Istanbul in the aftermath of the nudity protest 
on the Bosporus Bridge in 1997] And they diffused this. In other words, tactics-wise, they were similar. But, it is 
not a one to one similarity of individual tactics.  Yet, in terms of their general approaches, their civil obedience 
understanding, and their knowledge about how to behave towards the police when they staged civil disobedience 
acts, they were similar” (E/E 29).
14
 
Another contribution made by the local Greenpeace activists was to facilitate the 
Bergama activists to express their grievance outside the borders of Turkey. With that purpose, 
they helped the Bergama activists appear in an international conference in order to voice their 
demands. The Bergama activists and the Greenpeace activists perceived the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Convention held 
Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2000 as an opportunity, even though cyanide was 
not among the toxic materials which would be discussed at the convention. Still, it was an 
effective place to convey their messages to the world. However, since the Bergama peasants 
lacked the financial resources required for travelling all the way to Johannesburg, the 
Bergama activists could not participate in the negotiations in person. Instead, with the 
technological assistance provided by the local Greenpeace activists, they sent a petition signed 
electronically via the Internet which was shown on a large screen during the meetings. In this 
way, they conveyed their messages of “No to gold processed with cyanide” to the 
representatives of over 100 states by linking up to the meeting through using the ICTs 
(Hurriyet, 05, 12.2005; Milliyet, 05.12.2000; E/E 29). 
 In sum, Greenpeace was not involved directly in the Bergama movement. Rather, its 
support arrived unofficially that mostly took the shape of information exchange. In other 
words, even though its support was crucial, it was still not what it could have achieved as the 
                                                 
14
 Yet, some of the tactics were reminiscent of each other. Greenpeace activists hang a banner at the Bosporus 
Bridge saying “Cumhur Ersümer Stop Akkuyu” in order to call on the Minister of Energy to stop nuclear power 
plant plans at Akkuyu, Turkey in 1999.  Also, Senih Özay bought shares of Dresdner Bank in order to have a 
word to say about the bank’s involvement in the Ovacık gold mine project which reminded of Greenpeace’s act 
of buying shares of Shell with similar aims (Özay, 1995; http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=246, 24.09.2011).  
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most well-known environmental NGO all around the world. On the other hand, it was enough 
for the Bergama peasants to consider Greenpeace as a major contributor. For instance, 
Greenpeace activists went to the Bergama villages as part of their “Clean Production Tour” in 
2001 and stayed for two days (E/E 21). Even such a small-scale event left positive 
impressions in the minds of the Bergama activists who said that Greenpeace made great 
contributions to their movement: 
“Greenpeace came here a couple of times. They arrived with a bus full of people. They supported us. They 
opened their banners and distributed pamphlets. They supported us a lot (P/A 9). 
 
b. FIAN 
Foodfirst Information and Action Network International (FIAN International), and 
especially, its national branch in Germany were among the key allies of the Bergama 
movement. FIAN was an INGO operating for the protection of people’s rights to access food. 
(www.fian.org, 23.09.2011).
15
  In their combat with hunger and efforts to prevent unjust 
practices causing hunger, FIAN employs a wide range of practices throughout the world 
including monitoring related states policies, exposing any unjust practices, lobbying, sending 
Urgent Action letters, and empowering local groups through information campaigns and other 
educational activities (ibid).  
FIAN’s involvement in the Bergama movement started with the personal interest of 
Petra Sauerland, the chairman of FIAN Germany between 1993 and 2001. After learning 
about the contentions over gold mining in Küçükdere-Havran and Bergama by reading it in 
German newspaper, Tageszeitung, in 1993, Sauerland visited the region with her Turkish 
husband and met with the Bergama activists in 1994 for the first time (E/E 28; Lemke, 2002). 
She told the Bergama activists about FIAN and offered support for their cause. Sauerland’s 
                                                 
15
 FIAN International has been founded as an international membership based organization in 1986. Having 45 
national sections run by volunteers, FIAN International encompasses around 3,600 members in more than 50 
countries by 2011(http://www.fian.org/, 23.09.2011).  
 
 266 
 
motivation was “...to support people fighting for their food. Farmers would lose their land” 
(E/E 28). Subsequently, Lemke who acted as the main coordinator of transnational relations 
of the Bergama movement, called Sauerland asking help for putting through a resolution that 
that was co-produced by Lemke and the spokesperson of the EU Greens Group to the 
emergency meeting of the EP in November 1994. However, FIAN International was 
unwilling to take action since they considered Turkey as a relatively prosperous country 
where peasants were wealthier than the peasants of poor countries (Lemke, 2002a). Sauerland 
personally convinced FIAN International and launched a campaign by releasing the first 
Urgent Action letter on October 18
th
, 1994 (Lemke, 2002a). In the Urgent Action letter, the 
background of contentions in Küçükdere-Havran and Bergama were told, and FIAN’s interest 
in the issue was described as “FIAN is deeply worried about an imminent breach of the social 
and economic human rights of Küçükdere, Bergama, and other affected communities 
[referring to the Greek island of Lesbos which was in the range of affected territory]” (FIAN, 
1994). The proposed action plan was to launch a letter-campaign targeting the Turkish 
Ministry of Environment since it was the only ministry left which had not granted permits to 
the mine yet.  They asked the Minister of Environment to resist the pressures of Eurogold 
(FIAN, 1994). FIAN’s involvement was seen as an opportunity by the Bergama activists on 
the premises that they could enhance their credibility by stressing an INGO that was 
registered at the UN was also opposing the project. They reckoned that FIAN’s support would 
facilitate them to bring their cause to the agenda of the EP. By presenting the Urgent Action 
letter of FIAN to the EP, the Bergama activists were able to put their resolution to the 
emergency meeting which passed on November 17
th
, 1994. 
“When you say Bergama only, it does not mean anything, but FIAN is an international organization. That’s why 
I have consciously added FIAN’s perspective in our resolution” (E/E 27).  
 
On the other hand, FIAN International was still hesitant about taking action over the 
issue of gold mining in Bergama since gold mining did not directly overlap with the issues of 
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FIAN International. The basic criterion for FIAN International to get involved in a contention 
is the existence of threats to agricultural lands in a region. To convince FIAN International to 
launch a bigger campaign over Bergama, Lemke and Sauerland pointed out the risks that 
cyanide leach method would bring to the fertile lands in Bergama which would violate 
peasants’ right to food in return. In other words, the Bergama activists extended their frames 
to the issue of rights to food. In fact, the master frame of human rights had already been used 
by the Bergama activists, and they emphasize done element of human rights, the right to food, 
more in their frames in order to get FIAN International’s support permanently (Lemke, 
2002a). 
“FIAN is a human rights organization and supports people who demand their rights. Gold mining companies first 
say they will follow the law, but then they push people from their land..... Water and land are poisoned after they 
leave. There is no clean food left. They never pay compensation. They destroy houses” (E/E 28).  
 
From then on, FIAN International placed the issue of gold mining on its global 
agenda, and they started launching campaigns over gold mining with cyanide in various parts 
of the world.
16
 Furthermore, with the brokerage of Lemke, FIAN participated in the meeting 
of Global Mining Campaign in the U.S. in November 2001, entering the preparation 
committee (Lemke, 2002a). FIAN took over the role of extending the work against gold 
mining with cyanide to other organizations. For that purpose, FIAN organized a seminar over 
the issue of gold mining for German NGOs in Essen in 1997 in which Lemke and Taşkın gave 
speeches about developments in Bergama (Cumhuriyet, 17.02.1997). 
“FIAN invited many NGOs to a meeting in Essen (1997), and Sefa Taşkın and I lectured German NGOs, 
including Greenpeace about cyanide gold. In other words, we can say, with pride, that we happened to instruct 
them about a very important issue” (Lemke, 2002: 8). 
 
In that regard, the Bergama activists did not only receive support from INGOs, but they also 
actively contributed to the expansion of the transnational network of anti-gold mining. 
                                                 
16
 In November 2005, FIAN International, Earthworks and Ghanaian NGO WACAM jointly launched a 
campaign against World Bank financing of Newmont gold mine in Ghana (http://www.fian.org/news/press-
releases/in-ghana-gold-mining-is-in-violation-of-human-rights, 24.09.2011). 
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Throughout the Bergama movement, FIAN’s support continued in various ways. They 
contacted German originated banks and companies which were involved in the Ovacık gold 
mine such as Dresdner Bank, Degussa, and Metallgesellschaft as well as TUPRAG, the 
subsidiary of Preussag AG. FIAN put pressure on these companies and banks to withdraw 
from the gold mine project in Bergama and Küçükdere-Havran (E/E 28). On the other hand, 
they pressed the Turkish government to implement the court decisions and end the operation 
of the Ovacık gold mine through letter campaigns targeting Turkish Prime Ministry and 
various other Ministries (FIAN, 1997a; FIAN, 1997b). In their letters, FIAN specifically drew 
attention to the fact that operation of the mine would mean “more than the devastation of a 
scenic beauty- but could destroy the livelihoods of the current and future residents in the area” 
(FIAN, 1997a). Therefore, FIAN insisted on the fact their concerns revolved around 
livelihood matters and human rights rather than a conservationist aspiration. In addition to 
these activities, FIAN also provided aid to the Bergama peasants by channelling information 
over gold mining, maintaining relations with foreign scientific circles, and organizing 
conferences, seminars, and meetings. They also made support visits in order to increase the 
morale of the Bergama peasants (Lemke, 2002a).  
c. SOS-Pergamon 
 Australia was one of the contexts where the Bergama activists forged transnational 
links. This was because there were two Australian based mining companies, Normandy 
Resources and Posedion Gold, first as partners in the conglomeration of Eurogold, and then as 
the owner of the Ovacık gold mine (Taşkın, 1998). As a response to the Australian 
involvement in the Ovacık gold mine in Bergama, a group called SOS-Bergama was 
established in 1998 by several Turkish origin Australian citizens residing in Australia. The 
main purpose of SOS-Bergama was to bring the case of Bergama to the attention of 
Australian public and government in order to put pressure on the Australia originated mining 
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company, Normandy. The group described the goal of their campaign as “to thwart 
Eurogold’s attempts to expand their mining operations throughout Turkey”. The SOS-
Bergama group organized and run the campaign on the Bergama issue by getting the help of 
the Mineral Policy Institute (MPI), an affiliated member of Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
International. The links with the MPI were maintained through the brokerage of the (FoE) 
Australia. In fact, FoE Australia was called on for help through the personal contacts of the 
founder of SOS-Pergamon who was a member of FoE Australia at the same time (E/E 36). 
The MPI supported the campaign by using its already existing connections to convey their 
messages and spreading information about the campaign. Additionally, the MPI followed the 
case of Bergama and put each development on its web site, providing a constant flow of 
information about Bergama.  
SOS-Bergama participated in the protest against the World Economic Forum in 
Melbourne in 2000. During the protest, they stood as a separate group with their own name 
though acting together with other environmentalist, ecologist, green and anti-globalization 
groups which drew the attention of the Australian media and public. One week later, they also 
organized a picket line during the World Miners Congress meeting in Melbourne wearing 
traditional Turkish outfits to draw attention. As described by one of the prominent activists in 
SOS-Bergama, that protest was the peak of their activities in the sense that the Australian 
public learned about the issue of gold mining in Bergama, and they started receiving public 
support at increasing rates (E/E 36).
 17
 During the protests, they also launched a petition 
signing campaign. They collected around 7,000 signatures and sent them to the Australian 
Democrat Party, which was concerned about immigrant rights and environmental issues, to be 
presented at the Australian Federal Parliament. With the petition, the activists told about the 
hazards of Normandy’s gold mining activities in Turkey and asked the Australian government 
                                                 
17
 During marches and the protest some of the slogans used by the SOS-Bergama group on their banners were : 
“No to goldmine with cyanide in Turkey” and “Third World is not the garbage of the developed 
countries”(Milliyet, 08.10.2000). 
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and MPs to compel the Normandy Mining to stop its gold mining project in Bergama. Also, 
they demanded the parliament to enact a law prohibiting the use of cyanide by the gold 
mining sector (E/E 36). 
 The SOS-Bergama group also carried out activities in relation to human rights and 
democracy regarding the Bergama movement. A second major petition about the Bergama 
movement was launched in Australia when the spokesperson of the Bergama movement, 
Oktay Konyar, was arrested on 12 April 2001. This time the SOS-Bergama group acted 
together with the MPI. In the petition, an “urgent international support for Bergama Villagers” 
was requested from the Australian public. Through the internet, the petition was also sent all 
around the world asking for support (E/E 36). In the circulated sample message, which was to 
be forwarded to the Turkish government members and representatives of Normandy Mining, 
it was requested from the Turkish government to release the ‘leader’ of the Bergama 
Villagers, Oktay Konyar. The SOS-Bergama also conducted a joint press conference together 
with MPI in order to pressure the Turkish government from outside concerning the arrest of 
Oktay Konyar.  
To increase the effectiveness of their campaign and reach out to a wider audience, the 
SOS-Bergama group made contacts with the Australian media. When the group was formed 
initially, they contacted journalists from state-owned SBS radio who broadcast the initial 
statements of the SOS-Bergama. Then, articles on the Bergama movement were published in 
the nation-wide newspapers the Age, and the Australian and in the magazine Green Left 
Weekly. Also, a documentary was shot in Bergama and broadcast in Australia by the 
Australian-Dateline program which received a lot of attention. The ‘Kuvvay-ı Milliye’ march 
in which the Bergama peasants visited the Australian soldiers’ martyrdom in Çanakkale 
received immense attention from the Australian public (E/E 36). Through the use of the 
media, the Australian public became aware of the Bergama peasants’ protests. These 
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grassroots activities fostered the effectiveness of the SOS-Pergamon groups’ campaign (E/E 
34, 36). The Australian leg of the Bergama movement ended when Normandy handed over 
the Ovacik gold mine to the American based mining TNC, Newmont.   
d. Transnational Anti-Mining Networks 
Transnational links of the Bergama movement were not limited to their relations with 
Greenpeace, FIAN, and SOS-Pergamon. The activists got in touch with other INGOs and 
advocacy groups within the transnational anti-mining network. Mineral Policy Center (US), 
Mineral Policy Institute (Australia), and Minewatch (UK) were the main 
networks/organizations that gave support to the Bergama movement. Relations basically 
revolved around sharing information and making the issue of the Bergama movement known 
to the world. 
 Minewatch is a campaigning group launched in 1990 for connecting local populations 
and other groups that were struggling over mining issues.
18
 After doing substantial work in 
terms of linking local struggles to each other and spreading information about mining TNCs 
that they monitored, the group ended its activities to due to resource insufficiencies in 1995 
(E/E 32). The Bergama activists heard of Minewatch initially through the brokerage of 
Greenpeace. Greenpeace activists provided contact information of Minewatch to Taşkın and 
the peasants during their visit to the activist ship, Sirius (E/E 3; Taşkın in Reinart, 2003). 
Later on, Lemke approached Minewatch asking them to support their struggle. With the 
involvement of another activist with a crucial role in terms of maintaining cross-border 
relations of the Bergama movement, information exchange was extended (E/E 32). Later, 
Minewatch mostly provided information about Newmont whose activities it had been 
monitoring all over the world. Concomitantly, they disseminated information about the 
progress of the Bergama movement on their web site for the purpose of letting the public 
                                                 
18
 Formerly, the same group of people that formed Minewatch organized under the name of Partizan back in the 
late 1970s. Their purpose was to scrutinize the activities of the mining giant Rio Tinto and to give support to the 
Australian aboriginals who bore the impacts of mining in Australia (E/E 32). 
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know about ‘community pressure’ exerted on mining TNCs (E/E 32). Yet, the Bergama 
activists demanded further support form Minewatch such as maintaining links with other 
groups, visiting their region, and doing more detailed research on their aggrieved issue. 
However, Minewatch which overwhelmingly relied on information sent to them from activists 
from all over the world could not meet these demands due to its limited capacity in terms of 
financial resources and human power (E/E 32).    
The second international anti-mining group which gave support to the Bergama 
movement was the Mineral Policy Institute (MPI), an environmental INGO based in 
Australia. The MPI was formed in 1995 in response to the Australian based mining 
companies’ overseas activities and their negative impacts on the environment and local 
populations. The MPI which was also an affiliate member of the Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
International was specialized in campaigning, advocacy, and research over mining, mineral, 
and energy projects with environmentally hazardous effects. For that purpose, they gave 
support to local groups in Europe, Africa, Australia, Asia, and the Pacific by providing 
information and helping them in their struggles 
(http://www.foe.org.au/groups/affiliates/australian-affiliate-members-of-foe-international/the-
mineral-policy-institute-mpi/; http://www.mpi.org.au/about-mpi.aspx). The MPI which was 
specialized on the overseas activities of Australian based mining companies provided help by 
giving information about Normandy. On top of that, the MPI was also actively involved in the 
campaign launched by the SOS-Pergamon against Normandy in Australia as described above.     
Mineral Policy Center (MPC) is another INGO based in Washington, US, which 
works on mining and its hazardous environmental impacts. As a result of Lemke’s efforts, 
MPC (Earthworks since 2004) was engaged in the Bergama movement. The basic support 
arrived from MPC in the form of sharing information about mining TNCs’ activities (E/E 5, 
22). It was a mutual relationship in the sense that MPC also referred to informative research 
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done by the Bergama activists. The book of Sefa Taşkın, Cyanide Octopus, was translated 
into English and placed in the essential reading list for mining activists (Minewire, 1999). In 
addition, they publicized the Bergama movement in their newsletters (MPC newsletter, 2000). 
Steven D’Esposito, then president of MPC, was among the ones who signed the 
aforementioned Conventus 99 declaration (Conventus 99). Even though the support of MPC 
was found extremely helpful by the Bergama activists, relations were kept limited due to the 
differences in organizational structures and approaches. Underlining its bureaucratic and 
hierarchical structure, one of the Bergama activists found MPC inflexible and formal as stated 
below:  
“They first gave us information.… Because they work a little bit like NGOs, with a president, second president, 
secretary...[When you call, they say] “Hello. Can I help you?” They are not as flexible as we were. ..... First we 
took information from the Mineral Policy Center. Later, the Mineral Policy Center took Turkey as an example.” 
(E/E 22). 
On the other hand, relations with less formal groups like Minewatch could not be 
extended to higher level either. This time, it was the unavailability of resources such as money 
and staff which prevented further collaboration (E/E 32). Nevertheless, by joining these 
networks, the Bergama activists obtained valuable information about their opponent TNCs 
and gold mining in general. At the same time, the Bergama activists were sending them 
information about their struggle and mining TNCs which they obtained from elsewhere. 
“Minewatch helped us a lot. American [Mineral] Policy Centre helped us a lot....They provided help in the form 
of information. Also, we were also giving information to them. They were disseminating it to the world” (E/E 3). 
  
In that sense, the Bergama movement was not a passive recipient of support from 
transnational anti-mining activism networks. Rather, their exchange was mutual which 
indicated that the Bergama movement was also involved in the formation of transnational 
activism networks by providing input and linking different networks to each other.      
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Links with other movements and actors: 
 The controversy over gold mining in the Halkidiki Peninsula, in northern Greece, 
dated back to 1985 when a 20 year-old lead-zinc mine, Olympia mine, was planned to be 
turned into a gold mine. The peasants of Olympia village who had already been living with 
the environmental degradation in their region caused by the lead-zinc mine vehemently 
opposed this project thinking that gold mining would bring additional burden to their 
environment, and the Olympia mine remained closed until 1995 (E/E 33). In 1995, the 
Canadian based mining TNC, TVX GOLD, bought the gold mine, and the Greek government, 
which was in total support of gold mining, issued necessary licences which initiated the 
struggles of the Olympia peasants. During the first years of the contention, struggles took a 
violent form such as clashing with the police, burning equipments and violent demonstrations 
(www.mmpindia.org/greece.PDF). At the end of 1997, a group of environmental activists 
outside Olympia stepped in, and they decided to use legal procedures such as filing lawsuits 
and appealing to the Council of State, thereby changing the course of contention. Also, they 
aimed at putting pressure on the funders of TVX GOLD by contacting reporters, TVX 
shareholders, and market analysts. Subsequently, the story of the Olympia gold mine appeared 
in the international media. They called on the EU Commission to cut its subsidy for TVX 
GOLD, and they made their claims at the annual meeting of Deutsche Bank in 2000 for 
cutting off its financial support to the project. In 2001, the Greek State of Council gave a 
decision in favour of the activists and cancelled the Olympia gold mining project based on the 
“precautionary principle and the principle of sustainable development” (E/E 33).  The mine 
has been closed since then, along with another gold mine project in the same region.   
The Halkidiki movement in Greece and the Bergama movement shared several 
common characteristics. First, they forged transnational links among themselves and 
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exchanged views, strategies, tactics, and information. As a result of Greek activists’ demand 
for help, links were established, and the Bergama activists sent “bags full of documents” 
received from elsewhere (E/E 3, 33). Also, Konyar visited several villages opposing the mine 
in Greece and contacted peasants and mayors exchanging views in 2003. During this visit in 
which the Bergama peasants were supposed to participate, but couldn’t because of financial 
difficulties, Konyar shared their experiences of struggle as well as their strategies and 
organizational structures with the Greek anti-mine peasants and mayors (E/E2). Moreover, 
prominent scientists who became a part of the Bergama movement network provided 
scientific support the Halkidiki movement. Prof. Duman prepared an Environmental Impact 
assessment report on the Greek case which was presented to the State of Council by the 
Halkidiki activists (E/E 9, 33; Milliyet 12.09.2000; Milliyet, 14.04.2001). Prof. Korte and 
Prof. Duman participated in an international conference of’ Exploration of Gold Deposits in 
Thrace-International Meeting’ in the city of Komotini, Greece, in October 2000 (E/E 9, 33). 
Second, they used the same transnational networks in their opposition to TNCs. 
Through the brokerage of the Bergama activists who had already forged their transnational 
links, the Greek anti-mine activists engaged with the MPC, Minewatch, and FIAN Germany 
establishing similar relations of information exchange (E/E 28, 32, 33).Third, the Bergama 
movement’s activities bore impact on the Halkidiki movement, even if indirectly. The Greek 
Council of State referred to the decision of the Turkish Council of State when ruling against 
the operation of the Olympidia mine. In that sense, legal and grassroots struggles of the 
Bergama activists that won favourable court decisions contributed significantly to the 
favourable decision of the court of Greece and subsequently to the victory of the Halkidiki 
movement. This connection between national courts beyond borders exemplifies the central 
argument of the thesis on how the local, national, and global nexus interactively enmeshed 
together, rather than constituting separate and distinct levels (E/E 1, 3, 33). 
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Even though these two movements were mobilized over the same issue and displayed 
many similarities, there were some diverging aspects as well. First, in terms of their grassroots 
activism, mass mobilization among villagers in Greece was not as extensive as in Bergama. In 
spite of the fact that villages of Stratoniki and Olympidia were only about 10 kilometres away 
from each other, they did not act together in their struggles (E/E 3, 33). Also, violent acts 
were extensively resorted by the peasant activists in Greece whereas the Bergama peasants 
preserved their non-violent civil disobedience strategy throughout their movement (E/E 3, 
33). It was with the spill-over effect of the Bergama movement that the Greek anti-mine 
activists adopted the strategy of pursuing a legal struggle and the strategy of activism beyond 
borders as indicated by a spokesperson of the Halkidiki movement who said that that they 
learned a lot form the Bergama movement (E/E 33).Moreover, the national political 
opportunities were mostly closed for the Greek activists since the Greek governments and 
centre mass political parties were in favour of gold mining similar to the situation in Turkey. 
However, being an EU member state made a difference in the strategies of the Greek activists. 
Instead of pressuring their own government(s) directly, they approached the EU Commission 
which was a much more influential EU body (E/E 33). Finally, the Greek state used intense 
levels of coercion on the Greek peasant activists even exceeding the levels of repression used 
by the Turkish state.  
Clash between national and transnational: 
While all these transnational pursuits of the Bergama activists continued, a book 
entitled German NGOs and the Bergama Case (Hablemitoğlu, 2001) was published which 
marked a turning point in the Bergama movement. In the book, it was argued that the 
Bergama movement was organized by German foundations operating in Turkey with the 
directions of the German state. This argument was based on the claim that the German state 
possessed the largest gold reservoirs in the world, and gold production in Turkey was not in 
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the national interests of Germany since it would have lowered gold prices on the markets. 
Allegations continued by pointing out that, with the orders of the German state and German 
political parties, German NGOs such as FIAN and German foundations such as Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Foundation provoked 
and funded the resistance in Bergama (Hablemitoğlu, 2001). The evidence brought forth for 
such accusations were mainly the transnational links that the Bergama activists forged with 
political parties and INGOs from Germany. The conclusion of the book was that NGOs and 
foundations were the ‘agents’ of the West and acted upon the imperialistic ideals of Western 
countries with a ‘hidden agenda’ of weakening the nation-state in order to pave the way for 
the global capital. Accordingly peasants were ‘collaborators’ (Hablemitoğlu, 2001). 
Based on these claims in the Hablemitoğlu book, the Bergama activists were accused 
of engaging in espionage activities and working against the national interests of Turkey 
together with ‘foreigners’. Subsequently, a lawsuit was filed against 15 Bergama activists 
involving spokespersons and peasant activists. Additionally the representatives of German 
foundations and Petra Sauerland, then president of FIAN Germany, were also included in the 
lawsuit as suspects. In the indictment, it was claimed that: “In places in which classical 
diplomacy does not have any influence, these foundations carry out activities and penetrate all 
important fields of politics and society” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, 31.01.2003). In the mean time, 
the transnational support of the European Parliament, the European Commission, Green 
politicians, and INGOs for the Bergama activists continued through statements and references 
to the lawsuit on ‘espionage’ in the Turkey progress reports (Turkey Progress report, 2002).  
 “We contested the lawsuit opened by the State Security Court. I think the pressure exerted form Europe played a 
large role in the decision of the State Security Court. It was not only us. Germany, other states, the EU 
Commission all contested State Security Court’s handling of the issue. The EP did a lot” (E/E 27).   
 
Also, Cem Özdemir, a member of the European Parliament and an ally, stated in his support 
of the defendants that ideas and approaches are not state-centric anymore as in the Cold War 
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period. Cem Özdemir criticized the state-centric view of the Turkish state and underlined 
environmentalism was an issue which transcended national borders by saying:  
“Within the contemporary world, there are no homogeneous Turkish, American or German based approaches. 
Rather, there is a variety of diversified approaches in Turkey which is also the case in Germany or the US. The 
ones who do not want to see that live in the old world” (C. Özdemir, Kuzey Ege 04.03.2002). 
“I can say this. I am an environmentalist. Environmentalists operate at the international level. This means 
environmentalists do not have a nationality or borders. Environmental movements are international movements. 
Turkey should get used to this fact. For example, Greenpeace organized a series of protests in Germany like it 
did in Turkey. We welcomed this. We saw it as enrichment. They showed us our faults” (Kuzey Ege, 2002). 
 
In a similar vein, one of the spokespersons evaluated the lawsuit as a nationalist and state-
centric act of the Turkish state: 
“Government always misunderstood the case. They perceived it negatively. They interpreted it as an intrusion 
into our internal affairs. They thought that they [actors outside Turkey] are compelling us...” (E/E 3).  
 
After a prolonged legal process in the Court of State Security, the defendants were 
acquitted of charges on March 5
th
, 2003. However, even though the activists as well as the 
representatives of German foundations and INGOs were found not guilty in the court, this 
case did immense damage to the movement. First, wider public support achieved throughout 
Turkey deteriorated. Second, within the movement, the villagers started questioning 
themselves. “They were confused and they started saying ‘weren’t we doing something good 
for the country?’” (P/A 2) Therefore, the connections being built with the global civil society 
were damaged as a result of this act of the state. 
Overall, gold mining in Greece came to an end whereas it continued in Turkey. T heir 
strategies and tactics resembled each other’s. Furthermore, they built alliances with same set 
of actors beyond their national borders. Besides, the Bergama movement had a comparative 
advantage to their Greek counterparts in terms of achieving transnational support of INGOs 
and advocacy groups since they remained a non-violent mobilization. As Bob (2005) 
suggests, INGOs and advocacy network actors are more open to supporting groups which 
employ non-violence as their strategy. In that sense, it was more likely for the Bergama 
 279 
 
activists to get support at the transnational level. However, several obstacles created the 
difference in the outcomes. First, the Bergama peasants did not have sufficient resources to 
reach out beyond their borders. Language was a problem in the first place because there were 
only a small number of people who spoke English even among the university educated 
members of the Bergama movement network (E/E 15, 34).  
“We could not move out of our shell here. If we have managed something in terms of forging links with others, it 
remained at the level of some representatives. Birsel Lemke received an international award. We contacted the 
press and environmentalist NGOs abroad. However, if we could have moved our contention to the global level, it 
would have been more meaningful” (E/E 11). 
Second, the anti-imperialism discourse which was prevalent throughout the movement acted 
as an impediment to furthering transnational links and building alliances with ‘foreign’ actors. 
Even though the Bergama peasants were overwhelmingly willing to build further relations at 
the transnational level, some urban-based sections of the Bergama movement were sceptical 
about getting into alliances with actors, organizations, and institutions outside Turkey 
believing that it was against national interests (E/E 15, 16, 18). As a result, transnational 
contacts depended on only a few individuals, and the espionage case exacerbated this 
scepticism. Third, combating the Turkish state’s unresponsiveness was a more difficult task 
for the Bergama peasants. Compared to Greece, Turkey is more isolated from the global 
political structures since it is only a candidate state but not an EU member. As such, Turkish 
authorities and politicians were able to act as ‘regressive globalizers’- applying the necessities 
for the economic aspects of capitalist globalization and not complying with the principles of 
liberal democracy. In sum, despite all these problems and impediments, the Bergama 
movement has been able to integrate itself into the transnational activism networks and 
proven that politics is taking place within a globalizing nexus in which different levels of 
local, national, and transnational are enmeshed. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Capitalist globalization has increasingly become hegemonic. As Sklair (2002) has 
argued, the transnational capitalist class (TCC) dominates the current form of global system 
through its transnational practices. As a crucial fraction of the TCC, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) detach themselves from national interests and structures and pursue their 
own interests at the global level seeing the whole world as one giant market. Yet, the 
globalization process is not confined to the world economy but rather, it embraces the spheres 
of politics and culture as well. As a result, the conventional world order based on the primacy 
of nation-states is being transformed with the activities of the TCC whose members are 
diffused throughout the world.  
These transformations came with major costs: the ecological crisis, class polarization, 
and a democratic deficit. First, due to the globally pursued neo-liberal economic model based 
on growth, the exploitation of world resources reached unprecedented levels. Second, 
inequalities exacerbated both within societies and globally. Third, decision-making processes 
have been exclusively dominated by the members of the TCC which leaves the majority of the 
world population no control over political and economic decisions that directly affect their 
daily lives. Combined with the already existing gender, ethnic, religious inequalities and 
democratic shortcomings, capitalist globalization has presented an ‘unjust’ global system. 
Opposition to capitalist globalization has also been on the rise since the 1980s. 
Sufferers of the crises inherent in capitalist globalization constitute the “network of 
democratic globalizers”. Various groups, organizations, and individuals opposing the 
activities of the ‘network of neo-liberal globalizers’ mainly consisting of the TCC are 
mobilized under the Global Justice movement (GJM) using the infrastructure of global civil 
society. The GJM, an umbrella movement network entailing a plethora of groups, 
organizations, and individuals focuses on a variety of issues in connection to capitalist 
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globalization. Despite the extreme heterogeneity of its participants with varying political 
agendas and views, the GJM activists challenge their commonly defined adversary, capitalist 
globalization, and, they demand a more ‘just’ world with respect to the environment, labour, 
human rights, democratic participation, gender equality, and welfare programs. Opposition to 
capitalist globalization occurs mainly in two forms: first, transnational social movements 
(TSMs) which rest upon a wide network of transnational social movement organizations 
(TSMOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs) staging transnational protests in Seattle, Genoa, Washington, Prague, 
Quebec and elsewhere against  international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
the World Trade Organization; and second, local movements launched by populations who 
are directly exposed to the hazards of capitalist globalization, linking themselves to 
transnational networks such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico, the Ogonis’ movement in 
Nigeria, anti-large dam mobilizations in India, and rubber tappers’ movement in Brazil.  
The Bergama movement exemplifies the latter strand in the GJM. In their struggle 
against the environmentally hazardous Ovacık gold mine project, the Bergama peasants and 
other activists formed a movement network and contended mining TNC(s) and the state. In 
fact, the cause of the Bergama movement is not unique since similar projects with detrimental 
impacts are implemented in various locations all over the world. Yet, not all the local 
populations exposed to such hazards mobilize or, even if they do, many of those cannot turn 
their mobilizations into long-lasting and visible movements. Hence, grievances do not 
automatically lead to the formation of social movements. Rather, successful mobilizations that 
become sustained struggles are contingent on their framing of capitalist globalization, the 
availability of political opportunities at local, national, and global levels, and appropriate 
mobilizing structures. 
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As indicated in Chapter 5, the locals identified themselves as peasants of the Ovacık 
plain whose livelihood and lives are threatened regardless of their religious or ethnic 
differences. In that sense, they transcended previously existing social cleavages. Peasants 
belonging to different sects of Islam coalesced within the same movement leaving their 
historical tensions aside. Yet, in spite of the regional aspect of their identity, they did not limit 
their identity to their immediate locality. Instead, they constructed a more inclusive identity 
which allowed them to connect with other sufferers of the same process of capitalist 
globalization encountered in Turkey and elsewhere in the world. Even though the peasantry 
occupied a central place within the collective identity of the Bergama movement, other urban 
actors critical of capitalist globalization were involved as well since peasant identity was 
reconstructed in relation to capitalist globalization. In other words, the Bergama peasants 
portrayed themselves as one of the many groups experiencing destructive impacts of capitalist 
globalization. In this way, they were able to extend their movement network to national and 
transnational levels which increased their capacity to mobilize. At the same time, they were 
able to interact with actors facing similar conditions outside their regional and national 
territories such as the Halkidiki movement in Greece.  
All of this was achieved through the framing processes employed by the Bergama 
activists. The Bergama peasants based their frames on two master frames: 
“environmentalism” and “human rights”. Accordingly, not only did they express their 
concerns about environmental degradation, but they also drew attention to the human rights 
aspect of their contention since their rights to land, water, food, and life were being violated. 
More specifically, against the TNCs’ framing of gold mining as a means to develop a region, 
they claimed that the operation of the Ovacık gold mine with the use the environmentally 
hazardous cyanide leach method displayed the TNCs’ disregard for the environment and 
human life in their pursuit for profit. Additionally, they also emphasized that the Ovacık gold 
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mine would have negative impacts on the local economy and community life contrary to what 
was claimed by the TNCs and the state. In order to defy the claims of the TNCs and the state, 
the Bergama peasants proposed alternative uses of their land. In constructing these frames, 
they depicted their situation as part of a global process- globalization. Views over the content, 
dynamics, and prospects of capitalist globalization varied such as whether capitalist 
globalization had novel characteristics in comparison to imperialism or not, whether it could 
be tamed or not, and whether it offered benefits such as transnational opportunities or not. 
Nevertheless, there was a general consensus on the negative impacts of capitalist globalization 
such as environmental degradation, inequalities and human rights violations. In that sense, it 
was generally agreed that their grievances were mainly caused by the capitalist globalization 
process much like those of other local communities across the world.  
In that regard, the Bergama activists adopted a post-national approach in their norms 
and values by prioritizing human life and ecological justice over economic growth and profit, 
a perspective shared by the GJM activists all over the world. Concomitantly, they continued 
to express their communal and specific interests, without being exclusionary. Evidently, their 
collaboration with other movements in Turkey and across their national territories as well as 
their engagement in protests against other issues related to capitalist globalization such as the 
multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) or the Iraq War over which GJM activists 
mobilize displayed their commitment to a general opposition to capitalist globalization. In that 
sense, in spite of being a locally-unwanted-land-use (LULU) movement, the Bergama 
activists avoided acting as a Not-In-My-Backyard movement (NIMBY) with purely 
particularistic territorial interests. Instead, they located their particularism within a 
heterogeneous global agenda. 
The Bergama movement mobilized within a transforming political context. As shown 
in chapters 6 and 7, the Bergama activists had various political opportunities at the local, 
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national, and global levels, each of which they tried to make use as a local mobilization. At 
the local level, they forged links with civil society actors including CSOs, lawyers, and 
university professors who provided valuable support in the form of legal assistance, collection 
of scientific information, and lending legitimacy and prestige in eyes of the public and the 
power holders. In fact, these local allies became an integral part of the Bergama network and 
acted as committed intellectuals. Among these local elite, four of them acted as 
‘spokespersons’ of the movement maintaining relations between different sections of the 
Bergama movement network. As shown in this research, permanent support of local 
governments for local movements like the Bergama movement is crucial for its mobilization 
and sustainability. The fact that the local mayor, Sefa Taşkın, acted as a movement participant 
provided the locals with enhanced levels of legitimacy and prestige, access to political 
institutions, material resources and links with civil society actors. A former local politician, 
Oktay Konyar, maintained, managed, and coordinated protest activities, which was a 
significant contribution for the Bergama peasants who had never participated in a social 
movement before. Furthermore, Konyar set the non-violent civil disobedience as the main 
theme of their repertoires of action which marked the diffusion of such a strategy from other 
movements outside Turkey since civil disobedience was not utilized by social movements in 
Turkey before. With the innovative tactics and protest forms Konyar formulated, the Bergama 
movement received attention of the media, the public, and the power holders. Local elite’s 
support was not limited to various material and non-material resources to the Bergama 
peasants. They were also crucial frame articulators which enabled the Bergama peasants to 
relate their immediate grievance to global dynamics. 
National level opportunities were not as favourable as the local ones. In fact, the 
Bergama activists faced a national political context which was being reshaped by capitalist 
globalization. Even though political actors including political parties and civil society actors 
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had become diversified in the post-military regime period, the Bergama activists had 
difficulties in terms of finding allies or having access to decision-making processes. This was 
mainly due to, first, the absence of political parties which would support their claims save 
marginal left-wing parties which were considered to be ineffective by the Bergama activists. 
In their political articulations, both centre-right and centre-left disregarded the environment 
and prioritized economic growth either by referring to capitalist globalization or national 
developmentalism. Also, the absence of a Green Party or a New Left party left the Bergama 
peasants without potential allies at the national level. Second, even though there was support 
from civil society actors, it was erratic and fluctuating because of the lack of previously 
established advocacy networks at the national level. Third, despite the gradual 
democratization process Turkey was going through, the state apparatus consisting of 
governments, civil and military bureaucracy retained its exclusive and non-responsive 
characteristics. Although the judiciary was perceived as an opportunity, legal decisions in 
favour of the Bergama movement were not implemented which led the Bergama activists to 
question the working of democracy and the principle of rule of law.       
 The Bergama activists also moved their contention to the transnational level. By 
forging links with political parties, INGOs, scientists, and journalists abroad, they attempted 
to put pressure on TNCs and their states as well. The findings of this research confirm that 
local, national and global levels of polity are intertwined. In fact, the brokerage role of the 
local elite facilitated such alliances. The local elite under the leadership of Birsel Lemke 
brought their issue to the agendas of the transnational public and supranational political 
institutions such as the European Parliament. However, contrary to the facilitative role of 
local actors, the pro-mine camp consisting of governments, scientists, and miners’ 
associations were able to inhibit the continuation of such transnational relations. As the 
Bergama activists were accused of working against the national interests of Turkey in 
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collaboration with foreigners, the transnational opportunities started to diminish. In short, 
local and national political dynamics were determinant factors in the opening and closing of 
transnational opportunities.     
Various studies show that many of the social movements mobilized against capitalist 
globalization take place within national contexts by taking nation-states as their main target 
and fulcrum since there are no democratic political structures at the global level equivalent to 
the nation-state (Rootes, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Johnston, 2011). The findings of my research 
on the Bergama movement confirm these theoretical accounts, yet partially. Even though the 
Bergama activists demanded their state to take action in their favour and shut the Ovacık gold 
mine down, the Turkish state was neither the only target nor the only fulcrum they had 
chosen. They have campaigned against the TNCs at the local, national and transnational 
levels. Also, they have approached political and legal institutions beyond their nation-state. 
One of the underlying motives for applying to supranational and transnational political bodies 
was to create a ‘boomerang effect’ to increase pressure on their nation-state. However, they 
also aimed to stop TNCs which were carrying out detrimental practices. Therefore, in the 
practices of the Bergama activists, nation-states were only one of the targets and fulcrums. 
Also, national political contexts should be treated cautiously in the age of capitalist 
globalization since they are undergoing a structural change. Capitalist globalization has not 
rendered a fully globalized world yet. Instead, it is a globalizing world which rests upon 
transnational practices. In that regard, national actors and structures are inherent components 
of capitalist globalization rather than entities subject to the levelling forces of an external 
process that is globalization. In other words, although the portrayal of local, national, and 
global structures and relations as nested within each other and surrounded by a larger context 
captures to a certain extent the nature of capitalist globalization, in the light of the present 
research on the Bergama movement, I argue that the interaction between local, national and 
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global levels can better be understood as intertwined. As a result of intensification, extension, 
and acceleration of transnational practices, national borders are being transcended within such 
a globalizing world. Carriers of these transnational practices constituting capitalist 
globalization are the same actors that are used to be confined within the limits of their 
national territories and labelled as ‘national’ Through their policies, national political actors 
have become active agents of capitalist globalization, carrying out facilitative roles for the 
transnational practices to transpire. In that regard, even though the nation-state still appears to 
be one of the most important constitutive units within the contemporary global order, its 
content and role has been transformed to a large extent. As part of the TCC, governments and 
national political parties share the same interests and concerns with those of other fractions of 
the TCC. Still, the manifestations of this transformation vary across different contexts since 
previous cleavages combine with transnational practices producing multivariate political 
conjunctures. These new political conjunctures determine the direction of change created 
under capitalist globalization. Nevertheless, local, national, and global structures and relations 
are not located within each other, existing separately surrounded by a larger context. Rather, 
capitalist globalization renders an enmeshed political context in which local, national and 
global levels of polity are intertwined. Therefore, even if local social movements contend 
their own nation-states in their opposition to capitalist globalization, they still challenge one 
of the actors of capitalist globalization. As this study has made clear, the analysis of local 
social movements can be made only by taking into account the interaction between the local, 
national and transnational spheres in an enmeshed global structure which in turn interacts with 
framing processes and mobilizing structures, all of which is not possible solely by a state-
centric approach.  
In Turkey, national political actors became active agents of capitalist globalization 
enabling transnational practices to transpire. Governments and national political parties 
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facilitated the practices of the mining TNCs despite their citizens’ opposition. The Turkish 
power holders and state officials defended the operation of the Ovacık gold mine in the name 
of the ‘national economy’. Yet, these actors were aspiring to integrate Turkey into the global 
market by introducing major structural adjustments in the field of mining allowing the 
practices of the TNCs rather than building tentative alignments with capitalist globalization. 
Their objectives of becoming a part of economic globalization were discerned in their framing 
of the Bergama movement as a threat to the existence of TNCs in Turkey. On the other hand, 
members of the neo-liberal globalization network do not always act as ‘pure’ globalizers since 
globalization is a fluid process. In other words, pro-globalizing political actors which control 
the state might, and usually do, oscillate between nationalist and globalizationist stances 
varying across contexts. In the case of Turkey, state’s exclusionist and non-responsive 
character continued towards ‘its’ citizens through the governments’ use of the repressive 
capacity of the state and application of ‘illiberal’ measures. Put differently, without adopting 
the prevalent features of liberal democracy as part of capitalist globalization, state actors 
behaved as ‘regressive globalizers’ prioritizing the economic aspect of capitalist globalization. 
Similarly, most political parties opted for capitalist globalization to varying degrees in their 
ideological preferences which shaped their political articulations. The major social democratic 
party in Turkey tried to reproduce its nationalist and secularist position without making a 
precise reading of capitalist globalization which resulted in a failed political articulation. The 
Bergama peasants found their political party allies beyond national borders. Support arrived 
from the members of the Green Party at the European Parliament and in Germany. In that 
regard, the case of the Bergama movement points to the emergence of a new political axis 
revolving around capitalist globalization which cross-cuts local, national and transnational 
political levels within an enmeshed global framework.  
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  Diminishing political opportunities was one of the main factors which had an impact 
on the decline of the movement. The Bergama activists lost their transnational allies as a 
result of the Turkish state’ move of ‘espionage case’. At the local level, the support of the 
local elite diminished because of divergences over ideological and strategic preferences as 
well as personal power struggles between the leaders. In fact, the informal movement-network 
structure based on coalitional leadership provided flexibility and fluidity enabling them to act 
at the local, national, and transnational scales simultaneously. However, conflicts surfaced 
among the movement elite, vulnerabilities of this network emerged which became one of the 
main causes of demobilization. Additionally, the Bergama peasants became exhausted as a 
result of their prolonged activism which lasted for almost 10 years. As a result, many peasant 
activists dropped out -either sold their land to the TNCs or started working at the mine- which 
created splits at the grassroots. 
One question still remains: What is the impact created by the Bergama movement as a 
successfully developed and sustained mobilization? In fact, the focus of this study is the 
development and sustenance of mobilization. An analysis of movement outcomes requires a 
different research design. This is mainly due to the fact that evaluation of social movement 
outcomes is a complicated matter. As it is argued in the burgeoning literature on social 
movements, variables such as changes in public opinion, interest groups, political parties, and 
behaviours of governments and administrators as well as the impact of other social 
movements should also be incorporated in the analysis in order to single out the level of 
influence by each (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Kolb, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). Otherwise, it is 
misleading to attribute an automatic credit to social movements for political and/or cultural 
changes regarding their issues. Keeping this methodological caveat in mind, some preliminary 
points on the outcomes of the Bergama movement can be made.  
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At first glance, the Bergama movement is not a successful mobilization in terms of 
reaching its consistently stated-goal of closing the Ovacık gold mine. True enough, apart from 
the continuing litigation process carried out by several lawyers and CSOs, the Bergama 
movement has been defunct since 2003, and the Ovacık gold mine remains open to this day.1 
However, the classical approach of Gamson (1990) evaluating social movement success with 
respect to achievement of stated-goals and having access to decision-making processes has 
major shortcomings. First, defining success with respect to achievement of stated-goals leads 
to a conceptual shortcoming because of varying definitions of stated-goals within a single 
social movement network (Giugni, 1999); changes in stated-goals throughout mobilizations 
(Kolb, 2007); and varying perceptions and evaluation of consequences of a movement among 
various internal and external actors (Giugni, 1999). Resultantly, the concept of ‘success’ is 
replaced with other concepts such as ‘outcomes’, ‘impacts’, ‘effects’, or ‘consequences’ in the 
social movements literature (Giugni, 1999; Amenta and Caren, 2004; della Porta and Diani, 
2006; Kolb, 2007; Tarrow, 2011). Yet, despite the conceptual clarification, there are still 
challenges in relation to causality. Factors such as time-lag between political outcomes and 
movement mobilizations, the durability of changes associated with movements, the general 
impact of a protest cycle on political and/or cultural outcomes rather than a single movement 
complicate the analysis of social movement outcomes (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Tarrow, 
2011). On the other hand, Kolb (2007) claims that the success of movements with clear and 
constant stated-goals can still be evaluated by comparing them with similar movements in 
other contexts. Based on such a relational approach, the Bergama movement appears as a 
failed case when compared to the Halkidiki movement which managed to stop a gold mine 
project in their region. Yet, the relational approach to movement success still suffers from 
factors reviewed above. For instance, it appears that the Halkidiki movement’s success was 
                                                 
1
 The Ovacık gold mine is now owned by a Turkish mining company, Koza. The decline of the Bergama 
movement coincided with the placement of ownership to a Turkish company. However, Koza’s ownership had 
no impact since the movement was already in decline. 
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temporary since gold-mining activities have recently backlashed in the Halkidiki peninsula 
bringing to mind the pooint about durability of movement outcomes.
2
 Moreover, given the 
fact that various actors and agencies try to influence a movement issue, differences of political 
contexts between Greece and Turkey should be analyzed in order to compare these two 
movements since the enmeshed local, national, and transnational political scales produce 
different political relations and structures. More specifically, the impact of the fact that 
Greece is a member of the Euopean Union on the gold mine in Halkidiki should also be 
unpacked in order to single out the Halkidiki movement’s effect which in turn will allow us to 
identify the Bergama movement as a failure in this relational approach. The Bergama activists 
were able to push the TNCs to apply some precautions and safety mechanisms such as the 
impermeable layer in the waste pond. Additionally, the Bergama movement might be one of 
the factors which led to deference of the Turkish state’s project of opening other areas in 
Turkey to mining TNCs, since. In that respect, a ‘partial success’ perspective which refers to 
certain levels of achievement in the issue at stake such as amendments in policies and projects 
will provide a better understanding of the Bergama movement’s outcomes.  
Additionally, social movement outcomes are not limited to their stated-goals. Even if 
social movements fail to achieve their identified goals, they most often produce ‘unintended 
consequences’ which are collective goods unrelated to their immediate demands (Giugni, 
1999; Amenta and Caren, 1999; Snow and Soule, 2010). One such unintended consequence is 
the change that can be discerned in the values, beliefs, and attitudes of peasants. First, 
peasants turned into empowered citizens aware of their rights in relation to the environment, 
human rights and democracy. Second, activist peasants started developing more sympathetic 
and ‘understanding’ feelings toward protestors elsewhere which can be an indicator of 
                                                 
2
 Hellenic Gold, a subsidiary of Eldorado Gold, initiated goldmining activities again in the Halkidiki region 
which led to protests and clashes with the police in September 2012 
(https://earthfirstnews.wordpress.com/2012/09/09/protesters-in-greece-clash-with-police-over-gold-mine-again/, 
accessed on 25.09.2012). 
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continuing proclivity to activism. Third, women’s lives underwent a change as they became 
politicized and started taking active roles in the public sphere. Agency of the women also 
culminated in partial transgression of gender relations which points at a possible cultural 
impact of the Bergama movement. Yet, the durability and the trajectory of these personal life 
changes are unknown which would require further longitudinal research.  
Agenda-setting impact is described as the most easily achieved outcome by social 
movements (Kolb, 2007). That was also the case for the Bergama movement. In a national 
political context where environment was not among the top priorities of political parties, the 
state, or the media, the Bergama activists managed to place their issue on the public agenda 
for almost a decade. This might have several consequences. First, it might have contributed to 
a cultural change with respect to environmental issues in: a) the values, beliefs, and opinions 
and beliefs of the public; b) the discourses and media presentations; and c) collective 
identities and subcultures of similar local communities by altering their relation with the 
environment.
3
 In that regard, Bergama movement’s contribution to the possible growth of 
environmental awareness of the public at the national level necessitates further research based 
on longitudinal data on the level of environmental concerns among the public before and after 
the Bergama movement.  
Finally, the Bergama movement became a template for the successive local 
environmental movements in Turkey which modelled themselves after the Bergama peasants. 
Since the end of the 1990s, local struggles in Turkey against gold mining, large dams, 
hydroelectric, thermal, and nuclear power plant projects have multiplied in the face of 
manifestations of an increasingly aggressive capitalist globalization. The Bergama movement 
has been a true inspiration for the struggles against industrial projects. In that regard, the 
Bergama movement is the initiator of the grassroots based environmental activism in Turkey, 
                                                 
3Categories are adapted from the Earl’s (2004) review of the cultural impacts of social movements. 
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with a particularly strong spill-over effect in terms of its frames, tactics, repertoires of action, 
organizational forms, and issues. Diffusion of the strategies of the Bergama movement 
occurred in two ways. Firstly, after the demobilization of the Bergama movement, Oktay 
Konyar personally engaged in the mobilizations of the Develi- Kabazlı peasant movements in 
Manisa against the construction of a waste disposal facility and the anti-dam movements in 
Munzur and Hasankeyf in the eastern part of Turkey, as the movement leader in the former 
and as an influential ally in the latter. In the Develi-Kabazlı mobilization, all the practices of 
non-violent civil disobedience and innovative tactics used in the Bergama movement were 
applied in their slightly changed forms, and the movement was framed as a peasant-based 
environmental movement in a similar vein to the Bergama movement. In that sense, it was a 
direct diffusion of strategies, tactics, and organizational structures through the work of Oktay 
Konyar. Secondly, other local movements including mobilizations against the construction of 
a thermal power station in Bursa, gold-mining projects in the area surrounding the Ida 
mountain in the Western Turkey nearby Bergama, a gold mine in Eşme, and the construction 
of small and medium scale hydro-electrical power stations (HES) all across Turkey, followed 
the footsteps of the Bergama movement. These mobilizations commonly employed non-
violent civil disobedience protest strategies, utilized the litigation process as one of their main 
means, and made use of technical-scientific knowledge in order to defy their opponents. In 
that sense, they have utilized the repertoire of contention innovatively expanded by the 
Bergama movement. Hence, tactics and strategies of the Bergama movement diffused mostly 
through indirect channels such as the media. However, none of these mobilizations were able 
to establish an extensive network structure built on inclusive collective identities in which 
various sub-networks complement each other as successfully as the Bergama movement. 
Moreover, the transnational aspect of these mobilizations are either weak or absent, excepting 
anti-dam movements in Munzur and Hasankeyf which combined environmentalism with 
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human rights concerns regarding the Kurdish identity. Besides variations in framing and 
identity construction, immobility of subsequent mobilizations at the transnational level may 
be due to changes in the enmeshed political opportunities given the time-lag between the 
Bergama and other movements. More specifically, the Bergama movement might have also 
produced negative impacts in relation to its opponents’ stigmatization of its transnational links 
which was one of the factors for the demobilization of the movement. Also, as discussed 
throughout this study, even if local movements are embedded in the same national context, 
the available set of opportunities might be different. In other words, variations in the local 
opportunities culminate in specific political conditions which might change the trajectory of a 
mobilization. All these points underline prospects for a future comparative analysis of the 
Bergama movement and other local movements. A further direction of research would be to 
analyze similar movements in the framework of enmeshed political structures constructed in 
Bergama. 
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Appendix A 
Interview List: 
E/E: Elite/Expert interview 
P/A: Peasant interview 
E/E 1: attorney/activist, 10.09.2002, İzmir 
E/E 2: movement elite/local politician, 11.09.2002, 18.08.2003, 12.02.2004 Dikili 
P/A 1: peasant activists (group interview) 12.09.2002, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
E/E 3: movement elite/ local politician, 10.01.2003; 18.08.2003 Bergama 
P/A 2: peasant activists (group interview) 19.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 3: peasant activist, 21.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 4: peasant activists, 21.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 5: peasant activist, 22.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 6: peasant activist, 31.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 7: peasant activist, 31.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
E/E 4: local journalist, 01.09.2003; 05.09.2003; 13.02.2004, Bergama,  
          Turkey. 
P/A 8: peasant activists (group interview) , 01.09.2003,  Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 9: a peasant activist, 02.09.2003, 05.09.2003, 10.02.2004, 31.08.2004,  Çamköy,   
             Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 10: peasant activists (group interview), 02.09.2003, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 11: peasant activist, 03.09.2003,03.09.2003, 08.09.2003, 10.02.2004, 11.02.2004,  
12.02.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 12: peasant activists (group interview), 04.09.2003, Ovacık, Bergama,  
Turkey 
P/A 13: peasant activist, 06.09.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
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E/E 5: movement elite/environmental activists, 06.09.2003, Ören, Turkey; 28.02.2005  
Munich, Germany 
E/E 6: expert/academic, 09.10.2003, İstanbul 
E/E 7: elite/activist, 09.10.2003, İstanbul 
E/E 8: expert/academic, 25.10.2003, İstanbul 
E/E 9:  expert/academic, 10.11.2003, İstanbul. 
P/A 14: peasant activists (group interview), 08.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey 
 
P/A 15: peasant activist (group interview), 09.02.2004; 10.02.2004, Tepeköy, Bergama,        
             Turkey 
P/A 16: peasant activists (group interview), 10.02.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
 
E/E  10: expert, 10.02.2004, Dikili, Turkey 
E/E  11: movement elite/local politician, İstanbul, 12.02.2004, Bergama, Turkey. 
P/A 17: peasant activists (group interview), 12.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey. 
 
P/A 18: peasant activists (group interview), 14.02.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey. 
 
E/E 12: activist/ CSO member, 14.02.2004, Burhaniye, Turkey. 
E/E 13: activist/CSO member, 14.02.2004, Altınoluk, Turkey 
 
P/A 19: peasant activists (group interview), 15.02.2004, Narlıca, Bergama, Turkey. 
 
P/A 20: peasant activist, 15.02.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey. 
 
P/A 21: peasant activists (group interview), Kerim, TS, ND, 25.08.2004, Çamköy,  
          Bergama, Turkey 
 
P/A 22: peasant activist, 30.08.2004, Narlıca, Turkey, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 23: peasant activists (group interview), 31.08.2004, Tepeköy, Bergama, Turkey 
 
P/A 24: peasant activists (group interview), 31.08.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey. 
 
P/A 25: peasant activists, (group interview), 01.09.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey 
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E/E 14: expert/activist/CSO member, 03.09.2004, Dikili, İzmir. 
P/A 26: peasant activists (group interview), 04.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
 
P/A 27: peasant activists (group interview), 05.09.2004, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey 
 
E/E 15: attorney/ CSO member, 05.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey. 
E/E 16: attorney/ CSO member, 05.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey  
E/E 17: expert/CSO member, 06.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey. 
 E/E 18: expert /CSO member, 06.09.2004, İzmir, Turkey. 
P/A 28: peasant activists (group interview), 07.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
 
P/A 29: peasant activist, 07.09.2004, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
 
E/E 19:  journalist, 14.09.2004, Istanbul, Turkey. 
E/E 20:  journalist, 21.09.2004, Istanbul, Turkey. 
E/E 21: environmental activist, 23.09.2004, Istanbul, Turkey 
E/E 22: activist, 27.02.2005, Munich, Germany. 
E/E 23: expert, 27.02.2005, Munich, Turkey 
E/E 24: politician, 28.02.2005, Munich, Germany 
E/E 25: activist, 01.03.2005, Munich, Germany 
E/E 26: journalist, 01.03.2005, Munich, Germany. 
E/E 27: politician, 03.03.2005, Brussels, Belgium. 
E/E 28: NGO member/activist, 04.03.2005, Aachen, Germany. 
E/E 29: environmental activist, 02.06.2005 Malta (via the Internet) 
E/E 30: journalist, 14.07.2005, Istanbul, Turkey. 
E/E 31: politican, 03.08.2005.Çeşme, İzmir. 
E/E 32: expert/activist, 09.09.2005, London, UK 
E/E 33: activist, 13.11.2005, Salonika, Greece (e-mail interview) 
E/E 34: movement elite/expert, 23.11.2005, Ankara, Turkey 
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E/E 35: journalist, 16.05.2006, Istanbul, Turkey 
E/E 36: activist/ movement elite, 18.06.2006, New Zealand (via the Internet) 
E/E 37: journalist, 19.01.2007, İstanbul, Turkey. 
E/E 38:  journalist, 15.02.2007, İstanbul, Turkey 
E/E 39:  expert, 16.03.2008, İstanbul, Turkey 
E/E 40: activists/ expert26.02.2011, İstanbul, Turkey (e-mail interview) 
P/A 30: peasant activists (group interview), 22.08.2003, Çamköy, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 31: peasant activists, (group interview), 22.08.2003, Ovacık, Bergama, Turkey 
P/A 32: peasant activists (group interview), 05.09.2003, Ovacık Bergama, Turkey 
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Appendix B 
 
Maps 
 
Bergama: 
 
 
 
 
(https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=tr&q=bergama+google+map&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Ber
gama%2FIzmir&gl=tr&ll=39.108219,27.128334&spn=0.078589,0.215607&t=m&z=12&vpsr
c=6&ei=OhFPUMihEZOC8gPxioD4AQ&pw=2, 11.09.2012) 
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The Bergama villages 
 
 
 
(https://maps.google.com/maps?hl=tr&q=bergama+google+map&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=Ber
gama%2FIzmir&gl=tr&ll=39.108219,27.128334&spn=0.078589,0.215607&t=m&z=12&vpsr
c=6&ei=OhFPUMihEZOC8gPxioD4AQ&pw=2, 11.09.2012) 
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Appendix C 
 
Annual Agricultural Production in the Area Surrounding the Bergama-Ovacık Gold 
Mine by Dokuz Eylül University  (1995) 
 
Product Production 
Olive 391,560 /trees 
Pine nut 1,000/trees 
Fruit 203,700/trees 
Poplar  77,900/trees 
Grapes 4,000/grapevines 
Cotton 22,452/tons 
Wheat 16,600/tons 
Yonca 7,195/tons 
Corn 6,450/tons 
Sunflower 475/tons 
Tobaco 724/tons 
Tomatoes 6,430/tons 
Trifolium Pratense L. 15/tons 
Watermelon 15/tons 
Melon 10/tons 
Cattle meat 3715/tons 
Small cattle meat 6980/tons 
 
 
Source: (TMMOB report, 2001, 
http://www.reocities.com/siyanurlealtin/yazi/2002/tubitak/index.html, accessed on 
27.08.2012) 
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Appendix D: 
 
 
 
 
Chronology of events 
 
1988: Formation of Eurogold as a joint venture of transnational mining corporations 
 
1992: Operation licence for the Ovacık gold mine granted by the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources. 
 
1994: Operation licence granted by the Ministry of Environment. 
 
8 November 1994: Lawsuit filed by 652 Bergama peasants and Senih Özay for the annulment 
of the licence granted by the Ministry of Environment. 
 
18 October 1994: FIAN’s first urgent action letter. 
 
17 November 1994: The first resolution of the European Parliament on gold-mining in 
Bergama and Küçükdere. 
 
1994-1996: Initial mobilization efforts by Sefa Taşkın; first links with civil society 
organizations, scientists, lawyers, and environmental activists in İzmir; collection of scientific 
information about the hazards of gold mining with cyanide use. 
 
1996: Appeal to the higher court by the Bergama peasants in response to the refusal of their 
case at the local court. 
 
15 November 1996: First protest event of the Bergama peasants blocking the highway 
between İzmir-Çanakkale for 6 hours. 
 
1996-1997: Oktay Konyar’s participation in the movement network; escalation of civil 
disobedience acts and protests; further extension of the movement network with the 
participation of civil society organizations, scientists and environmentalists outside the İzmir 
region. 
 
January 1997: Unofficial referendum launched by the Bergama peasants. 
 
22 April 1997: The Bergama peasants’ occupation of the mine field. 
 
August 1997: The first protest on the Bosphorous Bridge in İstanbul.  
 
September 1997:  Visit of Sefa Taşkın, Oktay Konyar, and the Bergama peasants to an old 
mine site at Balya-Balıkesir in order to witness the detrimental impacts of mining 
 
1999: Normandy’s take over of the Ovacık gold mine. 
 
February 1998-February 1999:  First production of gold at the mine. 
 
1998: Appeal of Sefa Taşkın and 10 peasant/activists the Euroepan court of Human Rights 
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October 1999: TÜBİTAK’s report approving the operation of the Ovacık gold mine. 
 
5 April 2000: Turkish Prime Ministry’s decree that allows the operation of the gold mine  
 
November 2000: The Kuvay-Milliye march from Bergama to Çanakkale. 
 
8 December 2000: The reception of the Right livelihood Award by Birsel Lemke. 
 
April 2001: Start of the ‘trial production’ at the Ovacık gold mine. 
 
1 June 2001: The decision of the local court stating that the decree of the Prime Ministry was 
a violation of law. 
 
25 September 2001: The decision of the Supreme Court ordering damages to the peasants by 
the then-officials. 
 
February 2001: Cancellation of the trial production permission by the local court 
. 
25 March 2002: The second protest on the Bosphorous bridge in İstanbul.  
 
2 April 2002: Closure of the Ovacık gold mine. 
 
3 April 2002: Re-opening of the Ovacık gold mine based on a confidential legal decision of 
the Council of Ministers 
 
 
October-December 2003: Charges to the Bergama peasants and their spokespersons for 
forming an illegal organization, allying with German NGOs, and performing espionage 
activities against the interests of Turkey.  
 
4 March 2004: Exoneration of Oktay Konyar, Sefa Taşkın, Birsel Lemke and the Bergama 
peasants from charges of espionage. 
 
14 September 2004: The last protest of the Bergama peasants. 
 
10 November 2004: The decision of the ECHR in favour of the Bergama activists 
 
28 March 2006: The second decision of the ECHR about the Bergama Movement in favour of 
315 peasants who had brought their case to the court. 
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Appendix E 
Periodization of the Bergama movement 
 
 
Period Years Events 
1 st stage: Initial 
Mobilization 
1994-1996 
- Initial efforts of publicizing,  
  consciousness raising, and building a  
  movement network by SefaTaşkın; 
- First connections with scientists, lawyers,  
  and environmentalists in İzmir; 
- Scientific data collection; 
- First contacts with transnational actors  
  (INGOs, foreign politicians and  
  scientists); 
- First lawsuit against Eurogold; 
- Formation of the Elele Platform by  
  scientists, lawyers, and CSOs in İzmir 
- Consciousness raising in the  
  villages 
 
2nd stage: Sustenance of 
mobilization 
1996-2002 
- Participation of Oktay Konyar; 
- Start of the mass mobilization; 
- Civil disobedience protests; 
- Efforts to build links with political actors  
  at the national level mainly carried under  
  the leadership and of Taşkın 
- Scientific conferences and seminars 
- Lawsuits against the mining TNCs and  
  the Turkish state agencies/authorities; 
- Transnational campaigns in Germany and   
  Australia under the management of Birsel  
  Lemke; 
- Links with transnational mining advocacy  
  networks  
 
3
rd
 stage: Decline 2002-2004 
- Conflicts among the movement elite; 
- Espionage charges against the Bergama  
  activists; 
- Decreasing numbers of participants at the  
  protests;  
- Further lawsuits 
- Continuation of the mining activities at  
  the mine 
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Appendix F 
Leaders/Spokespersons of the Bergama Movement: 
 
Sefa Taşkın: Sefa Taşkın was born in Bergama in 1950. He graduated from the Middle 
Eastern Technical University in Ankara. During his university years, he participated in the 
left-wing student movement. In 1989, he was elected the mayor of Bergama from the ranks of 
the Social Democratic Populist Party. He was re-elected for the same position, this time as a 
member of the social democratic People’s Republican Party. During his term as the mayor of 
Bergama, he launched a transnational campaign in order to bring back the Zeus Altar from 
Germany to its original location in Bergama. Coming from a family whose origins went back 
to Crete, he also forged links with the mayors of several Greek Islands in order to consolidate 
cordial relations between the Greek and Turkish people. He received the national Abdi İpekçi 
Peace Award in 1996 for his efforts to maintain peaceful relations with Greece. His main 
contribution as an activist-mayor was to start the anti-gold mine movement. In addition to his 
initiator role, he became the official face of the Bergama movement who was also influential 
on its strategies, media relations, funding, relations with formal politics, and the management 
of the Bergama network. He was unable to win the elections in 1999. Taşkın also wrote 8 
books including a research about the configuration of gold mining and transnational mining 
companies and their operations around the world. He is fluent in English. 
 
Oktay Konyar: Oktay Konyar was born in 1943. He is a high-school graduate. After working 
as a vice-manager at a bank, he became a farmer. His political activism dates back to the pre-
1980 period when he actively engaged in socialist politics.  He served as the Bergama Deputy 
Chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party and the People’s Republican Party for 
many years. He joined the Bergama Movement in 1996 and took on a crucial leadership role. 
After the decline of Bergama movement, he continued activism in Manisa, nearby İzmir 
where he organized local peasants of Develi and Kabazlı against the construction of a waste 
facility in the region. He also made contributions to the anti-dam movements in Munzur and 
Hasankeyf. 
 
Senih Özay: Senih Özay was born in 1951. He studied law at the Ankara University. He has 
been working as a lawyer in İzmir. During the late 1980s, he opted for green politics, and he 
was one of the co-founders of the first Green Party in Turkey. In his career as a lawyer, he 
specialized in environmental and human rights law, and he gave legal support to many 
environmental struggles. He is also the founder of the environmental lawyers group.  
 
Birsel Lemke: Birsel Lemke was born in 1950. She studied political science at Ankara 
University and in the United States. During her studies at the Ankara University, she got 
acquainted with the prominent left-wing student activists. She lived and worked in Germany 
between the years 1975 and 1985. In 1986, she started running her own holiday resort in 
Ören-Balıkesir which was about 100 kilometres away from Bergama. Initially coming from 
left-wing politics, she joined the first Green Party in Turkey. Lemke participated in the 
Küçükdere-Havran mobilization against a gold mine project and contributed to the 
mobilization by maintaining links with foreign scientists and politicians as well as some 
national politicians. Lemke played a crucial role in taking the Bergama movement beyond its 
local borders into the world, and she built the movement’s transnational connections and 
shaped its strategies at the transnational level. Lemke received the prestigious Right 
Livelihood Award, a.k.a Alternative Nobel Prize, for her contributions to environmental 
struggles. She is fluent in English and German.   
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Appendix G 
The epigraph of 17 villages 
The land you stand on belongs to the peasants of Pınarköy, Kurfallı, Bozköy, Sarıdere, 
Eğrigöl, Ovacık, Çaltıbahçe, Narlıca, Çamköy, Tepeköy, Yalnızev, Küçükkaya, Süleymanlı 
and Aşağıkırıklar. This land is plentiful. In its plains, cotton like snow, wheat like gold, 
tobacco like amber stretch out. In its mountains, proud pine and oak trees stand and  its rivers 
are cooled by the shadows of  plane trees. The olive trees on the skirts of its mountains are 
perennial. You cannot get enough of its pomegranates and grapes; do not leave without a 
taste. 
Should you put your foot down forcefully, gushing water would spurt out. It heals the body 
and the mind. Hit the ground a little more forcefully and a variety of minerals scatter onto the 
earth. It is rich. Cleopatra owes something of her beauty to the mud of this land. The paper of 
Pergamon is a native. It has passed through the hands of kings, sealed agreements, carried 
words of love and was kept in silver chests. Alexandrians have read for centuries in their 
library and mused on their sculptures, sculptors and theaters. The residents of Bergama are 
honest, hard-working people. They do not covet other lands. They are hospitable. They do not 
discriminate against religion, language, race, gender and nation. They forget neither friends 
nor enemies. They are peaceful.  
They have only now heard what the greedy Europeans have done to American natives for 
gold. They bid farewell each night to their land, animals, trees and each other before going to 
bed but they cannot sleep. They despise greedy Europeans who prefer gold to life. They do 
not consider them guests but consider the rest of the Westerners as fellow men and women. 
They knew about gold but they just found out about cyanide. Once they learned about 
cyanide, they threw away the gold they wore with care. They know that their wheat, 
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sunflower and tobacco are yellow gold, that their cotton is white gold and that their olive is 
black gold.  
They do not want to leave and disappear or stay and die. They are furious nowadays. They are 
enraged nowadays. They are indignant in the face of the indifference of merchants of political 
hope. They are sensitive nowadays. They can tell apart friend from foe in an instant. If you 
come as a friend, meet them, listen to them and talk to them. If you are no friend, leave 
immediately. These people love life and nature, which is life to them. They know that the 
dead do not wear gold. This is how we saw these people, how we knew these people, how we 
understood these people and how we wrote about these people”.  
18 May 1997 
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Appendix H 
List of major political parties in government and opposition 
during the movement 
 
ANAP (liberal)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(9 November 1989-23 June 
1991) 
ANAP (liberal)  
(23 July 1991-20 November 
1991) 
DYP (centre right)-SHP (centre left) coalition 
 
(20 November 1991-25 June 
1993) 
DYP (center right)-SHP (centre left) 
(25 June 1993-15 October 
1995) 
DYP (centre right)-minority government 
 
(15 October 1995-5 November 
1995) 
 
DYP (center right)-CHP (centre left) 
 
(5 November1995-12 Mart 
1996) 
 
ANAP (centre right)- DYP (centre right) 
 
(12 March 1996-08 July 1996) 
 
RP (Islamic right) - DYP (centre right) 
 
(08 July 1996 - 30 June 1997) 
 
 
ANAP (centre right) – DSP (centre left)-DTP (centre right) 
 
(30 June 1997 -11 January 
1999) 
 
DSP (centre left) minority government 
 
(11 January 1999-28 May 
1999) 
 
DSP (centre left) - MHP (nationalist right) - ANAP (centre 
right) 
 
(28 May 1999-18 November 
2002) 
AKP (centre right) 
 
(18 November 2002-11 March 
2003) 
AKP (centre right)  
 
(14 March 2003 - 5 September 
2007) 
AKP (centre right) 
(5 September 2007 – 6 July 
2011) 
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